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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. The Problem of the Dissertation 
This dissertation wUl be devoted to the investigation of the 
relation botwcon crt and religion in the thought of t\vo outstanding 
contemporary philosophers, Paul Tillich and Jacq-ues Maritatn. The 
examination of this relationship is one of the many contemporary 
considerations of an Mea which has been frequently avoided in the 
past in part because of tho oxtrome tension between art and religion 
or because of the O<::easlonal absoi'J)tlon of the one by the other . 
2 . Methodol0<,1y 
Since the thinkers belnQ Investigated proeeed In such different 
manners, it ·.vill be necessary to t;Jvc an exposition of each position 
separately so that the inner dtalecttc may be revealed . · Thus Part I 
..... 111 be given to an exposition oi Tillich's view, and Par:: II vdll be an 
exposition of MarJtaJn's position . Part lll will be required ,os the 
attempt to bring together the two positions 1n an endeavor to show 
agreements and differences, and In the specification of the problematic 
areas in each position . Broadly speakin9, the parts dealinQ with 
I 
2 
Tillich and Maritain will proceed in an attempt to sho· •• ,. hov.· each view 
makes sense within its own framework . The final part wlll present 
comparisons and disclose difficulties . 
l. The Approach to Tllllch 
Tllllch ' s approach to both art and religion revolves around one 
primary concern: a concern for moaninQ . Th1s concern for meanlnq is 
joined with a concem for being; the !act that one Is must be correlated 
wlth the significance o! such exJstence, Religion becomes for T!lhch 
the deepest level In the quest for meaning and being; religion Is the 
"'dimension of depth . " Art is an expression of meaning. Now if 
symbols are most broadly defined as anything capable of carryinq 
meaning, then both religion and art as concerned with meaning are 
symbolic . 
A study of symbols thus becomes the context within •.vhich a 
limited but frw.tiul exploration may proceed , At the outset it will be 
necessary to analyze the baste characterizations of the symbol . 
Chapter II will pose the general outline of symbolic structure . Chapters 
111 and IV will develop, clarify, and probe certain issues a: stake in 
Chapter II as well as the spcclftc areas of rehgion and art . 
Since the phases of Tillich' s 'h'eltanschauung are so interrelated, 
it is impossible to avo1d a discussion of motters which could easily 
lead one astray: however, as noted above, by giving basic attention to 
3 
symbols matters are delimited somewhat . It is important to notice, 
however r that even though some delimitation is possible 1 the systematic 
character of T1ll!ch's thought makes the inclusion of some things 
essentl~ l; other things must be cut short . 
It might be helpful to mention the works of Tllllch which will be 
of primary interest in the development of this dissertation . First there 
Is Tlll!ch's magnum opus, Systematic Theology, l two volumes of wMch 
hovo already appeared with a third volume in the press . No consideration 
of Tlll!ch can afford to fail to utilize this as o key to all phases of his 
thought . In addition Tilllch has written Dynamics of Faith, 2 lli 
Courage To SO, 3 Biblical Religion and the Search for (}ltimoto Reality , 4 
Love, Power, and Justice, S and The Religious Situauor . . 6 The beginning-
1Paul Tllllch, Systematic Theology (2 vo!s . ; Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1951-) . 
2Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (Xew York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1957) . 
3Paul Tlll!ch, Too Courage To SO (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 19521. 
4Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reollty 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) . 
5Paul Tllllch, Love , Power, and [ustlce (New York: Oxford 
Univers ity Press, 1954) . 
6Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. H. R1chard Niebuhr 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1932) . 
st-udent is frequently advised to tum to TilUch's books of ser!":'!.ons, !h! 
Shakmg of the Foundations ,1 and The New Bcmq. 2 AntholoQles Include 
The Interpretation of History , 3 Theology of Culture,< and The Protestant 
~.s 
Although the anthologies just mentioned mclude some of the most 
important direct considerations of Tillich on the question at hand, there 
are some other articles included in periodicals and selected for other 
collections whlch uc so important that they must be mentioneC. here. 
These Include "Exlstentlallst Aspects of Modern Art,"6 "Theology, 
1Paul TilUch, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles 
Scribner• s Sons, 19 48) • 
2Paul Tillie!!, TM New Being {Now York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
19 55) . 
3 Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, Part I. trans. N . A. 
Rosetske, Parts Il, III, 'N, trans . Elsa L. Talmay (Now York: Charles 
Scribner' s Sons, 1936). 
4Paul Tlll!ch, Theology of Culture, ed . Robert C . Kimball (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1959) . 
5Paul T!lllch, The Protestant Era, trans . James Luther Adams 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) . 
6Paul Tilllch, "&xlstentlbl!St Aspects of Modem An," Christianity 
and the Ex!stemlaUsts , ed . Carl Michal son (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1956), Chap . Vll . 
5 
Architecture and Art, • 1 "The Religious Symbol, .2 "The Word of God," 3 
"'The Dance: What It Means to Me,•~ •rncolOQY and Symbolism,••S 
on arttclc in Van Dusen•s The Christian .~swer, 6 and an article written 
by Greene and Tilhch, "The Nature of Religious Art," 7 which ts 
particularly Incisive . The latest article Is "Art and Ulumate Reality, .,8 
which Tllllch regards as his definitive work on the relation between art 
and rell9ion. 
1Paul Ttllich, ''Theology, Architecture and Art," Church 
Monogement, XXXIII (October, 1956\ , 7 , 55-56. 
2Paul Tllllch, "Tho Rollglous Symbol ," Symbolism in Religion and 
Literature, eci. Rollo May (New York : George Braziller , 1960\, Chop. I! . 
3Pau.l Tillich 1 "Tho Word of God," Language: A.n I nquiry into Its 
Meaning and Function, ed . Ruth Nanda Anshen ( 11Science of Culture 
Sories," Vol. VI!!: New York: !larpgr Md Brothms Pull . Co., 1957\, 
Chop. VII. 
4Paul T!ll!ch, "The Dance: Whot It MeMs to Me," The Dance 
Magazine , XXXI ()'uno, 1957\, 20 . 
5Paul Tillich, "Theolo;:y ond Symbol!sm,•• Rcl1o1ous Symbolism, 
ed . r. Ernest Johnson ("'Religion and Civllization Series••; Ne·.o.J Yor:<: 
Harper and B<others , 19 55\ , Chop . VI . 
6Paul T!ll!ch, "The World Situation," Tho Christian Answer, ed , 
H. P. Van Dusen (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), Chap . I. 
7P.,ul TUlich and Theodore M . Greene, "The ~ature or Rehglous 
Art," Symbols and Society, Fourteenth Symposium of the Conference 
on Science, Philosophy and Reliolon .. ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1955\, pp . 282-284 . 
8Paul TUUch .. "Art and Ultimate Reality 1 " Cross Currents 1 X 
(Winter, 1960), 1-14. 
There are two ..,,.orks in German which have not been translated 
but which offer some helpful Insights Into Tilllch's early posihon . 
Those arc "Religlonsphilosophte, .. 1 an early attempt at giving the 
major outllnes of philosophy of rellolon, and "Kult und For::~,"2 which 
is a very concJse early statement of THUch's attempt to correlate art 
and rellglon . 
Though numerous works have been Indicated, this Is no attempt 
to be thorough . A thorough blblioonphy up through 1952 ls given In a 
6 
book by Kegley and Bretall, which ls one of the most thorough analyses 
of the various facets of Till!ch's posluon yot to appear. 3 Lelbrccht 
gives a full bibliography almost up to the present. 4 
ii . The .4pproach to M!rltatn 
lt will be necessary for the discussion of Maritam to proceed 
by a la!rly general omission of the phllosophlc background of his 
thought (as also in the case of T11Uch) . It would be easier to trace 
1Paul Tllllch, "Religionsphilosoph•e," Lehrbuch c!er Phllosophle, 
cd . Max Dessolr (Berlin: Ullsteln, 1925\. 
2Paul THHch, "Xult und Form," Kunst und Kirche,! (8 fahrgang, 
1931)' 3-6 . 
3charles W . Kegley and Robert w. Sretall (eds.), The Theology 
of Paul Tllllch (New York: The Macmlllar. Co . , 1952). 
4wal ter Lelbrecht (e<i .l, Religion and Culture (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1959) . 
7 
the indebtedness of Maritaln to historic positions than to trace Tillich's 
indebtedness , for Maritain makes numerous explicit historical 
references and regards himself as proceeding squarely wtthtn the line 
of one philosophic approach . His own introductory work to philosophic 
thought begins with the historical method, which he regards as 
"Indispensable . .. l In making this approach Marltain 15 following the 
mothod of Aristotle, whose solutions were not advanced a priori but 
always grew out of the historical framework and development . 2 And it 
is Aristotle who is the supreme philosopher: "Among piulosophers 
Aristotle holds a pes!t!on altogether apart: genius, gifts, and achieve-
ment--all are unique . .. 3 Ono must not ice funhor that Aristotle's method 
has been i ncorporated in a Christien context in the work of St . Thomas 
Aquinas, and i t would be more precise to call W.aritatn a ThomlSt (neo-
or paleo-l4 than simply an Aristotelian . If this is not merely because 
Aquinas is the trv.e interpreter of Aristotle and the true Aristotelian 
(according to M ar!te:in}, i t is at least because of the historical accident 
1Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy r trans . E. I . 
Watkin (New York: Shead and Ward, 19591 , p . x lv . 
3lbid . , p . 67 . 
4Matitain , Existence and the Existent, trans . Lewis Galantfere 
and Gerald B. Phelan (New York : Pantheon Books, Inc . , 1948), p , 
8 
that Aristotle has received various interpretations as in the case of the 
Arab! an thinkers , Avicenna and AverroCs . 1 
However, in aesthetics Maritain is doing something new 1n the 
history of Thomism. Fechner observes "that no earller Thomist 
(Including St . Thomas h.tmseiO hod ever vo'Titten a complete and saparato 
treatise on aosthotlcs . • 2 This Is sl<;nlflcant for Thomlsm, because as 
Scott says , Marltaln has "unquestionably the finest aesthetic sensibility 
amon<; the major figures of modern philosophy . • 3 
It 1s possible to deal wJth Marita1n with moro brevity than with 
Tllllch because for Tilllch 1\ Is necessary to develop the concept o! 
the symbol and then specify its religious and art1stfc facets in 
separate chapters . The work on Maritain will not need to develop 
certain concepts precedjng the direct analysis . Moreover, Marltain 
very carefully del!mits the subfect and proceeds with an .b.nstotelian 
rigor 1 which Tillich does not choose as hls mocie of discourse . 
The d iscussion of Maritain will be .able !O Ceve!op the aesthetic 
phases of his thought more than is possible with Tilllch . Marltaln has 
1cf. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian PhHosophy in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), pp . 187- 225 . 
2Chl!lrles A. Fechner, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain 
{Vv'estminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1953), p . 287 . 
3!\athan A. Scott, "Marltaln in His Role as Aesthctlcl~n, • 
The Review of Metaphysics , VJII (March, 1955), 491. 
9 
written more extensively in this area and has placed hts thinking within 
the limits of three or four major books. And one of these is an out-
standing opus which provides the oulline for his aesthetic position as 
well as 1\s locus within the maln body of his thought; moreover, since 
Maritain regards every phase of human existonco and culture as rolov~mt 
to religion, this book provides the basic insights Into the relation 
between reJ1910n and art. The discussion wUl proceed in the direction 
of the development of an aesthetic position with special attention to 
the reliQious implications of its various !acets . Thus the books 
mentioned in this introduction will Include only those on the philosophy 
of art . Another reason is quito relevant: so numerous are :\.~aritain's 
writings in connectJon wlth reli9ion that even the bibliography must 
be selective rather than exhaustive . 
His first outstanding contribution to the philosophy of an 1s 
Art and Scholastici.sm.1 Art and Poetrv2 is one of his earliest attempts 
to make a basic distinction which is crucial to his entire philosophy 
of art: the distmction between art and poetry. There are also two 
volumes which Marttaln has produced in collaboration with other persons: 
1Jacques Maritam, Art and Schol.astlcism, :rans . J . F. Scanlan 
(London: Sheed and Ward, Ltd., 1930\. So important •s this book that 
Scribner' s is cu.trently working on it for re - publication. 
2Jacques Maritain, Art and Poetry, trans . E. de P . Matthews 
(Now York: Tho Philosoplucal Library, 19~3). 
The Situation of Poetry ,1 in collaboration with his wife Raissa, and 
Art and Faith , 2 in collaboration with Jean Cocteau . His latest book 
is The Responsibility of the Artist, 3 in which he analyzes the relation-
ship between art and morality . 
Maritaln's magnum opus in aesthetics, Creative Intuition tn An 
and Poetry, 4 is so significant that Scott describes It as • a ma9nifi-
cent volume that deserves to stand alongside the really 9<eat essays 
in theory of art of this century, alongside such books as Croce's 
Estettca, Roger Fry's Vision and Design, Worrtnger•s A.bstraktton und 
E1nfilhlung, Malraux's Les Voix du Silence 1 and Susanne t .anger•s 
Feeling and Form. "S And Kelley says: "J.Jl that he suggested in his 
Art and Scholastic1sm and his Art and Poetrv, he no.,., summanzes and 
el aborates in this comprGhenstve study." 6 
1Jacques and Raissa Maritain, The Situation of Poetrv, trans . 
Marshall Suther (New York: The Philosophical L!brory, 1955\ . 
2Jacques Marttain anci Jean Cocteaut Art and raJth I trens . 
John Coleman (New York: The Philosophical Library, 19481 . 
3Jacques Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist (1\ew York: 
Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1960\ . 
4Jacques Maritam, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (•The 
A. W. Mellon Lectures: Bollin9en Series," Vol. I, No . 25; New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1953\ . 
10 
5scott, "Maritain in His Role as Aesthetician,• op . cit., p . 482 . 
6oom Placid Kelley, Rov . of Maritain, Creativo Intuition in Art 
and Poetry (1953), The Downside Review, LXX!ll (April, 1955\, 200 . 
The procedure on both Marltoln and Tllllch Is not to regard them 
with respect to development, but rather to attempt to see the ·.vhole 
system as it has developed. Because of this there ·.vtll be f-requent 
coming together of earliest and latest writings . The only departure 
from this would be In the case of a doflnltoly contradictory and 
problematic situation . 
11 
For Morltaln religion means something technical and d!f~erent 
from what was lntendod In the selection of the topic of the dissertation. 
Rather than dtscusstn9 what Marhatn moans by religion, the work on 
Martta1n will center upon contemplation; however, other facets of 
what may be broadly termed religious will be examined. One reason 
for specifyin9 contemplation as the baste cons!derauon of Marita!n ts 
that contemplation is r:he goal of the earthly religious life; it is the 
highest possible attainment for man in via (on the way) . Another 
reason lies in the fact that contemplation has so many more afftn!Ues 
with poetic mtuition than any other phase of religious life. 
Chapter V will deal with art and contemplation from the per-
spectives of cognition and creation . The emphasis will be on these 
areas as they are in themselves, their innor workings and technical 
elaboration . Chapter V1 will explore art and contemplation as they 
disclose themselves to other approaches and cultural achievements tn 
the world. The relation bet'Neen art and religion wUl be seen as they 
develop distinct worlds of their own . 
12 
111. Comparuol"l, Su:-r.mary, and Evaluation 
Tne thud part of the Investigation will l!ttompt to pull together 
tho two strands of the discussion by Indicating the areas In which 
Marltaln and Tllllch agroo or disagree on Issues . The comparison of 
these two ~en w1U form a laroe measure of th('l evoluatiOn 1 for their 
atatW'e maj{es the1t vfewa of each othc:- quito siqn1ftcant. The fl:tal 
phase of the dtscuuton will Involve a crl,lq\le of the baste problem or 
problems o! these mon . 
PART I 
TILLICH: RELIGIOUS AND .AAT!STIC SYMBOLISM 
CHAPTER 11 
SYMBOLISM 
Discussions concerning language and other types of meaning 
structures have occupied the interest of contemporary philosophy to a 
do9ree which has colored the whole tenor of modem modes of thought. 
Even a bare acquaintance w1th modern philosophy includes some 
!am1Uartty with Wittgenstein, Urban, and Cas suer, to mcnUon only 
a very few of the more prominent thinkers . Movements (whether 
explicit or 1mpl1cnl devoted to UnQuisttc analysis and to loqical 
considerations have dominated recent trends of thouQht. 
To Tillich this emphasis on logic and language ts a cultural 
phenomenon wh1ch, hke all other cultural phenomena, is mdicative of 
a deep and p-ositive meaning: it is the search for some instrument 
which will introduce light into the present general darkness or bring 
order into modern human confusion. This search is indicative of the 
realization that various universes of experience demand various 
universes of diScourse . Th0 basic criticism of ::he quest as 11. is 
generally undertaken ts that it is too exclusive: its molds ere so 
restricted and restrictive that they squeeze out most phases of ltfe .1 
1T1111ch, Theology of Culture, pp. 53- :: . 
14 
This chapt.cr will be concerned with an investigation of the 
general notion of symbolism with specific emphasis on the types of 
symbols upon which this dissertation 1s primarily concentrated. lt 
15 
will attempt to specify In broad outl!ne the way 1n which tho symbol 
serves as a focol point In Tllllch 's whole system; It will Indicate the 
manner in which tho symbol may be analyzed so that reHoion and art 
emerge as distinct factors in human exper.!ence: and it ·.vUl broadly 
point out the possible criteria of various types of symbols . Succeeding 
chapters will pick up strands of the discussion and work out the 
details . 
At the outset it is necessary to determine what is meant by a 
symbol in its broadest qualities . In various places Tillich mentions 
the general characteristics of symbols, but each discussion adds some-
thing e ither in the way of further points or some greater detail on a 
point included; therefore it wiLl be necessary to ?Uil togother three or 
four different discussions . By using this eclectic procedure one seems 
to discover five major characteristics of the symbol . 
l . Figurativeness 
Langer SU99ests In the Preface to the Second EdJtlon of her Philoso-
phy in a New Key that an acceptable term in English broad enou9h to 
16 
cover both signs und symbols v;ould have been helpful.l It is to be 
noticed that Tillich is no more successful than Longer in finding a word 
for both si9ns 4:nd symbols. HOW"ever, there are common gual1t1es of 
both signs ond symbols . The terms "'figurat1ve"2 or "representative••3 
should be regarded as the basic characterization of both the sl9n and 
the symbol . Signs and symbols are essentially figurative or 
representative . 
The use of the terms ftqurat1ve and representative immedtotely 
presents some semantic problems, for both are used in other contexts 
than this . T1111eh is not here concerned with the opposltion between 
the figurative and the literal, not is he concerned with represcntatio:'t 
as in an isomorphic or 1magisttc correspondence as opposed to some 
nonobJective presentation~ all that Tillich means at this point ts that 
symbols {as well as stgnsl are important for what they symbohze: 
"Both signs and symbols point beyond themselves to something else. n4 
VVheelwrtght gives a bnef sta tement of :he nature and function 
of the symbol as well as other terms which may be employed in desig-
natinq that to which a symbol refers and the referential act. He 
1Susanne K. LanQerr PhilosophY in a ?\ew Key (2d ed . ; 
Cambridge : Harvard \!nlversity, 1960), p , x. 
2Paul Tllllch, "The Religious Symbol," op . cit., p , ?S. 
3Tilllch, Theology of Culture, p . 56. 4lbld . , p . S4. 
suggests that I whatever the varied character of the numerous types of 
symbols I 
what they all have In common ls the property of being 
more i n intention than they are in eXistence . A symbol 
points beyond Itself, means more than It Is. In the 
words of an older vocabulary, It Is Ideally self-
transcendent . 
What the symbol means , when definite enough 
to be pointed to or otherwise clearly ldontlf!od, Is 
called the referend; when the main thrust of its 
meanlnQ Is a conception entertained by the mind about 
some roferend or c lass of refcrends it is called the 
reference . The word "meaninQ"' can denote either tho 
referend of the reference or the process of referrJnq; 
on most somanuc occasions 1 however I the three <tspects 
are by no means distinct .1 
\Vheelwrtght ' s use of the ccrm re!erend is not re9arded to be as good as 
(or as popular as) the term "referent" by Ledger \"'ood.2 and referent 
will be regularly emplcyod In th!s discussion, :or 'l'llll¢1\ doos no! 
a ppear to use any term regularly in this connection . 
The essence of the discussion of the first quality of the symbol 
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is that tho symbol l s referential: figurative a:nd representative mean the 
same as referential in most philosophic discussion . However, it 
should also be suggested "t this point that Tillich frequently uses terms 
1Philip V/heclwr iQht. The Burning Fountain: A Study in the 
Language of Symbolism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954) I 
p . 19 . 
2
tedger Wood I "Referend, '' "Referent," and •tReferential," 
The Dictionary of Phllosophy, ed. Daoobert D. Runes (Now York: 
Phllosophlc~l Library , n . d .l, p . 267 . 
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with a variety of meaninQs, and figurative is one of these terms . 
Thus one needs to leave open the meaning of figurative while keeping 
the (act clear that this term, as used as the basic quality of signs 
and symbols, means essentially referential . 
The referential character of symbols Is to be seen In that they 
occupy a pl{t.ee in a structure or order tn which oach object hes a ref-
erence beyond Itself to another object within the order so that It Is 
further possible for an object to be the point from which reference !s 
made as well as that to which reference Is made . The partlclpator!al 
characcer of symbols will be indicated later, but here the tnter:-elations 
of symbols con be generally specified. Symbols form a system of mean-
ings, with the system itself constituting a unifica11on of mean1ng . 
The single meaning which is experienced and accom-
plished .always bears a relationship to others; other-
wise it would be a meaningless aphonsm . ~eaning 
is a lways a system of meanings . The sys1em of alJ 
poss ible systems of meaning we call objectively 
world , subjectively culture . 1 
Vlithin this system "that which is symbolized can itself in tum be a 
symbol for something of a higher rank . ·•2 An example of this would be 
a 1A'Titten character (a letter), which is related to (or included m) a 
word, which is further related to a meaning, ·.-;hich 1s still further 
1Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p . 222 . 
2Tilllch, "Tho Religious Symbol, •' op . cit., p . 75. 
related to some aspect of reality . A word, a meaning. and even the 
reality may be a symbol at one level and a referent at another. 
THlich would agree with May when he points out that "to have a 
self and a world are correlates of the some copoclty"l lor symbolic 
behovior or for reloting by symbols . This is tho copocity "'to transcend 
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the immediate concrete situation, to abstract, to think and 11ve tn terms 
oi 'the possible . , ,2 Tilllch has this concept In mind as he defines 
personahty ••as that individual beinq which 1s able to reach univer-
sality . ,,3 Thus the referentia1 character of symbols involves some far-
reaching implications about man and his place in the ·,yor!d. 
2 . Perceptibility 
The second general characrerlsr!c !s mentlor.ed expl!cll!y 1n only 
one of the major descriptions of symbols . 4 However, this appears to 
be so central to Tilllch's thought in all areas that it can hardly be 
excluded . Perceptibility "' implies that so:nethfng which iS inttinsically 
invisible , ideal , or transcendent is made perceptible in the symbol and 
is in this way gjven objectivity , " 5 The main need for this characteristic 
is to give that which is symboHzed or referred to a concrete embodiment 
1Rollo May, "Tho Significance of Symbols," Symbolism in Religion 
and LHerature, ed , Rollo May (New York: George Braziller, 19601, p , 20 . 
3nutch, 1hc Protestant Era 1 p. 116. 
Srbtd . , p . 75. 
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and thus to stoblll:ro It by puttlnq It Into o specific form . As Kahler 
SU9Qests, a symbol is "a froren act. ·•1 Signs are also usually 
sufficiently crystallized so that there ts some basis upon which prOQress 
may be mode . If a ll Is In a~ of flux, only confusion w tll prevail . 
This ChDracterist1c I then t primarily performs the !uncuon or 
dellmltlnQ what shall stor.d for what, ond speclfyln9 It so that there 
can be o general understandinQ . However, U must be noticed that 
TUUch does not reQard the perceptlbUity as always sensory; it may 
"be something 1magtnat1vely cor.ce1ved·•2 or even "abstract concepts .. 
whose "use involves a perceptible element. ,.3 Something is tmmed.!-
ately given or present which is fu;urauve of (or refers to) someth1ng 
which goes beyond immediacy or something which ls absent. 
T1111ch brings out his emphasis upon the relation between thought 
and concrete reality in sugQestinq: ''1 think that every thought, even 
the most abstract , must have a basis in our real existence, which, in 
our penod, not only in Europe but also in this country, is our his-
torical existence . .. 4 An important term (be ing) can be clarified at the 
1Er1ch Kahler I urhe Nature of the Symbol I II Symbollsm in Religion 
and Literature, ed . Rollo May (New York: George Btazlller, 1960), p . 54 . 
2Tillich, .. The Religious Symbol 1 " op . cit . , p . 76 . 
4Tllllch , The Interpretation of Hlstor~, pp, vll-vih, 
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very outset if it is seen in relation to this emphasis uPOn the specific 
and concrete factors entering into human existence . Tillich insists that 
"every thought I if 1t is not empty. must grasp being, somethin9 which 
is stven to thought a~ the material which it conceptualizes . .. 1 Here 
being is seen as any material of roal historical oxistence; i .e . thought 
is rooted ln historical existence or grasps be1nQ: these aro to.vo ways 
of saying basically the same thing . 
In connection with this, TUllch would distinguish bo~,.-oen subjec-
ttvlly and Intimate connection with lifo . 2 
Insofar as interest means subjectivity, itS exclusion is 
a prerequisite of truth . Insofar as it me ens connection 
with life, its intensity !s decisive in the value of know-
ledge . It follows that the attitude o: knowledge must 
not be strangeness but in(imacy, not distance from but 
nsarness ro life . 3 
\Vhee lwright could very easily have addressed his remarks to 
Tillich' s intention when he suggests that 
Goethe holds that the world is intrinsically .. symbolic" : 
by which he means that every quality, character, happening, 
is at once concrete event (Phdnomenonl and archetype 
{Urphdnomen) . The Goethean archetype, however, is not 
like the Platonic eidos something separate in existence or 
even in thought from the particular; it exists only in and 
1Tilllch, "Theology and Symbollsm," op . cit . , p . 107. 
2r illich inserts a footnote earlier which insists that some '"distort 
the idea of decision in knovded9e by confusing decision and subjective 
arbitrariness ." The Interpretation of History, p . 147. n . J. 
3TUllch, The !nterprototlon of Hlsto~y, p . 148 . 
through the particular, and hence can be knov.•n only by 
opening our eyes and ears and hearts to the sensuous 
living world . . . . The green and golden archetype. as 
distinguished from the gray abstract idea, is at once 
9enuinely universal and undivorclbly concrete . 1 
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There .,_re certain conceptual formations ·,•,.hich are sufficiently unrelated 
to concrete existence as not to have 'the characteristic or perceptibility; 
just what the status or such concepts would be Is not clearly indicated 
by TUlich except that it would appear that these would "exist" In the 
same realm as Marx•s "ideologies." 
Ka.rl Marx called every theory which ts not based on the 
will to transform reality an "'ideology," that is, an attempt 
to preserve existing evils by a theorot!cal cor.structfon 
which justifjes them. Some of the impact of Instrumentalist 
thlnktng on our contemporaries stems from its emphasis on 
the unity of action and knowledge . 2 
Several things are actually Involved in the characterlsttc of 
perceptibility . The first ls the basic notion that anything which ls really 
meaningful must be regarded as havjnq some perceptual involvement . 
Here the arguments of Kant against the isolated Platonic forms could 
easily be from Tilllch's pen , 3 
1wnccl.,.,orlght, op . cit. , pp. 88- 89 . 
2ri11ich. Systematic Theology. l, 76- 77 . 
3ct . Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smlth (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd . , 1953), pp . 310- 314, A313- 320= 
8370-377. 
The second thing, which has already been !nd1cated, !s T!lllch's 
espousol of the Marxian "demand for the unity of theory t~nd practlce" 1 
2 
or "ex.Jstential thlnking." TiUich's sermon on '"Doing the Truth" 
includes this basic thrust: 
People sometimes say, "This !s right In theory but 
it doesn ' t work in practice . .. They ought to say, "This 
ts \•;rong in theory and consequently lt ts wrong in 
practice . " There is no true theory which could t::c 
wrong Jn practice . 3 
Tilllch goes on to point out the third major phase o! this charac-
teristic by sugg:estin9 that "this contrast between theory and practice 
Z3 
!s contrived by peoplo who want to escape hard and thorough thinklng.u 4 
A further description of an td.eolooy is that it is '"a system of concepts, 
s whose function it is to cover up the contrast of reality. •• TUUch, 
along with Marx (as T!ll!ch understands hlm), is not concerned with 
metaphysical materialism, but he does regard one of the baste concepts 
of dialectical or economic materialism .as essentially correct. 
Economic MateriaUsm shows . .• the fundamental 
s1gnlf1cance of economic structures end motives for 
the social and intellectual forms and changes or a 
period . It dentes that there Is a history of thought 
and religion which is independent of economic struc-
ture; and, thereby, confirms the theological ins19ht, 
irul!ch, The Protestant ETa, p . 258. 
3T!lllch, The Shaking of the Foundations, p , llS . 4Ibid . 
STUI!ch , The Interpretation of Hlstorv, p , 63 . 
ne9lecteC by tdeaHsm that man Uves on earth anC not 
in heaven; philosophleelly Qxpressed 1 in existence 
and not in essence .1 
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Thus, the emphasis on percepUblllty involves at least three 
things: the ideal cannot exist or subsist in isolation from ;:he concrete, 
the theoretical and the practical are interdependent, and actual existence 
has elements of disi"Upt!on and fragmentation. There is no point to the 
construction of a theoretical struc1urc which does not take into account 
ell of the hard facts of reality and which docs not consider actual 
practtce. Symbols are not distinct from such a world; they are inextri-
cably enmeshed within lt and as such afford some clues to an under-
standlnQ of it. 
To sug9est, then, that a symbol must be perceptible is to point 
toward the next characteristic of the symbol: the symbol is rooted in 
reality and because of this ho!'S an innate power. 
3 . Innate Power 
The most important eharacteristtc of symbols, according to T1ll1ch, 
is their innate pov..'er, 2 and thls 1$ contingent upon the fact that they 
participate In reality . 3 It is at this point that the dtsttnctlon must be 
I Ibid . , pp . 64- 65 . 
Zril!ich, "The Religious Symbol," op . cit ., p . 76 . 
3cf. Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp . 54-SS; Dynamics of Feith, 
p . 42 . 
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made betv<een the sign and the symbol.1 The fundamental dif~erence 
between symbols and siqns "is that signs do not participate 1:'\ tany way 
in the reality anci power of that to which they point. Symbols, a lthou9h 
they arc not the same as that which they symbohze 1 participate in its 
rr:eanlnc;; and power . .. 2 
An example of the sign is to be seen in "the red light at the street 
comer" which 
points beyond its own redness to the summons to the 
driver to stop his car . But there is no intri:1.s ic 
relationship between this sign and the stopping of the 
cor . It Is a way of tndtcattng something to the individual 
driver . 3 
In contrast to stQns, 
symbols arc nearer to the reality expressed in them. 
ThG!r dlrGet, !!l\1Md!ate, Mrl-symbolic nature must have 
an original affinity to the symbolic content they represent . 
If water is used in reliQious rites, not the power of water 
as such has the religious efCoct; but the ritual context 
m which a stands. But Jt stands in thls context, because 
lt has natural qualities through which 1t ts adequate to 
its ritual use (pur!ficatton, regenoratton, doath, and 
4 birth, etc .\ . 
Up to this point signs and symbols havo been reQ4J'ded as having 
the same qualities !n that both are ftguratJve, and both have some 
ltbld . 2T11Jich, Theology of Culture, p . 54. 
3ntUch, ":'heologyandSymbolism,• op . cit., p . 108 . 
4Paul TilUch, • symbol and Knowledge," The Journal of Uboral 
Religion, II (Spring, 1941), 204 . 
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perceptible involvement; however, a very careful distinction between 
s!9ns and symbols Is drawn by Till!ch and must be analyoed here, though 
to do so w Ul engage the discussion In l)n examinouon of the structure of 
reality and the place of the self In It in T!ll!ch's system. 
!. Symbols and Language 
Tlll!ch attempts to clar!!y the distinction botween signs and symbols 
by showinQ that in an exomtnatton of language words "are signs for a 
meaning which they e>:press ... 1 It appears that the word sign ls quite 
appropriate in this context, for practically all \'.'Ords are signs rather than 
symbols . Meanings or concepts are not necessarily ucd to words, or 
translations from different lanyuages would be 1mposs1ble. HO'.•:ever, 
there are words which have come to participate in the concepts or things 
toward which they point in the sense that they cannot be produced, used, 
and changed arbitrarily without altering the whole s1:uet1on and its 
moan1ng. 2 It appears that Wheelwright has something l!ke this !n mind 
when he suggests that in expressive language or depth language (which 
he poses as both emotive~ referential in contrast to steno- lanquagc 
which is referential but not emotivcl3 the symbols "'have a largely 
ITillich, Theol09y of Culture , ;> . 55 . 
2ruuch, "The Rel19lous Symbol," op . cit . , p . 76; Dynamics of 
Faith, p . 43 . 
3wheelwright, op. clt., pp. 3, et passim. 
self- Jntent!ve reference as \'leiJ"l as an objective reference. Stated 
differently 1 "expressive meanings ... are not stipulatlve; they are 
Qiven not by definition but mainly by contextualJ2atlon ... 2 \Vords 
-....-htch exemplify this are love I beauty 1 mother, horne . Such words 
could be changed only with extreme difficulty due to their cmot!oM! 
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1nvolvoment . HO'Never I THUch is not merely concerned with what might 
be called subjective connotation or even conventional connotation with 
reqard to symbols . 3 Though these may be extremely important, the more 
signtflear.t question lies in the direction of the relevance of such 
symbolic references within the broad system of reality. 
Now THUch not only SUQQests that language is ~t present primarily 
a matter of stqns: he elso suQgests that languag-e originatcci as symbols 
but that it was reduced to siQns by the •• transition from the mystical to 
the technical view of the world ." 4 And not only Is 11 poss!l::!e for a 
symbol to become a s !gn, signs may also become symbols, 5 which be-
come "s!gn-symbol$"6 or "mere •potnung• symbols . .,7 
1
:bid . ' p . 60 . 2 Ibid ., p . 61. 
3cf . Irving M . Copi, Introducuon to I.ogJc (2d ed .; Xew York: 
The Macmillan Co . , 196ll, pp . 108-110. 
~illlch, "The Religious Symbol,• op. cit ., p. 76 . 
STUllch, "Theology and Symbolism," op . cit., p , US. 
7Iillich, "The Relig1ous Symbol,• op . cit., pp . 93-94 . 
0Ib!d . 
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It would appear that the distinction bet., .. een si9ns and symbols 1s 
only a matter of deC}fee , thouQh, of course, the degree would be 
sufficient to make considerable d1Herencc . Tho key term here is 
porUctpatton, which determines whether that which is before one Ss a 
sign, a symbol, or a sl9n-symbol. The nature of participation must be 
explored, and this will be done In the next section . 
J. Heywood Thomas suQgests that Tllllch holds to a pre-
Wlttgenstelnlon concept of language In his faHure to recognize that 
meaning 13 to be determined by use ra:her than by its correspondence to 
realHy ,1 There are terms which TilUch uses which would indicate h~s 
approach to be w1thin the major classical tradition from Plato to Russell . 
These would include his examinatlon of the f!gutat!ve and representative 
functions of language as considered earlier . It Js to be regretted that 
Tillich did not give more attention to this specEic problem, but this can 
only be expected in light of the expanse of his thought and his inlerest 
in tho illumination of the general questions which are foundational to 
any ot:ter questions which might be asked . 
The discussion hete may be short to tho point of over-simplification, 
but Tillich's tecoqnition of the shifts in language (his v:illlngness to 
shift terms) would indicate at least that he does net hold to a sirnole 
one-to-one correspondence between specific words and reality . This 
IJ . Heywood Thomas. "Some Notos on the Theology of Paul 
Tllllch," The Hibbert Journal, LVII (April, 1959), 253-254. 
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would allow a view of lang-uage which is conventional as oppOsed to 
natural: however, it would scaroely sound like ''h'ittgenstein . On the 
other hand, TilUch does not seem to be so rigid as Thomas insists. 
Nevertheless, 1t Js quite true that T1lllch holds that lan9ua9e reflects 
the exlstln9 structure of thln9s , for lan9ua~e Is one facet of reality and 
Is rooted In aU reality: there Is no such thin~ as \!!!.which Is 
deracinated from reality 1 just as there is no cp.tstemolOQy whtch .is 
separate from all metaphysics .I 
There ts always at least one problem about ..... Mch logical 
positivism, l!ke all semantic philosophies, must make a 
decision . \Vhat ts the relat!on of signs , symbols, or 
logical operations to reahty? Every answer to thJs 
question says something about the structure of beinQ . 
It Is ontological. 2 
And thus the lnqu!ry Into linguistic structure loads cne deeper into 
ontological considerations . 
l! . Symbols and Real!ty 
The basis upon which symbols are sa!d to Oe charged with mearung 
and power lies in their occupation of a place tn the system of rec11ty. 
Tllllch explicitly suljgests that the main function of the symbol Is "the 
opening up of levels of reality v.·hich otherwise are hidden and cannot 
1Tilllch, Systematic Theology , I, 19. 
2 Ibid . , p . ZO . 
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be grasped in any other way . ••1 Symbols are needed because the mind 
or being of man cannot directly have that toward which symbols pomt . 
Some things cannot ba compre hondcd lttorally and directly; '.11/hen this 
is the case, the proper symbol can function as the solution of an 
enigma or as the means by which one can approach that which is 
inoccesstblc by diroet means . This is a large Part of tho truth which 
emerges from oxistent!alism, thou9h Tillich does not feel that exis-
tentia lism produces, in this respect, the solution so much as St poses 
the problem (but without the problem, no solution) . The existent!allst 
" cannot have puplls in the ordinary sense . He cannot commu:-nca:e 
any ideas . because they are not the truth he wants to teach ... 2 The 
existentialist must attempt by "special forms of expresston"3 in the 
interest of .,indirect communication" 4 to 9et personal truth f-rom himself 
to his student. However, the existentialist founders upon an inability 
to ptn down adequately the personal mode of )ndircct communication; 
he ·wresd es "w1th the problem of persona) or •non-objective• th.inking 
and its expression--this is the calamity of the Existential thinker . .. s 
Consequently , it is necessary for Tillich to specify the manner m which 
1Ttllic h, Theology of Culture, p. 5 S. 
2 3 Ibid . , p. 90 . Ibid . , p . 91 . 
4lbia . , pp. 90- 91. slbid . , p . 91. 
the symbol participates in reality and the woy in which reality is 
revealed through the symbol in order to be free of the problems of 
extstenUalism at this POint . 
Tho theory of participation Is a difficult one as Is made obvious 
by tho classical discussion In Plato' s Parmenldos .1 Novortholess, 
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Tllllch has this notion ln mlnd and suggests that the symbol partlcl~ntes 
in reallty . 2 In fact , Tllllch Insists that there Is universal participation 
In that everything occupies some point between the poles of Individu-
ality and participation. 3 By this he means that everything has a 
tendency toward tnd!viduality, particularity J or uniqueness, and it a lso 
has something in common with other unique things . From Anaxagoras • 
' sugQestion that ••in all things there is a POrtion of everything" .. to 
Whitehead 's insistence that "if we allow for degrees of relevance, anC 
for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity is present 
in every other actual entity , .. s some attitude toward the unifyin9 forces 
1There are numerous editions of Plato's Parmenides . 
2cr. Tllllch, Theology of Culture, pp . 54- 55; Dynamics of Faith, 
p . 42 . 
3systemet1c Theology I L 174- 178 . 
4Milton C . Nahm (ed.l, Selections from Early Greek Philosophy 
(3d ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 194n, p. ISO . 
SAlfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The 
Macmillan Co. , 19 29) , P. 79 . 
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of the cosmos has been necessary for the metaphyslct~n: Individual 
objects form some kind of whole. 
Tllllch soys: "This is just what participation means: being a 
part of somethin9 from wh1ch one is, at the same ti:ne, separated . .. 1 In 
essence "partic ipation is a partlalldentlty and a partial "onidentlty . .. 2 
Literally, part1cipat1on moans "taking part . •• This con 00 
used in a threefold sense . It can be used in the sense 
of .. sharing ," as, for instance, sharing a room; or in the 
sense of "having in common, '1 as Plato spo:a.ks of the 
methe>:is ("havinQ with"), the particlpalion of the Indi-
vidual in the universal; or St can be used in the sense of 
"being a pcsrt," for instance of a political movement. 3 
TUI!ch proceeds to give the analogy of a phys!cal body, although he 
does not seem to require that this analogy ho!d in all or even In most 
respects. It is the fundamental point which is made by th1s analogy 
which 1s of concern . Tilllch insists that the part must not be lost !n 
the whole, nor must the part be cut off from the whole (courage to he as 
a part , and courage to be as oneself4). 
At the ontological l evel there is what m1ght be called a sharing in 
the power of being; i.e . the self is not simply an independently existing 
entity, rather the soli is grounded in a universe which has prod'Jced a:1d 
which sustains him . Tho power of being, in which there is participation 
1T1111ch, The Courage To Be, p . 88 . 
4rbid ., pp . 86-90; cf. Tllllch , Systematic Theology, 1. 174-178 . 
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on the part of everything which exists 1 is the positive affirmation of 
existence in general. 
It is imperative thot or.e be conscious of the fact that 'Iillich does 
not reject the individual in his emph~sis on part1c1patJon, and he insists 
that partlelpatlon Involves lndlvtdualizatlon and without such would be 
lmpossiblo . "Without individuollzotlon noth.tng would ex.lst to be 
roloted . Without porttctpatlon the category of relation would have no 
basis in reality . .. 1 Till!ch does not subject tho self to a total negation 
as in Buddhism: 
Separation is not estran;ement, seli-centeredness is not 
selfishness, self-determination is not sinfulness . They 
are structural descriptions and the condition of both love 
and hate 1 condemnation and salvation . !t 1s time to end 
the bad theol09ical usage of jumping v:ith moral 
1nd19Mtlon on every word ln which the syllable "self" 
appears . Even moral jndign~Uon would not e-xist with-
out a centered self and ontological self-affirmatlon. 
The subject of self- affirmatlon is the centered self . 
As centered seli it js an individualiz-ed self . It can be 
destroyed but it cannot be divided: each of its parts 
has the mark of this end no othet self . Nor can it be 
exchanged: its self- affirmation is directed to itself as 
this unique, unrepeatable, and irreplaceable individual . 
The theolo9ical assertion that every human soul has an 
infinite value is a consequence of the ontoloqtcal self-
affirmation as an indivisible I unexchangeable self. It 
can be called "the courage to be as oneself ... 2 
1Till1ch, Systematic Theology , I, 177 . 
2r 11Uch, The Courage To Be, P . 8 7 . 
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Once Tillich's insistence up,on individuality has been made clear, there 
can be a deeper understandlnv of his theory oi partlcipallon. "The 
element of participation guarantees the unity of a disrupted world and 
makes a universal systam of relations possible ... 1 
It is in man that indlvlduallzallon and partlcipotlon reach their 
pcrfoct forms . Plants and animals are si9n1ftcant as they are brouQht 
into relationship to human ex.lstenoe . In man there is potential univer-
sality, as HnQutstic universals tnd1cate;2 howovor, :nan's actual 
parUcipatlon in the universe is limited . 3 
The pe!"tect form of 1nd1vtduelizat1on is in the person , and the 
perfect form of pantc!pation is communion . 4 .~d it ts impOrtant to 
notlce that even in the perfect form of communion ind!viduaUty !s not 
destroyed; in fact , the destruction of individuality would mean the 
impossibility of communion , "Ona individual can conquer the entire 
world of objects, but he cannot conquer another person without 
destroying him as a person . . . . If he does not want to destroy the 
other person, he must enter into communion with him . .. ~ 
1Tillich, Systematic Theology, Ir 177, 
2TUltch, The Courage To Be, p. 91. 
3TUltch, Systematic Theology , I, 176 . 
4 • Ibid . >rbid ., p . 177 . 
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There ere various ways tn which one could divide reality, or 
there are numerous ways of thinking of reality. However, one can beg in 
l>y looking at the whole of eX!stlng objects , and thls whole ts distinct 
from the various parts which constitute it. On tho other hand, there is 
the creative power by which the whole extst1n9 world exists, or the 
powor by which there is somethlng rather than nothing •1 This power Is 
not just one object among others; nor ts It the whole of a ll obJects: it 
ls the ground: anci abyss of all that exists . It is the "unconditional" or 
"transcendent .. as "that which gives bolng to being , as the trans-
cendent power of be ing ."2 At times Till!ch hesitates to co li this level 
reality, though at other hmes he feels free to include this; for tho most 
part, however, he refers to this level of reality as ultimate reality, or 
being-itsel f, or as the ground (Grund) ~abyss {AI>grund) of being . 3 
Although Kegley may be correct in his suggestion thot "TIIIIch has 
not ... gone on record concernino his metaphysical position, whether 
monistic or pluralistic , .. 4 1t is also true that the whole of Till1ch's 
1Cf . Scllell!nQ'S view Md faspers ' and Tillich' s reliance upon him 
at this point in Arthur C. Cochrane, The Ex istentialists and God 
(Philade lphia: The Westminster Press, 1956) , pp . 50 - 51 . 
2Tllllch, The Interpretation of History , p . 270 . 
3T11Uch, oassirn . The references throughout !Hlich's \•oritlngs are 
so frequent that spe:cl!ic documentation appears to be superfluous . 
4charles W . Kegley, • Paul Tlllich on the Phtlosophy of Art," 
The journal of Aesthetics and Aft Criticism, XIX (Winter, 19601, 183 . 
thought seems to tend in the direction of an ultimate monism il'l. wh1ch 
everythln9 Is dependent u:>on ultimate reallty fo: Its beln9 .1 It should 
also be painted out that Tllllch attempts to avoid a metaphysical 
position ·.vhtch arrives at a dead homogeneity or identity f as e .q. 
Bradley' s Absolute or some forms of mysticism. 2 
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Earlier discussion pointed out that one of the primary !unctions oi 
the symbol is that it be referential; now it is possible to expand this 
concept to suggest that a symbol is really a symbol when the referent 
ts ultimate reality; i.e . there are now two meaninqs of the word 
symbol, for a symbol may be merely referentJal (a!ong with the other 
qualities which it has) or it may be referential to ultimate reality . The 
most s1Qn1ficant symbolism Is to be round ir. the latter area . But this 
is to anticipate. 
Within the world of formed objects there are symbols oy means 
of which one object refers to another . Since all thin9s are umted tn 
the ground of beinQ, or since ~u things find themselves related on the 
one har.d to tho ground of being and thus ot. the other hond to "lJ things 
•...-hich are likewise thus related to the uhimate reality, finite obJects 
participate in one another's power of being. Due to this (and depending 
let . Tllllch's discussion of creation In Slblleal Religion and the 
Search for Ultimate Reality, pp . 35-37. 
2cr. Tlllich, Systemauc Theology, I. 140-141 . 
upon the degree of relevance) one obJect can serve ti.S a symbol for 
another and contain within itself the innate power of the other obJect . 
This is basically 10 s ay that certain objects are so much alike in 
certain respects that they naturally refer to one another . 
N"ot only may one symbol refer to ultimate rca! tty; one qroup or 
system of symbols can refer to ultimate reality . And thou9h ultima:e 
reality 1s beyond multiplicity, it is a many-faceted unity, and 11: can 
be approached only in a variety of manners . Each symbol and each 
system of symbols can open up ultimate reality in different ways. 
T1111c h speaks of ultimate reality as 1f 1t ts profound and fecund . 
By thls way of penetrating into the depth of things and 
finding the different points 1n which they transcend 
themselves, the di!lerenllation and multiplicity of 
rollqlous symbols can be understood; lt ts the eon-
sequence of the muhipl1c1ty of pesstble approaches 
from reality to the Unconditioned which transcends 
real!ty Md multlpl!ci:y, but which can be grasped by 
the human mind only in a variety of symbols . The 
different basic qualities of reality p:ov1de the different 
basic symbols of religion , I 
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And here a danger must be menuoned, though fuller discussion will 
follow . The danger whtch any symbol or set of symools is most apt to 
fall into is that of short-clrcu!tlng its symbol!c character and reducing 
the referent to that with which the symbol is most immediately 
connected . The failure to 90 beyond that •.vhich is superficially present 
1Ttlllch, The Interpretation of History, pp . 269-271. 
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in order to arrlv-e llt the dimension of depth in wh1ch meaninQ and being 
rest in the ultimate roaHty must be re9arded as idolatry . 
The discussion at this point has already become somewhat 
lengthy, but there are several other thlngs which must be said to 
provide the context for further meaningful discussion. These matters 
will include further discussion of being 1 discussion o! non- being and 
the demonic, and at least the mention of God in conneet.ton with these 
concepts . 
Earlier 1 being was defined in tts most concrete sense as -any-
thing whlch has temporal existence . Ttllich would subscribe to Sartre's 
famous dictum, ''existence precedes essence, .. 1 though Sartre ' s 
explanation of th.is would not be fully acceptable , 
First of all, man exists, turns up, appears or: the scene, 
and, only afterward defines himself • . • Thus there Is 
no human nature, stnce there is no God to conceive it. 
Not only is man what he conceives h1mself to be, but he 
is also only whot ho wllls himself to be after his thrust 
toward existence. Z 
Ti!Hch does not grant that Sartre and other existentialists have actually 
succeeded In m~lntolnlnQ their point of beginnin9 . Tll!lch himself 
insists on the tmportt~nce of the msights of existentialism: however 1 
he adds that "even the most radical existentiahst, 1f he w&nts ~o s&y 
1jean Paul Same, ExJstent1al1sm anri Humanism, tra.ns. Philip 
Maire: (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd . , 1948), p . 15. 
2Ibld . ' p . !8 . 
something, necessarily falls back to some essentialist $t&tements 
becauso without them he cannot speak . .. 1 Thls is not to postulate 
some "world of essences• but only to suggest that there are untversels 
or unifying centers for Hngu!stlc discourse (a:1d evon some ontic 
unlfyln9 center) . T!lllch holds, in a discussion ol Same and 
He!dogger, who insist that there are no essences, no norms, only 
39 
chaotic existence, that each man reveals his concern for such elements 
in his philosophy though he may do it only impllcitly. 2 Whether or not 
'l'Hllch' s evaluation of Sartre and Hcldegger is too harsh or inadequate, 
the basic point here is Tillich's affirmation of the need for essences . 
Tllllch rejects the term metaphysics because of the connotation 
of beyond the physicaL 3 Instead he uses the term ontology . 
Ontolog-y asks tho question of being, I.e . of something 
that is pre sent to everybody at every moment. It is 
never "speculative"' in the (unJustified) bad sense of 
the word, but it is always descriptive, describin9 the 
structures which are presupposed in any encounter 
with reallty. Ontol09y is descriptive, r.ot speculative. 
It tries to find out wh1ch the basic structures of 
be!ng are . 4 
lntllch, Theology of Culture, p . 121. Cf. also Tilllch, "The 
Relation of Metaphysics and Theol09y," The Review of Metaphysics, 
X (September, 1956), 63. 
2nll!ch, Theology of Culture, p. 121. 
3ruuch, Slbllcal Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, 
pp. S-9. 
4T!Il!ch, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 23 . 
It is true that THllch attempts to consider being as concerned with 
temporal and historical existence; ho'Never, the term qulckly ls caught 
up into problems c>..'tendtng beyond concrete existence . Immedlately, 
in fact, or.e ts faced wUh the question as to whether the term being 
is not too largely restricted to the SUlltlc chara.ctor of the world rather 
than to its dynamic qualities . In answer to this TilUch says: 
Bein9 seems to point to a static world, a block reality, 
whereas reality irrefutably has tho char&ctor of becoming . 
One must agree that a definition of ontology which qives 
preference to the static over the dynamic elements in 
reality not only Is prejudiced and m!stoken but also has 
senous consequences for tho confrontation of ph1losophy 
and biblical rell9lon. A static ultimate and the llvln9 
God arc obviously incompatible . But be1n9·as-such has 
neither static nor dynamic implications. It precedes any 
special qualification. It points to the original fact that 
there is something and not nothing and to the power of that 
which is to resist nonbelnQ. Obviously, this roslstanco 
has a dynorr.ic character, and the pcr.ver o! being has a 
dynamic character, a.nd the pa.\l'er of being is actual ln 
many centers of power. But they all participate In the 
power of being, ln being - itself . 
Being- itself or the power o! being needs to be carefully examined, but 
this can be more carefully done in the chapter on reli9ious symbols . 
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Here lt w!ll mere ly be proposed os the ultimate power by which anything 
which exists has been brought into existence . Moreover, it is not one 
thing among others, for thts would deprive it of its ulumacy; being-itself 
ltnllch, Bibllcal Rel!glon and the Search for Ultimate Reality, 
p . 16. 
would then be reduced to the world 01' something within the world of 
which It Is the basts . 
Having postulated some source of the world and its octtvity, 
what :nust be the character of this source lf the '''Orld is to be as it is?! 
In reference to the phrase "unconditioned uanscendent" Tillich 
says that what he means 
is that the ground of being is at the same tlme the 
abyss of any definite being; and conversely that the 
abyss of being which transcends all special bein9s 
is at the same time the creative ground of all forms 
of existence . They aro all conditioned by it; but 1t 
itself is not conditioned by anything; they all are 
contained in it but it itsel! ls not exhausted in their 
infinity . 2 
The qround of being may .be reqarded as the d1vine clarity in ·.vhich can 
be sMn "tho perfaellon, eomple!lon, and rauonah:y of form. ·•3 Thl~ 
may be regarded as tho structural phase of the divine life, the logos 
aspect , In contrast to this there is an emphasis on somcthlnc;; which 
breaks through structure and form; too great emphasis on the complete 
reasonableness of thG qround of being results in a loss of the divine 
lrt Is only l>y the later discussion on religious symbols that this 
postulation can be clarified . It ls hoped that tho discussion wlll not 
appear to be han91:w too much in mid-air at this potr.t. 
2t!lllch, "Symbol Md Knowledge," op . ell., p. 203. 
3r!lilch, The Interpretation of History, p. 108. 
depth, and this means a loss of inexhaustlblllty and transcendence ,1 
rho depth of things, tholr basis of existence, Is at the 
same time their abyss; or in other words, ... the depth 
of things is inexhaustible . If' it .• ..,ere not inexhaustible, 
and if it could be exhausted in the form of thin9s, then 
there would be a direct, rotional designable way from the 
depth of th!ngs to their form; then the world could be 
comprehended as the necessary &nd unequivocal unfolding 
of the basis of existence; then the supporting basis would 
pour out entirely· into the cosmos of forms; then the depth 
would cease to be depth, ceaslng to be transcendental , 
absolute . 2 
But, Tillich goes on to arQuo, if there Is not somethin9 tO\\•atd which 
these th1ngs all tend which is not exhaus1eds then there w1U Oe a 
succumbing to lack of being and meaning. There has to be "Something 
More •• which confers upon the universe a sense of directiol"'. and 
meaningful:tess . 
NO\-; mexhaustiblltty 1s not to be regarded as passivity but ••as 
an active tnexhaustibJUty. as a productive inner Infinity of existence, 
i .e . , as the 'consuming fire ,' that becomes a real abyss for every 
form . "3 On the one hand 1 inexhaustibility refers to the fullness of 
ultimate potentiality, to a ••general potentiality" which always provides 
much more novelty than any concrete situation could ever actualize . ~ 
On the other hand, If there Is this inllnito potentiality (inexhaustlblllty) 
1:hen everything which exists does so with an mner msecurlty; any 
1Ibld . 2 ll:>ld . ' p . 83 . 3 ,lliE.. .. p . 84 . 
4cf. Whitehead, op . cit . , pp . 101-102 . 
particular existence may give way to some novel form under the 
creative (and destructive) Jmpact of the abyss . 
Form, in()xhaustibilHy, the divine, the demonic, the Satanic, 
are all very carefully enunciated in the following passage: 
Form of being and lnexhnusttbility of beir.q belon9 
together . Their unity in the depth of essential nature 
1s the dtvine, theft separation ln existence , the 
relatively independent erupt!on of the 01 abyss .. in th.!.ngs, 
is the demonic .. An absolutely independent eruptlon of 
the "abyss," a mere devouring of every form, would be 
the Satanic, which for that very reason cannot tako 
form or come to existence . In the demonic, on the 
other hand, the divine, the unity of bottom and abyss, 
of form and consumption of form, is still contained: 
therefore the demonic can come to existoncc only in 
the tension of both elements . The tension Is really in 
everything • ..,.h1ch 1s produced by the creative power , 
The impul se for !ormation inherent ir. everythJn<; and 
filling it and tho horror of decay of form Is founded on 
lllo form-qual!:y or exlstAnc~ . To como lr.to tw!lnq 
means to come to form . To lose form means to lose 
existence . At the same time, hcr~·,.eve:, there dwells tn 
everything the loner Inexhaustibility of being, the will 
to realizo in itself as an individual the active tnf!ntty 
of being, the impulse coward brcak!nQ through its own, 
limited form, the longing to realize the abyss in itself. 
The living form with the fullness and limits of its 
existence resul ts from the cojoinod affect of both 
tendencies . From the isolation and formless eruption 
of the abyss results demonic distortion. Oemonry is 
the form-destroying eruption of the creative basis of 
things . I 
The basic meaning of demonic as it appears in th1s early passage is 
"the unity of form-creating and form-destroying strength. ·2 It Is by 
lTilllch , The !nterpretatlon of History, ;>p . 84-85 . 
2rbtd . , p . at. 
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means of the concept of the de,.,omc thot Tllltch feels ~.e ts able to 
reJect ponthelsm, which he re9ards as tho vtow tho: God "has pou.'"ed all 
hts creative per ... ·er into e system o! forms, and he lS bound to these 
forma . "'! 
God, thus, is ultimate reality in whom structure and creativity 
(destructiveness) unite . In later discussions those !octors are worked 
tnto o tnnttartan schema . There must be somo unllylnQ principle to 
bring together creativity and form, and this Is to bo found In the basic 
principle of lUe which Is love. "Life Is bolng In actuality and low !a 
the ~ov1n9 po-.,.·or of life . Lo\o"e Js the drtve tOW'Udt the u.n1ty of the 
ooparoted .• 2 Love :>ecornes the unlfy1ng prtnc:plo both In the u!Uo:ate 
reollty end In human e:dster.ce. Essentially tho Trlr.lty can be 
doscrlbed tn dialectical terms as "the lnner mo'v'Cment of tho divine life 
as en eternal separation from Itself and return to ttsel!. ··3 
The divine llf<> Is the dynamic unity of depth ond 
Corm , In mystical language tho dopth of the divine life, 
Its inexhaustible and ineffable character, is co.llod 
•Abyos . • In philosophtcollanguogo tlut form, the meaning 
end structure element or the divine life, Is called "Logos . " 
In rellqtous languaze the dynamtr l;nlty of both elements 
Is celled "Sp!nt. • 
1Tllllch, Systematic Theology, 1. 236. 
2T!tl!ch, Love, ?owe: and Justice, p. 25. 
3T1lhch, Systematic Theology. l, SO. 
41bld '. p ' 156. 
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The Abyss Is the power, maJesty, and !no:<haustlb!Uty of the Godhead; 
the logos is the meaningful structure; and the Spirit is the actuallzation 
of these two principles ln mean!n9ful creativity . 1 
Early discussions by Tilltch tend to emphasize the demonic and 
the abyss as terms for that phese of the divine being which wos 
disruptlve and creative . Later discussions refer less frequently to the 
demonic as a term to be used 1n the manner previously lnd1cated 1 but 
the term has taken on new meaning. i .e . ''the claim of somcthin9 
conditJoned to be unconditioned . ••2 This is the claim of some conctete 
being to be ultimate , However, occasionally TUlich still uses demonic 
in tho early manner. 3 
Tllllch Includes an account of the activity of the demonic on the 
level of actual existence and panicularly ~ .... tthln personality . He 
suggests that "'the demonic comes to fulfUlment In the mind, but the 
forces which rule destructively in the demonic, are directly visible 
in the sub- mental . " 4 
The demonic comes to fulfillment in personality, and 
personaUty ts the most ptomtnent object of demonic 
destruction, for personality is tho bearer of form in its 
totality and unconditioned chari\cter . There, the contra-
diction of it, the cleavage of personali:y, !s the highest 
and most destructive contradiction . S 
llb!d . ' pp . 249-252 . 2Jb!d .• p , 227 . 
4ruHch , The Interpretation of Hlstorv, p . 86 . 5Jbld. 
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The cJcovaqe of personality may be based upon "the powers of its own 
psychical depth . •I Interestingly, Tlll!ch suggests th&t the demonic 
dwells "in the subconscious level of the human soul. "2 In speakfnq o: 
the inoxhaushblc or abyss phase of God I he speaks of ••the creative 
darkness of the unconscious . .. 3 A.nd the unconscious is related to 
POtentlallty within the dlvine os THUch suggests : "'The unconsc1ous is 
mere potentiality, and it should not be painted in the tmage of the 
actual . • , 4 Comparison of TUHch with Jung should prove most 
fascinating . 
There is a correspondence between states of demonic possession 
and qrace; however, possession is destructive and empues life of 
meaning whereas grace enhances the !orm in creativity and fulfillment . 5 
One might be very disturbed about the inclusion of the demonic 
within the divine life, but THlich insists that the demonic will never 
succeed !n destroying God and thus the world . 
There is only one ccrte1nty , that the demomc is overcome 
!n eternity, that !n eternity the demonic Is depth of the 
divine and ln unity with divine clarity . . . . We need 
not . . . qrant the u ltimate victory to the negation, to 
the abyss, to meaninglessness . 6 
1Ib1d . , p . 92 . 2!bld . • p, 89 . 
3
rul1ch, Svstematic Theology, I. 250 . ' 'Ibid . , p . !79 . 
5rul!ch, The Interpretation of History, pp , 87-88 . 
61b1d . ,p . J22. 
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Later discussions by THllch place the emphasis upen the 
dishnction between being and non-being within being- itself . Being-
Itself Is the divine; being may be equated with the structural or formal: 
non- beinQ may be equated with the demonic . Killen points to various 
parallels where the demonic and the concept of non- being serve the 
same basJc function .1 After examining a few pertinent passages, there 
will be an attempt to summarize the places 1n which these t.tYo concepts 
converge. 
Non-bemg is spoken of as "that in God which makes his self-
affirmation dynamlc"2 or as that which •makes God a living God . .. 3 
It 1s regarded as a negative principle within God which Is productive 
of anxiety. 4 Non-being is the dynamic clement, "the potentiality of 
betng, which ts nonbe!ng in contrast to things that have a form, er.d 
the power of being In contrast to pure nonbclng . .. s The concept of 
non-bemQ appears in the writings of Hartmann and Freud in the theory 
of the unconscious . 6 Non- being is matter in Greek thought and is 
"the principle of resistance against form . " 7 Earlier Tllllch had said 
iR . Allan Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tlll!ch 
(j. H. Kohl, N . V. Kampen,l9S6l. pp . l76-177 . 
2Tllllch, The Courage To Be, p . 180. 3Jbld . 
4 tbid . 
6!bld . 
Snlllch , Systematic Theology, I. 179 . 
7tbld . 
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practically the same thing about the demonic except that he included 
the words 8Ctive and unconquerable, "active, unconquerable resistance 
to rorm" 1 Also nbeing has r.onbetn~ 'within' itself as that which is 
eternally present and eternally overcome in tho process of the divine 
life." 2 
These passages would seem to be sufficient to show that Till!ch 
has changed hts vocabulary without changinq hJs basic concept . More-
over, he now uses demonic in a new way . 
Killen suggests that there are certain differences in these two 
terms ana that Tilllch stands on the border In an inability to accept 
fully either term: 
Neither concept Is entirely satisfactory to Till!£;hj_both 
lead to dlfflcult!es which provo ambarassing bi!Y. 
Non-Being can be better defended from a rational logical 
standpoint than "the demonic .. , but it proves insufficient 
to explain thQ ambiguous dynamic character he sees ln 
everything . On the other hand while "the <iemonlc" 
accounts for the ambiguous 1 it places the element of 
evil and the problem of ovll too definitely In tho heart 
of the Abyss and of qod himse lf and ma:<es Hlm too 
responsible for evil. 
Whatever the <iUferences behveen these two concepts 1 one can see that 
they roughly correspond: both are dynamic (creative with more emphasis 
1TUllch, The Interpretation of History, p . 109 . 
2Tillich, The Courago To Be, p. 34 . 
3KILlen, op. cit . , p . 177 . 
on destructive aspect in the demonic); both are ne9at1ve; both involve 
potentiality; they include the unconscious both in ul!tmate reality and 
in personal existence; and both are present but overcome in the divine 
life . 
Though "being has nonbelng 'within' ltsoll, .. 1 "being- Itself does 
not participate in nonbelnQ . In this it stands Jn contrast to every 
beinQ . .. z If it is possible to speak of the demonic or non-being within 
belnq-ltse lf, lt is possible to speak thus only metaphorically or 
symboilcally; for when non- belnq Is predicated of f!nlte being, the 
result is the possibility of not being. 
Tho answer to the question how non- betng can resist 
the power of bein9, c~n only be that non-being is not 
foreign to being , but that It Is that quality of being by 
~~lll¢1\ &VGryth!ng that partle lpatos in be!"~ Is nagat~d . 
Non-belno Is the negation of belnq within being Itself. 
Each of these words is, of course, used metaphorlcelly . 
But metaphorical language can be true l~nguage, painting 
to something that Is both revealed and hidden In this 
hmguage , Baing which includes non- being is Unite 
being. "Finite" means carrying within one•s being !he 
destiny not to be . 3 
Within the finite world (or world of finite objects! there can be 
m-eaningful d1scuss1on of deqrees of betng only 1f being me4ns pawer of 
1ttlllch, The Courage To Be, p . 34 . 
2Tllllch, Systematic Theology, I. 236 . 
3Tllllch, Love, Power, and Iustlce, pp . 38-39 . 
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being rather than object of thought .1 Thore are no degrees of ex!sUng: 
this l& an either/or matter; however, there can be degrees of ••the power 
ol takin9 non-being into one's own sell-affirmation .• 2 
A life process is the more powerful, the more non-
being it can include in its self-affirmation, ·.vtthout 
being destroyed by it. The neurotic can include only 
a Httle non-betnq, the averaqe man a largo amount, 
God--symbol!cally speakin9--an infinite amount . 3 
The degree, then, to which anyth!n9 participotes in reality is 
dependent upon the power which it hos to overcome non-being. Now 
with respect to the relation between signs and symbols, it might be 
better fo: Tillich not to say that s1ons have no innate power whereas 
symbols do, but rather to say that symbols have a much higher doqree 
ol power than signs . It does oppear that the distinction which Tllllch 
rnokes can be seen to stand once the Ungu!sUc problems have been 
clarified . 
iil. Symbols ond the Soul 
Aubrey ts very disturbed over Tillich's placement of certoin powers 
!n thin9s so that symbols are regarded as having Innate <rualltles apart 
from minds: 
The statement that words and signs originally 
"conveyed the meanlnq which they expressed, \ ... ·ith 
an inherent power o! their own,. puzzles me. Is this 
pow-er really resident in the symbols or ir. the 
)Ibid . , pp. 68-69. 2rbid., p , 40 . 3Ibld . 
associations which they have with the emotional 
experience of the interpreter? I simply cannot ascribe 
any metaphysical power "innate" in the symbol por se. 
Is it not rather that the context which gives it meaning 
gives it also an emotional stgntficance which arouses 
powerful reactions !n the person who experienced the 
sign !n the context and thus attachod the total meaning 
of the sltuatJonal context to the symbol itself. What 
other "POwer" have symbols than this? 1 
The preceding discussion has attempted to show what Tlillch means by 
su9gesting that the symbol has a metaphysical power or power within 
itself, and even Aubrey admits to a context which gives meaning to the 
symbol. Nevertheless, the analysts would have concluded without 
being complete 1! 1t had stopped prior to an examination of the self . 
In his discussion of "expression'", which seems to be the same as his 
earlier discussions on symbolism, TJllich suggests that "expression is 
always expression for someone who can receive it as such,H 2 for 
someone who !s able to make the requisite distinctions between the 
surface and the depth of problems and reality, and only rn3n ha& :his 
capacity. 3 Man is certainly not excluded from Tilllch's analysis . 
However. TtlUeh is concerned lest the m1nd and !ts relation to reality 
be taken as the relation; it was this pitfall within idealism wh!ch 
caused hJm in his early thinking to retain what was valuable and teject 
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1Edwin E. Aubrey, •communication to the Editor on 'The Religious 
Syml>ol,'" The Journal of Liberal Rellglon, n (Spring, 19~1), 201 - 202 . 
2
rnttch, "Art and Ultimate Reality,•• oe . cit. ,p. 2 . 3Ibid. 
the rest of idealism . What he rejected was .. the claim of :he idealists 
that their system of meaningful categories portrays realfty as a whole, 
instead of its being conceived as an expression of a definite and 
limited relation to reality . ,.J This may be another reference (ur.docu-
mentod by TilHch) to tho Cartesian over-emphasis on consciousness . 
Symbols not only serve to open up levels of re.,Uty, they a lso 
serve to open up the soul which Is to be (and has been) regarded as 4 
special aspect of reality , Symbols open up "'levels of the soul, levels 
of our interior reality . ,.Z rust what does it mean to say that there are 
levels of the soul? The expllcll lndlcotton whlch Tlllich glves of thls 
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ts found in his sermon on "The Paradox of Prayer," In which he suggests 
that "every prt~yer Js humanly impossible, fust because it brings deeper 
leve ls of our being before God than the level of consciousness, •• 3 and 
as a result prayer is frequently in "wordless sighs . " Both TllHch's 
position on symbols and on the unconscious ·..,·ould indicate that one of 
the major functions of symbols .is to probe deeper than consciousness 
in an attempt to provide meantngfu lness, which penetrates completely 
through the individual beln9 and reaches into the intercourse with all 
existence and even with the pewer of beinQ . 
1Tilllch, The Interpretation of History , p. 61. 
2rlll!ch, Theology o! Culture, p. 57 . 
3T1ll!ch, The New Belng, p . 138. 
The concept of the po ..... ·er of symbols to open up the soul 1$ not 
unique to T!llieh~ for this Is shown tn a penetrating paragraph ·.vrtnen 
by Rollo May: 
The heal!ng power of the symbol and myth has two 
aspects . This po·.ver restdes, on one hand, in the fact 
that the symbol and myth elicit and bring into awareness 
the repros sed, unconscious, archaic urges, longln9s, 
dreads 6nd other psychtc content. Thts is the rcgress1ve 
function of symbols and myths. But on the other hend, 
the symbol and myth reveal new goals 1 new ethical 
insights and possib!Hties; they are a breaking through 
of greater meanin9 which was not present before . The 
s ymbol and myth in this respect are ways of working 
out the problem on a higher level of mtcgratton . Thts 
we call the progtessive function of symbols and myths . 1 
As May' s article Indicates, the symbol has found its place in psycho-
therapeutic thouqhr anri techniques . And It appears that Tll!lch has 
this phase In mind when he Indicates the significance of the symbol 
ln opening up the soul . However, Tillich's interests lead him into o 
discussion of the ontol()9ical bases of human anxieties along with 
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human neuroses and other pathologic~! conditions as well as an analysis 
of human sin . Rumen freedom 1 the distinction between man's essential 
bein9 and existentlal estrangement, the courage to be~ and the moaning 
of existence are considered as basic concerns of the individual. 2 
1 Rollo May, loc . cu ., p . 45 . 
2cf . especially Tlllich, Tho Courage To Bo and Systematic 
Theology, passim. 
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Thou9h man is a microcosm in whom the macrocosm ts mirrored, I 
he is basically the one big- question mark: "Man is the question he asks 
about himself, before any question has been formulated , .,2 But by 
beln9 the question ond by asking the questions i:npl!ed In his existence, 
man is a least prepared for the answers if they should be forthcoming . 
As such, "'he himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, ... 
fn hts a.vn existence he has the only possible approach to eXIstence 
ltself ."3 
The basis of man's ins ight into the nature of existence lies in the 
correspondence between his own structure and that o( the .... ·orld. In 
order to explain this correspondence T1111ch mtroduces the term 
ontologica l reason or logos (in contrast to the more specifically 
cognitive function of reason) and define s it "as the structure of the mind 
which enables it to Q.tasp and to shape reality. ,. 4 Now lf the mind is 
able to grasp ond shape reality 1 then the world which ts grasped and 
shaped by reason or logos must have a rational or logos c haracter . 
Tllllch thus dlstlnqulshes between a subjective and an objective logos 
or reason . "The term 'reason I • in Tillich's thouoht, refers to these 
lcf. Tllllch, Systematic Theology, !, 176, 0 , 13; The Protestant 
Era, pp . 116-117 . 
2rnl!ch, Systematic Theology, I, 62 . 
31bld . ' 'lbld . , p . 75 . 
ss 
structur.a of reality an<! of the mind, as well as to the thought 
proee11. ·I 
In attemptJ.,,g to explain the poalllon of tl><l subJective and :he 
objective reason, Tilllch does not want to become Involved In phUo-
sophie rivalry between the various schools of thought which he broadly 
schomallzes as answers roughly given by ree.Usms, ldealtsms, dualisms 
or pluroltsms, end monisms . All that is nooded here is o recognition 
of the common factors In all of these positions: In all these positions 
the mind Ia able to grasp and to shape Its world, !.e. tho "'!nd both 
receives fro:n the world and produces something within the world . 2 
Slnce the soul and ti".e world have thla icl.nd o! relatlo:t, it is :tO'K 
readily seen that symbols can have the two-fold function of opening up 
leve ls of reality a.'td of the soul; and a lnce the structures of the soul 
cones pond to the structuros of reality, the deeper tho lnd!Vldual Is 
a biB to pene trate his own soul, the deopcr Ia he peorlng Into the comple>: 
world about him . The value of symbols lies In their capacity for 
providing Insight Into facets both of the self and of the world which 
would othorwlse go undiscovered. The symbol 
opens up levels of realtty whJch otbforwlae ue closed for 
us . All arts create symbol a for a level of reality which 
1Robert Clyde Johnson, "A Theologian of Synthells, • Theology 
Today, 'YN (April, 1958) , 37 . 
2TIIIIch, Systematic Theology, I, 75-76 . 
cannot be reached L"\ ~ny other way. A picture and a 
poem reveal elements of reahty which cannot be approached 
actent1f1cally . In the creative work of art we encounter 
real tty L,. a dimension whtch 1s closed for us withot;.t such 
worics .1 
Moreover, the symbol 
also unlocks dimensions Md elements or our soul which 
correspond to the dimensions and elemonts of reality . 
A groat play gives us not only a new vision of tho 
human scene , but It opens up hlddon depths of our 
own belnq . Thus we ore able to receive what tho 
play reveels to us tn realtty. There are within us 
dimensions of which we cannot become aware except 
through symbols, as melodies and rhythms In music. 2 
AI a result the aymbol1s "1nf1nHely more powerful"' than "rauonal, 
poJltlvlaUe statements .• 3 
~ . Acceptability 
The fourth characteristic of symbols Is their acceptability, which 
•tmplles that the symbol Is socially rooted and socially supponed . "4 
This one characteristic comprises tho fifth and sixth characteristics of 
symbols In the discussion In Dynamics o! Faith . I( so, the charac-
terlstlc will need to be expanded . 
In tho l?yna:nlcs o! Faith the filth charactorlsttc of the symbol 
1!UIIch, Dyna:nlcs of Faith, p. 42 . 
2 Ibid .. pp . <2-43. 3:-.~ay, Joe. c.:., p . IS. 
4TIIllch, "The Rehgious Symbol,• op, cit ., p. 76 . 
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is that it "cannot be produced intentionally ... 1 And the bosls of this 
is that symbols "9TO'N out of the individual or collective unconscious . •• 2 
Signs are replaced without much difficulty, but symbols come into 
existence and pass out again only by being born or by dytnQ; this is 
the sixth charactcrisUc in Dyn~mies of Faith . Siqns are consciously 
invented and removed . Symbols are produced out of the "qroup 
unconsc1ous'" or the "collectl.ve unconscious" and are thus publicly 
powerful; however, some arc more publicly relevant than others; thoy 
"have an especially social function . '' 3 
Although Bm•me does not use the term symbol tn the same woy that 
Tilltch uses it, he does seem awue of the same type o: thing as 
perce ived by Tllllch, for he says: 
In qeneral, in mattets of abstract thought, it is much safer 
to use the same words for very different thlngs than to use 
different words for tho same thing . A poUt!ca1 party moy 
chanoe all its principles and remain the same pany, but a 
• chonge of name would be fatal . -
Certain words or other types of symbols emerge from a situat1on and are 
the symbols for this occasion; nothing else could serve the same 
purpose, for the symbol is "accepted by tho unconscious dimension of 
1TJIIleh , Dynamics of Faith, p , 43 . 
2 1bid 0 3Jold 0 
4sorden.Parker Bowne, Theory of Thought and Kn,.,..•1edge (New 
York : Horper and Brothers, 1899), p . 148 . 
our being. • 1 And thus WheeiWTiqht Ia correct when he suggests tlla! 
•unltk• l09lcal symbols, :herefoce, lt 11 tmposa1ble to subst~tute o-:te 
expressive symbol !or anoiher without desuoytnq or radtcally :ra::s· 
figuring tho texture of meaning. • 2 Gurney, Hans lick, and Sullivan 
would a lao agree that one symbol cannot be roplGced by another . 3 
58 
Broadly spoaklnq, it does not oppOar that Tllllch reJects all dell.b-
crat•neas ln th• creation of symbols when he Insists that symbols are 
not produced lntontlonally; 'Nhat he rejects 11 arbitrariness. A symbol 
.. aatts!Sea"' its creator in his deepest being, ond to the oxtent that the 
e,..etor is aoetaUy conditioned, to that same extent will the symbol 
aaua!y soetety . This will ;or.ear. that symbols are not Just expressions; 
:hey are communications as wol!. 
It ls not correct to say that a thinq ls first ll 8ymbol and 
then qains acceptance; the process of becomlnq a symbol 
and tho acceptance of !t as a symbol belong toqether . 
The act by which a symbol is created 1s a social act, even 
though it first springs forth In an individual. The 
1nd1vtdual can devise si9ns for his own prtvato needs; he 
cannot make symbols . If something becomos a symbol 
for hlm, it is always so In relation to th~ community 
which In turn can recognize itself In It. 
irllllch, Dynarr.lcs o: Faith, p, 43 . 
2wheelwrlght, op. cit., p, 61 . 
3John Hospers, "W.ea.l'\tng ln Mustc, • A Modern 8ook of Es:M:.lcs, 
ed. Molvln Rader (2d ed . rev. ; 1\ew York: Henry Holt and Co. , 1952), 
pp. 258-282 . 
4tllllch, "The Religious Symbol," op. cit,, pp . 76-77 . 
some examtnauon of Tung 's thought may introduco so:ne fresh tnstqhts 
into Tillich's thought. T11Uch's explicit references to Jung (as to any 
other thinkers) arc very few, but he doos speaK of Jung's analysis of 
Protestantism in its attitude toward symbols as follows: 
C. G. Tung has called the history of Protestantism a 
history of continuous "iconoclasm'' ("tho dostruct!or. 
of plcturos," that Is, of religious symbols) and, 
consequently, the separation of our consclousnoss 
from the universaUy human '*archetypes" that are 
present In tho subconscious of everybody . He Is 
right. Protestants often confuse essential symbols 
with accidental signs . They often are unaware of 
the numinous power inherent tn genuine symbols, 
words, acts, persons, things. They have replaced 
the great wealth of symbols appearing In the Christian 
tradition by rational concepts, moral laws, and 
subjective emotions .1 
The key to this statement may be stated more brlolly 1n T!lllch's 
suggestion that "the loss of sacraments and symbols corresponds to 
the exclusive emphasis on the center of persona!tty !n Protestantism ... 2 
The emphasis both in Tilllch and In Jung is upon the funcucn of the 
unconscious in the production of symbols. 
T!lllch Is extremely fearful that the soul which is "the vital and 
emotional ground from which the self-conscious center of personality 
arises 01 3 may be 
1Tilllch, Tho Protestant Era, p. xxlli. 
2rbld . , pp, ;odll-xxtv. 3 1!?.!2. . • p . 131. 
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gradually deprived of its power and subjected to a 
rationalized and intellectualized consciousness . The 
vengeance of the soul for this repression is the chaotic 
and destructive outbreak of the repressed forces that 
revolt against the dictatorship of an overburdened and 
overvaluated self ... consciousness . 1 
11The s ymboHc name for the complete victory of the phUosophy o! 
consciousness is Ren~ Descartes." 2 It is because of this extreme 
emphasis upon consciousnoss and the rational that psychoanalysis and 
ex1stentiel1sm have er1sen as a "protest against the tncreasfnQ power 
of the phllosophy of consciousness in modem industrial society . • 3 
Those who have been guilty of this one-sided emphasis need to 
come to the realizatJon that 
the !deal of personallty r In the way in which it has 
developed in modern Protestantism and secularism, is 
besGd en an illusion, en tho !lluslen of "pure conscious-
ness." There ts no such thing . Unconsc1ous psychic 
forces continuously break into our conscious center and 
direct it just when we believe ourselves to be completely 
free. The dark. ground of pre- personal beinq, wh1ch 
contains e lements of the universal process of life as well 
as the life-process of the individual& is effective in every 
moment of our conscious existence . · 
1Ibld. 
2r!llich , Theology of Culture, p . 115 . 
3 
.!!ill!.. ' p • 11 4 
4rullch, Tho Protestant Era, p . 134. 
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jung dlsttngutshes ber.veen two :nodes of artistic creatlon--the 
psychological and the visionary .I The psychological mode of cro6Uor. 
would correspond roughly with Ttlllch ' s structural aspect cf ;,.tltlmate 
reality or the Niet~schean Apollonian aspec~ or the formal phase of 
e reat>vlty. This ls the conscious and the intelligible aspac t . 2 The 
vistonary mode arises "from the hinterland of man's mind" ar.d "15 a 
primordial experience which surpasses man's undcrstandln). ,.3 "I't 
arises from umeless depths; it is foreign anci cold, many .. S1ded, 
demomc and qrotesquo . " 4 
The disturbin9 vision of monstrous ar.d meaninqless 
happenings that in every way exceed the grasp of human 
feeling and comprehension makes quite other demnnds 
upon the powers of the artist than do tho experiences of 
the foreground of life . These never rend the curtc.tn that 
veils the cosmos; they never transcend the bounds of the 
humanly possible. t~nd for this reason are readHy shaped 
to the demands of a it. no matter her .... • QTeat a shoe.< to the 
1nd1vJdual they may be . But the prlr:1.ordht.l expenences 
rend from top to bottom the curtain upon which ts ;:l:afr.ted 
the p1cturc of an ordered world, and allow~ glim~se into 
the unfo.thomed abyss of what has not yet become. Is it 
G vision of other worlds, or of the obscuration of the 
spirit. or of the be9inning of thin9s before the age cf 
man, or of the unborn generations of thG future? VVe 
cannot say that it is any or none of these , 5 
1
ca.r1 Gustav Jung, "Psychology and Literature," A Modern Book 
of Esthetics. ed . Melvin Rader (3d ed . ; New York : Holt. Rinehart 
and Wmston, Inc., 1960). p . 142. 
2!bid . ' pp . 141-143. 
4Jbid . 
3 Ibid .. p . 143. 
5Ibid . 
•The prtmordtal experience is the source of his creativeness, .. 1 but 1t 
is not something which involves clear vision or easy formdatlon, 
since "it is merely a deep presentiment tha~ strives to find ex-
pression . " 2 And no matter how beautifully and powerfully the artist 
m.:ty express himself as a result of thts deep vision, his 1ns1Qhts must 
alwoys exceed his ability to express such, because of the richness of 
this peak of experience . 
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]unq calls the basic force producing this vision 45 well as the 
content of the vision the "collective unconscious. 11 3 This is dcf!ned as 
a certain psychic disposition shaped by tha forces of 
heredity: from !t consciousness has developed .... 
In eclipses of consciousness - -in dreams, narcotic 
states and cases of 1nsan1ty-... there come to the surface 
psychic products or contents that shO'.v all the traits of 
primltlw lewis or psychic development . . . . What 
is of particular lmpertance for the study of literature m 
these man1festatlons of the collective unconscious is 
that they are compensatory to the conscious attitude . 
This is to say that they can brinq a one-sJded, abnormal, 
o r dangerous state of consciousness into equilibnum 
in an apparently purposive way. 4 
The artist becomes a "collective manu ir. that he is "one who 
carries and shapes the unconscious, psychic lifo of mankind. "5 And 
when the art appreciator 1s able really to enter into the wor5. of art and 
to let the ... rork act upon himself as It entered into the experience of the 
1Ib!d., p. 148 . 
4lbld . 
2Ibld . 
s llili!.·, p . lSI . 
3Ibid.' p. 149. 
artist, Jung suggests that this Is what happens: 
To 9f8.SP its meaning, we must aUO"N It to shape us ~s 
it once shaped him. Then we understand the nature of 
his experience . vve see that he has drawn uPOn the 
healing and redeeming forces of the collective psyche 
that underhes consciousness with its isolation Jl;r.d 
its painful errors; that he has penetrated to that n:atrtx 
of llfe In which all men are embedded , which imports 
a common rhythm to all human existence, and allows 
the mdlvldual to communicate his feeling and his 
sutvtng to mankind as a whole . 
The secret of artistic creation and of the e!fective-
ness of art Is to be found ln a return to the state of 
participation mystique--to that level of experience at 
which it is man who lives, and not the individual, end 
at which the weal or woe of the single human being does 
not count, but only human existence. This 1s why every 
great work of art is obJective and impersonal, but none 
the less profound! y moves us aach and all . l 
Several things emerge from this investlgotion of Junq which are 
ospec!ally near the thouQht of Tilllch: emphasis on :he unconscious AS 
a powerful factor in tho production of symbols; the characterization o! 
the unconscious as demonic, Dionysian, non-r~t1onaJ, creative, and 
destructive; tho uso of the term "collect1ve unconscious"; Tilhch's 
view that revelation arises from this source and Jung•s view that 
heallng and redemptlon are here; Tillich's view of u ltimate reality and 
Jung•s view of the 1'matrlx of life in whJch all men are embedded"; 
finally. Junq's concept that there ls a "common rhythm• ln <1ll human 
l Ibid . , p. 153 . 
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existence ts paralleled In Ttlllch's pOsition that there are styles 
(especially rel!g!ous styles) . 
May elaborates UPOn a further d!mens!on of Tillich's thou9ht !n 
his suggestion that "every dream has its conscious pole. "i : By th!s he 
means. in part. "the dream is an 'answer' from unconsc1ous lcvols to 
a ' question• posed by \he patient ' s Immediate existence . .. 2 
Out of the matrix {or. as Rank woulC put it. dialoc t!cl 
of c-Onscious and unconscious the symbol is conce ived. 
molded and born . The symbol is "mothered•• by the 
archaic mater tal In so-called unconscious depths , but 
••fathered" by tho individual's conscious existence in 
h1s immediate struggles. 3 
TUHch is primarily concerned about "temporal questions" and "eternal 
answers " and goes beyond the preceding analysis which could work 
qulle readily Into o notyro11~11c framework, 
However, lest this phasB of the investigation labor ~.;nder a rnis -
apprehension, it Is necessary to see that psyeholO<)lcal a!lj social 
factors are important only in the manner of selection and not in the 
actua l production of the content . Tillich rejects the naturalistic 
!mplicattons of the Marxian emphasis on symbols as ideologies or 
political subterfuges and the Ntetzschean (or Freudian) emphasis on 
the unconscious origin of symbols and thelr tack of objecti·;e 
l May, "The Significance of Symbols," op. c!1 . , p. 18 . 
2 
.lli!L· ' :;>. 19 . 
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foundations .1 Nevertheless, what those positions have shov;n ls " that 
the psychological and social situation Is decisive for the selection of 
symbols In all spheres . • 2 And Tllllch suq9ests that althou9h •psycho-
logical and social impulses control the selection, .. 3 these impulses 
••can themselves be viewed as symbols for an ultimate metaphys1cal 
structure of existence . "' 4 Thus the content must be relevant to {and 
even submitted by) reality. Selection is made within reality and upon 
its basis . Therefore neither from the standpoint or the con':ent nor from 
the standpoint of selection Is the production of symbols arbitrary . 
S. Concealment 
In none of his basic discussions of the symbol does Tllhch 
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present this as a characterJsttc; however, a b:te! discuss ton of conceal• 
ment may summarize an area of hls thought only imphcu in the 
preceding characterisUcs. Symbols not only have a revelatory charac-
ter in this ability to probe recesses inaccessible to other rr:eans of 
gaining insights, they are also not the reality •.vhich they open up, ar.ci 
by not actually being that which they refer to, they serve to cover up 
some of the reality of the referent. Thus every symbol which reveals 
also conceals . There is a difference or a 94P between the vehicle of 
1nl11ch, "The Religious Symbol," op . cit . , pp . 78·81. 
2 
.lli2.·' p . 78 . 3 .lli2.· ' p. 81. 
communication and the actual thing whtch is to be corr,municated. 
A symbol Is both a!f!rmed and negated by that to which It refers 
because on the one hand what the symbol says about the referent has 
an adequate basis 1n the referent: the symbol is not just a wild 
expression. On the other hand, "& symboLic expression is one whose 
proper meanmg is negated by that to \o'lhich it points , ,1 because for .,.u 
of its adequacy to communicate what it communicates, lt rr.ust add that 
it falls short of a total communication of the referent . Th1s is seen 
pantculerly tn relation to ultimate reality, for no concept cr system of 
concepts could fully hcdqe In being-Itsel f, which breaks through all 
forms of ex1stence .both erGative ly and destructively in new develop ... 
ments a:td wastes . The neqatlve phase of the symbol Is a ?totection 
ior the referent agoinst being raped by charging barbarians. 
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If the ear11.er discussion on the Increase ln the presence of non-
being in the more powerful expressions of lifo carries over into the 
symbolic, symbols will conta in more negativity than s1gns; there ·,·1111 
be more within the symbol to be conquered 0 And because of this 
greater weic;ht, there w!ll be added opportunity for the sym=>ol to lose 
its function and to be presented as somethinQ adequate tn its own riQht. 
It is important to nouce that the symbol ahvays refers beyOO'Id itself, 
lrullch, Systematic Theology , 1, 239 0 
and, in the sense that the referent utters a no to any assumption of 
excess slg:ntftcance on the part of the symbol, the referent negates 
tho symbol. 
Tt should be possible, by reviewing the discussion of tho abyss 
or demonic aspect of ultimate reality 1 to discover the broad base upon 
which concealment rests .1 As the result of this discussion, 1t should 
not be necessary to fill out the detatls o! concealment . Tho important 
thlnQ to be noticed Is thot symbols contain wlthln themselves the dark-
ness and obscurity of ultimote reality itself . If there ts a clarity 
withln the ultimate, from the human perspective thinQs are certai:"tly 
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rar from clear . The human unconscious and the divine abyss are 
ubiquitous factors in which more is always concealed than !s revealed . 
But this should not be passively accepted as a basis £or hc.ltinq in the 
human endeavor for wisdom and truth; 1t should be the basts upon which 
the inquirer can be incjted on to greater inqujry 1 !or reality is rtch and 
profound : it always holds more than is open to even the most mtansive 
search . If the symbol conceals profound facets of reality 1 it does not 
do so out of molice (to usa o trope) , It does so to beguile the 
inquirer into a deeper intimacy with itself, with the promise of greater 
Insight both Into reollty and the self. 
1VIde supra, pp . 42 - 50 . 
6. SummMy 
The five characteristics of symbols are figurativeness, 
percept1b111ty, innate pOW'er ~ acceptabUity, and concealment . Both 
signs end symbols ate figurative or referential. It is due to men's 
relating ab111ty or universalizlno funcllon that he has the power of 
9rasptn9 the symbol's referontlal quality . 
Percept!b!l!ty has three facets: meonlngfulness Is inextricably 
linked with perceptual involvement; the theoreueal can (ruitfully 
proceed only in connection with the practical; and observauon of actual 
existence reveals it to be disrupted and fragmented . 
It Is because of Its being rooted in reality that the symbol has 
Innate power. Signs and symbols are distinguished In that signs have 
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a lower degree of significance and power than symbols . An examination 
of lang-uage (a type which includes both signs and symbols) reveals 
that there can be no such thing as usage apart ~rom an ontological 
situation which has the potentiality for such usage . In what sense do 
language and other types of signs and symbols participate in reality? 
What 1$ the gener& structure •....-hich grants entrance to symbols? 
Sy:nbols are discovered to have. two main levels of referents: obJec:s 
within reality ar.d ultimate reality . The degree of the proXl:r:ity of 
objects tn ultimate reality determines the natural relettonship and the 
degrco of power which one object can have in reference to another . 
Symbols are objects within reality which are so Jntlmately connected 
with other obJects that their power for referring to thom IS great . 
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The re lationship between symbols and ultimate reality must be 
carefully considered . SJnce everything participates tn ultimate reality f 
everything may be symboltc of ultimate reality . There are ':wo funda-
mental characteristics of ultimate reality, which determine the character 
of symbols w1thln it. Ultimate reality has an abyss (creative-
destructive or demonic) phase and a format phase . Symbols are ne9ated 
by the very object which they represent f for they are never fully 
adequate . Reality 1& fuller than the symbol, and resting or. the abyss, 
the symbol is in do.nger of qiving way to another for:n or symbol. As a 
resu lt symbols are not flnal o r absolutely stable; they are floxlble . 
While Tllllch Insists that symbols are within the structure of 
reality, he also maintains that symbols require a subJect, who Is able 
to recognize their significance . Symbols serve as a revelation or the 
person as well as reality, for they unlock layers of unconsciousness: 
m fact, symbols are produced tn the unconscious dimension of man ' s 
bein9 . 
The characteristic of acceptabflity ts concerned wtth the social 
basis, support, and acceptance of the symbol . In order to disclose 
the root1n9 of the symbol in society T1ll1ch examines the unconscious f 
especially at !ts collective levol. The Important point here Is that the 
symbol ts rooted !n the deepest dimensions of tho human soul . The 
symbol is not arb1trarUy produced or destroyed, for H emeqes from and 
is grounded in the common core of the being of man . As a resu l t the 
symbol probes the deepest levels of the unconsciousness of the self . 
The charactcrlsUc of concealment is actually lmplici: m one 
facet o! innate power and of acceptability . The abysmal phase of 
ultimate reality and unconsciousness as the <;reat symbol producing 
source are negating factors in the symbol itself. The symbol is 
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Insecure (it may 91vo way to some other symbol), and it is often 
unintel llglble or obscur<> (as a dream which must be interpreted) . 
Nevertheless, even this produces no stultifying effect upon the function-
ing of the symbol , for it may lead to otherwise unimaginable flights 
of creativity and to a level of intelli9ibll!ty and insight unettdinable 
by means of a consciousness which ls unconscious of its subterranean 
activity and bein9 . 
CHAPTER III 
R£UGIOUS SYMBOLS 
In the preced ing chapter there has been a general discussion of 
the major charactertsttcs and functions of symbols . In this and the 
next <::~.apter there w111 be an examination of two types o! sy:nbols, 
the reUgtous and the artistlc, or art and relig1on as o!fenng two types 
of symboltsm. The basis for d istinction lies in t he fact "that there are 
levels of reality of 9reat difference, and th&t these different levels 
demand different approaches and different languages." 1 
For Tllhch it is necessary to think of the reli9ious symbol as 
essentla lly different from any other symbols with which it may be 
associated ordinarily . Reliqious symbols refer to that whlch is beyond 
the subject- obJect d i sti.nction, to that which Ss beyond the concoptual 
sphere; they indicate ultimate reality and aro a matter of ultimate 
concern . 2 "Reliqtous language 1s ordinary lon~ua9er change<! under the 
power of what it expresses, the ultimate of being and mean in<; . .. 3 All 
other symbo ls can be placod ln a two -fold classlficatlon: (1) the symbol 
lT1lltch, Theology of Culture, p . 54 . 
2ruhch, "The Rcl19!0us Symbol, • op, cit , , p. 77 . 
3Ti!lich, Theology of Culture , p . 47 . 
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can symbolize '"something that hos also an unsymbollc obJective 
existence aside !rom its ideal sign!l!cancc"l; (2) symbols may be "the 
forms g1vin9 expression to an 1nv1slble thing that has no ex:stence 
except in its symbols. "2 Examples of the former would be the represen -
tation o! a king by a flag or a state by a k!ng; examples of the latter are 
"cultural creatlons like works of art, scientific concepts, !lnd leoal 
forms . oo3 
Tlllich also uses another modo of d!stlnguishing rellg;ous symbols 
from all other expressions. Ultimate reality may be experie:1ce-d and 
expressed either directly or ind1rectly; the direct approach is by means 
of reHqtous symbols, and the lnd trect approach is by philosophy and 
art. 4 
In this chapter there wtll be an attempt to analyze the rellg!ous 
symbol. First it is necessary to see how the notion and sh;;nlflcance 
of reli9ion develop or how religion emerges as ultimate concern. This 
poses certain problems concerning certainty, revelation, and the 
various expressions of the basic concern. The nature and function of 
the symbol as the answer to the quest for God and the reso lution of at 
least the bllslc ;roblems connected with reUQion Wlil then be ex., mined . 
Finally there will be the consideration of the crnena of syml>oh, the 
4T!ll!ch , "Art and Ult imate Rool!ty," op, cit., pp. 2-3. 
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q1.1est1on of religious truth, and the possibility of ldol~try . 
1. Religion as Ultimate Concern 
Without recogn12!nQ that Tillich's views are developed ·.•nthin a 
context of tension and without perceiving that his final system is of 
such a broad scope as to contain within itself many ter.stons~ there IS 
no way of graspinq what he says . Many erluotsms of THhch ~ave 
hinged upon a narrow preoccupation with some specific phase of hts 
thought. Tillich is concerned with some thinqs much broader than 
consistency; he desu-es a configurational coherence or a Gestalt,l 
While some critiCISm of speciflc phases of a 9h1losopher•s position may 
be perfectly leqitimatc, the 9encral trend of a man's though: must not be 
completely negated by one aspect . 
T1ll1ch•s approach 1S summarized at the beginning of o ne of his 
early works. 
When 1 received the invitatlon to give an account of 
how my ideas havo grown from my life, it came to me 
that the concept of the border line might be the fitting 
symbol of the whole of my personal and intellectual 
development. It has been my fate, in almost every 
direction, to stand between alternative possib1Ht1es 
of existence, to be completely at home in neither, to 
take no definitive stand against either. As fruitful as 
such a posltton is for thought, since thinking pre-
supposes recepUveness to fresh possibilities, it ts 
difficult ~nd dangerous for life, which steadily demands 
lpaul TUUch, •Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The 
Theology of Paul Tilllch, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. 
Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), pp. 330-331. 
decisions and thus excluston of alternatives , From 
thts dtSJX>Sition and these tensions have come both 
destiny end task , I 
Now H thls is kept in mtnd, 1t may help to keep some of the later 
developments in perspective . 
I. The Condition of Modern Man 
TllHch is not alone in hiS tensions fn the modern worlci; for 
tnsecurlty and uncertainty seem to prevail . It is the anguish of 
extstence which has been one of the leadtnq forces in the development 
of existentialism as a philosophy, which has contributed to the founding 
of schools of psychotherapy~ and which has been so predominant In 
modern art . 2 In fact I 1t ts in art that one may gain tnsi9hts most !ru1t -
tully into tile h11man sltU3tlon with its problems o 
Scott's analysis of Camus' early works provtcies an excellent 
summary of the attitude of many contomporanes toward the world and the 
Insolubility of its meJor problems of moaning o valuin9, etc . 
Now it 1s in the so early works--m The Stranger 1 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, tn the plays Cross-Purposes 
and C411Sula--that we 9et what Rudoll Bultmonn would 
~11 Camus' .. sense of existence," his sense or what 
man ts up against in thiS world. And the cru.x of 
it ... is the idea of the world'$ absurdity. The 
def1ntt!on of that in relation to which the human task 
lruuch, The Interpret!lt!On of History, p. 3 . 
2cf. Tlll!ch, Theologv of Culture, pp. 96-126 . 
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ts to be carried on does not in other ...  •ords posu any 
specific hindrance or obstruction: rather it is simply 
the calloused "thickness and strangeness of the •.v:)rld" 
that constitutes our irremediable burden . L'absurde 
<;rows out of the fact that life is filled with meanings 
that are incomprehensible to man, that existence 
tntransigently resists man's demand for rational 
coherence , and that man everywhere beholds the evidence 
of the fragility of his life . God Is dead, and the sense 
of angoisse . of l'absurde, QTOW'S out o! the absolu:e 
uncertainty as to whether or not tho:-o ts any effecttve 
ontolOgical warrant for the continuance of the enterprise . 
The issue is the anx1cty of emptiness, of meaninglessness: 
and the scene that ts explored in Camus' early writings 
ts the Abyss of ~ m whoso servitude human life is 
caught at the end of the modern period--a world In which 
Nothing is at the center, the world of Hardy and Conrad, 
of Hemingway and Malraux and Sanre . 1 
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T1llich has attempted to get at tho bases upon which such ongoisse 
or Anqst rests. In his attempt he asks quosuons concernin~ the 
cond itions which make such tension poutble, and he examines this from 
the viewpoint of psychotherapy . Hts fasclnatlng analys1s o! this leads 
him to distingutsh between existential anx1ety and patholOQlcal anxiety . 
Existential anxiety 1s a necessary predicament of all men because "it 
belongs to existence as such and not to an abnormal state of mind as in 
neurotic (and psychotic) anxiety . .. 2 k'l\ examination of huma:. nature will 
show the baste types of existential anxiety . 
lNath&n A, Scott, Jr., "The Modest Optimism of Albe~ Camus," 
The Christian Scholoc, XUI (December, 1959), 261. 
2T11Uch, The Courage To Be, p, 41. 
Earlier diScussion pointed out that the broadest characterizations 
of reality or of that which is are the fact simply that someth1ng js and 
the f~ct that 1t mtght cease to be; b thing- ha s both being and non-beln9 . 
But tho notion of being goes beyond the simple assertion that somothlnq 
ts to the ground by which that something has come to be and In which It 
ls presently existing, and the simple fact that a thing may not be is 
rooted in the basic structure of that which produces anythin9 . 
In looking at thlnqs insofar as they are, that is 
m looking at the quality of beinq in all beinqs, we may 
discover two baste characteristics or thing-s: the ultimate 
seriousness and the ultimate lnsecunry of things . Through 
the mere fact that something is, that it takes pan 10 being, 
tt shares in these two qualities . They do not follow from 
a special structure of things, they are dependent 01 the 
mere being of things . Seriousness ts meant to be the 
expression for the feeling that every being gives us through 
its pure belnQ, that !t ls ultimately impenetrable , that lt 
cannot be either removed or invented, in short, that it has 
an ultimate, unconditioned power of cXlstence . Insecurity 
is meant to express that things show an ultimate lack of 
weight, an indication of possible non- being, a dehctency 
of ultimate necessity . ... That every betng partSc!pates 
in absolute betng shows the seriousness of thin<;s . That 
it ls separated fro m the absolute shows the 1nsecwity 
of things , l 
Insecurity Is the term used in tho preceding passage for the posstblltty 
a thing has that It might not be; In The Couraoe To Be the term "anxiety" 
is used to indicate "the state 1n which a being is aware of its possible 
1ruuch, The Inter pretation of History , pp , 270-271. 
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non·betno,••l or ••the existential awareness of non-being,• 2 m 
briefer form . This condition and thB awareness of it may also be 
descr ibed as " finitude J experienced as one ' s own finltude. "3 
Now every being which may cease to be also has power to resist 
non -betng; the general expression for this resistance 1s the courage to 
be . 4 Courage may assume three different forms correspondin9 to the 
three different negations which are possible . The threats by non - being 
are fate , death, emptiness, meaninglessness , QUilt, and condemnation , 
and these may be classified in three qroups o! twO . Toe threats of fate 
and death pO"oduce the anxiety o! death; the threats of emptiness and 
meaninglessness produce the anxiety of meaninglessness; and the 
threats of guilt and condemnation pO"Oduce the anxiety of condemnation . 0 
The couraqe which meets the threat and battles with the anxiety 
will be three- fold: ontic self - a.ffirmallon, spiritual sclf-afflrmation, 
and moral sell-afflrmation. 6 Societies in general and part1cu1ar people 
within them vary with respect to the type of threat which produces most 
conc.ern , and though no person or society may be tota lly freo from any 
type of anxtety, each person and society is dominated by one type . The 
lT!Il!ch, The Courage To Be, p. 35 . 2lbld . 
3lbld. 4rbtd . , passim. Sib>d . , pp. 40- 54 . 
6Jbld . 
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Greeks were plagued with the problems of fate and death; ~he Med1.aevals 
were concerned over guilt and condemnation; an<i modern society Ss 
besieged by overwhelming emptiness and meaninglessness 0 1 
Anxiety in this concept,. in contrast to the notion of fear, does not 
have any Qarticular obJect which produces it. 2 Hetdegger's view 
parallels Tllllch's in that for both dread or anxiety (as the translation 
of the Gcrr.:an Angst) is the threat of nothingness and not the threat of 
some particular thing 0 3 
Roberts has a brief summary of T11lich on this point ~s well as 
another phase of human conflict. 
Finitude is the ontological bo!lsis of human anxiety . 
Tillich uses the latter term in this connoctlon, to refer to 
Urangst . As such it must be distinguished 1 of co.1rse I 
!rom fear, which Is d>rected toward definite obJects and 
can be overcome by action. It must also be distinguished 
from neurotic anxiety··which, like Unangst, may be 
independent of any special objects or occasions ("free 
floating") --but wh1ch can be removed psychotherapeutically 
by the resolution of inner conflicts . Like Kierkeg;ard and 
HeideQQer, Till!ch regards urongst as directed toward 
••nothinQness . " Though ineradicable 1 it can be accepted 
and used creative ly as a part of what 1t means to be 
human . 4 
1told . • PP . 57- 63. 2tbld . , pp. 36 - 3S. 
3cochrane, op . cit. , pp. 80- 8! . 
4Davld E. Roberts , "Tilllch's Doctrine of Man,• The Theology oi 
Paul Tlll!ch, ed . Char les W . Kegley and Robert W . Bretall (New York : 
The Mocmit tan Co . , 1952), pp. 121-122 . 
Tilhch pointS out that there are many conflicts which arise from the 
"Cont1n<;ent occurrences i n human life . .. l In connection w1th these 
psychotherapy can perform quite adequately , and yet certain problems 
do arise because of the fo1lure to take ontologleal matters into 
consideration . 2 
In contrast to this w!despread djsturbance over what man ts as 
well as the prcdlc~ment Into which he Is plunged there Is the Thomis tic 
(or nee-Thomistic) optimism: 
Gllson's Insistence upon the substantial etern!ty 
of things and their existential contingency, and cpon 
the fact that creatures 1n themselves do not have any 
potency for nonbeing, stands in considerable contrast 
to the Heldeggerlan and Tillichian doctrine that Dase!n 
or finite beinq part!cipates 1n nonbetng and in consjderable 
proxlmity to Barth•s doctrine of the qoodness of the 
created world and Its created freedom to exist 0 'The 
nothing does not enter into the Neo·Thomist deflnttlon 
of existence 0 The Thomlsts are ~ot perturbed by the 
question of ha,o~ 1 can exist in the face of the threat of 
non being 0 While they do not exactly take exlster.ce for 
granted as .t.u"istotle d id , yot for them existence is c;iven 
and once given imparts substantial e ternity to creatures . 
For this reason the whole exis tential pathos which we 
find expressed in various ways in Kierkegaard, Jaspers , 
Heldegger, Sartre, and Tlll!ch Is missing In the Neo-
Thomlsts . !heir approach to exlstence is impersonal 
and objective . 3 
1rlll!ch, The Coura9e To Be 0 P o 64 0 
3cochrane , opo cit ., p o 103 o 
z Ibid., PPo 64-65 o 
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Discussion tn Chapter non the ontoloqlcal issues and the presence 
of non- boJng tn ultimate reality as well as the insecurity o f all BnJre 
beings, and the existential emphasis which at least deHm~ts the 
impersonal approach to human existence, along with the general sense 
of meoninglessness or rejection oCcurrent and traditional consuucUons 
of meaningful systems, .,.,·ould all conspire against the Thomistic 
optimism. HO'.-.rever I the solution to [his problem does not seem to be 
essential to the progress of the discussion. 
It may be well at this point to Indicate that T!lllch does not pose 
man as he is as the only way of looking at the picture . Human na:ure 
must be regarded from tho standpoint of "essential 90odness, existential 
estrangement"! as well as from the perspective of the posslbtllty of 
salvation •through which the cleavage is ove:-come and healed . .. 2 As 
such, man has an essential nature, an existential nature, and a teleo-
logical nature . 3 
If the doctrine of man ' s original goodness !S lacking, 
man Is Identified with his unlimited libido ond the 
despair about life which is its necessary consequency . 
The h-ealin9 fn a radical sen so 1s not possible . Freud 
Is right In combining his libido doctrine with his 
doctrine of the death instinct for lndividuals and 
cultures . But he is wrong tn soyinQ that this is man's 
essential nature (Instead of tt!s e:dstent!al distortio~l. 
If he were right, Schopenhauer' s introduction of 
lruuch, Theology of Culture, p. 119 . 
2Jbid . 
JndJan ideas to the \'lest would be the last answer 
to the problem of human nature . Salvation •.vould 
be annihilation of creaturely existence .1 
Thus Tillich points to some hope in the human situation v.•hlle 
making <:lear that there is no easy path to human attatnmer.t. 
11. Arguments for God's Exlstence 
If such widespread doubt, turmoil, and agony perstst, ·.vhat kind 
of op;>eal can and should be made to people who are preoccupied wlth 
these? It is just to these people that Tillich speaks with tho most 
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vigor and effectiveness, for he too re<;ards doubt as one of the necessary 
factors in belief; and, in fact , the man who doubts is saved as well 
as the person who believes, for even ho who doubts is concerned or 
else hB would be lndtfferent to both faith and unbelief . 2 
To the man who longs for God and cannot find Him; 
to the mon who wants to be acknowledged by God 
and cannot even believe that He is; to the man who 
1Paul Tillich, "Psychotherapy and a Christian Interpretation of 
Human Nature, " Review of Religion, XII! (March, 1949) 1 268 . For a 
very careful analysis of the general contrast made by Tilltch between 
tr.e essential and the existential refer to Systematic Theology, !I 1 19- 78. 
2ct. Soren Aabye Kieri<egaord, Concluding Unscientl!ic Post-
script, trans . David r . Swenson and Walter Lo.,..-rie (Prlnce-=:on: 
Princeton University Press . 1944), passim. Notice especial!y 
KierkeQaard's insistence that "even he who is lost through passion 
has not lost so much as he who lost passion, for the forme' had the 
possibility .•• P . 540 . 
Cf . olso Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi ' s position in Dhirendra 
Mohan Datto, The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), p . 39 . 
is striving for e new and imperishable meanino of 
his life and cannot discover Lt--to this man Paul 
speaks _I 
That is, salvation is not just for the man who exclaims that he has 
attained; salvation is for the man who Is concerned about truth and 
meanin9 . "'There 1s faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith m 
the truth as such, even if the only truth ·.ve can express is our lack of 
truth ... 2 "All that matters is not one's faith in objective facts, but 
one ' s concern to find the final ultimate truth,'1 3 as Killen Jr.terprets 
T!ll!ch . It Is here that Tlllich's view that theism (of the ordinary 
variety, l.e. with its emphasis upon a kind of anthropomorphism or of 
a 9od who Is less than the God who Is being - Itself) is the basic 
provocateur of atheism . 4 "'The great maJority of both contempor~y 
secular philosophers and Protestant theoloqians . . . have abandoned 
the traditional theistic proofs as being nondemonstraUve . .. 5 Therefore 
since arguments for God's existence are not adequate, the tnqutrlnQ 
mind, whlch cannot be satisfied in subteriuqe anci easy faith, 
1THI!ch, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 139. 
2Tllllch, The Protestant Era, p . xiv . 
3KJI!en, op. cit., p . 24 . 
4TIIlich, The Shaking of the Foundations, pp . 45-46· The 
·-Protestant ETa, pp . xiv- xv . 
5;ohn Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1957), p . xvll . 
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frequently turns to atheism as ~n alternative . But Tillich' s point here 
is that even this person 1s grasped by a profound faith, which anchors 
him In the true God . 
Tillich suggests tha t there are two majo:- approaches to the 
existence of God, and there are t\\'o types or philosophy o! rei19ion 1 
which are contingent upon the approach taken . These are :he ontological 
and the cosmological approaches . I The ontolo9ical approach will appear 
to most philosophers prima facie as one type of argument in comrast to 
another type; but Tlll!ch def!nJtely does not mean that the ontoiO<,Jical 
approach be regarded as an argument, as the succeeding dtscusston will 
make obvious . What Tillieh refers to is an approach whlei". lies behind 
and supports arguments for God's existence, giving them direction and 
significance; and these at9uments may be ontological or cosmolog ical. 
The distinction between these two types of approach ts seen by 
contrasttn9 the Franciscan school of thineenth-century scholasticism 
which included Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Matthew of 
Aquasparta whose major '"emphasis wes on the immediacy of the know-
ledge of God"2 with the Thomistic approach, which proceeds from the 
effects of God to the God who 1s their cause . 3 The former Q.pproach 
begins wilh God and thus has him before it begins the actual ar9ument: 
1rulich, Theology of Culture, pp . I0- 29 . 
2 ~ .. p , 13 . 3Ib!d 0 ' pp 0 12 - 22 0 
"God is the presupposition of tho question of God ... l It also asserts 
that ••God can never be reached 1f he Is the obJect oi a question, and 
not its basis . .. z The other approach maintains that knowledge Is not 
immediate, lt ls mediated . Such a method always falls short of 
complete demonstration, and the theory of Duns Scotus that "'demon-
str4tiones ex Unite remain within the finite and cannot reach the 
inflntte''J is doflnitlve. 
The onto!O<)Ical principle Is defined more fully In the following 
statement: "Man is immediately aware of something uncor.ditional 
wh.ieh Is the prius of the separation and tnteractior~ of subject and 
obJect, theorettcally as woll as practically." 4 rn the first place 1 this 
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definition is an attempt to point out that man 1n hls total being ts "aware• 
of somethlnq: I.e . , it is the reJection of a psycnolO<)y which gives each 
psychic function its isolated sphere o! operation, and tt is the 
acceptance of a psychology (which ts as old es Au9ust!ne, at least, anC 
as new as contemporary psycholoqios) S which shows "~he mutual 
tmmane!"'ce of the funcUons of the soul and the impossibility of 
I ibid., p. 13 . 2Ibld . 
31bld .,p.i9 . 4I" l . 22 ~- · p. . 
5cr. the brief discussion of tho Gestalt>stS tn Floyd L. Ruch, 
Psychology and Life (4th ed.; New York: Scott , roresman and Co ., 
19531' pp . 21- 22. 
separatinq them . .. 1 Hera Tillich wants espectally to emphastze the 
fact that "man, not hls cognitive function alone, is a· ... · are of the 
Uncond1Uoned . "2 Man Is present as a participant in reli~lous ex-peri-
ence; he !s not just a spectator and cannot grasp wha.t is Qolnq on ln 
thls attitude. 
That of which man is aware is not an object for man as a knowlnq 
subject; God ts the power of being which precedes this distinction both 
logically and ontolog!cally . God Is not one being alongside other 
betngs; he is not even primus inter pares; he is the power of being 
itself wttho-•t whtch nothing would now be. God ts not the totallty of 
being, bu' the baste power of being or the creative energy by which 
anything comes into existence . 3 TUlich ' s procedure here 1s not to 
define God into existence I but rather to use "God" as the term for 
something which actually exists . 
Now if God appears as the power of baing, which resists non-
being I then Ol"'.o's very own existence is inextricably involved with 
God: God 1s no1: a stranger, nor does one come to kr.ow h1m as such; 
rather God Is that :rom which one has proceeded and possibly is 
estranged, but he is that wHh which one's deepest being 1s most 
vitally involved . 4 It should not appear stranqo, then, that religion 
1 Ibid., p . 23 . 2 lbtd . ,p . 24. 
3Ib!d . , pp . 24-26 . 41btd . ' pp, 10- 11. 
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should be defined as "being ultimately concerned about that which ts 
and should be our ulUtnate concern . ,.l .. Faith" and "God" are defined 
respectively as "the state of be1n9 grasped by an ultimate concern"2 
.and "the content of the concern . .. 3 The basis o! such concern is 
expressed tn the statement that .. our ultimate concern is that which 
determines our being or not-be1n9 . " 4 "Being" here refers to "the 
whole of human reality 1 the structure I the meaning, and tl'.e aim of 
existence," 5 since the very foundation of human existence is at stake. 
To define religion in such broad terms is to open it \:P to a 
proliferation of potential contents; there certainly is no specification 
that the content shall be a narrow denom.inational religiosity . In fact 1 
though Tlllteh may think that he is produetn9 a Chrtsttan system (and 
there may· be good reasons for thinking that he has or has not done sol I 
it is necess.ary to notice that he does not attempt to res,ricc reltq1on to 
traci.Hion41 forms of Chr1&tianny, although he does re9ard h1s position 
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es retaining the valuable lr. the tradition . Tillich ur<)es men to recognize 
that reU910n ts to be understood as that dimension .... ·h.ich qoes beyond 
every manifestation ln cultural form evan thou9h this !orm be some 
particular religion . It is also to be recognized that ultimato concern 
I fbld ., p , 40 . 3rbid . 
4ftllteh, Systematic Theology, I, 13 , 51J:>Id . , p, 14 . 
may bo present even 1n something ordtnarUy recognized as secular; and 
the "secularist" may turn out to be more re ligious than the "faithful 
believer . • 1 
It may appear as a uemencious advantage to have rehgion defined 
so broadly, for it takes away the insolence and arrogance of the 
rel1Q1ous man who feels that he has now attained and has ~he last word 
(God's Word) on the subject. It thus tends to qlve flnalltl and 
certainty in being a matter of ultimate concern, and yet it tends to 
favor humility in the recognition or the l&ck of a Uno I statement on the 
actual expression of that concern . The scientific attnucie, careful 
analysis and experimemauon. and a satisfaction with o:-tly the most 
probeble hypothesis are here given entrance . However, it must be 
pointed out that Till!ch cioes not ht~ve any fundamental concern for the 
srudy of science as such 1 nor does he regard contempOrary scientl£ic 
approaches to rel!glon as adequate. 2 All that Is being suggested hero 
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is that Till1ch has an awareness of the Importance of moving very 
cautiously in the erection or a theological system . Humility (as science 
insists and probabilism of any sort requires) is a prerequ1s:te of 
religious investigation . This is seen further in what follows . 
Lrmlch, Theology of Culture, pp . 40- 43 . 
2Tllllch, Systematic Theology, I, 40-46 . 
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TUJlch regards tdmself as spannin9 the ga!) between European and 
American thinking. The European approach places emphasis on the 
divine presence and d ivine certainties; the American approach is broadly 
characterized as pragmatic with a nominalistic basis. The nominaUstic 
attitude 
Is the feeling of standing at the periphery end not at 
the center of truth, and therefore the demand for 
tentative steps from the periphery towards the ce:tter, 
always aware of tho fact that they are tentative and 
may lead in a wron; direction .1 
One of the very beneficial effects of this attitude is a QOnu1ne humility 1 
but this humi lity may tw-n into arro9ance if it proceeds to the dismissal 
of ultimate questions in a preoccupation with preliminary matters . 
The earlier definitiOn of fai th should now be broadened to include 
not only the st,e1te of being ultimately concerned but also the risk 
involved m the ondeovo:- to relate this concern with some concrete 
manifestation or embodiment in wh1ch the concern can become fully 
realized. 
The immediate awareness of the Unconditioned has 
not the character o f faith but of self-evidence . Faith 
contains a continQent element and demands a risk. It 
combines the ontological certalnty of the Uncondl ~toned 
with the uncertainty about everything conditloned and 
concrete . This, of course I does not mean that faith is 
belief In something which has higher or lower degrees 
ol probab!l!ty . The risk of faith Is not that It accepts 
assertions about Goci, man and world , which cannot be 
1t!lllch, Theology of Cul ture, p . 171. 
lull y verified, but mtght be or might not be In the 
future. The risk of fallh Is based on the fact that 
the unconditional element can become a matter of 
ultimate concern only if it appears ln a concrete 
embodiment . . . . The risk of faith is an exfstential 
risk f a risk in which the meaning and fulfilment of 
our Hves 1s at stake, and not a theoretical judgrr.~r'!t 
which may be refuted sooner or later .1 
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lt is true that there are some religious theories end organizations which 
meke e pretense of finality. Faith here is simply the acceptance of the 
theory or organi zation; the acceptance is pri:narily mtellectual; end 
security is offered, risk is either reduced to a minimum or completely 
destroyed . 
Any system wluch sets ltscH up with this kind of finality Is in 
fundamental opposition to the Protestant prlnclple, but this principle 
must await clarltlcatlon for a later seeUon. Here it can only be 
pointed out that I'illich's approach ;lves a principle of certamty to 
religion, and it also gives science and other cultural creations c3 chance 
to move with some degree of autonomy . The kind of confidence which 
culture can hovo is not the security of absolute certitude or the hope of 
the final attainment of the same; rather it is the freedom to ongoge in 
activity without the fear of the imposi tion of an external authority . 
Iii . The Dimension of Depth 
IUilch hao given the name ••dimension of depth" to that leve l of 
I fbid., pp . 27-28. 
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human experience which involves the kind of .. awareness" included ln 
the ontolOQ!cal approach . Rel19lon Is not the product of some or9ant-
zation, nor is it some special function of the mind or self; relf9ion is 
the dimension of depth: "Reltgion !s not a spec1al function of man's 
spiritual life, but it ts the dimension of depth in all of its r~,~ncttons . .. 1 
The dimension of depth "points to that which is ultimate, infinite, 
unconditional in man's spi.r.ttual ll!e . Religion, in the largest and most 
baste sense of the word, is ulUmate concern . • 2 Since this 1s the case, 
why is Jt necessary to have this added section on the dimension of 
depth? The function of th1s section is to inve stiQate reltg!on somewhat 
further and to point up the essence o f religion somewhat more clearly . 
To say that religion is the dimension of depth is to 9et at the heart of 
the matter . 
Deep, in itS spiritual use, has 1\\"0 mean!ngs . ... 
Truth Is deep and not shallow. Suffering Is depth and not 
height. Both are deep, the light of truth and the darkness 
of suffering , There Is a depth In God and there Is a depth 
out of which the psalmist cries to God . 3 
For Tllllch profundity or depth Is not a matter of scholarship or 
erudition, the simple worker may actually bo tn the possess1on of truth, 
whereas the detached but learned scholar may have no ttut?l thouqh he 
knows aU . .. Nothing of real importance is too profound for anyone. 
1
r!lllch, Theoloqv of Culture, pp . 5- 6. 2Ibid" pp . 7-8 . 
3Paul Tillich, " Depth," Christendom, IX (Summer, 1944) , 317 , 
Not because it is too profound but because it is too uncomfonable you 
shy away from it. ul ThJs might cause considerable difficulty for some 
philosophers who accuse Tll!lch or greeting inquiring minds and hearts 
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with abstract being, thus restrictinq reiig!on to the intellectually elite . 2 
The attitude tO\vard ultimate reality ("which underlies every 
reahty••3 and which "characterizes the whole a?pearln<;; world as non-
ulUmate 1 prohminary, transitory and finite'"4) 
Is the awareness of the deceptive character of every-
thi!'l.q we encounter which drives one to discover what 
is below the surface . But soon we tealiz.e that even 
If we break through the surface of a thing or person or 
event 1 nBw deceptions arise . So we try to dlg further 
through what l!es deepest below the surface--to the 
truly real which cannot deceive us . We search for an 
ultimate reality, for something lasting in the flux of 
transitoriness and finitude . All philosophers searched 
for it, e\19n If they called change Itself the unchanginQ 
in all being . 5 
This is in the language of philosophy and will sound !orel9n :o the mind 
unacquainted with such terminology. However, the language may sh1!t, 
and one may speak of "what you take seriously without any 
reservations . .. 6 
1 
..lli!L·. p . 323 . 
2wi11Jam P , Alston, "Tilllch on Idolatry," The Journal of 
Religion, xxxvm (October, 1958). 267. 
3rulicn, "Art and Ultimate Reality, " op. cit . ; p . 1. 
s,ola . 6Tillich, "Depth, 11 op. cit:., p. 320 . 
All men have this level of awareness in their experience, even 
though they may not be fully conscious of it; there Js a focal point, 
something which gives direction and meanin9 to life, something which 
is to be taken in profound seriousness . 
The term situation seems to mean somethinQ whtch Js 
established, at rest and constant, a baste fact which 
lies at a deeper level than do all the visible tende ncies, 
something which Is Invisible to those who live wtthln 
it but which is, for that reason, all the more ef!e:tive . 
It refers to an unconscious, self-evident faith which 
ll<>s at a deaper !<>vel than th<> apparent antithesis of 
the belle! and unbellef which both arise out of It and 
are both equally rooted in it . ThJs unconscious !atth 
which is not assatled because it is the presupposition 
of Hfe and is l!ved rather than thought of, thls all-
determining, Unal source of meaning constitutes the 
actual religious situation of a period .1 
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Tilltch speaks of "the unconditional of which we are immed1ately aware, 
if we turn our minds to it ... '2: .,No human mind is entirely v:ithout an 
ultimate concern and some practical and theoretical expressions of it . .. 3 
iv . Revelation 
The baste problem of modern man has been 1nvestiga!ed, and 
TilJich has shown how the question of God 1 s eYJstence fits into the 
total picture of the quest for God. All has revolved upon Tlllich's 
1Tlllich, The Religious Situation, pp . 39-40 . 
2Tlll!ch, Theology of Culture, p . 29 . 
3rlll!ch, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism, • op . cit. , p. 347. 
insistence upon a fundamental awareness which all men have. This 
raises further questions concerning the nature of this awareness and the 
relation betwoen the religious awareness 1 religious symbols~ and 
symbols in 9eneral. 
Tillich def1nos revelation as "the manifestation of the depth of 
reason and of the \)Tound of boin9 . .. 1 That revelation should be the 
manifestation of the ground of bein9 is already clear from preceding 
discussion, but what is the depth of reason? The depth of reason 
would have to be something beyond the structuros both of reality (1n 
the restricted sense) and of the mind . "'The depth of reason 15 the 
expression of something that is not reason but wh!ch precedes reason 
and Is manifes t through It . ,.z It Is that phase of ultimate reality which 
reveals itself !n the logos aspect of reality. Now since every operation 
within reality receives its meaning by means of reference to ultimate 
reality, reason is deficient unless it points to the depth of reason. 
Thus revelation is essential to the adequate functioning- of reason it set:, 
and without revelation reason ialls into conflict with itself , 3 
It is helpful to look est revelation from the standpoint of its 
relation to Tillich's trinitarian principle . This helps to indicate the 
various factors present in a revelatory situation . 
1nlltch, Systematic Theology, L 117 . 
2 12!2.. ' p • 79 • 
It Is the abysmal character of the divine llfe whic h 
makes rove latJon mysterious ; it is the logical charac-
ter of the divine life which makes the revelation of 
tho mystery possible; and It Is the spiritual character 
of :he divine life •.vhich creates the correlation of 
miracle and ecstasy ln which revelation can be 
received . Each of these three concepts which point 
to the ground of revelation must be used . U the 
abysmal character of the d1vine life is neglected, 
a rationalistic deism transforms revelation into 
Information . If the logical character of the divine 
life Js neglected , an irraUonallstic theism trans-
forms revelation into heteronomous subJection . If 
the spiritual character of the divine life Is ne9lected, 
a h istory of revelation is impossible . The doctrir.e 
of revelation is based on o trinitarian interpretation 
of the divine life and Its self-manifestation .1 
Klllen has explored Tllllch's theory of revelation qui:e carefully 
and compares and contrasts Tilllch's theory with the v1ew of reformed 
theology. 
The depth of reason in man reveals particularly :he 
reol!ty and experience of Ultimate Bein9 and Is T!Uich's 
explanation of what is generally classed as general 
revelation . Reformed theology would say that when, 
for example , men reveal in pa1ntinqs and works oi 
art a consciousness of somethinq of Ult imate meaning 
and of the Ultimate ItSelf , this is an evidence that 
man has rccoived yeneral revelation from God and--
as Is explained by the Scriptures In RomansCh. 1--
not \o':antlnq to accept it has changed it into something 
else·-11hlls changed the truth of God into a lie" . If 
~ reVE:lals strange and awful reactions to God this ls 
an evidence or (J:eneral revelation , though tho thouQht 
expressed in the a.rt itself is not the revelation v .. l-.ich 
God has 9iven but an interpretation and distortion made 
of It by man . Tllllch sees this reaction In art and calls 
1t an evidence of the "depth of reason". Reformed 
1told . ' pp . 156-157 . 
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theology would call it an evidence and result of general 
rovelation, being careful to make It clear that what is 
seen tn art and the pagan rel1910ns Is not the revelation 
itself but man's reaction to the revelation. He sees 1t 
as a real revelation though Jn symbolic form. 
Tlllich has apparently no real appreciation of 
the distinction between generttl and special revelation 
since he both confuses the experience of individual 
illumination with that of spec ial revelat!on--collinQ 
Ulumtnation special revelation--and classes lt with 
what comes under general revelation .1 
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Killen's basic chan;e Is thot Tllllch falls to distinguish between special 
and general revelation, but Tillieh's answer would be quite simply that 
there is no special revelation, !! special revelation means that some-
thin9 Is unambiguously given which must be unambiQUOusly understood 
end/or obeyed . Z 
Though there is something about the revelation whlch is given, 
this is always in connection with its being taken or recc:uved . "In one 
and the same passage revelation and the reception o! revelation are 
inseparably united . .. 3 
The baste error of fundamentalism is thet it overlooks 
the contribution of the receptive side tn the revelatory 
situation and consequently ident1ftes ~ tnd1v1ci~;al 
and conditioned form of recelvin9 the divine with the 
divine Itself . 4 
1Killen, op. cit., p . SS . 
2This wt!l be discussed later with the question of Idolatry and the 
Protestant principle . 
3rllllch , Biblical Religion and tho Search for Ultimate Realltv, p, 4. 
4 lbld . 
97 
Revelation bears some of the same qu~UUes as a more general experience 
which occurs, for "when spirit understands spirit it interprets e.t the 
same tJme . The object receh-es a meaning which is born out of the 
interaction of that which understands with that wh!ch is understood . •• ) 
The essence of Tillich ' s insistence upon revelation !S in tha lack 
of self-sufficiency of human thought and effort apart from their being 
rooted In the ground and abyss of the!r be1ng.2 To say that there 1s the 
reception of revelation or of content but an inabllity to produce ft 
within the finite is simply another way of saying that human existence 
and its mode s of expression in culture are the perpetual quesuons but 
that the ans• .... ers are not to be given within the questions or that the 
questio~s do not evoke their own answers though they may have an 
almost total affect upon the form which the answers will take . 3 Human 
existence is disrupted and disjointed; there Is sin and guil:. emptiness 
and meaninglessness, and there is subjection to contingency an<i even 
death. If an onswer is given. it is because there is a fulfilled time, a 
1
ruuch, The Religious Situation, p . 67 . 
2ct. ospoc!aUy Tlllich, Tho lntorprotat!on of History, pp , 25-26 . 
One can see this concept on almost every other page of Tillich's 
wriUnqs , 
3cf. Tillich, The New Being, p, 123; Theology of Culturo, p, 49 . 
"moment of time which ts invaded by eternity. ,.1 There are other 
passages wh1ch bring out this basic fact . 2 
Revelation is not to be taken "in the distorted sense of an 
authoritative divine information. Revelation is the self-manifestation 
of ultimate reality Jn ecsttJitic experiences, expressed in symbols ... 3 
In revelation "it Js not God that is given, but the symbols of the 
encounter between God and man . " 4 
A new awakening ... cannot be r.l&de, but only 
received .... \Ve can do nothlng. More harmless 
but just as impossible is 1t to wish to make ne•.•; 
symbols In culture and religion . Symbols also qrow 
and are not mtJide . And 1t has been evidenced that 
they grow most creatively at the point where revelation 
breaks through . It Is by the prophetic personality 
and not through the :priests of religion nor the leaeers 
of cultW'e that the dec1s!vo symbols are created . But 
to try to make a new chureh or a new culture \vlth the 
help of new symbols is to attempt to evade the ·...-ord 
of revelation . S 
A prophet may evan change .. the encounter berwee:1 God and man . '"6 
A.::"'l.d the reason reltgtous symbols are born and die is because "they are 
1Ttll1ch, T~.e Religious Situation, p. 176 . 
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2ct. especially Tillich's The lnteroretat!on of History, pp . 173- 17 4, 
3rUl1ch, 11The Rolation of Metaphysics and Theology," oo . cit . , 
p . 60. 
4
r HUch , "Theology &nd SymboUsm," op. cit. , p. Ill. 
ST!ll!ch, The Interpretation of History, pp . 239 - 240. 
6rullch, "Theology and Symbolism, • op , cit., p , 113. 
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the expression of an encounter with ultimate reality, and they disappear 
If this k ind of encounter disappears . .,l Each Individual an~ each 
soc!ety has its O'A'n distinctive approach, and this makes its contri-
bution to the changes within the revelauonal configurat10n. 2 
The best passage for stating the nature of revelation ir. relation 
to symbols and theology Is as follows: 
Theology is not rellglon, but it presupposes 
religion. Every religion expresses itself in symbols 
of its ultimate concem. These "symbols of fatth•• 
are the subject-matter of theology . Theology, In 
spite of its name, ts not "sctenoe of God, .. but it is 
the logos-determined interpretation of the symbols of 
God ' s self- manifestation in a concrete situation. 
These symbols are not arbitrary interpretations of the 
concrete revelatory expenences . But they appear 
within this experience itse lf . They are not created 
intentionally, but they are bern in the same dimension 
in which tho revelatory e~rlanca takes place . ! l'l 
and through Its symbol$ the religious encounter w lth 
reality opens up the dimension of reality In which 
ultimacy appears. There is no other way of cxpress1:1g 
our encounter with the holy than in symbols. Therefore~ 
the "logos of theos," theolo11y, is the logos of the 
symbols in which His manifestation expresses itself . 3 
The basic substance or content of revolation is love. HThe final 
1Jb!d . ' ;> . 111. 
2Ttlllch, The Interpretation of History, pp. 173- 174. 
3ruUch, "The Relation of Metaphysics and Theology ,• op . cit.. 
p . 59 . 
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revelation, and the Ctnt~l salvation, is love ... 1 Since revelation is a 
coming together of the temporal and the eternal, love is the only answer, 
for "love alone can transform itself according to the concrete demands 
of every ind!vidual and social situation without losing its e ternity and 
dignity and unconditional reality . • 2 
Thore are. many finer nuances of Tillich's theory of rAvelatfon; 
however, his basic positiol'l has been set forth 1 and this is all that is 
possible. 
2. The Role of Rollq!ous Symbols 
As the preceding sections hove shown, there is some direct 
contact with God . The dimension of depth ts a level of the self's 
experience m wllicb there Is an Immediate apprehension of ultimate 
reality whereas on all other levels of experience there is rr.cdlation, 
whether this be in connacUon with other phases of reh9ious experience 
or in the development of doctrine. Nevertheless, the dimension of 
depth does not seem to be very fruitful, if left to itself or ~~ unolabo-
rated . It becomes fruitful only in conJunction with experience in ell of 
its variety. The dimension thus is primarily generative of Inquiry; It 
1oav1d \Vesley Soper 1 MaJor Voices in Arnericar. Theology 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), p. 143 . 
2nll1ch, The Protestant [ra, p . 155. Cf. a lso Syste :natlc 
Theol09y, I, 151-153 . 
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gives point and focus to activity; !t ts the production of the Insistence 
upon the ultJmote meaningfulness of the world a.nd human Lfe, though 
the actual content of meaning may vary so much as to produce a theistic 
approach on the one hand and/or .en atheism on the other , 
Now once this fundamental encounter hos occurred, :here is the 
need for ~hought, for some specific content to the worship. Reliqious 
experience is not just some encounter with an oblong blur, which cannot 
be approached except at the Intuitive level. Though Tllllch may have 
certain basis in his thought for the accusation that he is a mystic, he 
insists upon the significance of things ln the approach to God, and 
reqards things as opening up facets of the nature of G-od: :he cosmo-
loqlcaJ approach rests upon the ontological approach, though the 
cosmological approach Is Inadequate by Itself . 
There are reasons for regarding the religious functior. of the 
symbol as the essence of the symbol In Tllllch's system. The terms 
figurative and symbolic are es;>eclally appllcable to concrete conflg-
urations which rotor particularly to bein9 itself or ultimate reality . 
TilHch uses the words figurative and symbolic in contrast 10 what 
something 1s said to be dtrectly; in other words, the reference 1s not 
directly to an object which can be pointed out .1 "A reo! symbol points 
let. Tllllch, •The Religious Symbol, • op . cit. , pp . 77, 83, 
89- 91' 97 . 
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to an obfect which never can become an object. .. l An idea is figuratlvc 
\ ... ·hen "it does not signify an object, that is, it must be ttanscendent . "2 
And "real symbols provide no objective knowledge, but yet a true ow.ara-
ness ... 3 From earller discussion It Is to be l:nmedlatoly recognized 
that the last passage simply rofers to the dlmenston of depth In which 
there ts awareness without isolated cognitive apprehension . 
In one of Tllllch's latest articles he uses symbol only !or 
religious meanings; philosophic concepts and aesthetic lmaQes are 
contrasted with rel!Qlous (and he does not feel that thls term Is !ully 
' satisfactory either~ rather, he refers primarily to ult.tmate reality)"' 
symbols and myths, 5 with myths being "sets of symbols . " 0 This only 
seems to reveal the shifting terminology o! Tillich rather than any 
changing conceptions, and his general approach ts to call th!ngs symbols 
wh!ch have the general characteristics described in an ear:1er chapter . 
However, within the symbol there are some distinctions, and the 
deepest meaning of the symbol lies in Jts reference to that wh1ch is 
beyond ordinary referents, to the God who is ultimate reaHty . 
Even within the reliQious symbol there are vanous levels or 
types. Actually Tfllich divides these types in various ways, but 
I 
..!&!!!.. . ' p . 77 . 3rble . , p . 91. 
4cf. Tllllch, "Art and Ultimate Reality, • op . cit. , pp . 1- 2 . 
61bld . ' p , 3 . 
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usually practically the same things are pointed out in each discussion . 
In "The Religious Symbol"' there are t·.vo main levels of re1:gious 
symbols--the obJective and the self-transcending .I In "T:,e Nature of 
Religious Language" there are two levels called immanent ond trons-
cendent.2 In "Thoolo<;y Md Symbolism• these two major types are 
expanded into throe, which are called the tronscer.dant, the sacramental, 
and the liturgical. 3 
In "The Rell<;!ous Symbol" T!ll!ch distinguishes the t'"'o basic 
levels of religious symbols by su<;gestlng that the objective religious 
symbols arc "a supporting level In which religious objectivity is 
established and which is based In Itself. .4 Self-transcen:!in<; 
religious symbols are "a level supponed by it bhe obJective levej/ 
and pointing to objects of the other level. .. 5 Now Tlll!eh does not 
explain the latter level of religious symbols s and he discusses only 
the objective religious symbol . Under the objective reliqious symbols 
there are three basic levels which have to do with God as the Supreme 
Being, the nature oi God, and actions of Goci, and with natural and 
htstortcaJ objects as they refer to deity . 
iT1lllch , "The Rellgious Symbol," op . cit . , p . 89. 
2nll!ch, Theology of Culture, p . 61. 
3Tllllch, "Theology and Symbollsm," op . cit ,, pp , 113-llS. 
4TUI!ch, "Tho Rellgious Symbol," op . cit., p . 89 . Slb!d . 
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In "The Nature of Rellglous Language" Tllllch completely dis-
regards self-transcending religious symbols, for in his division between 
immanent and uanscendent symbols he includes only that whlch was 
discussed in "The Rellglous Symbol" under obJective rellg:ous symbols . 
And In "Theology and Symbolism• the throo lovols of rehg1ous symbols 
correspond to discussion in the preceding, and no mention is made of 
enythlnq which might correspond to self-tr~nscending roli~!ous symbols . 
Becouse of this lack of c lority as well as becouse of apparent complete-
ness of the symbols even without tho self-transcending type, these will 
not be considered . 
1 . Transcendent Religious Symbols 
The basic dfstincllon within rel!ofous symbols Is between trans• 
cendent symbols, ln which reference ts made to God himself, his nature 
or qualities, and his acts, and immanent symbols, which aro concerned 
with historical and noturol objects , l Friedman points out thls dis-
tinction as running throuQh all religions : 
A distinction must also be made within the symboJ 
itself, as W . M . Urban has shown in Language and 
Realitv, between "intrinsic symbols" and "ins1Qht 
symbols . " Tho intrinsic symbol points to some 
object which can also be known literally and directly 
without the a!d of symbols . The insight symbol, 
on the other hand, points to a referend \'.·hich eanr.ot 
be known Uterally ond !n Itself because it is beyond 
lrullch, Theology of Culture, p . 61. 
the rational or the empirical or because It Is 
utterly transcendent and unconditioned. Thus the 
cross in its Christian usage is an intrinsic symbol 
which points to the suffer ings of Jesus ~nd the way 
of life of those who seek to follow hlm. But the 
sufferings of Jesus are themselves used ~s an insight 
symbol for a hlddon process of redemption which can 
never be known directly and non-symbolically, yet 
Is nonetheless an article of faJth with the maJority 
of CJ'!Iistian sects . The concept of God as a loving 
father, the concept of the Holy Spirit as the wind 
which bloweth where 1t listeth 1 tho concept of 
Christ as the Word, the Jewish concept of the 
Shekinah or Glory of God, which is exUed from tho 
Infinite, the HJndu concept of tho avatar or tncarna-
tion of the Absolute --these ara all insight symbols, 
and it Is symbols such as these that form the pril!'.ary 
material of all religions , I 
Tillich makes this distinction much more briefly with the transcendent 
lOS 
level (corresponding to Fnedman 's insight symbols) as "the level wh!ch 
qoes beyond the eml)!rleal reality we encounter ,"2 and the Immanent 
level (corresponding to lntrmsic symbols) as "the level whlc h we find 
w ithin the encounter with real ity . ,.3 
Transcendent symbols are concerned with the Supreme Being, 
or God. 
The word ••God .. Involves a double meanin9: 1t connotes 
the uncond!Uonal transcendent; the ultima to, and also 
an object somehow endowed with qualities and actlons . 
1Meurice S . Friedman, "RehQious Symbolism and 'Universal ' 
Rellqion, " The Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (October , 1958), 215 . 
2Tlllich, Theology of Culture, p. Sl. 
3Ibld . 
The first Is not figurative or symbollc, but is 
rather in the strictest sense what it is said to 
be. The second, however, ts really symbolic, 
figurative. It Is the second that Is the object 
envisaged by the reUc;ious consciousness , I 
Here Tllllch ' s discussion o! the two Absolutes in "Two Types of 
Pnllosophy of Rellgion" Is appropriate . The t.vo Absolutes are the 
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unifying forces of religion on the one hand. and the unifying principle of 
phJJosophy on the other: ~and.!..!.!.!. respectively . 2 No·,o,· unless 
these are united there is still disconnection or plurality at the hoan of 
the universe . The connection ts achieved in the dictum: Deus est 
.!!!£ . 3 Nevertheless, even th1s poses many problems., and .it may solve 
tho or1q1nal problem only by a tour de force unless the manner 1n which 
this serves as a u.n1lyin.g center is explicated . 
Tilllch joins In the rradltton of whlch Thomas Aquinas Is a part in 
exalting one term (biblical) above all others for a nome characterlzin9 
God--being- itself. 4 Tllhch uses this as the non-symbolic statement 
&bout God. God is being itself. Now St . Thomas takes Ills departure 
from the "I am who am" of the Old Testament 1 but Tlllich derives his 
lrllllch, "The Religious Symbol," op . cit., p . 90 . 
2THIJch, Theology of Culture, pp . 11-12 . 
3Ibld . ' p . 22 . 
4jamcs A. Martin, Jr . , "St. Thomas and Tillich on the Nomos of 
God, " The Journal of Religion, XXXVII (October, 1957), 256. 
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pos1tlon (from a biblical standpoint) from Mark 12:29, 30, !rom the great 
commandment . "Ultimate concern is the abstract translation of the 
great commandment! 'The Lord, our God, the Lord is one: and you shall 
love the Lord your God with all your Heart, and with all your soul and 
with all your mind, and with all your strength . ... 1 Thus Tlll!ch's 
emphasis is upon religion as demand (rather than contemplation, which 
is the Thomistic emphastsl and ultimate concern . 2 
T!lllch does not Intend that these terms (God and being-itself or 
ultimate reality) should be regarded as equivalent . 
Tho term "'ultimate reo.Jtty• is not another name 
for God In the religious sense of the word . But the 
God of religion would not be God 11 he were not first 
of all ultimate reality . On the one hand, the God of 
religion is more than ultimate reality . Yet religion can 
speak of the divinity of the divine only if God Is 
ultimate reality . Ti he were anything less, namely, 
a being--ever. the highest--he would be on the level 
'Ot oil other beings . 3 
It would appear that the rel19ious absolute Involves an emphasis uPOn 
personality and value and is thus axiological in character, ..... here as 
being is the philosophic aspect ond is primarily ontoloQical or meta-
physical . 4 TiUich ls saying 6t least two things m the clause Deus est 
1Tilllch, Systematic Theology, I , 11 . 2Ibld . 
3Till1ch, "Art and Ultimote Reality,'' op . cit., p . 2 . 
4Ke9ley, "Paul Tllllch on the Philosophy of Art I " op . ell. I 
p . i79 . 
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esse . God is (not, God exists); this means that whatever God's 
attributes , God is something which can have attributes . Moreover, 
vthatever else ultimate reality is it contains both the founCations of the 
axiologtcal and the ontological . 
IC God may be used as t he inclus i ve term with beinq-irself used 
as a quality of God, it must be urqed that ln such a representation a 
tension must be sat up, and it ts tn view of such a tenslotr. that the 
concept of God Is alive and filled with mystery. The Idea of a supreme 
being Is one phase of the total Idea: God is a being with certain 
definite qualities . But then this idea of God is negated by the realization 
that God t ranscends every possible characterization, for he ts that 
obtect which transcands obJectivity . 
Urban offers the criticism of Tillich 's view as presented in "The 
Rel!gious Symbol• that it Is a pansymbolism In wh!ch there can be no 
proper mode of evaluation . ! " J>an- symboUsm becomes pan .. fictionJsm • .. z 
While Urban hes t~ken part of his negative criticism from TUI!ch ' s 
.analysis of Cassirer, Tillich c laims that hl$ critique has proceeded 
upon the assumption that it !s Cassirer's position which is a. pan-
symbol1sm . On the other hand, Tillich disclaims pansymbohsm for 
lwllbur M . Urban, "A Critique of Professor 'Ii llich's Theory of 
the Religious Symbol, • The Journal of Llborel Religion, ll (Summer, 
1940)' 35-36. 
2Ibid . ' p . 36 . 
himself and claims that there is one point at which there is non· 
symbolic knowledge. Tillich admits 
that any symbolic knowledge presupposes some bests 
of non-symbolic knowledQe and that pansymbol!sm 
defeats itself . . . . The non-symbolic element in 
all relic;~1ous kno•,...ledge ls the experience of the 
unconditioned as the boundary, gTOund, and abyss 
of everything conditioned • • • • The &ttempt of 
bad metaphysics to establish the Idea of God in 
positivc-rotional terms is irrefutai:>ly rejected by 
Kant who follows here the predominant theologica l 
tradition . . . . I can accept the c lassical doctdne 
of "anal09ia entis... . .. But while acceptlnq the 
method of "analoqia entis, .. I cannot accept any 
attempt to use it in the way of rational construction. 
The symbolic, affirmative concepts about God, 
his qualities and his actions, express the concrete 
form ln wh1ch the mysterious 9round and abyss of 
belnQ has become manifest to a belnq as his 
ultimate concern in an act which we call 10revelacon ... 
Tho special symbols are dependent on the concrete 
sltuauon and conflQuratton ln whleh the mystery of 
tho Qround appears to us . 1 
The precedlnQ could be used as an explanation of Ttllich's somewhat 
perplexinQ state mem that God .. does not appear ·.-;ith1n the context of 
experiencc" 2 nor can he "be explained in terms of concepts ... J This 
seems quite Kantian: the cateqortes (structures of experience) do not 
apply to God because God is not within the conte>:t of experience . 
Nevertheless, there is an approach to God and one can be aware of 
1
rmtch, "Symbol and i<nowledQe,• op , ell., p, 203. 
2T1lllch, "Theology and Symbolism," op, cit., p . 107. 
3tbld . 
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God; in fact, without this basic awareness reltgious symbols would be 
without foundation . 
Thus it is possible to make some positive assertions about God, 
and the baste poslltve assertion is that God is beinq-!tself . This ls 
the via eminentiae . But there are always negative assertions which are 
equally possible: via negationis. Now if these are combined, one is 
using the via symboHca.l In comparing Aquinas and: T!lhch, Martin 
arrives at the view that these men are close together in their use of 
analogy (in the case of Aquinas) or symbolism (In the case of Tlllich) . 
Matmonides and others are correct in holding that 
no term derived from nature can be predicated 
unlvocally of God and creatures, ••for every effect 
which does not exhaust the power of the cause 
receives the likeness of that cause incompletely . .. 
(Ia . xl!t. 5) Neverth~less, terms ~j)J)U6d to both 
God and creatures are not purely equivocal, boc~t:.se 
"th!s would mean that nothin9 could be known or 
proved about God rom creatures . " 
It should be concluded that terms are us•d 
according to analogy . . . . This method in 
common use Hes midway between pure equivocation 
and simple univocatlon . . . . The meaning is 
not fixed and identlcel . . . nor whoUy dlfforent 
. . . but ls used flexibly to signify dliferent 
proportions to one constant . (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologlca, Ia. xl!. l; ra . xill. S . l 2 
1Ttllich I "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism r" op. cit.' 
pp. 334-335. 
2Martin, loc . clt , , p. 254 . 
In fact Mantn ocn:ates Wl!ch's word symbolic with r::etapt.orlcal a:td 
analoqlcal.l Probably, however, Tllllch's word would tnclude these 
term• without being restricted to them, fet bolh metaphoric a:'ld 
analoqlcal are primarily literary and coqnltlve terms where>S Tllbch 
usoa symbolic to refer to thtnQS such as the sacraments, hturgy, and 
the products of culture . 2 
Alono with this basic characterization of God there may be an 
examination of God's qual ities and acts. God wtll be spoken of here 
Ill 
as betnQ and actL•g upon the basts of what :nan Ia and :he •·ay 1n which 
he ocu: nonetheless, great care cust be taken to not !of'9'et :hat God 
11 not an obJect th01.19h he may be spoi<en o! oa an object a:ld thou;h 
:noiQhtS Qalned through such modes of approach may be very helpful . 
Love, mercy, power, ommsctent, omnipresent, omnipotent "cannot be 
applied to God In tbe literal sense. "3 In speoktno about God's act!nq , 
one is concerned with temporal and causal factors , "but Ged Is beyond 
.2!!!. temporality, though not beyond every tomporellty . .,4 A:td Ttlltch 
1Ibld., p . 256 . 
2However, cf . TUUeh, Systomauc Theology, I, 131: 7he Couraoe 
!o Be, p. 179. 
3Ttl!Jch, Theoloqy o~ Culture, P. 62 . 
4rbtd . 
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SU99Gsts I "'I really do not know what past and future arc Jn the qround 
of being ... I 
11. Sacramental Religious Symbols 
On the immanent level there are three distinctly different phases 
if one grant to the incarnation a umque position . These are mcarnational, 
sacramental, and Utur9lcal religious symbols. 'Ihe tnca.rnattonal 
concept is not unique to Christianity and presupposes somo connection 
between the transcendent and immanent levels on the one hand. On the 
other hand if the gods become very transcendent the more incarnations 
•arc needed 1n order to overcome the remoteness of the divtnc ... 2 
The 1ncarnat1onal and sacramental levels are put together some-
what In Theology of Culture and ~re merged Into one In ''TheOIIJIIY and 
SymboHsm . u The distinct characteristic of this level is that here God 
is reaching down and pulling up persons and thlngs to himself, or God 
reaches down to man . 
TUllch ls greatly perturbed at the loss of the sacramental outlook 
in Protestantism . 
The decrease in sacramental thinking and feeling 1:1 
the churches of the Reformation and in the American 
denom1nauons is appalling. Nature has l ost its 
1T!ll!ch, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism, .. op . cit., 
p . 340 . 
2Ttlllch, Theology of Culture, p . 64 . 
religious meaning and is excluded fror.l particlpation 
in the power of salvation; the sacraments have lost 
their spiritual power and are vanishin9 in the con -
sciousness of most Protestants; the Christ ts in-
terpreted as a religious personality and not as the 
basic sacramental reality, the "New BeinQ . " The 
Protestant protest has rightly destroyed the maqical 
elements in Catholic sacramentalism but has wro:wly 
brouoht to the verge of disappearance the sacramental 
foundation of Christianity and wlth H tho religious 
foundation of the protest itself . . . . The sacramental 
element . .. is the one essential element of evo:-y 
reltoton, namely, the presenco of the divine Oefore 
our acting and suivinQ, in a "structure of grace~' 
and !n the symbols expressing It . 1 
This section could extend ad !nUnitum by attemptin9 to invest!-
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gate Tllllch's ChrlstOIQ9y; instead there will be only a brief discussion 
of the sacraments as such. A new term, "the holy," must be introduced . 
The simplest statement In defining the holy Is found in one of Tlllich 's 
earliest works: "'Heilig ist ein sinnerfiillender Akt oder ein Sinngegen-
stand, lnsofern er Triiger des unbedlngten Sinnes 1st. u2 Sacred objects 
or holy things or persons are such not because of some inner quaHt!es, 
but because they tLre successful conductors of infinite meaning, because 
they are real symbols of ultimate reality . The predicate ho)y 1s just a.."' 
expansion of the term symbol;~ symbols a:re holy: ~ symbols beat 
the meaning and power of the ultimate reaHty . "Any object or event 15 
ITJlllch, The Protestant Era, p. xxiil . 
2TIIllch, •Rellglonsphllosophle," op. cit. , p. 805. 
sacramental in which the transcendent is perceived to be present . 
Sacramental objects are holy objects, laden with C1v1ne power. Hl 
Religion is ultimate concern, and the holy ts that quahty which 
corresponds ln God to ultimate concern in man. 2 This may be further 
ll4 
expressed as the paradoxical relation which is sustained Cetween God 
and finite things, whereas God Is unapproachable as ordlnory obJects 
or subjects are . 3 Sacraments (in the broader sense) are objects or 
persons which are to be regarded as holy because of their pccullar 
abOity to reveal God . But since "the sacramental presence of GoO is 
a consequence of hts omnipresence, ,.4 one may wonder why everything 
could not be regarded as a sacrament. In fact, "if one always 
experiencad the divine presence, there would be no Ctcferet.ce between 
sacred and secular places . The difference does not exist i:1 the divine 
life ... 5 This ts to point out that present human life is not lived in the 
Kingdom of God, and there ts a need for distinguishing beto.>.'een the 
sacred and the secular . 6 
So important ts the sacramental element that "a complete 
disappearance of the sacramental element (not the so3me thir.q, be 1t 
1T!lllch, The Protestant Era, p . 108 . 
2
r!lllch, Systematic Theology, I, 215 . 
3 J.2!!!.. ' pp , 271- 212 . 4Ibid ., p . 278. 
6Tllllch, Theology o! Culture, pp, 40--13 . 
5Ibld . 
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noted, as tho particular sacraments} would lead to the dis3.ppearance 
of the cultus and, finally, to the dissolution of the visible church 
itself. ·l Moreover, sacraments are to ba understood 1n "relation to the 
new being in Jesus as the Christ" 2: on the one hand, this makes Christ 
tho fundamental sacramental reaHty and makes possible the overcominq 
of the demonic in a Gestalt of grace; on the other hand, it insists upon 
the historical stgnif1cance and orientation of symbols. 
It is possible for sacramentallsm to become magical as in 
Catholicism, but such an approach can never produce the reality whlch 
is needed by the religious desire. 3 And as symbols require the human 
bcmg ior their reception and interpretation, so can there •oo no 
stacramental object apart from the faith that grasps it ... 4 
finally, socraqental objects ore exposed to the danger of bein9 
rec;ardcd as holy in themselves, although they have derived their 
holiness from reprosentln9 the divine holiness . Both Idolatry and 
demontza[iOn are used for the actual failure at this point. 
lil . Liturgical Religious Symbols 
ThiS section wlll close with tho following !>riel but very pointed 
quotation on the final level of rellQ ious symbols: 
ITlllich, The Protestant Era, p. 9 4. 
2Ibid., p . 102 . 3 Ibid ., pp . 9 7, 98, llO . 4 Ibid., p . 110 . 
There is a third level, the llturglcal level, 
where all kinds of slqns are elevated to symbolic 
J)O'Ner, ~- , special objects, special gestures, 
special garb; the vast realm of sign-symbols os I 
call them, including water, light, odors, colors, 
sounds . As signs they are replaceable; as symbols 
they are consecrated by tradition, but with loss 
po,Ner than genuine symbols . They are a mixture of 
symbols and signs .I 
Whereas transcendent religious symbols are the symbols of God hlm-
seH, his attributes, and acts, and sacramental symbols are God 
reaching down to pull objects and persons up to himself, Hturglcal 
symbols are nature and man reaching up to God . 
3 . Symbolism and ReHglous Truth 
The problems connected with an evaluation of the adequacy of 
rAilglous S\llllbols to do ll\6 task assl~rned to them and with the 
do.ngers involved in symbolic representation must be considered . The 
fundamental religious awareness, the levels of symbohc str.Jctures 
9ive rise to questions 1n theology, to the problem of idolatry in 
religion, to the Protestant principle, and finally to the question of 
truth In religion. 
Heschel attacks the whole process of symbol- formation and 
symbol-stgnlftcance by lnslstln9 that 
symbols are substitutes 1 cherished whenever 
the object we are interested in is momentarily or 
1Tilllch, "ThoolOIJY and Symbolism," oe. ctt., ;>. liS . 
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permanently beyond our reach. Unable to flnd a 
direct approach to Its object (or a direct way of 
expressinQ itselO, the mind accepts a symbol in 
place of the original object of Its interest . The 
premise of religious symboHsm ts the assumption 
that God lies beyond the ken of our minds and will 
therefore never be apprehended or expressed dlrectly 
but only through the symbol . Now the second part 
of that premise Is not logically necessitated by the 
first . If the knowledge of God Is beyond the reach 
of man, what gives us certainty to assume that 
there is e symbol that may serve as His representative? 
Symbols can be taken seriously, only if we are 
convinced of man's abU Sty to create legiUmate symbols, 
namely, of his abi lity to copture the invisible in the 
vlsiblc, the absolute in the re lative . Thoir valldlty 
will, furthermore, depend upon our being in POssession 
of criteria by means of which we could decide wh!ch 
symbols represent and which misrepresent the object 
we are interested m; which to accept and "lh•hich to 
reject . Yet in order to prove the validity of symbols 
In general and in order to prove the adequacy of 
particular symbols, we must be tn possession of a 
knowledge of the symbolized obJect that ls lndeper.dent 
of all symbols . To justify and to judge symbols we 
are in need of non- symbolic knOW' ledge . 1 
As a result of his analysis, Heschol regards symbolism as a form of 
solips ism . 2 Urban offers a similar criticism of Tlllich's earlier view, 
and says that Tllllch's pansymbollsm Is headed toward (If net already 
ll7 
there) panflctionism . Tilllch's reply to these statements anC approaches 
has already been Indicated . 
1Abraham Joshua Hesche!, "Symbolism and Jewish Faith, •• 
Religious Symbolism, ed . F. Ernest Johnson (New York: The 
Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1955), pp. 64-65 . 
2 Ibid . , p. 64 . 
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The function of the rell9ious symbol must here be noticed . 
Tllllch insists upon the literal base: God Is being Itself. It Is 
literally tho case that there is some bein9 or order or source of order; 
however, the problem arisos when there is an attempt to apprehend the 
nature of thJs mysterious being . Here is the point at which symbolism 
is significant. 
The theory of the religious symbol presupposes 
thet .an ultimate <::oncem, the 9round of meani n9 
and beln'J, has the ultimate truth, Is the condition 
of every relative and preliminary trUth in such a 
way that even the most radical scepticism as long 
as it asserts something, is dependent on this 
ultimate truth . The theory of the rell<;~lous symbol 
brings religious certainty back to its real and 
absolute foundation, llberatln'J It from the infinite 
uncertainty of probable jud9mcnts about existence 
or non-existence .1 
Here TUUch attempts to bring tOQether absoluteness and huwillty 
before the facts . The function of the symbol Is to release the basic 
nonsymbollc level of knowledge of God so that at thlslevel there may 
be absolute certainty I .,.,·hereas on tho symbolic level there fs only 
contextuol truth or truth for a particular situation. In the doap 
Immediate .awareness of God there ls a unity of tite entire being with 
the ground and obyss of aU being; but when there is any movement 
away from this level (oven as In revelation) thoro Is always 1he 
posslbHity of error end the need foro hesit4ncy of .assertion . Yet 
1Tilllch, "Symbol and K.~owledqe," op . clt . , p. 206 . 
even within cultural achievements or the products of relig!ous 
organization, service, and cult there may be the achievement of a 
Ka!ros in which the temporal is charged with the oternal and is lifted 
up to a measuro of truth which 1t is incapable of within itself . 
I . Theology 
lt Is the function of theology to take religious symbols and 
examine them. Theology is not a direct discourse upon Goci, as tho 
etym0l09y ml9ht indicate: theology conceptualizes, explains, and 
criticizes religious symbols . 1 
The direct object of theology Is not God: the direct 
object of theology Is His manifestation to us, and 
the expression of th1s manifestation is the reHQious 
symbol , This is the basic relation between theology 
and symbolism. The obJect of llwology Is found In 
the symbols of roliotous experlence . They are not 
God, but they point to God . God may be said to 
be the object of theology but only indirectly. The 
direct object of theology Is found only In re l1glous 
symbols.Z 
Theology, like a ll thought, has to have something to think about, 
somethin9 whlch is qtven to it, in order to proceed: theology is 
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rooted in the world of concrete existence . The point from which progress 
begins must be further delimited to a theological circle, or to the 
acceptl!lnce of some spectftc set of symbols or revelctlon 1n contrast 
l.rllllch , "Theology and Symbolism," oo . cit., pp , 111- 114. 
2lbid . ' p . 108 . 
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to philosophic procedu.re which cannot be restricted jn this manner . 
Theology is concerned with existential involvement and saving truth 
in contrast to detached objectlvity . Theoi09Y (Christian) Is concerned 
with the concrete logos or the special revelation in Jesus as the 
Christ . 1 
In the conceptual!zatlon of religious symbols, theology "disc loses 
the relation oi the symbols to each other and to the whole to which 
they belong . " 2 Explanation consists in the determination of "the 
relauon of the religious meantnQ of the symbolic material to 1ts 
original and simple meaning . • 3 There Is a duplicity about the symbol, 
and one may need to show how a symbol arose from Its or1Qinal Uteral 
meaning to its current symbolic s1Qn1ficance. 
'Ihe theological function of criticism 
does not seek to dissolve the symbol as historically 
or sclentlflcally or psychologically untrue. That 
would mean crttici:dnq symbols on a non- symbolic 
level, and no symbol can be cr1tictzed on a non-
symbolic level . If a symbol is criticized, it mus t 
be criticized within the bounds of symbolic mean:ng . 
We must criticize it from the inside, comparing 
e lements of it with the whole of the symbolic system 
to which thoy belong 0 It is one of the reasons for 
the dtsinteqraUon of rel19ion in recent centuries that 
the symbols have been taken literally o Then thay 
Icc. Tllllch, Systematic Theology, I, 22-28 . 
2Tllllch, "Theology and Symbolism,• op. cit., p. Ill. 
3 Ibid . , p. 112 . 
provoke criticism on a non-symbolic basis, and 
dis Integrate because on this basis they are 
meaningless . J 
Tho function of criticism is three- fold: 
First, it has to prevent the reduction of the symbols 
to the level of non- symbolic thinking . The moment 
this happens, their meaning and their pO' .... ·er am lost. 
Secondly, theology has to show that some symbols 
are more nearly adequate than others to the encour.ter 
which expresses Itself In symbols . And, thirdly, 
some symbols must be sho-.vn to be inadequate m the 
light of the totality of the symbolic meaning whld. 
they represent; they contradict the fundamental 
symbolic structure . This is the way in which 
theological criticism of symbols Is possible; but 
it is never possible on the non- symboUc ievel. 2 
The final phase of the d iscussion of religious symbols will 
enter Into some of these issues, and thus there · ... ·til be no attempt to 
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carry tnls analysts further here. One must not, however , underostimate 
the theological function . 
U. Idolatry 
Tllllch describes as his fundamental theo!Q9ical problem "the 
relation of the> absolute .. . and of the relattve . .. 3 Difficulty arises 
when the relative 1s raised to the status of tho .obsolute, at.d this is 
particularly possible in the case of rellgious symbols which have 
become especially charged with religious power and meaning and are 
I ~ .. p . 113 . 2ro!d • 
3Tllllch, The Interpretation of History, p . 25 . 
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regarded as holy or sacred . Frequently lt happens that " such a reality, 
like a book , person , a community, an institution, or doctrine, c laims 
absolute authority and lays claim to submission of every other kind of 
re•llty , life, •nd doctrine . .. 1 If something, like the Church, 
claims absolute validity for tho assumed forms in 
whtch it must live as earthly society, if it calls 
itself I(Jngdom of God, then It succumbs to 
arrogance and violates culture and society in 
demonic heteronomy . 2 
For the do monic Is something Unite, somethinq 
Umhed, wh.lch puts on inflnlte unUrnited diqn1ty . 
Its demonic character is evident therein, that sooner 
o r la ter another Hnite reality with the same claim 
will stand in opposition to it, so that the human 
consciousness will be severed between the ~"No . 3 
1\ term which Is used as synonymous with demonry Is Idolatry: "All 
idolatry Is nothing else than the absolut!zlng of symbols of the Holy . "4 
•Idolatry ls the elevotlon of a preltmlnary concern to ultimacy .• ,s 
"Holiness provokes idolatry . •• 6 
Alston attacks Tillich's theory of idolatry primarily upon a 
Unguis tic basis, and it must be admitted here that Tilllch frequently 
does not write as clearly as he mi9ht have for maximal understanding . 
2Ibld . , p . 228 . 
4Tilllch, Theology of Culture, p. 60 . 
ST!Ihcl\, Systamatlc Theology, l, 13 . 
61bid . , p . 216 . 
3rbld . , p . 26. 
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Others have also attacked T!lllch's termlnol09y and lock of clarity .I 
There are four ways, according to Alston, to look at the notion of 
Idolatry: (ll Idolatry as ldcntlf!caUon: (2) Idolatry as replooemem; 
(3) Idolatry as regarding something as Inherently holy; and (4) Idolatry 
as Qlv1ng ultimate concern to something prellmir.ary . In the ftrst way, 
when there is identiftcatlon there are concepts of both th1nQs identliied, 
but it appears that for THllch, says Alston, one concept drops out. 
for no one in his rlyht mind would make such identlflcatton 1f he had 
both concepts . 2 The thtrd type of approach ls rejected as self-
contradictory, for lf the holy ls de!lned as something which derives 
its holiness from someth.tng else, then how can that same th1r.Q be 
regarded as inherently holy . 3 (2) and (4) are rejocted as foundortng 
upon the impasse that attitude defines being- itself, and if this Is the 
case, one could not possibly replace belng - ltself or be u!Lmatoly 
concerned about something prel iminary: 
The response and the object (being use!O have 
boon indissolubly connected by definition . Thus 
It Is logically Impossible for anyti\lnq to replace 
bein9 itse lf; as soon as we are in the son of 
1ct. Alston, loc . clt., pp . 263-267; Randall, loc. clt., 
pp. 139-141; Tllllch, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," op . clt. , 
pp. 335- 336 . 
2 .~ston,J!!!!!.., p . 263 . 3lbld . ' pp. 264 - 265. 
situation in which we could use!£ to point to being 
itseiC betn~ itself ts what we are, by definition, 
pointing to. 
One might call in other writers to lend authoritv to Tllllch's 
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definition of Idolatry . Vaharuah suggests that the Idolatry of the present 
.,l1os in the fact that its ulttmate concern does not point beyond itself, 
to the possibility that it heals es well as destroys . .. 2 And Friedman, 
in almost l'illichian terminology, suggests that 
because we cannot get beyond the symbollc~l in 
our description of the divine, all reliQlons ure 
constantly faced by the problem of Idolatry and 
demonlsm--elevattnq to the status of the uncon-
ditioned and absolute that which Is only conditioned 
and relative . 3 
A philosophic defense Is equally possible . Is It possible for a person 
to become so Involved in a lo-.ver level of meanln9 end reality that he 
fails to move on to a higher level? Is it not possiblo for ~ man to 
enjoy thmgs other than God end fall to make progress toward God? The 
answer to these questions seems obvJous to onG who has e"-en minimal 
religious insights and mterests . 
Alston is not unaware of the approach of Tillich on the matters 
just mentioned 1 and he gives a further definition of idolatry. 
1Jbid., p . 264 . 
2Gabriel Vahan!an, "Biblical Symbolism and Man's Religious 
Quest,• The Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (October, 19581, 226. 
3Friedman, Joe . cit., p . 219. 
TUIIch sometimes suggests that whot he means 
by "Idolatry• Is the ceterrntned attachment to one 
set o! symbols and the refusal to recOQnlze t~.o 
pcsslb!Uty that any other set of symbols could per-
form the same or analogous hmcUons. One mtght 
cell such an attachment an absoJuttztnQ o! the 
symbols, taking them to be Inherently holy, etc. 
Undoubtedly, such absolutlzlng does occw In rohg!on 
and often presents serious problems , I 
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But Alston's recognition of this rea l and serious problem dooa not cause 
him to accept Illllch's analysis of Idolatry, and his rejection of 
Illl!ch's approach Is three-fold: 
(ll "Idolatry• in this sense has no euenllal 
reference to be1r.g Itself; her.ce we could not 
doacrlbe such phenomena by saying thot ay:::bols 
are being lder.t!Hed with the ground of being. 
(21 Th.ls ls not what is usually meant by "Idolatry. • 
(31 It Is a rcore widespread phenomenon thon what 
ts ordinarily called "Idolatry•; and It may be so 
deeply rooted in the religious enterprise that It Is 
tmposalble to remove 1t without destroying the 
enterprise as a whole . 2 
Alston's Urst quost!on Is again related to being-Itself, and he admits 
that this Is tho crux of the whole d!fflculty. 3 What he cannot see Is 
that Tllltch has some meaning for being-Itself which Is lndopcndem of 
the psychoiOQtcal attltucie called ultimate concern. What mast be 
shown Is that Tllllch does have some standard or crlterlor. for the 
evaluation of obJ•ets or persons which present themaolves as claims 
1Alaton, loc. cit . , p . 266. 2Ibld . 
3 Ibid., pp . 265- 266 . 
upon ultimate reaUty . But Urst there must be a brief final word on 
Alston's other criticisms . 
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To say that Tillich is usino the term idolatry in an unusual 
fesh1on does not appear to be any major criticism; this may involve 
confusion (and that is certainly not good), but other questions are more 
pertinent . To say that what Tllllch Is talking about Is so widespread 
that to remove it would be to remove the whole religious en~erprfse 
may be correct in certain respects; but what would happen might be 
very desirable: real religion might be Increased . That Is, general 
relioton is always in need of prophets who are transforming tho 
encounter betwoon God and man . Even such a radical aansformaUon 
as this might very well be in order . Or must one rcoard the present 
religiosity as sacrosanct, as beyond the pale of radical criticism? 
ill. The Protestant Principle 
It is by means of the Protestant principle that TtiUch aue~pts to 
establish some criterion of truth for religious symbols. The Protestant 
principle !inds its basis in the oarller conce?t of the guardian principlo. 
Here a dynamic approach to truth is taken, and both absolutism and 
relativism are rejected .1 The Quardian concept is a negatlve pnnciple 
by means of which the unconditioned character of the unconditioned is 
1rtlllch, The Interpretotlon of History, pp , 169-171, 173-174 . 
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rettt.lned: it is simply the insistence that whatever the rational 
achievements of man they will ah .. ·ays fall short of a system which does 
not need revision. One might ask whether thls syste m cannot be 
produced or whether It just will not be . To this T!ll!ch would say that 
any syste m must be developed out of a concrete situation, and concrete 
situations arc notoriously imperfect; thus even though there is a Kairos, 
perfection cannot be achJeved . Nonetheless. there can be truth in a 
situation, for truth Js not some absolute but rather an achievement of 
contact with the qround of being in an ecstatic apprehension of miracle 
by whtch a situation loses its superftclahty and recOQnlzes Us divine 
depth . 
The Protestant principle Is based upon ontologlco l ond theological 
insights into the fundamenta l relation bet<...-een God and m&n or ultimate 
and finite reality . 1 The most adequate brief explanation of the 
Protestant principle is os follows : 
The POwer qrasplng us in the state of faith is not 
a beinc; beside others, not even the highest; it !s 
not an object among obJects. not even the qreatest; 
but It is a quality of all beings and obJects, the 
quality of polnllnQ beyond themselves and their 
finite existence to the infinite. inexhaustible, and 
unapproachable depth of their .beln9 and meaning. 
The Protestant principle is the expression of this 
relationship. It Is the Quardtan against the attempts 
of the finite and conditioned to usurp the place of 
the unconditional In th!nklnQ and actin9. It Is the 
lnllich , The Protestant Era, p. 163 . 
prophetic judgment against religious pride, 
ecclesiastical arrogance, and secular self-
sufficiency and their destrucuve consequences .1 
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Protestantism as an organization itself falls under its own principle; as 
such, it "transcends its own religious and confessional character, .. . 
It cannot be ldenttfled wholly with any of Its particular historlcol forms . " 2 
Tlll!ch Interprets what the apostle Paul m.ight have said with approval: 
"No religion mottors, neither ours nor yours . .. 3 Chr1stlan1ty's viSion of 
its own smallness is its greatness. 
The importance of being a Christian is that we can 
stand the insight that it is of no importance . It 
Is tho spiritual power of rell9lon that he who is 
rellglous con fearlessly look at the vanity of 
religion . 4 
The employment of neQotlvo categories in religion is subject to 
much legitimate criticism , yet King points to some of the real values of 
negation. His first point is that ••neQation in religion is never absolute 
or finals mdulged !n simply for its own sake and withou1 positive 
counterpart,• 5 and his potnt is well supported by J. B. Pratt's Incisive 
explanation: 
Por a negation loses all mean1n9 without some -
thing positive to negate. The reol!ty of any portlcular 
1tb!d . 
3T!lllch, The New 8elng, p . 17. 
2lbtd.' p . 162 . 
4tbld . , p . 19 . 
Swtnston L. Kinq, •Negation as e Religious Category, •• !h!, 
journal of Religion, XXXVTT (April, 1957), 112 . 
fact or event or belr.g moy be denied: but when you 
deny real!ty to all bel119 you have defeated yo:.ar o;·:n 
purpose and have said nothlnq . . . . U all :aallty 
ta "emptiness" then ""emptiness• turns out ~o be 
Just another name for reality . 1 
In connection with TUllch's use of the term conditioned which may be 
rogarded •• tho nogatlon of the conditioned, King uya, "TIIIlch's 
•unconditioned ' Is tho essential being of the condltlonod ." 2 
And Tllllc h Insists that 
tho Protoatant principle Ia not moro negation . But 
If such a reality does exist how can It oacope the 
Protostant protes:? In other words: HOW' con a 
aplrttual Gestalt live :! lts principle 11 the protest 
against Itself? How can critical and formauve 
power be u:Uted L"l !he rea.Hty of Protestanuam? 
The answer :s: In the power o! the New Being that 
is manifest tn Jesus as the Christ . Here the 
Protestant protest co~es to an er.d. Here 1s the 
bedrock on whlch It stands and wh.lch '' not 
subjected to its cnuctsm. Here te the sacramental 
foundation of Protest~J-nttsm, of the Protestant 
principle, and of the Protes !ani reality. 3 
Tho Now Bolnq in Christ becomes the ulllmate criterion by moons of 
which a ll other things are to be adJudicated . 
The second point whlch K!ng makes Is that 
neoo.Uon ln rellqion is . . . a preparouon for 
the pOsitive experience and concept In rellQion . 
1Jbld., p . U3, eltlr.c; J. B. Prott, The PtlqrlmaQe of S;Jddiusw 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 19281, p . 238 . 
2K!ng, Joe , cit ., pp . U4- IIS . 
3T1lllch, The Protestont E:ra, pp. xxll-xxllt. 
129 
On the pr-actical ~evel of experience Jt servos the 
function of prepanng the lnd!v!dual for the receptlo:> 
of the tn;e knowleC.~e of the ultimate. Or.e must 
not, religion teaches, rush pree!pttately 1nto 
contacts w!tb dtvtn!ty . 1 
130 
Thta POint Is well tal<en In that practically aU rel!g!ons are anxious to 
rotoln the ultimacy or at least the uniqueness of divine bemQ 1 and 
expcrlonco w!th the deity must not be taken l!ohtly or frivolously. 
Tho third point Is that negation 
Is also a safeguard for the purity and ultimacy of 
rcltoton'a baste ideas. One must not chatm ultimacy 
for tho loss than ultimate. Th.!s Is the marl< of 
spiritual and Intellectual Immaturity or dishonesty. 
Th1a Is also the essence of Idolatry. 2 
W!'.At this does is to leave rellolon with a eena• of r.:ystery which 1s 
proaent In all of IJ!e . It doos not deny the possibility of c~eat!v!ty . 
"Rehoton as a vital human co!'leern is always more than its conceptual 
forms. ,,3 Tilllch's emphasis on the abyss, do.rkneaa, and the uncon-
sctous would be responsive to thls potnt. 
The final suggestion which K!nQ maku Is that the positive 
content lmpJted by neqaticn is to be seen In two major llnes of thought: 
"Or.e comes nearer the tree l>y elimination of tho false •• 4 .nd l>oth 
imperfectJon and non- being 1~_ply some cornact wuh per(ec~ton a.:td 
lKinq, loc . ell . , p. 1!5. 
31bld .• p . 116. 
z!bld • 
4Jb!d . • p. 117. 
being ,l The negative implies "positive, yet still confused ~ intuition 
of ultimate reality . .. 2 
One refuses ordinary conceptions and comparative 
terms here because one has in religion some kind 
of experience or even knowledge of the non-conce;>tuel 
and incommensurable ~uality of the u.n1verse not 
obtainable elsewhere . 
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The essence of King ' s position seems to Ue in a brief statement: 
"Negation stands for the depth factor in religion and provide s a 
creative tension in the midst of Jt. • 4 James E. Sellers exa:nines numerous 
positions ranging from naturalism and atheism to extreme supernaturaiJsm 
and points out how all of these views {with each one neoati:'!.9 the others) 
cooperate in keeping allve both thought and discussion on the question 
of God . 
Every position of our seven offers some truth 
1n its GoQ .. view, even the view that there is no God. 
Sartre ' s despair, symbolized in his God of nothinQ-
ness, is a correction of utopian theologies which 
mendaciously offer all the answers (either now or m 
the Kingdom to come). On the other hand, the hard-
headed tenacity of fundamentalists is in many 
respects much more desirable than the erratic 
loyalties of Sartreans and drifting eggheads . If the 
extremes were lopped off, contemporary thought 
about God would be deprived of range as well as 
depth . The tensely opposed demands oi enterprising 
intelligence and reverent submission, however. w 11l 
usually come into balance somewhere bet~een. 5 
1 J!ili!. . ' pp . 117-118 . 2lbid . ' p . 118 . 4Jbid.' p , 116. 
srames E . Sellers I "ThG Range of Contemporary Bclie! s 1n God," 
Religion ln Life, XXVJJI (Sprin9, 19!;9), 211 . 
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This Is In harmony with Tillich's principle of living on the boundary ol 
positions and of petmitUng one POsition to serve as the corrective of 
another . 
In connection with the discussion on the negative in roliqion one 
must not fall to mention the charges of some who say that Tllllch's 
negativism logically tends toward mysticism . Klllen compares Tllllch's 
doctrine of God with thot of Sir Wllllom Homilton and Henry LonguevUle 
Monsel ond InsistS that the Joglcol concluslonct tholr approach is that 
nothing can be said about God, for to say anything about God >s to 
Um1t him . Nevertheless, none of these men follow their logic rigidly . 1 
Tllllch has adopted a definition of the Infinite which 
leads to contrad!ctions and which must lead to the 
final conclusion that we cannot even speak &bout 
God, baeause to speak is to limit. Therefore we 
must, if consistent, be silent about God , for :o 
speak about him is to destroy his existence . 
T!lUch finally realized that the way he sou9ot 
to escape silence, by speaking of God in myth, is no 
better than silence because myth and symbol, wnhout 
something that is non- mythical, say nothin9 that has 
any meaning . Therefore he has more recently maintamed 
that there is one thing which can be said about God 
that ls not myth , namely that He is Being- Itself. This 
is inconsistent, but it is either & case of being 
inconsistent or speaking in uninterpretable riddles 
so he chooses the first, though it leaves him still 
with o most impoverished concept of God . 2 
The basis of Tillich' s need for a non- symbolic level of experience was 
indicated earlier . 
1Killen, op . cit . , pp. 253-257. 2K1Uen, op . cit., p . 255 . 
Cherbonnier describes the mystical metaphysical world- view as 
follows: 
Reality Is on undlfferont!atod unity . The everyday 
world, since 1t 1s a multlpllclty, Is therefore not 
really real, but at best a fra9rnonted distortion of 
true Being . Though lllusory, It nevertheless Im-
prisons all who take lt seriously. The goal of 
human Uvi.n9 is to dissolve 311 connoct!on with tho 
realm of space and time, tncludtn9 even consciousness 
Itself. For since consciousness lmplles a dlstlnctlon 
between knowing subject and known object, 1t belongs 
to the defective world of plurality .1 
Then Tllllch Is quoted as !! this Is the position he maintains. 
Cherbonnier's main chat9es against mysticism are that its :heory of 
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symbols is self-contradictory or self-neqetlng in that it maintains that 
silence is the only approach to God but keeps on chattertng2; that its 
reJection of the subordination of symbols to a non• symbolic criterion Is 
supplemented by an insistence upon the necessity of such a crtterion3; 
that it turns to an emphasis ••upon the efficacy of a symbol at the 
expense of its uuth"4; and finally, in desperation, 1t becomes esoteric 
and even dogmatic. 5 A.""ld though Cherbonnier does not use TiH1ch as 
an illustration of all these principles, it is quite obvious that he reg-ards 
him as being just such a representative, and frequent quot&tions and 
allusions are made . 
lE. La B. Cherbonnier, "Mystical vs . Biblical Symbollsm," 
The Christian Scholar, JOO<IX (March, 1956). 33 . 
3Ibid., pp . 34-35. 4Ibld . , p. 36. 
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Cherbonn.ler then turns to an elaboration of the bibllcal approach 
to metaphysics and symbolism. Hero the Tillichian notion of God as 
beln9 Itself is rejected for a God who Is a being: "The truest thing that 
can be said about God ts that he ts Someone . .,J He emphasizes history 
and its unity as made possible by constancy of purpose , 2 Then he 
comparos the distinction between the literal end the symbolic within the 
bibltcaJ framework to the my sue distl!'\Ction. 
Whoreas for the mystic this distinction roprosents a 
cleavage between two 1ncomP4tible realms of being, 
for the Bible llteral symbolic acts both belong to the 
realm of history . Though the symbolic act refers to 
another event of the past or future, at the time of 
ils actual accomplishment the symbolized avont w~s 
(or will bel quite literal. The dlstlngu.tshlng charac-
teristic of a biblical symbol Is simply that It "mal:os 
present•• 4 literal act of the past or future. Whereas 
for the mystic a story or statement may be l!terally 
false but symbolically true, for the Bible this Is 
Impossible , The truth of Its symbols is wholly 
dependent upon the factuality of the events they 
symbolize . 3 
In reply to Cherbonn1ar•s argument that Tillich is a n;ysttc, Jt 
must be stated that Tlll!ch acknO'...,ledges human freedom In his discussion 
of the polar concepts of freedom and dest1ny4 a.l"\d of freedom in 
connection wuh contingency . 5 T1U1ch emphasizes the h!s:or!cat both 
I Ibid" p , 37 , 2Ibld . , pp . 37 - 39 . 
4tlll!ch, Systematic Theology, I, 182- 186. 
0T1llich, The Protestant Era, Chaps . I and II . 
3 :bid . ' p , 40 . 
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in re9ardin9 Christ as a historical event1 and ln hts historical sense, 
which ts revealed in hls concern io-: the temporal pole in the temporal-
eternal correlation. 2 TiUich's interest tn the cultural depa:-cs !rom the 
interest of numerous mystics who are shut in with eternity, the alo!'\e:tes.s 
ol the alone with the alone {Plotlnus). 3 
Whether it is possible to defend some definition of mysticism ts 
not here the question. The main point of refuting Cherbonn!er's charge 
that TUHch is a mystic lies in Cherbonnier's characterization of 
mysticism. If the principles which he outlines are what is meant by 
mysticism, then surely none except an individual who ·was perfectly 
willing to speak absolute nonsense would be -... ·UlinQ to accept t:tc title 
"myst!c . " It does not appear to be necessary to refute Cherbonnier's 
points in thl$ section oxpUcitly, for this ontire chapter is devoted to 
j ust such a refutation . 
!v . The Ultimate Criterjon 
In connection with his insistence upon the ultimate JHeral 
cnterion of all symbols, Cherbonnier speaks of "'the ordinary canons of 
1cr. A. T. W.ollegen, "Chnstology and Biblical Crltlclsm ln 
T!llich, • The Theology of Paul Tilllch, eo . Charles W . Ke9ley and 
Robert W . Bretall (Kew York: The Macmillan Co., 1952), pp . 231-237. 
2Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3- 8 . 
3PloHnus, The Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. joseph Kau: 
(New York: Appleton- Century-crofts, Inc., 1950), p. 158. 
verif1cation••1 and the "ordinary canons of truth," 2 thouoh he does not 
explicate these with sufficient clarity to insure an accurate inter-
prctaU:on of what he means . One might suggest, h011.'cver I that if he 
ls reduc1n9 religious experience and the primal forces from wtthln and 
•above" which produce this to that which is empirical, then he 1s over-
looking (or rejecting) the contribution of logical positivism with Its 
radical rejection of metaphysics, religion or theology, ethics, and 
aesthetics from the ordlnatx; canons of verification (i .e , these realms 
must be verified not upon the basts of their anal ytici ty nor upon the 
basis of their be inc;; factually observable) . The point here is that 
there are numerous modes of verification for the determinahon of 
meaning I and tho fact that one canon cannot be applied to all universes 
of d iscourse does not vaUdate one universe of discourse and invalidate 
those to which It cannot be applied 0 It Is just such an approach which 
gains for itself the epithet "sctentism , " 
On this point the penetratlnQ analysis of :netaphor by Nemetz Is 
quite si9nificant . Metaphor is not an ,.unaltered report of our 
experience, .. 3 but rather an activity of unifyln<; a plural i:ueJlectual 
content, whereas literal statement is just such an una:ltered report of 
Irbtd 0 , P 0 35 0 2rbld., Po 350 
3A.."\thony Nemetz.~ "'Metaphor: Tho Daedalus of Discourse,'' 
Thought o xxxm (Autumn, 19581, P o 421. 
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experience and as such is immediately and directly 1establc or 
verifiable . I 
What Nemetz advocates is "a radical pluralism of methods, a 
pluraUsm that follows necessarUy from the analogous character of 
truth . " 2 'The fact, thBn, that thore are multiple canons of vcrl(ication 
depends upOn the fact that truth ts analogous or that the same quality 
cannot be .ascribed to or predicated of different objects in en identical 
or univocal manner . The relation between the literal and the f1Qurative 
is further specified: "A metaphor . . . is conceived out of literal 
statements. But once expressed it ts not an additive product but some-
thJnq uniquely individual even thouQh dependent on the noLens of truth 
which made It PQSslble. • 3 Though Nemetz here ma;,: be advocat1n9 a 
position somewhat in harmony with that of Cherbonnler, he seems to bo 
going beyond anything that Charbonnler would be willing to say, and 
Tillich would seem to agree with the major thrust of Nemetz's assertions , 
namely that the mode of venficaUon is plural; the same standard must 
not be used for reliQion ~• Is used !n science and logic. 
T!lltch aqrees .. o:nh Nemetz' acceptance of plural modes of 
signification and verification , although the bas1s upon which they accept 
thls may d iffer . Tllllch acknowledges the posslblllty of regarding 
truth and fals1ty as qualities of judgments; however, he also sees 
I ~·' pp . 421-422 . 21bid .• p . 4-11 . 3lbld .' p . 435 . 
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another possibility . Truth and falsity may be concerned with the levels 
of true being . In such a case, falsity occurs because of tl".e dece?tion 
of a lower level of reality In bein9 taken for a higher level. "The 
seemingly real is not unreal, but 1t is deceptive i f it is taken to be 
really real . • 1 These ontological considerations depend upon the notlon 
of true or ul t imate being . 
For example, upon carefully analyzing a person there w111 be 
deeper and deeper understanding of him until finally there '-'OY be a 
grasp of his Inner dynamics to the pOint where deception w1l1 be avoided . 
We may still be surprised; but such surprises are to 
be expected If a personality Is the object of knowledge . 
The truth of somethin9 is that level of its beln9 the 
knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and 
consequent disappointments. Truth, therefore, is 
the essence of thln<;s 3S wall as the cognitive act 
in which their essence is gras ped . The term "truth" 
is, Ukc the torm "roason, .. subjecUve-obJeeuve. 
A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses 
true being~ and the really teal becomes truth 1f it 
is grasped and expressed in a true judgment . 2 
Logical positivism ts correct tn insisting that "every c09nitive 
assumption (hypothesJs) must be tested•3; hO\A/ever, "'it ls not 
permissible to make the experimental method of vertrication the 
exclusive pattern of all vertfleaUo:l, .. 4 in spite of the fact thet "the 
safest test is the repeatable experiment ... s But experimentation halts 
1Tllllch, Sys tematic Thco10Ql , !, 101. 2 [bid . ' p . 102. 
3Ibid . 4Ibld . 5Ibid . 
139 
and dJsrupts the life process in order to arrive at statistical and quanti-
fled results 0 The experiential method , on the other hand, ~pproaches 
the llfe process and finds its verification in the efficacy of the though: 
or system within the life process itself; as such, the expertontial method 
is unrepeatable, mdefinJte, and has an element of risk conr.ected with it . 1 
Kno-.vledge is basically a "form of union . " 2 This un!on ts 
possible only because of a prior separation 0 Thus know1edQo ls the 
coming tog:ether of cognitive union and cognitive d1stance. Correspond-
inQ to the union phase of coQnitton is receiving, experiential, or 
intuitive knowledge: emphasis here is on the existential . Correspond-
ing to :he detachment phase of cognition ts eJ(perimental, shaping, or 
controlling knowledge in which there ls emphasis on the technical and 
mechanical . The balanced combination of union and d istance is 
understanding . 
Understanding another person or a historical figure, 
the life of an animal or a reliQious text, involves 
an amalgamation of controlling and receiving 
knowled90, of union and detachment, of participation 
and analysis 0 3 
Ordinary knowledge (loe 0 apart from revelation\ ls faced with a 
problem: "'Controll ing knowledge is safe but not ultimately significant, 
1Jbld o, pp. 102-105 o 
3Jbld 0' P o 98 0 
2Ibld 0 ' p 0 94 0 
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... ,.hHe receiving knowledge can be ultimate ly significant, but it cannot 
q ive certainty ... l 
The world has become increasingly interested Jn scientific 
knowledge and truth. but most people are still concerned with the 
experiential more than the experimental; and within the experiential 
emphasiS Is the question of re ligion . 
In no realm of hfe is the question of truth as 
important as 1t is in religion . For, in the realm 
of the religious symbols the lack of truth is not 
error , but distortion, or to speak more exactly , 
it is demonic distortion or idolatry. The question 
of truth in reli9ion is the question concerning the 
God who is really God and not the elevation of a 
!lnlte being or value to divine validity . 2 
Tllllch discusses the necessity for parUclpaUon or the expartentlal 
approach by suggesting lh&t Mliglon ls eoneerned wlth "!he doelslon 
which involves surrender, venturing faith, and for which there ts no 
critenon and experimental test outside the situotion itself ... 3 
Martin offers a careful statement on the existemial character of 
the reltgfous criterion: 
Tllllch .. . asserts that the exlstontlol 
involvement of the lndividua l is an indispensable 
tnqred!cnt in any utterance about God as religious 
object--or subject--by the individual; one cannot 
1rbld ., p,IOS. 
2rn lich. "Symbol and Knowledge,"' op . cit., pp . 205- 206 . 
3 
..!.l!!!!. " p • 2 0 4 . 
speak of God without at the same time speaklno o : 
the character of one's relation to God . What that 
relation is at its heart is crucial for the entire 
theoloqy which attempts systematically to express 
lt . ... The Protestant Tlll!ch feels that the 
Thomistic Catholic formulation ls deceptive because 
It pretends to arrive at some knowledge of God 
purely "objectively~" through a dispassionate analysis 
of nature, and that it is an inadequate articulation 
of Christian religious experience because it exalts 
a contemplative attitude toward deity above an 
attitude of active involvement expressed in either 
anxiety or love, or both . 1 
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It ls because of Tililch's emphasis upon the exls tentlal character 
of rellQious awareness and truth that he is able to reject the need for 
empirical aids to religion; i.e . the truth of empirical assertions does 
not substantiate or invalidate tho truth of religious assertions. Whlle 
the historicity of Christ, !or example, is not unimportant for historical 
research and for biblical criticism, this question Is not s ignificant for 
the religious truth that a New Being has appoarod which shakes human 
existence and gives u new meanjnQ. 2 
The followinq passage is quoted 1n its entirety because 1t is so 
appropriate to discussion on reUq1ous truth . 
The truth of a religious symbol has nothing to 
do with the tn..lth of the empirical assertions involved 
In It, be they physical, psychological, or historic al. 
A rellgious symbol possesses some truth If It adoquately 
expresses the correlation of revelation in whtch some 
1Martin, loc . cit . , p . 240. 
2Tilllch, The Interpretation of History , p. 264 . 
person stands . A reUglous symbol li_ true lf it 
adequately expresses the correlation of some person 
with final revelation . A religious symbol can die 
only if the correlation of which 1t ts an adequate 
expression dies. 1'his occurs whenever the revelatory 
situation changes and former symbols become obsolete . 
The history of religion, right up to our own time, Is 
full of dead symbols which have been kllled not by a 
scientific criticism of assumed superstitions but by 
a religious criticism of religion. The judgment that a 
religious symbol..!!. true is identical with the judgf.'!ent 
that the revelation of which it is the adequate expression 
Is true . This double meaning of the truth of a symbol 
must be kept in mtnd. A SYfl'l..bol has uuth: it is 
adequate to the revelation lt expresses . A symbol is 
true : it is the expression of a true revelation .1 -
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The distinction made in this passage is betvveen possessing the truth and 
being true . The principle upon which this dist!ncUon is made is on tho 
type of revelation involved . And the basic difference tn revelation !s 
between that which Is final and that which is not . "FlMI rave lstlon 
means more than the last .genutne revelation . It means the decisive, 
fulfi lling, unsurpo.ssablc revelation, that which !s the criterion of aH 
the others . " 2 The essence of a final revelation is that 1t have "the 
povver of negating itself wuhout losing itself . .. 3 There must be complete 
transparency to the mystery revealed . 
Only those symbols which are adequate expressions of the final 
revelation .!r.!.. true: all other symbols express some other degree of 
lrtlllch, Systematic Theology, I. 240. 
2 
..!&!£.. ' p. 133 . 
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revelation, though they do this adequately, and thus possess truth . 
This distinction Is to be regarded as depending on whether the deepest 
level of being (true being) Is being revealed or some other level . 
External criticisms (some other mode of verlflc~llonl are not 
proper 1 but within the situation itse lf there is a fundamental internal 
criticism and criterion of every religious symbol. 
Within the s!tuatlon , .. there is a criterion for 
every religious symbol--1 have called it "The 
gu~rdian,•• namely, the unconditioned character of 
the unconditioned over against any symbol tn 
which a conditioned , Hnito, exhaustible reality 
h made the expression of our ultimate concern . I 
Thus, again and again Tllllch emphasizes the !mpossibillty of any 
finite realltv occupying a place of ultimate worship and loyalty . The 
Protestant principle becomes the ultimate principle of determ1ntng 
truth, and this principle Is adequately exemplified In only one being 
which has been upon the human scene . 
I! Christianity claims to have a truth superior to 
any other truth In Its symbolism, then It Is tho 
symbol of the cross In which this Is expressed, 
the cross of the Christ. He who himself embodied 
the fullness of the divine's presence sacrifices 
him self in order not to become an idol, another god 
beside God, a god lnto whom the disciples wanted 
to mako him . And therefore tho dectstvo $tOry is 
the story In which he accepts the tltlo "Christ" 
when Peter offers it to him. He accepts it under 
the one condition that he has to go to Jerusolom 
to suffer and to die, which means to deny the 
Lruuch, •Symbol and KnO'.vledge," op . cit , , p , 204 . 
" 
idolatrous tendency even with respect to himself. 
This is at the same time the criterion of all othet 
symbols, and 1t is the criterion to which every 
Chrlstlan church should subject itself . 1 
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Tillich's regard for Jesus as the Christ does not mean that he has 
taken a static criterion ultimately . Tillich suggests that 'the Protestant 
Idea of truth is the concept of truth wtllch is actually living, full of 
tens ion, disturbing reality and the spirit ... 2 Jesus is not to be 
slavishly followed . 
In following him we are liberated from the authority 
of everything finite in hJm, from his special 
traditlons, from his Individual p1ety, from his rather 
conditioned world view~ from any legalistic under-
standing of his ethics , 
transparent to the divine mystery that ho is tho ultimate criterion of 
truth . It Is because Jesus d id not seek the worship of hir:1self but 
turned all worship toward God and thus revealed the ultimate reallty 
that he becomes for men today the ultimate symbol of the :ina! 
revelation: Jesus as the Christ is the truth . 
1Tllllch, Theology of Culture, P . 67 . 
2T!ll!ch, The Interpretation of History,;> . 173. 
3Tilllch, Systematic Theology , L 134 . 
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Tillich's emphasis on the existential character of reliqious truth 
causes him to approach Tolstoy's criterion of art: contagiousness. l 
A symbol is born, lives, qrows, and dies in so far a.s it ls effective 
ln communicating ultimate reality . If a symbol is hl9hly affective, it 
Is true; U a symbol !s lneHectlve, It ls false; !fa symbol elevates 
itself to the status of the unconditioned, it is demomc . 2 
Tillic h must not be taken, however, as employing puroly the 
criterion of efficacy tn place of truth (cf. Cherbonnter) , and the way tn 
which Tllllch's notion of efficacy fits Into the total picture would show 
this to 00 an oversimplification with a strong tendency toward mlsundcr-
standhHJ . Whatev-er the subjective factors involved in re ligion, there 
~e objective principles which become the ultimate criteria of rellglous 
symbols . 
4 . Summonr 
This chapter has specified the nature of reUc;;ion and the relevance 
of symbols to religion . It has sho·wn the tmportance or symbols to 
TUlich's reUgious perspective ond to the question or religious truth and 
certainty . 
let. Melvin Rader (ed .l, A Modern Book of Aesthehcs (3rd ed . 
rev.; New York: Holt, R!neh~, and Winston, Inc . , 1960), pp . 51- 53, 
62-71. 
Zc1. especially Tllllch, "The Rell9ious Symbol," oo . cit., pp . 91, 
93 . 
,. 
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Religion is essentially ultimate concern . Modern man is 
primarily driven by the anxiety that his whole existence either is or 
may become meaningless . It is the nature o! man to have ontological 
anxieties, thouqh these may be augmented by patholoqlcal cond!tlons, 
which can be treated by various psychotherapeutic methods . 
Human anxiety is further increased by the inability of rational 
arguments to satisfy fully the mind and resolve doubts. But it is at 
this point that .a person can encounter u ltimate reality in ultimate 
concern; for the ontological approach to God does r.ot proceed by WIJY 
of mediation and arqument, it is Initiated hy an immediate awereness 
of a •somothinq More," · ... ·hich demands tot.,l concern and commitment . 
And 1t ts one's total concern which is the contact wi th ultimate reolity 
and the source of salvation . That is, the only reQ l concern ts tha1 one 
is concerned; there is no need for concern over specific crthodox 
propositions . 
Tllllch goes to 9feat pains to show that re!Jglon is not a sphere 
of its own; separate from culture end other phases of huh.an life . 
Religion Is the dimension of depth in the whole of life. lr. all of its 
activities and creations . The nature of what is dtscloseci at the 
dimension of depth is Indicated by the theory of revelation. Revelation 
discloses the qround of belnq and the depth of reason . 
" 
--
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Now revelation is a disclosure of ultimate reality, but it is not 
authoritative information, it is the reception of ult!mate reality in an 
ecstatic experience, which is expressed in symbols . Symbols 9f0"'"'' 
out of the human encounter with ultimate reality . Thus the role of 
religious symbols becomes that of fructlfying the !mmedlate awareness 
of ultimate reality: religious symbols make possible a r!ch knowledge 
of what the "object" of rellQJous exporionco is . 
Religious symbols are transcendent, sacramental, ~md Uturqical. 
At the transcendent level the notion of God in himself is considered . 
These symbols aro particularly ImPOrtant because they form a b.nsis for 
other symbols . Moreover, at this level there is the primary nonsymbolic 
statement-.. Oeus est esse--upon which all the symbols rest. 
The characteristic of sacramental rel!g!ous symbols !s that God 
reaches down to man and things and pulls them up to himself . Christ 
is the fundamental sacramental real!ty . Uter9lcal symbols are produced 
as both nature and man extend themselves to-...va.rd God . 
It is the theory of the religious symbol which brings religious 
cert~inty back to its real and absolute foundation . There is one literal 
truth: God is be!ng-ltsolf . Now the symbol begins at this point; It is 
the product of encounter with this ultimate creat1vo source and the basic 
medium of Insight Into !t . But symbols are flexible and r..ust not be 
regarded as absolute; they are the products of a specific situatlon 1 and 
' 
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their truth Is dependent upon the context within which they have been 
created. Thus the symbol ' s acoeptance of the possibility of error makes 
a place for certainty and assurance in the deep immediate awareness of 
God . 
Theology is not direct rational encounter with God; rather it is 
the discursive treatment of the symbols produced by a divine .. hurnan 
encounter . 
Idolatry Is the exaltation of a symbol to the status of its referent. 
Here Tillich's contribution is to keep central issues in mind. to 
rec()(Jnizo the problematic character (the concealment aspect) of tho 
symbol, and to destroy the hope that some partlculor symbol Is In-
fallible. 
This leads to the Protestant principle, which is crucial to 
Till!ch' s thought . This Is the principle which stands In judgment upon 
any particular manifestation of the dlvlne . Christianity's recoqniUon 
of its smallness is Its greatness . Christ ls the principle operating 
concretely, (or his roollty and significance lie In his sacrifice of hlm-
$elf to the ultimate in the recognition of his own insignihcance . The 
essence of negativity in relJg!ous symbols Js in their capacity to keep 
religion alive, creative, and open to new insights ond trAnsformations . 
In Tillich's analysis of the truth of r-el!q!ous symbols he insists 
on several thinqs: the modes of verlftc.ation arc plural (one cannot 
I 
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determine reli9ious truth on the same basis as scientific truth); 
rel19ious truth is based on the experiential method (existential); the 
truth possessed by a symbol Js dependent upon its p-roximity to final 
revelation (and the essence of final revelation is the pcr.. ... er or tote! 
neoaUon without total loss of itself); Jesus as the Ctvist is the ultimate 
criterion of truth ln that he did sacr!f1ce himself wholly to the mystery 
which he sought to reveal (he does not hereby become a stattc criterion). 
' 
CHAPTER IV 
ARTISTIC SYMBOLISM 
Having looked at Ttlllch ' s general system w!th reg~rd to 
meentng and being, and having considered religious symbolism as the 
basic meaning of symbolism, it is now Ume to look at a culturaJ 
producuon where there wUl be an attempt to see what significance fs 
attached to things o-r objects as opposed to that which is :,eyond 
objeet!fteotlon. 
In this chapter there will be a presentation of T!H!ch's general 
concept of the relation between culture and religion. This wil l be the 
context in which art will be introduced as a specific cultural mani-
festation . Then art will be examined with respect to its primary 
contribution to TUltch's world, the nature of the art object •.viii be 
considered, and the relation between the Insights of art a:td ultimate 
reality and the criteria of art will be analyzed. 
l. Religion and Culture 
The relation between religion and culture is one of the most 
Important problems which Tlllich faces, for his emphasis >n ultimate 
reality makes possible the total negation of aU cultural expressions . 
Such negation Tlllleh totally rejects, and he develops •a 'theology of 
ISO 
-) 
151 
culture,' which Is the attempt to analyze the theolo9y behind all 
cultural expressions, to discover the ulumeto concern in -;he ground of 
a philosophy, a political system, an artistic style, a set of ethical or 
social principles . .. 1 
As religion has been defined, there Is no way to restrict It to a 
particular area; e.g. to the Church, to sacred things, or too holy 
day . Z All preliminary concerns (I.e. anything which Is not In Itself a 
matter of ultimate concern) have their foundation Jn the ul:1mate 
concern, and each preliminary concern must be regarded as '"the vehicle 
o f the ultimate concern without clatmtng ultimacy for ltse~{ . ,,3 Even 
the Church must submit to the standard of Judgment by ultimate concern: 
no organization can make Judqments without coming under Judgment 
itself . Now lf religion is understood tn the broad manner tn ·.vhtch 
Tilltch specifies it, the traditional distinction i:>etv.•een the secular a nd 
the sacred must not be retained . However, It is quite obvious that such 
a distinction has been maintained at the level of both secular a~d chur<:h 
life . Secular culture has pulled itself apart from its ultimate concern 
(as far as th1s ls POSSible) , and religious people have often been opposed 
1Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 39 . 
2nlllch, Theology of Culture, p . 41. 
3
rllllch, Systematic Theology, I, 13 . 
I' 
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to the secular "world . .. l 
. . Ferre says of Tilltch that "few theoloq1ans have fuller or truer 
appreciation of secular learning and culture than TU!lch . • 2 And Tillich 
describes the essence of the relation between culture and religion by 
Religion 1st Rlchtung auf das Unbedingte, Kultur 
1st Rlchtunq auf die bedlngten Formen und lhre 
Elnheit . .•. Aher dlese Bostlmmungen sind 
unzureichcnd . Form und Gehalt gehOren zusammen; 
es 1st sinnlos, das eine ohnc das andere zu setzon. 
feder <ulturelle Akt enthiilt den unbedlnqten Sinn; 
er ruht euf dem Sinngrund; er 1st, insofern er ein 
Stnnakt 1st, substanUell rel19jOs . . . . Aber er 
1st nlcht intentional reliQIOs. 
The dlHerence between religion and culture Ues in the intention of that 
which Is specifically religious and that which Is specifically cultural . 
It is the matter of intention which makes something directly or 
Indirectly rellglous . 
It will bo quite helpful to look at culture as It may be considered 
from the standpoint of being "autonomous," "heteronomous, • and 
"theonomous . • An autonomous culture is not interested in ~nythlng 
ultimate; here only the demands of theoretical and practical reason are 
lrm lch , Theology of Culture, pp . 40- 43 . 
2Nels F . S. Ferre, "Contemporary Theology and Chr1st!an Higher 
Educahon, • The Christian Scholar, XU (Tune, 1958), 152 . 
3rnlich, "Rel!glonsphllosophle," oe . cit ., p , 
--
followed . A heteronomous culture may be reqarded as one in ··Nhlch 
there is 
the attempt o! a religion to dominate autonomous 
cultural creativity from the outside, while self-
complacent autonomy cuts the ties o! a civlHza-
tion with Its ultimata ground and a1m, whereby, 
in the measure in which it succeeds, a clvtllzi-
tton becomes exhausted and spiritually empty . 
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A theonomous cul ture is defined as one "in which the ulUr.~.ato meaning 
of existence shines through a11 finite forms oi thought ar.c! action; the 
culture is transparent, -end ltS creations are vessels of a sp1ritual 
content . .. 2 
Western culture is bas1cally heteronomous . At the .end of tho 
medtaeval period the west was largely controlled by eccles tastlcol 
on;anizatlon; than men became dominated by technology and machinery; 
at present Western man is faced with the threat of the totalitarian 
state . 3 As a result the cultural predicament hos become almost hope-
lessly tragic; disruption, despair, conflict, and meaninqlessness are 
prevalent . If thJs sltuatlon should turn out to be a ••datk :1lght of the 
soul, • there may be the hope that renewed meaning may be produced; 
and the result may be ~ theonomous approach to culture . 
1Tillich, The Protestant Era. p . xvii. 
3
rheodore M. Greono, "Paul Tillich and Our Secular Culture," 
The Theology of Paul Tlll!ch, ed. Charles W . Keqlcy ond Robert w. 
Brctoll (New York: The Macmillan Co . , 1952), pp , 53-57 . 
There is nothlng which may not become a bearer of ultimate 
concern, but the problem is concerned with the transparency of the 
revelation of such concern . Thus, although no culturo can completely 
hide reltQious meaning, it is in the theonomous culture that the 
following Is transparently true: 
Re ligion as ultimate concern is the meantng-givin9 
s ubstance of culture , and culture Js the totality 
of forms in which the basic concern of rel!gion 
expresses itself . In abbreviation: rel!glon is the 
substance of culture, culture is the form of religion , 1 
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Tll!tch had earlier spoken of the relation of the cultural and the religious 
as correspandtng to the dupllclty of God and the world. "Der Doppel-
he it von Religion und Kullur, von Glaube und Unqlabe entspricht In der 
Objectssphiire die Doppelhe!t von Gott und Welt . • 2 Since God Is not 
something existing alongside the world, but rather the world's depth 
dim0nsion, religion is not something going along wah culture but the 
depth dimension In cu lture Itself . Another way of stating this relation-
s h.ip is as follows : 
in religion the substance which is the unconditioned 
source and abyss of mean lnq is des ignated , and the 
cultural forms serve as symbols for it; whereas ln 
culture the form, wh.tch ls the conditioned meaning 
is dosl9notod, and the substance, which is tho 
lruuch, Theology of Culture, p . 42 . 
2Tilllch, "Rellgtonsph!losophle," op . cit. , p . 804. 
unconditioned meanlnQ becomes percept!ble only 
indirectly throughout the autonomous form .1 
Thus the same idea or object can have Immediate and symbolic, or 
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cultural and rell<;tous ~ meaning . •ote gleicha Idee kann , .. unmittel-
bare und symbol1sche, re!tgtOse und k.ulturelle Bedeutung haben . "2 
Whether something is called religious or cultural de?cnds upon the 
primary function of !hat thing and whether it Is directly (intentionally) 
or Indirectly (unintentionally) directed toward the dlrnenslon of depth . 
The fact that nothing can make itself completely superficial or totally 
dissociate itself from ultimate reality means that all things are at 
least impJtcJtly reliqious. 
2. Aesthetic Experience and &xpress!on 
Tillich briefly indicates the s1gnlf1cance of art in the foJlo-.yJng 
statement: 
The aesthetic realm always furnishes the most 
sensitive barometer of a spirituol climate . Art 
Indicates what the c haracter of a spiritual sltuatlcn 
Is; It does this more Immediately and directly than 
do science or philosophy . . . . Science is of 
greater Importance In the formation of a spiritual 
situation, but art 1s the more important for its 
apprehension . 3 
1nlllch, The Interpretation of History, p . 50 . 
2Tllllch, .. Reli~Jionsphllosophle, .. oo . c it., pp . 804-805. 
3TIIllch, .. The World Situation, .. op . cit., pp . 9- 10 . 
This same comparison is expended at another point: 
While science and phllosophy have an Immediate 4nd 
causal stgnificanca for the spiritual situation o! a 
time, whether as destructive or construct.!vo forces, 
an is to be evaluated only as a mediate cause . For 
Jts immediate task is not that of apprehend.Jng essence 
but that of expressing meaning. Art indicates what 
the character of a spiritual situation 1s; 11 does this 
more immediately and directly than do science anC 
phllosophy for it is less burdened by objective 
considerations . Its symbols have something of a 
revelatory character while sctentiftc conceptualizat1on 
must suppress the symbolical in favor of objective 
adequacy . Science is of greater importance in the 
nse of a spiritual situation but art is the more 
imponant for its apprehension . 1 
Nevertheless, when one attempts to discover Tillich' s general 
attitude tO\vard art, the problems or drawing toqether the scattered 
strands and of filling in the <;aps become quite monumental. In 
answer to the question as to what is TUHch's philosophy of art, 
Kegley says: "No one to my knowlcdoe, has attempted an organized 
answer to this difficult question. I submit that this conception of 4ft 
ceo be summarized as follows : Art is the expression of a person's 
experience of ulttmate reality. u 2 The three major terms of the above 
summary are expression, experience and ultimate reality . 
l.ruHch, The Religious Situation, p . 85. 
2charles w. Kegley, "Paul TJ.llich on the Phllosophy of Art, • 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XIX (Winter, 1950\, 
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1. Conflict and Resolution 
In order to thi!'..k about T1111ch's theory of aesthetic experience, 
1t is necessary to return to his disUnctton between receiving and 
controlltnQ reason . Within controlling reason there is "a polarity 
between the organizational and the organic elements, .. 1 or beto.veen law 
ond personal communion . 2 In receiving reason one can observe "a 
polarity between the cognitive and tho aesthetic elements ... 3 A 
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similarity may be noticed between TilUch's division between the shaping 
and the receiving and Croce 1S (and the a lmost universal) distinction 
between the practical and the theoretical . However, Tillich regards 
th" receiving-shaping dis Unction as much more basic than the 
theoretlcal- practical distinction, though he Includes the theoretical 
within the receivin9 and the practical w!thin the shapin9 aspect. 4 
Within the theoretical Croce dtstlnqulshes the aesthetic and the 
logical; these are comparable to Tllllch ' s divisions, though the logical 
is only one phaso of the cognitive and may be regarded as 3 baste 
emphasis within the cognit!ve . It is essential to Til11ch•s argument to 
notice that the different functions of reason are not to be re9ardcd as 
1rUllch, Systemauc Theology, I. 77 . 
2Jbld . 3!bid . 
4T11Uch, .. Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," op. cit., 
pp . 332-333 . 
I 
performances 1n water-Ught compartments, and one ctan discover a 
continuum o( functioning between the poles .1 Therofore, although it is 
possible and necessary to make the preceding distinctions, 1t is also 
necessary to recognize mid-points in which there is a merging of the 
poles; moreover , the aesthetic pole is not to be re9arded as non-
cognitive , nor is the shaping phase to be regarded as non-:-eceiv!ng . 
Even the practical has the theoretical within it though this is not its 
emphasis . 
What thls means for aesthetics is that aesthetics can be defined 
with a deqree of precision; but aesthetics should not be regarded as 
excluding the other facets of re.!)son, whether these are cognition or 
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the conuolUng functions , Thus tho aesthetic is d!si:inct from the 
cog-nitive, the social and moral, and the legal; but 1t is not non ... eoonitivc, 
nor does it exclude moral poss1bUiUes or social implications. 
By examining the e>.-tremes to which reason may go, one can 
hedge - in or define aesthetic experience. Subjective or finite reason 
is subject to the conditions of existence, to d isruption end self-
destruction; and thus there are conflicts within finite reason which cause 
it to inquire about someth!.n<r more profound ln which these ma.y be 
resolved . Hov.·evor, It is necessary to observe that the depth of reason 
as It appoars tn revelation does not contradict the basic structure and 
IT!lllch , Systematic Theology, I, 77 . 
,. 
the actual functioning of reason. Reason and revelation arc comple-
mentary; revelation provides the norms by which rational conflicts may 
be evaluated and resolved.1 
Thoro are three basic conflicts Jn reason: (1) between autonomy 
and heteronomy, (2) between relativism and absolutism, (3) Md 
between formalism and emotionalism. 
(I) The Conflict between Autonomy and Heteronomy . --This 
conflict arises out of the polarity of structure and depth, or from the 
distinction between surface and depth (or meaning which lies belO'.< 
the immediately given form}. A "reason which affirms and actualizes 
its structure without regarding its depth is autonomous,"'2 but this 
does not carry with it implications of rebelUon and pride or even an 
improper! y understood self- sufficiency. On the other hand reason may 
arrogate itself to the assertion of its prerogative to speak in an 
unconditional and ultimate manner. 3 However, reason discovers i:s 
essential belng in the theonomous uniting of autonomous reason with 
its own depth, and reason is not destroyed in such a realization. 
Killen is dismayed because 1 for Tillich, reason is deficient, and not 
depraved in the Refotmed sense4; but TiHtch ins1sts that the quost for 
1rbtd . • PP . 79-83. 
3Ibid ., p . 84. 
ZruHch, Systematic Theology, I, 83 . 
4cr. K111en, op . cit . , p . 59. 
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reunion of estranQed tea.son •arises £!:!!.of reason and not in opposition 
to reason • .,l Thus theonomous reason is not some extraneous force 
enter ing into and overpowering reason; it is autonomy made whole or 
seen in depth . 
The value of this approach Is seen In that aesthotlcs can have 
at least a measure of autonomy . There is no cutting away of the 
ground from under the artist; rather this is an expansion and wholeness 
which gives to the artist real depth . Here there is a depth which saves 
the anist from shallownoss (autonomy) and destr<J.ctlveness 
(heteronomy), because in theonomy there is "the complete transparency 
of the ground of being" 2 in the object as well as "the complete self-
sacrifice of the medium to the content of revelation . • 3 In aesthetics 
this means that 
aesthetic reason does not obey ecelosiastical or 
political prescrJpts, nor does it produce seculat 
art cut off from the depth of aesthetic reason; 
through its autonomous artistic forms it points to 
the Now Being which has appeared In final 
reve lation . 4 
Revelation docs not give priority to teltg.ious OrQanization; 1t indicates 
that therG are numerous media which may equally well dtscover the ultimate . 
Aesthetic experience excels !n its sensitivity to ult1mate rr.eaninQ . 
l.ruHch, Systematic Theology, I , 85 . 2 Ibid . , p . 147 . 
4Ib!d . ' p . 149 . 
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(21 The Conflict between Relativism and Absolutism . --This 
confllct is produced by the polarity of the static and the dynomlc 
elements of reason . A structure is not something static, Vlhcther it 
be rational st ructure or some other kind; structures involve "duration 
·,•;ithJn change and chanqe in duration, ••1 or static and dynamic e lements . 
ln. the realm of aesthetics tho absolutism of tr~dition may appear 
in the 9uise of academic aesthetics, which is the defense of "the 
static element of aesthetic reason . '' 2 Academic aesthetics usually 
arises as something creative and new and is usually "attackod at its 
inc-eption as a distortion of former academic ideals . • 3 It thus beQins 
as a revolutionary absolutism and eventually elicits traditional 
absolutis m. 4 Tlll!ch does not Identify the academic and the absolut-
istic; but stnce academic art ts statlc und since absoluttsrn i& the pre-
dominance of the static e lement, the absolut.isttc principle ts oxemplifieC. 
in academic art . 
On the other side of this conflict, oesthctic rcl8tivlsm may be 
provoked by the auitude o! placing •uU previous styles on the same 
level without giving any of them preference in terms of a classical 
ideol . .. s ';Vtthout critical norms positivistic re lativism {as just 
excmpltfiedl turns either into absolutism or Into cynical relativism in 
I Ibid . , p . 78 . 2Ibid . 31b1c . 
4Ibld . , pp . 86-87 . slbta . • P . sa . 
wnlch there Is the atUtude of either superiority or indifference . 
The revelallonal answer to the problem posed by the absolute -
relative controversy is love, for love ls both facets of the controversy . 
No artistic production can stand as absolute under the penetrating 
judgment of final revela tioni however, it is not thereby reduced to an 
aesthetic chaos .1 Eros or love 
strives for a union with that whlch ts a bearer of 
values because of the values it embodies . This 
refers to the beauty we find i n nature, to the 
beautiful and the true in culture , and to the 
mystica l union w ith that which Is the source of 
the beautiful and the true . Love drives towards 
union with the forms of nature and culture and 
with the divine sources of both . 2 
There Is an lnterestlnq connection made between personal communion 
and anistlc expression: "He who cannot love the friend cannot love 
the artistic expression of ultimate reality. ,3 Eras 1S thus the broad 
term for that force which moves the wheels of human exjstence: .. we 
have, iollow1nQ Plato, defined erOs as the driving force ln all 
cultural creativity and in all mysticism . .. 4 
There can be no copylnq of ultimate beauty, but the passion or 
erOs which drives the artist toward beauty wherever !t can be dis-
covered makes possible the production of beauti!ul objects. The fact 
I Ibid . , p . 152 . 
2Tillich, Love , Power ( and rusttce I p . 30 . 
4 Ibid., p . !17 . 
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that the ar-tist creates in the presence of beauty means that he has at 
least captured a perspective of beauty; this makes his work absolute, 
but such a work must not be copied; another artist must attain his own 
presence; but art is not thrown into chaos because there are widely 
differing works. 
In this sense there is no right work of art; every product 
involves al ternatives, selections, and pmcisc expressions. ln tho 
same way no moral act is the nght act which may be exalted to the 
l evel of absoluteness . 1 Every work makes its own approach and must 
be considered upon the adequacy of Its approach and not upon the 
basis or other alternatives or selections wh.ich would have been 
possible . The point is simpl y this, every Mtistic express .:.on ts 
absolute in that the artist is absolutely concerned for insight into and 
the expression of the beautiful $ but the a.rtis1 must use the means 
which are at his disposal and operate within some cultural ftameworJ::, 
and this means that he Is related to much that causes him :o fall 
short of his ideals; nevertheless, his desire will cause him to create 
aqbln and again In quest of the beautifu l . Every object so produced Is 
created and rooted in the absolute. 
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(3\ The Conflict between Formalism and Emot!onallsm.-·There 
is a uniting of bo1h the formol and the emotional elements 1n a properly 
1T!1Uch, Systematic Theology, L 152- 153. 
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functioning reason, but these fall into conflict with U.Yldue stress being 
placed on one phase or the other. There is a correspondence between 
the fOTma1 element and the cognitive and leqal functions of reoson; or 
as Tillich says : "There is a predominance of the formal element in the 
cognitive and the legal functions of reason ."' On the other hand, there 
ts a predominance "of the emotional element in its aesthet._c and 
communal functions . " 2 
In cognitive formalism there is extreme emphasis on "he isolation 
of functions , on analysis, and on formalized logic: controlling know-
ledge attempts to exert itself as the sole avenue of knowledge; and tn 
the receiving cognitive realm there is "lntellectuoUsm, the use of the 
cognitive intellect without erOs . • 3 
Formalism In aesthetlcs Is suggested by the phrase , "art !or 
art's sake, .. in which there is a disregard for "' the content and 
meaning of artistic creations for the sake of their form • .. 4 Aesthetlc!sm 
is another name for this posltlon. which may be fun her re9arded as 
depriving "art of Its existential character l>y substltutlnq detached 
judgments of taste and a refined connoisseurship for emotional 
union ... s 
1Ibtd.,p . 89 . 
3 Ibid . , p . 90 . 
5Ibld . 
21bld . 
4Ibld . 
Now 1f an is to 00 expressive or 1s to communicate insight , 1 
it c,onnot be conceived of "as an escape from reality into an ivory 
tower . " 2 Nor can it be regarded as "aesthetic surface"' or "reducible 
to aesthetically agreeable patterns of sound and color and , .. there-
fore in essence an escape from reality, mere play, an object of 
aesthetic delight and nothing more . .. 3 
The emphasis here compares to tho Insistence of theonomy that 
reason bo unltod with its depth, to the recogn.ttlon tho.t forr:'ls are 
wholly superficial without the substance of ultimate reality shining 
throuqh them . Not only Is there superficiality but thoro may be 
idolatry involved 1f tho cultural forms or the artistic creations arc too 
highly regarded In their own right . Aesthetic experience !s a matter 
of preliminary concern; "be ing grasped aesthetically Is not being 
grasped by the ult!meto . " 4 "Can you challen9e the ability of those 
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who vis it galleries to experience the esthetic side of art without 
e>."Periencing the full Jmpact of the relig:ious side? "S And when there ls 
such experience, there Is always danger, even if aesthetic experience 
1To be considered later, pp . 178-188. 
2Theodore Meyer Greene, Tho Arts and the Art of Cr i: icism 
(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1940). p . 229 . 
3 
..!llli!. . • p . 233 . 
4TUI!ch, The Protestant Era , p . 219 . 
5rmlch, "'l>.rt and Ultimate Reality, • op . cit . , p . 13. 
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is in connection with rolig10n. 
Every public performance of Bach's Passior. of St. 
Matthew carries with it the risk of makfng the 
gospel srory more meaningless for people who 
adm1re the qreat art of Bach's music without 
being grasped by its infinite meaning ,I 
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It would appear thot Tillich is askinQ the aesthetic :o cease to be 
aesthetic in order to be aesthetically adequate. T1lhch seems to be 
destroying the autonomy of aesthetics at this point. On the other hftnd~ 
he seems to be isolat1n9 the aesthetic and tho roUglous. But he cannot 
be both requiring the aesthetic to be religiously Significant in order to 
be aesthetically adequate and isolating the aesthetic and the reli~JiOus . 
In order to realize what TU11ch is saying it ls necessary to call 
to mind three basic cons!derauons, t\•;o of whtch hD.ve alraady been made. 
(1) The holy is that ohase of ultimate reality which corresponds to 
ultimate concern in man. A corollary o{ this is that there must be some 
phases of ultlmate reality which do not correspond to ultt~ate concern 
ln man. The deepest 1nsiqhr:s or ert and aestheUc experience thus do 
not correspond to this ultimate concern, though they are lnsi9hts into 
ultimate realJty (beauty) . (2) Religious symbols directly provoke 
insight into ultimate reality, and artistic symbols prov1de only indirect 
msi9ht. This seems to bear out further the no~ ion that there is some 
facet of ultimate reality whleh ts grasped by art, bat this is not the 
1nllich, Systematic Theology, I. 90, n . 10. 
direct confrontation with that in ultimate reality which is of ultimate 
concern . (3) Tllllch distinguishes between insight (art) and trans-
form~tlon (religion\ (to be exomined later\ : art may provide Insights, 
whJch lead to transformation, but the primary function o! .art is not to 
transform reality, it is to ~ive in sight into it. 
'Ihe dimension of depth In every cultural reality is the reli9ious 
dimension or the dimension of ultimata concern . One m&y have to do 
a bit of revising here or at least a bit of expanding. The :::Umens1on 
of depth may either be expended to include insights into ulumate 
reality, which are not strictly religious. Or the dimension of depth 
may involve only the religious level ln every cultural creation; If this 
is so, there needs to be included alon9 with this the fact that there 
can be profound insights into ultimate reality itself, which are not 
included in the dimension of depth . 
1&7 
There may be the Isolation of the cognitive from the aesthetic 
function. Some arts are nearer the aesthetic polo (e .g . r.:us!c) and 
some tend away from the aesthetic (though they are more aesthetic than 
cognitive\ toward the cognitive (e.g. literature: "Literature sU ll 
contains too mueh philosophy to be able fully to satisfy t:"\e ciesire for 
pure artistic contemplation"!). Though the emotional element and the 
11'lllich, The Interpretation of History, p . IS . 
aesthetic function cannot be equated, the emphasis in the aesthetic 
is upon emotion , and emotion plays a primary role in aesthetic 
experience . 1 
Tilllch descrtbes emotion as "the vehicle for receiving 
cognition ... 2 Emotion makes POSSible a union •,vlth 6 content in a 
way in •.vhich "pure cognition" would not find possible . Since know-
led<)e is the coming together of union lJnd detachment, wJthout the 
fusion of emotion, knowledge would be impossible. And since 
aesthetic experience is not the exclusion of cognition, CO<Jn1t1on may 
be one of the sl9nificant phases of aosthetJc experience due to the 
heightenlnq or emotion 1:\ that experience . 
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Nevertheless, if emotion is opposed to cognition in the manner 
above Indicated, how Is It t hat It Is possible to enhance Insight by 
means of emotional involvement? The answer to this Hes in the !act 
that cognition as such tends toward cognitive formalism, with extreme 
emphasis on detached and relatively unemotional knowing . However, 
thiS ls not the only level or mode of cognition, and when emotion is 
more fully included In cognition • different level of knowledge is 
possible --and the knowledge here 1s even more significant than in 
cognitive formalism . Thus Tillich' s assertion that literature tends to 
be more philosophic than is ordinarily possible in aesthetic cxpcnence 
1Tilllch, Systemotlc Theology, I, 77 . 2lbld . ' p. 98 . 
,, 
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must be taken to mean that literature provides more insight into matters 
of detached cognition but not necessarily more ins1Qht into even :nore 
Sl9nlflcant types of aesthetic cognition . 
It Is important to nouce that emotion is not the whcle of 
aesthetic experience; emotion must be structured. Emotional reactions 
against formal reason are "'merely 'emotional ,' that is , minus structural 
alements" :1 they are, a t the experiential level, merely outpoured 
e motion which becomes irrationa.Usm. 2 And irrationali sm is destructive 
either by attacking reason with some rational co:'ltant, which Is 
L'Tationally, or blindly and fanatlcll.lly, supponed; or .. lrratlonahsm 
empties itself of any content and becomes mere subjective feeltng . ,.3 
The final result of this, however, ts not simply "an empty sentimen-
tality but the demonic rise of antirattonal forces, '1 4 because the mind 
lays HseH open to forces without adequate erltie~!l checks. 
The be sic danger in thts conflict is the isolation o: th.e functions 
of reason, and basically for aesthetics the separation of aesthetics 
from CQ9nltion . The dlsUnctlon made by Feigl and Ayer between the 
cognitive end the non .. coc;~nitive, with aesthetics !!.nd religion under the 
non- cognitlve, would be good examples of en inadequate apprehension 
I J2!!!.. ' p. 93 . 2Jbld . 
31bld . . lbld .' p . 94 . 
I 
-
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of the holistic character of experience .1 However , 1i the :tnalysis of 
the rehgious awareness is Accepted, it is possible for revelation to 
reunite the divided being and Its functions . Tillich descr:bes this as 
including the cognitive !unction or else as including no f\lnction. . 
Moroover; lf emotion must be excluded from knowledge 1 then the most 
important knowledge, about which we arc the most emotional, must be 
exc luded. 2 
Revelation restores the split functions of reason to .heir pristine 
purity and wholeness, or at least It shows the •.vay to sue:, a 
restoration. 
11. Aesthetic Meanin? and Expression 
As the preced ing discussion has already shown, Tillich 1s 
interested primarily in moaning at whatever the level of consideration . 
Superficial pleasantness or aesthetic surface must be grounded tn 
meaningful content . The succeeding discussion will attempt to deal 
ict. Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and toglc (2d ed.; 
Kew York; Dover Publlcotions, Inc., i946l, Chap . VI. Cf. also 
Heroort f'eigl and Wllfrld Sellars (eds .l, Readings in Philosophical 
Analys is (New York: Appleton .. Century-Crofts, Inc . 1 1949), pp. 6- 9 . 
A very interesting text which emphasizes the holis11e app1oach !n 
rolig10n from the perspective of psychology Js Wayne I:. Oates, 
The Rehg1ous Dimensions of Personality (New York: Assoeiatton 
Press, 195n . 
2ri111ch. Systemotlc Theology, I. 153-155 . 
-,; 
' . 
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more expllcttly with the nature of aesthetic experience by an 
examination of empathic projeetton and especially by a consideration 
of psychical distance, for it is in a consideration of these phases of 
aesthetic experience that one ls able to apprehend TUllch's basic 
fears in connection with the aesthetic experience . Moreover, 1t 
will be necessary to show whet Tllllch has to say about ~rtlstic 
devices and techniques . And, flnolly 1 the insights gained through 
artistic expression will bo considered with respect to their effect 
upon the person ex:periencin9 them . 
(ll Empathy and Distance . --Ttlllch does not have :nueh to soy 
OXJ>licnly about empathic projection . He does say that ''only poetic 
empathy opens the inner life of nature . .. l Moreover, the paradigm of 
mental (or spiritual) functionin9, which !s given on co.gnjtlon 1 may be 
regarded as applicable to (and possibly even derivable :rom) aesthetic 
o>,:perience as .... ·ell . 2 Here Tillich insists upOn knov.·ledge as a 
combination of union and detachment . 3 There is a union wtth and 
participation in the object; the subject is involved ln the obJect . 
However, such union is possible only if there is a prior C.etachment, 
and detachment presupposes a prior attachment. Vv'hat tl':is basically 
means is that there 1s some basis for the union (or reunion) of things 
which have something Jn common, but yet which are different and 
1Jbid .• Jl, 43 . 2Jbld . , I. 94-105. 3Ibld . , p . 94 . 
II 
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distinct . Union means that there can be an e:dstential involvement in 
tho object, and detachment moans that there must !>a some retention of 
the identity of the experiencing subject. 
Now TUltch Jns1sts upon the existential partictpeuon or empathic 
projection of the subject in the art objectJl but he is more concerned 
wlth what Bullough has c~lled ·•psychical distance . .. z For oxcmple, 
Tllllch points to the lack of seriousness of much art by re;a:dlng it as 
"only osthetic and therefore passtno. , 3 He speaks of an aesthetic 
mysticism which is characterized by a lack of "vita! ser!ousness , .. 4 
He proceeds to suggest that "ultimately it remains confined withln 
the esthetic form and so reveals the !act that the spirit of self-
sufficient rtnitudc is stronger in it than ls the desire to break throuQh 
to the &t:ornal . "5 The important thing to notice in the preceding 
passages ts not the mysticism as such; it is the term estl".etic, which 
1ror articles concerned with the importance of empathy for 
aesthetic experience consider A Modern Book of Esthettcs , which is 
edited by Melvin R4der . Pp. 367- 391 are especially •mportant 
articles wrltten by Vernon Lee. Theodor Lipps, and \!Vii helm \!Vorringer . 
2cr. Edward Bullough, " 'Psychical Oist&nco• as a factor in 
Art and an Esthetic Principle," A Modern Book of Esthetics , ed. 
Rader (3d ed . rev . ; Now York: Holt, Rtnohart, and 'Winston, Inc . , 
1960)' pp . 394-411 . 
3
rllllch , The Religious Situation, p . 99 . 
4 1£!!!.. ' p . 165. 
- .-. 
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Is the qualllylng adjective and which Is the source of the lack of 
vital meaningfulness . 
At other points Tillieh s'peaks of a 11 beautifying realism, .,I which 
"covers reality . " 2 And he asks: "Is there not an elemen: of unrcahty 
oven in the greatest work of an? .. 3 Thh tendency of art away from 
tho seriousness of reality was recognized in some of TUUch•s 
earliest ·.vrltin9s, for he says: 
The lmaglnatton manifests itsel!, among other 
things, in the delight In play . This dell9ht hos 
accompanied me throughout my life, !n play proper, 
In sports, taken by me playfully, and ln spirit of 
dilettantism, never serious ly, in the social play, 
!n the playful emotion that accompanies the pro-
ductive moments and makes them the expr-ession of 
the most lxlatlflc form of h~man freedom. The 
rom~mt1c theory of play, Niet:r.:sche ' s preference for 
play to "tho spirit of heaviness," Kierkegaard ' s 
"esthetic sphere, •• the imaginative elemant in 
mythology have ever been attractive to me and 
ever danQerou.s . Perhaps it has OOen the sense of 
this danger -.o;hich drove me more and more toward 
the uncompromising seriousness of prophetic 
rellqlon . . . . 
The highest form of play and the truly pro-
ductive abode of lmoglnotlon Is Art. 4 
In conjunction with art beln~ re9ar<ied as playful and !mo91nat1ve 
In contrast with life and Its stern realities, Tlllich emphasizes the 
1Tillich, "Existentialist Aspect'Jof Modern Art," op. cit., 
p . 146 . 
2Ibld . 3Tilllch, Theology of Culture, p . 7. 
'Lrilllch , Interpr<>tatlon of History, pp . 13-14 . 
~spect of detachment which appears to be the dominant quality of the 
aesthetic, though frequently 1t predominates to the product!on of a 
false art or aestheticism. 
It is the aesthetic detachment which c"n take held 
of our rel ation to culture and makes erOs i!lmbiguous . 
We have learned th!s espec!olly from Klerkegaard . 
His aesthetic stage of man's spiritual development 
is not a stage but a universal quality of love exposed 
to the dangers Kierkegaard deser!bos . The ambiguity 
of cultural erOs is its detachment from the realities 
which it expresses and consequently the dtsappeanng 
of existential participation and ulUmato responsibility. 
The wings of erOs become wings of escape. Culture 
Is Jrresponsil>ly enjoyed. It has not received the 
justice which it can demand. Agape cuts lr.to the 
detached safety of a merely aesthetic~· It coes 
not dony tho longing toward the good and the true and 
its divine sov.rce I but tt preve nts 1t from becoming 
~n ~esthellc enjoyment without ultimate aerlouaneu . 
,;gapA' makos the cultural erOs responsible and the 
mysuca1 !.!:2!, personal.1 
The esthetic attitude itself succumbs to demonry . 
It becomes estheticism. Here too the typical double 
face o! tho domonic appears : The ability of the 
esthete to Identify himself with everything disso lves 
the fixed HmJta!ions in our relation to thJngs I b'..lt 
on the other side takes away the independence a !"!.d 
PO\>ter of things . The maintenance of the esthet.c-
distance, which cho.ractcrizes all estheticism I cuts 
off the true community between man and things and. 
leads to a domineering attitude, implying in most 
instances some erotic element .... Estheticism is 
by no means bound to a development or predomtr.ance 
of the esthet!c function but is a quite general attitude . 
And it is a necessary attitude. It is not possible to 
create artificially situations in which the estheuc-
dlstance !s overcome, in which a concrete comn:unity 
1nllich 1 Love, Power and ]usucc, p . 118 . 
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with things is Qained anew . The ewkwardness of all 
such attempts and their final fiUlure shows thot the 
esthetic demonry was not overcome but merely covered . 
What places us constantly before the obyss of sense-
lessness and voidness of meaning, at the same :lme 
constantly opens up to us the approach to everything 
existing . That is the dialectics of estheticism .1 
From the preceding quotations it would appeac that the very 
thin9 \•;hich marks the qlory of .t~rt ~nd aesthetic experience involves 
a very serious danger by its tncitomont to a playful atthude toward 
!He . Detachment is the pr!mary characteristic o: the aesthetic 
experience . The aesthete is a spectator of life rather than a pantci-
potor . With this in mind one can read!ly apprehend T!ll!ch's dlstlnc-
tton bet\.;een art and religion: •Does not art express real!ty, whlle 
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rcl!q lon transforms reality? .. 2 
The preceding Is true despite the f~ct that emotion ls one of 
the ma jor factors in an, t~nd music for example is extremely emotionally 
oriented . It ts true also despite the fact that there fs the quest for 
beauty-itself 1:"1 ultimate reality . At points beauty, for Tilllch, seems 
almost excluded as a categoty for s!gntflcant artistic production. It 
must certainly be sold thot Tllllch rejects the separation of formal 
beauty from content . Surfocc pleasure is aestheUcSsm, but aestheucs 
'rlllich, The interpretation of History, pp . ll8-119. 
2r1111ch, Theology of Culture, p . 7. 
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cuts beneath the surface and strives for boauty- itself . The surface-
depth distinction cmer<)'es again. 
(2) Techniques . --If Tilllch' s primary emphasis Is on expression 
os was Croce's, it is not d ifficult to conjecture that along with 
Croce Tillich may {&11 to q ive adequate consideration to the techniques 
by which Insights are expressed . 1 And In fact Tlllich does say little 
about the disciplines required Oy the arust 1n order adequately to 
express his mstghts . On the other hand, Tllllch does not completely 
1gnoro this problem, and he does suggest that more than an emotional 
outburst is required even !or oxprcssiomstic an, in .... ·hich there ts a 
tendency to smash old forms and modes of product lor: . The artlst 
cannot simply express some pass.l.ng fancy or whim . At least he 
must express his basic substance . As Greene suqqests : '"Self-
expression ' in art is . . .• even in its most restricted fo:-ms, the 
expression of more than a passinQ mood, idea, or impulse. It must 
to some extent express the artist •s enduring personallty . . ,2 Bu: 
Tillich (as Greene also) goes on to su99est that the expression of 
the artist must be regulated by the principles o! reality and by an 
ability to handle the material of his art . TUHch's basic concern 
1cf. Benedetto Croce, •Intuition and Expression, •• A Modern 
Book of Esthetics , od . Melvin Rader (3d ed . rev . ; New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, Winston, Inc . , 1960), pp . 88-104 . 
2 Greene. op . cit., p . 232 . 
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about expressionistic art is that it may be a self- e>-."J)ress:onism which 
expresses nothing; only careful dtsclpllne can provide the remedy . 
There are fundamental elements tn artistic conception 
of reality whlch cannot be iqnorod . Even in the 
expressionist style . .. my warning Is that It rr.!ght 
neglect these c lements and become the emotional 
outcry of an artist who d id not learn his job. 1 
think a great danger for modern art Is that It Is 
carried through by people who see:n to think thJs Is 
an easy job; you do not need to learn very much, you 
simply express your emotional substance and every-
thing is all right . Such outcries in art are as bad as 
they are In phllosophy. Therefore, do not let us 
forget to sit down f!rst and to learn, both In philosophy 
~nd in art.l 
With these suggestions In mind one could not say that Tilllch would 
hold, as \-.·ould Croce , that there ate no "mute tn9lor1ous MUtons . '" 
Insight is essential, but no work can be produced which can adequately 
convey that it.sight unless the artist has the requisite techniques for 
the obJectification of such .into the artlstic product . 
Tlll!ch could give hearty support to Langer's pUn9ent analys ts 
of mere seH-expresslonfsm 1n music: 
Sheer self-expression requires no artistic form. 
A ly".ching party howling around a gallows tree, 
a woman wringing her hands over a sick cMld 1 
a lover who has rescued hts sweetheart in ~n 
acetdent and stands trembltno 1 s ... •eating, and 
perhaps laughing or cry!ng with emotion, is 
!Till!ch, "Art end Ultimate Reality," op. cit .,?. 14 . 
g~vin.g vent to intense feelings; but such scenes are 
not occasions for music,. least of all for comPOS~no . 1 
In such scenes as these discipline would be difftcul! and the very 
important factor of distancing would be neqlected . 
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(3) Insight and Healing . --The Insights or ort are as slgnlflcant 
as insights gained from matenals which eppear to be much closer to 
religion . For example, TUHch says : •J always learned r.tore from 
pictures than from theol09ical books . " 2 Even arguments for God ' s 
existence and theological analyses have lim1tatlons, which restrict 
the ir usefulness even beyond that of some artistic productions . 
Discursive languaoe (for instance, a.rquments for 
the existence of God or similar nor..reHoious 
activities) is unable to open u9 u ltimate reality, 
the level of the holy. And dtscurs!ve lanQuage 
does not express the ground of the soul in which 
the holy Is experienced . 3 
Til!ich calls upon men to look at art as pointing to ultimate meanings, 
and he seems to suggest that art ts able to reve&l ~n a \'-'ay which ts 
able to surpass otoor modes of expression . 
1tanger, op . cit ., p . 216 . 
2rnl!eh, "Art and Ult!mote Reality," op . c!t , , p, 10. 
3Paul T!llleh, "The Word of God," Language: An Enquiry Into 
its Meaning and Function, ed . Ruth Nanda Anshen {"Science of 
Culture Series," Vol . VIII; New York: Harper and Brothers Pub . Co . , 
1957), p , 133 . 
,. 
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It is a function of art to open up levels of rea!Jty; 
in poetry, 1n visual art, and in music, levels of 
reality are opencC up which can bo opened up In 
no other way • • . • You can take that •,o;hich a 
landscape of Rubens . . . mediates to you . . . 
What this mediates to you cannot be expressed 
in any other way than through the painting Itself. 
The same Is true also in the relationship of 
poetry and philosophy . The temptation may 
often be to confuse the issue by bringing too 
many philosophical concepts Jnto a POQm . . 
if one uses philosophical language or scientific 
lanquage, It does not mediate the same thing 
which Is med.lated In the use of really poetic 
language without ~ mixture of any other 
language . 1 
Tho dance, which is regarded by many religious people as 
.Incapable of s ignlf.lcant rel.lglous meaning (due to the •depreciation 
of the bQ<Iy with its expressive and creat!w po·.vers··Z), embo<iles 
profound insights: 
The expressive power of the moving bQ<Iy. the 
organization of space by dancers (individuals ar:.d 
Qroupsl, the rhythms embodied in vts!bJe movements, 
the accompanying sounds expressing the idea and 
the passion behind the dance: all th!s became 
phflosophJcally and religiously significant for :r.o . 
It was a new encounter with reality in its deeper 
leve ls . 3 
rhus Tillich specks of his experience with the dance school of Mary 
Wig man during the 1920s. 
"ruuch, Theology of Culture, pp . 56-Si. 
Zpaul Tlllfch, "The Dance: What It Means to Me.·• op. cit., 
p . 20 . 
I' 
179 
'I 
I 
In another essay Ttlllch writes on the importance of ¥t in 
reveallnq or expressing ulttmate reality . 
The symbolic power of visual art is not that special 
symbols are painted (as Is true of bad art) but that 
if you point a picture, whatever the content of it 
may be, a landscape or a pOrtrait, or a story, tt 
expresses a level of reality to which only the 
anistic creation has an approach . We never would 
see 1t 1f art did not reveal it to us. In this sense 
even a very naturalistic landscape--let us say, 
by a Dutch painter in the seventeenth century--;.s 
a picture 1n which everything Is symbollc In tho 
sense that it points to a rea.Uty and a mearung, to 
a level of reality which the painter In his creative 
encounter reveals to us . Now we can see it; now 
we can be .!!1. it . 1 
Art has insights to give that cannot 00 gained in any other way, 
for $Ymbol$ ~e of S\!Ch e na\1110 aJ 10 110 Irreplaceable; lhe question 
arises, however, as to whether THUch's conception of art is 
propagandistic: must leqlt!mate art be not only artistically adequate 
but express some specific content as well? 
Modern art is not propaganda but revelation. It 
shows that the reality of our existence is as it ts. 
It does not cover up the reality in which we are 
living . The question therefore is this: Is the 
revelation of a situetton propaganda for it? If 
this were the case all art would have to become 
dishonest beautification . 2 
Now just what does the artlsttcelly authentic and reUgiously 
significant object reveal? What is uniquely revealed by art? Tlllich 
1Tilllch, "TheoiOl;Y and Symbolism,• oo. cit., p . 109. 
2Tillich, The Couraqe To Be, p . 147 . 
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seems to answer this in a clear and concise statement: 
In the cognitive realm the depth of reason is its 
quality of pointing to truth- itself, namely, to the 
lnf!nlte power of being and of the ultimately real, 
throu9h the relatlve truths In every field of know-
ledge . ln tho aesthetic realm the depth of reason 
is its quality of pointing to "beauty .. itself," 
namely, to an infinite mcaninq and an ultimate 
significance, through the creations Jn every field 
of aesthetic intuition.! 
The ground of being is unitary; hOW"evcr , it is ~ complex unity , and 
these varied modes of approaching it reveal multiple facets with.L'1 it . 
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The aesthetic realm points to beauty-Itself, and thus a boautlful obJect 
!s the primary product of an . 2 
All of this seems to be contradicted by TllUch's interest In art 
obJects which are not regarded as beautiful 1n any ordinary sense. 
One mlQht consider whet Tillich reqards as one of the mos t important 
of all modern pictures, Picasso' s Guernica . In fact, when beauty 
Is considered by T!lllch, he always warns against prettification and 
a beautifying realism, and ins ists upon a realism which ;>uts things 
exactly as they are , without an idealizing prettification. One may be 
legitimately surprised to see that T!Uich re9ards the Guernica as 
realistic art . it certainly 1$ not realistic if by recHsm is meant some-
thing Hke an unretouchod photograph . What Tillich means by realism 
lrmlch, Systematic Theology, I. 79 . 
2cf. Plato Symposium 206. 
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in art is that the artist must not touch up the photoqraph in such a 
manner as to make it better or prettier than it really is . The artist does 
not have to copy or imitat e directly , but he must deal with reality 1 
whether critically or descriptively. by creating something which reveals 
the distortions whlch are really pro sent without g lossing them over . 
The seat of most rell9ious Kitsch (which T!lllch leaves untranslated, 
but which means worthless finery or trash) is found in descriptive and 
critfcaJ realism's 11borrowing sentimental traits and beautlfying dis· 
honesty from the distortions o f the ide~ llstlc s tyle ... 1 Realism and 
idealism will be considered la ter alo n9 with the other stylistic e lementS, 
but these approaches must be a t least introduced here in order to get at 
the sh)nillcance of artistic express ton . TUUch su9gests tho.t there is 
another basic source of Kitsch in religious art which l!es In the 
idealistic emphasis in which estr ange ment is neglected and the 
essentJal unity of man with the divine is predominant . 
The key to an underst~nding of Tlll ich's view that art u lllmately 
tends to Insight into the nature of beauty-itsolf lias in his d1stinet1on 
between essent!ol and existential being . Essential being is that 
,,·hich all things are In God, and existential bein9 is , .. ·hat all th!ngs 
are whtch exist . It is easy to obscure actual existence by a dreamy 
and optimistic vision of what thln9s ought t<> be (In terms of wh~t they 
1Till!ch, ·•Art and Ult!m~te Reality,• op . cit., p . 11. 
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are essentially). Authentic an, though it strives for the ;;>roduction 
or beauty, never forgets what actually is, and never obscures these 
facts in its productions . 
The present age must cope with violence, anxiety, and even 
despair; and the art whlch ls presently produced is Indicative of the 
contemporary cultural distress. The tnmsition of tho present , as weLl 
as the cutrent anxiety of meanin9lessncss, produces an art -.•,•hich is 
frequently distorted, violent, and ba.ffhng . T!llich and Greene say: 
It is not stranqe that our most sensitive and creative 
artists should so poignantly express thts cultural 
distress in such baffling ways; nor is it surprising 
that they should so seldom express a triumphant 
faith or "the peace that passeth all understanding." 
VIe must admire their spiritual courage and their 
artistic inteqrlty in en age of spiritual turmo1l and 
anxiety. And we can be grateful to them fer their 
notable artistic affirmations at a time when all 
spiritual affirmations are difficu lt ond rare. For 
their art~ as authentic art~ is an affirme;:tion of 
the creative ima;tnatlon, and their very violence 
ls an implicit af!trmation of all the values whtc:, 
are being threatened and violated in these tragic 
times. They have at least had the courage not to 
retreat into an e mpty formaltsm ~ or a trad1t1ona!istlc 
conventionalism, or a dishonest saccharine prettiness . 
This courage of theirs may well be prophetic of a new 
reltqiously oriented cultural vital!ty which, we can 
hope, is slo-..,•ly and painfully coming into beln<; m 
our day.l 
Two characteriStics of the successful anist are menttoned 1n the 
1rilllch and Greene, "The Nature o! Religious Art," op. cit., 
pp . 283 - 284. 
I 
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preceding discussion: integrity and courage. It is just these t<.vo 
qualities which are ebsolutely necessary. If art is primarily the 
communication of insight, and 1f meanin9s which are so dlstresslnq 
are to be expressed, then the artist must search for insight into 
reality and for courage to convey his insight with integrity. Integrity 
and courage are two sides of the same coin . If art were mere 
sentimentalism, beautifying reallsm, or mere trimming or ornament, 
no such quallttes would be needed. 
T!!Uch discusses the way In which modern art has been truly 
propheuc and has thus provided cathartic insight into the contemporary 
predicament . Several literary works are mentioned and some of their 
baste themes are rather carefully (within the limits of extreme brevity) 
analyzed . 1 Concerning Sartre' s No Exit T!llich says that though in 
gener&l there may be no exit from the impossible situatton one may be 
in~ nevertheless~ there is an exit 1! one is able to say that there is 
none. 2 The actist, in facinq thin.9s as they are, f8ces them with a 
1works mentioned other than those Included In the main body of 
the discussion are Eliot's "The W~steland," Kafl<o's The Castle ond 
The Trial, Auden's Age or Anxiety, Sartrc's Age of Reoson, Arthur 
Miller's Death of a Salesman , and Tennessee Williams ' A Streetcar 
Named Desire. Cf . Tllllch, The Couroge To Be, pp . 142- 146. 
2Tilllch, The Courage To Be, p. 143 . 
' creative courage, which transforms their destructiveness into o 
structured creation . 1 
P._'lother side of the human situation is seen by Camus in The 
Stranger, in which meaninglessness arises because of the loss of 
subjectivity of the hero In his Inability to establlsh an existential 
relation to himself and hls world, with the resulting lack of either 
anxiety and despair or courage. 
He is a stranger because he nowhere achieves an 
existential relation to himself or to his world ... 
He is described nol as a person but as a psycholoqtcal 
process which Is completely conditioned .. .. 
He is en object among objects , without mean lng for 
himself an<i therefore unable to find mean1nQ in his 
world . 2 
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Hope resides in taking the despair (the condition o: hopelessness 
produced in modern man by the anxiety of meaninglessness) into one •s 
being, and thus, by the meaninQful presentation of meaninglessness, 
affirming onesel!, cow-ageously afflrming ultimate meaningfulness (or 
the signlftcance of the quest for meaning1. 3 The a.""tistic expressions 
of despair, decay, meoning1essness, and chaos are not :hemselves 
what they express. Tilllch points out that some are not able to under-
stand this and 
1Jbtd.' pp, 139-143, 147-148 . 
3Jb1d" pp . 54,139-149, ISS. 
2Jbid . ' pp, 144-145 . 
'1 
l!lttack as a morbid longing for negativity whet 1n 
reolny is courageous acceptance: of the rte9ative. 
They call decay what ls actually the creative 
expression of decay. They reject os mcamng less 
the meaningful attempt to reveal the meaninQless-
ness of our situation. 1 
Greene states this very pointedly: 
Fraeuonality Jn art is never, of 1ts.clf. arusttcalJy 
expressive. The expression of chaos cannot itself 
be chaotic . Fractional tty is often a symptom or 
manifestation of disorder, but it cannot anistically 
express disorder . Vv'hcn an angry man hacks at a 
block of marble In a bllnd rage, or bol>bles 
incohercncies, or fllngs p.oint onto canvas with 
reckless abandon, the results will be symptomatic 
of his mental state . But they wlll not be art . To 
express such mental states artisticall~· the artist 
must discipline both hlmseH and his medium . 2 
Frankl also agrees with Tlll!ch that meaning Is not just the grasp o! 
stat!c truths~ but even the quest for meaning and the afhr:naUon of 
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ult imate meantnQfulness in the face of a bewildering mear.inglessness 
are meaningful . 3 Tillich has called the affirmation of ulLmate meaning-
fulness the "acceptan=e of acceptance. ,4 the acceptance that one ls 
in the grasp of something ultimately significant, and thus the key to 
be!nq-ltsel!., 
I Ibid ., p . 140, 2Greene, oo , cit., p . 219 . 
3 Cf. Oates , op . c lt., pp , 250-253 . 
4T1111ch. The Courage To Be, Chap , VI . 
s 
.!Jlli!. . • pp , 178-181. 
-,, 
--
Modern art is primarily question rather than answer. Its 
greatness lies in its intogrtty and courage to express the tragic 
contemporary s i tuation without forcing some solution , 
This is the Protest~nt element in the present situation: 
No premature solutions should be tried; rather, the 
human situation !n its confllcts should be expressed 
couraQeously . If it is expressed, it is .already trans-
cended: He who can bear and express guilt shows 
that he already knows about ''acceptance-in-sptte-
o£ . " He who can beat and express meaninglessness 
shows that he experiences meaning within hi$ ciesert 
of meaninglessness .1 
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The Kairos cannot be forced, but by honest expression of the situation 
as it is there can be an openness to the rise of some real answer. 
Indeed, the religious function of art may be to ask enough 
questions thot the pot answers of traditional rellglon (which hos 
become largely Irrelevant to human need) may receive further tnvesti-
gation and a resulting reinvigoration . The answers of the churches 
have become unintelligible and meaningless to modem mon, largely 
because they are not the answers to the ques!ions artsin9 out of 
contemporary existence . But art does rise out of human questioning 
rother than out of etemal answers. 
I believe that existentiollst art has a tremendous 
religious function, in visual an as well as in all 
other realms of art, namely, to rediscover the 
basic questions to which the Christian symbols 
1T1111ch, Theology of Culture, p. 75 . 
are the answers ln a way which is undarstandable 
to our Umo. These symbols can then become again 
understandable to our time .1 
3 . The Work of Art 
For Tllllch the work of art has three aspects --subject matter, 
form and style . 2 Tho first two phases will be considered rather 
brie fly, then the final phase will be treated more ot len9th. 
i . Form 
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It is the formal aspect which gives the work of art as uniqueness, 
which makes the work to ex!st, which gives it " its special place 
within the whole of being, .3 and which gives the work "Its expressive 
power . .. 4 There is no creation without s ome special form; "the form 
is the ontoloqically docisive element in every artistic creation--Gs in 
any other creation." 5 
In spite of the requisite presence of form in every work of ort, 
overemphasis on form leads to autonomy, to formalism, and to 
superf1ci~.lity, with a neglect of content . ~ven theorists Ukc Bell 
and Fry could not restrict themselves to pure form and came up with 
1Tllllch, "Existentialist As poets of Modern Art, • oo . cit., 
pp . 146-1 47. 
2Tlllich, Theology of Culture, p . 69 . 
31b!d . Stbld . , pp . 69 - 70. 
such concepts ~s "significant form" 1 and "the substratum of all the 
emotional colors of lLfe , • 2 which goes beyond tho aesthetic surface 
or formal arrangement . And if these thinkers who 4re endeavoring to 
make form primary in their theory of the art o.btect have uouble and 
eventually Introduce something else, T!llich, with his emphasis on 
what a work expresses or means~ is much lass concerned wHh the 
formal phases of the work ' s existence. 
11. Matter 
It ls dtfftcult to give a title to this section because it includes 
so many thtngs, and it is only possible to underster.d Tillich if all of 
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these things are mentioned . TJllich discusses (expl!cltly or !mpl!c ltlyl 
what Is being used In the sense of raw matenal to be for:ned Into a 
work of art, more specific materials, subJect matenals (in the sense 
of what is spoken about by thG formed matter), end content (in the 
sense of what is said about the subject matter v1a the formed matter) . 
Subjec t matte!" is "potentially identical with everything which can be 
1cuve Sell, "Slgnlflcant Form," A Modern Seck of Esthetics, 
ed . Melvin Rader (2d od . rev . ; New York: Henry Holt and co., 
19521, pp , 317-318 . 
2Roger Fry, "Pure and Impure Aft ," A Modem Seck of Esthetics, 
ed . Melvin Rader (3d ed . rev . ; New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 
Inc . , 19601. p . 309 . 
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received by the human c-.md in sensory 1m09e1. •1 thts is the broad 
potential mater13.1 fro~ wh!ch selectto:'\ may be made fo:- the p-..:.r;>ose 
of tnform1n9 (patting into !orm) ~ work of an. It includes r4w materials 
'' such 01 sounds, words .. stones 1 colors 1 "2 aa well as speeif1c 
subJect materials like "the willful and brutal destruction or o small 
town by ruclst olrplones,•3 pictures o r Christ, the VlrQin, and 
booscolly ultlmate reality. 4 It Is to be noticed especially that every 
work of e.rt in some way wiU say something about ulumotc co:-tcern, 
ond Sn this sense ult1mate reaLty wHl be the ultimetf:!' sub;ecr ~ener 
of every work of art . This puts uhi!'!"!ato reallty ln o peculiar posltion 
as subject matter or cor.tent. When TllUch auoo•ata that there car. 
be o potntln9 without rel191ous content, he must be speoldng of religion 
in the na.rro-... ·er sense of speclflc symbols auch as the cross or a fish. 
Even tn art which has a nonreligious stylo and a nonreligious content , 
the ••power o( botn; is visible, not directly, but indirectly . ,.,; It is 
because or tho focts Just Indicated thot Tllllch con soy: "Ultimately 
no Irreligious art ts passtble ... G At this point one moy also be 
1
rtlltch, Theology of Culture, p. 69. 
4
rttllch, "Existe:1Ua!ist Aspects o! Modern Art,• op. cU., 
pp . 132-133. 
s Ibid., p, 135 . 
6rllllch, "'Theology, Architecture and Art," op, cit . , p . 55 . 
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remtr.c!ed of Tllllch's ;eehn<; that even the a:heist ts not trrellQlous .1 
It ia tmponant to notice that one aspect o! mattRr ts that of 
oppoaltton to form. TilHch refers to n"gro sculpture a:td Sh..lva 
plcturea as aesthetlc thou9h stondinQ In opposition to classical 
aoathotlct . If this ts so, .... ·hat 1s revealed ts that 
there ts something positively contrary to form that is 
capable or lltting Into on artistic form. Thoro oxlsts 
not only a lack of form but also a contradiction of 
form; there exists not only somothin¥ leas poa1Uve 
but also something contra·posJUve . 
And that wh.lch 1s contrary to form Ia the demonic. 3 
KeQley notices th.ls in his article with rupee! to the conceahng 
aspect of any symboUc proeucuon. This ho describes u 
the Platonic not!on that expression tn the 4MS always 
Involves 1119 ereatl~g arttst tn t!lo dl!flculty or uslr.9 
some medJum of CO!'r.muntcatton, which medium ls 
ipso facto an obstacle . TUllch scorns to aqree 
heartily '""'"ith Plato's contention that •matter," or 
tho medium of artistic creation, is at onco the 
lnd!spensable means and the !rreconc!loble foe of 
artistic communicat Jon . The Greek sculptor, seeking 
to oxprota the vJbranL rhythmic motion of tho runner, 
but hovinQ to do so in cold, hard stone, Is perhaps 
o peronnlal one striking example of thil difficulty in 
oil arusuc expression.~ 
One m10ht wonder~ hO'Ne\-er, if the opposition to form ts as static 4nd 
1Ttlllch, The Protestant Era, pp. xlv-xv. 
2TUI!ch, The Interpretation o! History, p, 79. 
4 Kegley, loc. ell . , p, 176. 
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as much concerned with the artistic medium as Keoley would suggest. 
That ts, ts not that wh!ch stands in opposition to form a dynamic 
force which brin.qs about the production or creation of form as well as 
th~t which threatens every form \\·lth destruction? 1 Granted that the 
artistic medium may pose nu:nerous obstacles to the artlst, lt is his 
obligation to bring this medium into subjection to his art by means oi 
diligent d iscipline; but even when this h&s been done, there is still 
the dynamic potential!ty which cannot be fully made actual in any 
specif1c creahon. 
111 . Style 
One o! the most extensive studies of Tillich on the question of 
the r~lal!on betwMn art and ult!mate fhlity or God lies m the 
direction of styles . TUl!ch regards "An and Ultimate Reality• as hls 
definitive work on the subject of art and religion,2 and 1t is here where 
he carefully discusses the releUon between styles and religious 
meaning . 
One may begin by quoting Tllllch's brief comparison of 
philosophic method end artistic style: " Method Is to phllosophy what 
style is to art, the expression of the Intellectual attitude of the 
1ct. this wtth the discussion of the demonic and the dynemlc, 
pp . 42- 50. 
2This information came to me in a letter from TUHch's secretary . 
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Individual and of the spiritual situation of the whole . .• 1 Essentially 
styles are the b1ndtng or unifying perspectives of any lndiv!dual or 
period. It Is due to style that works ol art have something in common . 
Styles develop within the evolvement of the individual arttst•s 
porspectJve . As such, the style of an artJst may vary from work to 
work . And even as the artist's perspective Js evolved withm some 
cultural perspective, his work slows the imprint of his penod's outlook . 
Moreover, it i s through the style of any particular period that one 
t s able to see the perspective of tho.t period or the basi c meantnq- of 
the period . 
Style is the form which expresses the meaning of the 
period . If you want to know what ls the ultimate 
self-interpretation of an historical period, you must 
ask, "Wl\at kind of style Is r>r4!$~!'1! I~ the artistic 
creations of thJs period." Style ts the over- aU 
form which, in the particular forms of every panl -
cu1ar artist and of every particular school, is still 
visible as the over-all form; and this over-all form 
ls the expression of that whJch unconsciously is 
present in this period as its self- interpretation. as 
the answer to the question of the. ultimate meaning 
of its existence . 2 
Now lf every style contains an approach to the ulhmate meaning 
of the period in wtuc h it !s produced, an analysis of styles should be 
religiously siQnlflcont . 
lTllllch, The Rellgtous Situation, p . 70 . 
2THUch, "Existentlalist .~spccts of Modern Art, .. op . cit . , 
pp . 133-134 . 
In every srylc :he dtlmate concern o! a hu:r.ar. qroup 
or period is c:ani.!est. It is ono of the cost fasclnatl~ 
teak a to decipher the reltq1oua a::.ean1n9 of styles of 
the past such as the archaic, the cloaatc ~ the 
notural1suc, and to discover that the same charactar-
18t1cs which are discovered in an arUsUc creation can 
oliO be found in the literature, ph!losophy, and morals 
of o period. I 
More briefly stated, "every style POints to o so!l-!r.terpretot!on of 
mon, thua answering the questJon or the u!t!mote mean!nQ of IHe ... 2 
Thus styles are basically answers to the human predicamont rather 
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than questions. And as TUUch would mstat, the answers do not ar!se 
from human inQenuity or lnUQht; they ore tho products of dtvlne 
eommunton or eo;nmunleot!on (broadly constdoredl . Styles, thus, 
4!8 not Just h"manly devtsed; they artae from tho human predtcar.;ent, 
which Involves an ontoloqtcal ~uucture and 60m<J mode of dlv:na -
human encountor . Style in a work 1s not consciouely or intentionally 
ercGtod usually, !or an artist !s usually groaped by more than he 
GCtuGl!y appre hends . 3 A.~d !n no case Is It possible to Imitate older 
styles and produce genuinely artistic crcattona 0 
Tlllich contrasts style with form and matter tn The Interpretation 
of Hit tory ar.d refers to style as •the third element 0 • 
Style never lies !n the ,n:entlon of tho creative 
ar.lst 1 not even when he consciO<.~Ily follO'Ns a 
1TUI!ch, Theology of Culturo, p. 10. 
2
rbtd • 3 !t:id.' p. 71. 
I 
provtous style . He can nevor consciously 91Ve 
hl::~aelf his style. Th& style ... 11 appuer.t 
or.ly to the hJstortan or observer o! .ut (who un.der 
corto1n cltc\!.mstances can bo the a a.-no porson as 
the onlstl . . . . As soon as attention Ia 
directed to the thltd element, freedom and fate 
ace lost, and subjective orbltrortness controlled 
by psychological n&cesslty replace& them.l 
Rollo May is able to sum uP the genoral eharocterlstlcs of style 
in Tllllch's use of the term In tho follow In; statement: 
In every society there are certoln formative 
principles which !nluse every aspect ol that 
culture- - art, science, oducatton, reltc;1on. 
The1e formative principles are expressed !.n 
eertaln basic symbols a.•d myths which ler.d 
form and unity to the culture. Such symbols 
ue the cultwe's form of transcending the 
Immediate situation; they wtU always bo bound 
up with tha funda;::o:er.tal values and ooola accepted 
tn the soelety. 7tU!ch uses the expression •style" 
for these underlying unifying prlnclplos In a otver. 
culture; . . . This •style" will always hov• a 
reiJgious dimension since it POinta to a meanlnQ 
beyond the Immediate situation of tho culturo. 2 
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It Is Important to observe that Tllllch dooa not re9ard his approach 
to styles as tho only possible one. His approach Ia to examine styles 
with re;ard to their manifestation of ultimate concern. But this is not 
tl-.e only eerspectlve. ':'his rr.eans thot there ts much a.bou~ styles which 
!11Uch doe a not say~ and this is unfortunato from the standpoint of 
atte::\pUn; to 9et ~ total plct-..l!e o! hta aettheucs as well as h!s 
1Ttlllch, The Interpretation of History, pp . 146-147. 
2 Mdy, toe. cit . , p . 24 . 
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religion, but one must not take an omission which is consciously 
made for either an oversight or for the neqlect of some facet which 
would be essential to a fully developed theory. Tllltch states that he 
is not concerned w!th a full enumeration of styles, but rather with the 
specJftcatton of those stylistic keys by which all s:yles may be 
evaluated In light of their religious Import . 
It is not my task to point to such koys for the 
deciphering of styles in 9eneral, or of tho 
innumerable collective and personal styles which 
have appeared In history . Rather, I shall Indicate 
those stylistic elements which are expressive for 
ultimate reality . 1 
Every work of art may contain all the stylistic elemems which are 
indicated by the stylistic keys; however, one of these may predom1nate . 2 
In order to examine these, It Is neeessary to observa them in their 
exaggerated or completely dominatinQ form. 
In Theology of Culture and "Art and Ultimate Reallty" there are 
two discussions of styles, which are superficially quite different. 
ln Theology of Culture Tlll!ch classifies the stylisllc keys as 
1deal1sl1c, realistic 1 subjective, and objective . 3 In "Art and Ultimate 
!rullch, "Art and Ul timate Reality," op. cit ., p . 3 . 
2cf. Ibid., p . S; Tllllch, Theology of Culture, p . 71. 
3Tlll1ch, Theology of Culture, p . 71. 
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Reality"' there are five sty!istlc keys : sacramental 1 mystical, 
realistic, Idealistic, and expressionistic . I 
By examtntng these discussions carofully it l& possible to 
notice that the objective and the realistic are subsumed under realism 
as descnptJve and critical phases of it, the subjectlve is tho same 
as the expressive, the 1deal1st1c compares to the idealistic, and the 
sacramental and the mystical are discussed only in "Art and Ultimate 
Reality . " The considerations will thus proceed upon the basis of the 
distinct tons made in "Art and Ultimate Reality . " 
(ll Numinous Realism (the Sacramental) . --Tllllch bases the 
stylistic keys upOn main types of religious experience, and the first 
type he mentions is sacramental re11gtous experience . Corresponding 
to th1s is numinous realism in art with emphasis upon both the 
fascinans and the tremendum . 2 Numinous realism may be defined es 
the uniting of appreciation for a particular ordinary thing with tho 
cosmic significance ·.vhich m&y be ascribed to it . 3 The primary 
danger which Is possible In th1s type of experience Is ldolatrv . 4 
1Tllllch, "' Art and Ultimate Reality," op . cit., pp . 4- 10 . 
2ct. Rudol! Otto, The idea of the Holv, trans. )ohn W . Horvey 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1929), pp . 12 - 41 . 
3r!lllch, "Art and Ultimate Reality, • op . cit . , p . 4. 
41bld . 
Examples or paintlngs in which numinous realism predominates 
are Klee's '"Mesque of Fear" and '"Child Consecrated to SuHerinQ, 11 
/ 
Cezanne's '"Still Life, • Braque's '"Man ·with GuttM ,·• Chaga!l's •t 
and the VIllage," De Chirico's "Melancholy and Mystery of the 
Street," Miro•s •composit1on,"' Tanquy ' s "Mama, Papa ts Wounded,• 
Gabo ' s "Spir itual Theme , •• and Lippold's "Full Moon, Variation 7 ... 
(2\ Tho Myst!co l-Panthelstlc . --Tlllich docs not give this 
stylistic key a n artistic name as he docs in the other four instances . 
The mysuca l ls "that styhstic e lement in which the particularity of 
thln9s 1s dissolved into a visual continuum"!; the primary character 
ts that of unity or order as over aga1nst heterogeneity anci variety . 
The type of palming which exemplifies thts ls the non-objecttve. The 
dangers involved in this rellgJous or anisttc epproach are emptiness 
or the negation of content . 
Tho sacred emptiness can become mere emptiness, 
and the spatial empUness of some pictures indicates 
merely artistic emptiness . Tho attempt to express 
ultimate reality by annihilating reality can lead 
to works in which nothing at all i s expressed . 2 
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Examples of p~lntings tn which this stylistic clement predominates 
are Ashikaqa ' s ''Tho Landscape, " Tat Chin's ;.•;orks, Kloe's ''Equals 
IrJinity," Seurat's "Fishing Fleet," Kandinsky's "lmprovisaUon," and 
jackson Pollock's •No. I. • 
I 
.!!lli!.. . • p . 6 • 2Ibtd . 
) 
199 
(31 Roallsm (the Prophetic-Protesting!. --The basic religious 
function or experience tnvolved here is 
the cr1tlc!sm of a demontce:Uy distorted sacramental 
system in the name of personal righteousness and 
social justice . . . . Not nature, but history 
becomes the place of the manifestation o! ultimate 
reality. It is manifest as personal wUl, demandinq 1 judging, punishing, promising .I 
So frequently men lose the fascination of the usual 1:"1 their daily 
encounter with i t; and not only is the fascination lost, they lose the 
significance and fact of the reality before them . The realistic approach 
lies tn "the humlUty of accepting the q1ven,n 2 and wnh this acceptance 
comes "rellqious po· ... ·er . .. J Realism may be divided into a scientific 
descnptlve form anci into an ethical crttlcal form . ':'he objective or 
lmitailnQ k~y lS Meess~ry IO !1\e WO!k Of !l't because the artist "uses 
materials four.d in ordinarlly encountered reality . • ,-4 However I THllch 
insists that there is not sJmple tmtuuion or description in artistic works; 
works of art bring the unfamiliar out of the familiar and indicate "the 
mcxhaust!ble richness in the sober , objective , quasi- sclontlficolly 
observed reality, .. S 
In works in whtch crtr:tcal re~lism predominates ulU:nate reality 
I lbld . ,p. 7. 
4Tllllch, Theology o! Culture, p. 72. 
3 Ib!d . 
ST!lllch, "An and Ultimate Real!ty,• op. clt., p. 7. 
!I ::~ant!estod by the iad~ent of exuttr.9 rc4l~ty. !he ";J.gltr.ess # 
tn~usUce, and d!ston.!o:1s o: eX1sUn; reahty are d!spJa,-ee. 
Cntical reaHsm is predominantly dlrectod to maO'I--
personally, socially, and hiStorically, although 
the suffering 1ri nature ls often taken lnto tho 
arttsUc expression of the u;Uness of encountered 
reality ,I 
Critical roallsm corresponds to what Ttlllch calls realism In Theology 
of Culture. In Theology of Culture Tllllch points not only to the 
exJatontial distortion of the essential, but to thG fact that there !s 
an abysmal aspect or the dlvlne as well. 2 7ha r.ogatlve, ugly, and 
eel! -destructive point to the Judotn; and desuucuve characte: o: 
ultt~a.te reallty, which J)".J.ts every exlstlnQ form on a very precarious 
!ootlno. 
The baste dangers of realism are either a " J imple f.asclnatior. 
with the ugly ,.3 or the succumblnq •to a neoatlvuy without hope . • ~ 
The on ly way of overcoming thts in art is Jn the achJcvcmcnt of a 
Qonuine work of art with reel artistic form. 
Courbet's "'Wave, .. Corinth' s "Sol! Portrait with Death 1 " 
Hopper's "Early Sunday w.omtng,• Sheeler•• "CiaJJic Landscapc 1 " 
Goya'a "Wha< Co..r~~.,. a c.d •nil Deatl\ She Will Beautify Herself, • 
1;btd . 2: llllch, Theology o! Ccl<ure, p. 73 . 
3Tll!leh, "Art ar.d Ultimate Roallty, • op . cit,, p . 7 . 
4Ibld • 
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Dau.mlor's "A Butcher, • ::>ix's •war," and flnally Georqe Grosz's 
• MetropolJs• are examples of paintln;s tn wh~th the realistic ele=::~er.t 
predominates. 
(41 Idealism (the Prophetlc-Cr!tlcol or Rellglous Humanism). --
The emphasis from this perspective Is on the present as tlllod with 
hoPG: God Is In man and man Is In God hero and now . It Idealism 
Is understood as a glossin; over of the present and an unwilllngness 
to face tho stern facts of reality, h must conuno.ae to bear bravc:y 
the attacks to wh.lch 1t has been subjected, beca1.1se 1t plainly Cesen.-es 
them. However, 1f tciealts~ ts se.n from the perspec~lvc of the worlC 
as tt ought to be or as 1t 1s tr.. us potential perCectlon, then it s~ould 
be re;arded as one of the t:".ost wholesome empho••• of modem tu::es. 
Idealism meaos anticipation of tho hlQheat pos-
atbtlftles of being; .. . lt meant remembrance of 
tho lost, and anhcipauon of tho roQolnod, paradise 
. . . . It expresses the dtvJno character of man 
and h1s world In his essential, und!otortod. 
creoted perfection .1 
T1111ch reQards idealism as be!n; thrutoned wtth more dangerous 
tendencies than any other stylistic elomenu in o wor~ of art. 7he 
basic danQer 1S •co~ruslr.g !deal ism with a sup<>rftc•ally and senll-
mentolly beouttfylng realism .• 2 A Qenutno !dull am bungs the 
J)Otentlolltloa In the de;>ths of a belnQ or evor.t lr.to exlster.ce as 
l Ibid . , p. 8 . 2Ibld . 
Mt1Jtlc toa~es. whereas •beaattfytng roaham ShO\\·s :.he act:.aal 
exiattnce of its object, bt.i.t with dJthor.est, lCeoHzln; adci.1Uor.s . • 1 
Keoley is concerned with :'Jlllch'& approach ~o 1doaltsm t:: 
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art and regards Tllllch as Interpreting ldooUsm psychologically rather 
than phtlosophlcally 0 Dces not Tllllch depend heovHy upon neo-
Piatonlsm, Stoicism , and Scholllnq's philosophy? Nevertheless, !! 
ono will reexamine the discussion of pereeptibllity, one wllt notice 
that Tllllch Is not doparllno from his basic Insistence upon !atthfuhess 
to tho facts even If they are extre,ely difficult to lace 0 
Examples of lciealls::l are rrancesco'a '"O'.Joen o! Sheba• a:1ci 
•solomor., • Peru;lno's ·courage and Temperance," Poussln's 
''Landscape, .. Lnqres• "Study fOt th.e Golden Tit;cr,• PICG$SO's •life,'' 
and Rousseau's •Dream . • 
(Sl Expressionism (the Ecstattc-Splrltual) 0--Expresstonlsm Is 
regarded as the most dlroctly religious of all tho types, and it is 
dynamic combining the reallsttc and the mystical along with the 
critical and the anticipatory 0 It Is the break ng to pieces of "the 
surface of 0\61" own being anci that of our world . ., 2 •\Vhile the others 
are only 1ndueetly represer.ting the ultlmato, tho expressive element 
repr•aenta 1t directly. • 3 
1tbld 0 2n tlich "Art and Ultlmoto Reality 0 • op o cit., Po 9 0 
3rllllch, Theology of Culture, p o 73 0 
Expressionism appears almost everywhere but it "comes jnto 
its O"Wn within Christianity"! even though "the Church was never 
happy with ecsuulc movements•2 because "they seemed to destroy 
its sacramental foundet1on . " 3 Expressionistic oloments have been 
quite prominent even to the point of determinin9 "the art of the cata-
combs, the Byzantine, the Romanosque, most of the Gothic and the 
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' Baroque style, and recent development str.ec Cezanne. ••"' These styles 
are not always explicitly rel!glous In the sense that they frequently 
"dtsreqard symbols of the religious traditlon . ,.5 On the ether hand 1 
the e~pressionistic e lement ts also especially stqnificant m works 
which deal with traditional religious symbols . 
The dangers of expressionism are tv.•o-!olci; expression may be 
confused with seli-expression with the result being on the one hand 
the confusion of ecstasy · ... ·ith over-exeitament and on the other hand 
the inability of the work to break into reality itself, remaining 
arbitrary. 6 
If the means for penetrating tnto ultimate reality are rapture 
and ecstasy, then that phase of art which comprises this function will 
be most adequate to reUglous expression; expressionism is that phase . 
1Tilltch, "An and Ultimate Reality," op . cit., p . 9. 
3tb!d • 
6tb!d .. pp . 9-10 . 
But the result in art is the same as in religion; there must be a 
distinction drawn between genuine ecstasy and artificial se lf-
intoxication , l Due caution must be taken on the part of the artlst no~ 
to attempt to force the expressionistic element, for in expressionism 
the ultimate is entering in a most direct fashion, and the ultimate 
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cannot be mampulated. Thus all the artist may achJeve by his attempt 
at the coercion of ultimate reality may be his own strained self-
intoxication and self-expression . 
Examples of expressionism oro VDn Gogh's "Hills at St . Remy ," 
Munch's "The Scream," Derain ' s "The London Bridge," Marc's "Yellow 
Horses ... Schmidt-Rottlu!f's .. Peter and fishermen, •• Heckel's "Pray-er," 
and Nolde's "Pentecost• and ''Prophet . " 
lv . Content and Style 
THUch attempts to point to the fact that it ts not necessary for 
art to be explicitly religious ln or<ler to be actually religious ln Import . 
In fact some works of art have no traditional religious symbols and yet 
they are religious masterpieces. On the other hand, ho-. .. ·ever, Tillich 
suqqests that it is possible to have a non- religious style as well as 
non- religious content. 2 In his explanation of this type of ort Tllllch 
1Till!ch, The Protestant Era, pp . 79-80 . 
2tHUch, "Existentialist Aspects of Modem Art," op. cit . , 
pp . 132-136 . 
. , 
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speaks of things which ore purely ordinary on the level of secular 
human existence . There is little (if any) difference between this and 
his dJsc:ussJon or descriptive realism. 
The level of a..rt which has a religious style and non-reltc;;ious 
content Js the existentialist. This movemer.t began ..... lth Cezanne in 
the visual arts . ~otice that expressionism also denotes that which 
has been produced since Cezanne .l Existentialist an may be regarded 
as expressionistic art in the preceding discussion, but which does not 
have reltqious content . 
Some art has a non- rcl1g1ous style even though its content is 
religious . ror example, fouquet ' s palntinq of a Madonna is tho 
painting of a court lady with a bad reputation; as such the Madol"lna 
and Child relallonship "Is reduced to Ute mo!her-child relationship of 
o great lady of the court of France. " 2 Though such a painting may be 
ostensibly religious, lt may rather tend to the production of !rrel!9lon . 
Several times T1111ch compares pictures which are ostensibly 
religious (the traditional subject matter) with pictures which are not 
apparently· reli~ious : '"It ts not an exaggeration to ascribe more of the 
quality of sacredness to a still-life by Cezanne or a tree by van Gogh 
1rUUch, "Art and Ultimate Reality," op . cit., p . 12 . 
2rnuch, "'Existentialist Aspects of Modern Art,• op . cit . , 
p . 142 . 
than to a picture of Jesus by Uhde . ,,1 He refers to pictures by Oude 
and Hollman . 
These pictures all portray Jesus either in terms of 
a sentimental, religious man, as does the Hoffman 
work In Riverside Church, or in terms of a rhoumatlc 
or otherwise sick, dull school teacher walking 
through little villages . 2 
When Tillich gave the essay on "Art and Uhimate Reality• at the 
Museum of Modern Art in New Yo rk City on February 17, 1959, the art 
critics who were in his audience gave approving laughter at his 
remark , which follows: '"l came to the conclusion that an apple of 
Cezanne has more presence of ultimate reality than a picture of Jesus 
by Hoffman. " 3 
f"!nally, art may have a re11Qious s:yle as well as a religlous 
content . This type of art would correspond to expressionism with 
religious content . 
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In discussing such m~tters it is necessary to notice th~t '"there 
is no style which excludes the artistic expression of man ' s ultimate 
concern."4 Thus one would not want to say that any style would bo 
1Till1ch, The Religious Situation, p . 89. 
2Tllllch, "Existentialist Aspects of Modern Art," op. cit . , 
p . 139 . 
3Ttlllch, •Art and Ultimate Reality, • op . cit . , p . S . 
4Tlll!ch, Theology of Culture, p . 72 . 
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capable of beinQ totally irreligious; yet it is important to observe th~t 
ultimate concern may be present either directly or indirectly . And 
the most direct style In which ultimate reality is present is the 
expressionisttc . 
The expressionistic clement has ... the 
strongest affinity to religious art . It broa.ks through 
both the realistic acceptance of tho c;iven and the 
!deallstic anticipation of the fulflllcd .. ~nd beyond 
both of them It reaches Into the depth of ul!lmate 
reality . In this sense i t is an ecstatic style -
element, cxpressinq the ecstatic character of 
encountered reality .1 
Thus expmsston!stlc art is set apart from all other art in that it is 
dtrectly religious, whereas there are varying degrees of directness and 
indirectness tn the other styles. 
TiiJ!ch spoaks of artistically authennc art which is slgnU!cantly 
rel1g1ous in t-A•o evidently different manners , implicitly and expllcltly . 
In the first way the artist expresses his honest quest for ultimate 
meaning and stqniftcance even though he may f~il to arrive at some-
t hin<;< which is more than portlally and possib ly even distortcdly 
satisfactory; and such e reli9ious inquiry is present oven 1f there is 
nothing about the subject matter which is traditionally or rocoQnJzably 
religious . Plcasso•s Guernica is an example of t hiS type of art, for 
here man•s ultimate concern is expressed in the presentation of the 
1TJJlfch, "Art and Ultimate Reality," op. cit.. p. 11. 
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human anxiety which is involved in such a <rl.lest for ultimate meaning; 
tn the Guernlc& ls also seen the passionate revolt v,rhich mer~ !eel in 
the presence or cruelty and hatred . 1 The a:1swor to man's deepest 
questions cannot be given from the exJstentlal sttuatton, but such a 
quest may provoke a revelatio:u!l answer , 
ArttstJcally authentic art can be stgnJficantly religious explicitly 
vdth the aid of a subject matter which is recoqnizably reliQious. 
However, one must be cautioned not to think that the mere use of 
reliQious materiels can guarantee e ithor good art or art which is 
relt<;!Ous ly s19nificant. Any art which lacks artistic vitality is .. wholly 
Inexpressive . .. 2 Rouault, Rattner, Racs, and Chaqa ll are memioned as 
contemporary painters who have succeeded In producing authenUc art 
which 1s also significantly rel!qlous . 
Each age has to develop its own style, but this age has not yot 
quite succeecieC in develop!no a style which is adequate to tts needs; 
for this reason contemporary religious art is not stable and is dUficult 
to comprehe nd . The difficulties which this age has rovooled in 
attempting to develop its own artistic style are due to a pervasive 
cultural distress . 
1T1lhch and Greene, "The Natute of Rell9ious Art, .. op . cit . , 
pp . 282-284 . 
2to!d.' p . 283. 
' 
' 
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4. Standards in Art 
From the preced1ng discussion it may be possible to select the 
standards wh!ch Tillich regards as necessary for a work of an , On 
the one hand Tllllch sees art as having an aspect of beln<,; artistically 
authentic; on the other hand art can be roUgtously s!grHflcant . Tho 
extent to which these are distinct and to -.,..,.hSch they merge :nust be 
considered . One of the primary questions to !>e asked is whether art 
has any autonomy or whether it is tied to re1191ous and dogr:tatic 
consider allons (norms) . It might be inltlolly suggested that if art is 
to be ruled from without (heteronomously), thts will occasior. a 
disuust of the whole endeavor. 
It will seem to aid the discuss ton to lns1st upon the innocence 
of Tillich's definition of rel!Qion. T!lllch does not regard rel!glon 
(except in a narrower sense, and here no criterion is offered) as a 
set of symbols, creeds, or r!tualsi nor does he require that a person 
even believe in God in order to be religious . Tillich does not consider 
religion from the standpoint of a provincial denominational roUQiosity . 
rn fact in his insistence upon the rellgiosity of a ll styles his main 
point ls "Lo show that the manifestation of the ultimata in the visual 
arts is not dependent on the use of works •.vh1ch trad1Uomllly are 
called religious an ... 1 And even one who has expressed concern over 
1
rullch, "Art and Ultimate Reality, • op. ell., p. 10 . 
the present attempts to reconcile art and religion pralses Tlllich for 
his contribution to a proper and fruitful attitude toward such a 
reconciliation . 
It is clear that the major theological Impetus 
for the new atti tude towards the arts comes f rom 
Tillich's exc iting Protestant catholicity . No 
matter how the concept of ultimate concern turns 
out in the history of theolOQY, the concept can 
forever rnake provision for the return of Protestant 
Chr!stia.nity to all the arts In the best sense even 
lf the majority of Christians never approach either 
religion or the arts primarily in terms o! ultimate 
concern . The leodcrs of the new movement today 
want Christians to search for deep religious 
meanings: In Picasso and Munch; in The Old Man 
and the Sea and not in The Robe; in Man's Fate 
and not in DcMiUe•s Ten Commandments or Or. 
Peale •s columns ,1 
TilHch reco<;n1zes the dangers lnvolved m so-called religious 
art, and sees that .. the artistic form may sw41lo.,.,. the rehg1ous 
substance, " 2 with tho resulttn9 te$ectlon of such !n a devotional 
context by many people . On the other hand, religion may provoke 
pic torial products which can scarcely be called works o: ar:; ~nd thus 
art deteriorates in the use of many churches. 
The relatlon bct\'ioen art and rehgton can be resolved by 
recognizing on the one hand that TUUch•s dchniuon of reltgton is 
broad enouQh not to prescribe some narrO'.'I approach and on the other 
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1Harry R. Garvin , "Reli9ion and tha Arts: '!he Coming Dangers, •• 
The Chrlstlon Scholar, XLII (December, 1959), 280 , 
2THUch . "J..n and Uitimatc Reality," oo . cit . , p. 10 . 
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hand by being aware of Till1ch's insertion of metaphysics , lt must 
be askod whether Tillich's aesthetics can function 1n !solation from 
ontoloQy . The answer would have to be no. but th1s does not mean 
that there is no flex.ibiUty wUhln aestheiics, for the encounter with 
ultim~ue reaUty may change as the artist performs the prophe\ic (not 
necossariJy in a religious sense) function of openiP.Q up new avenues 
of appro~ch to reality . Whatever is done is always done in connection 
with reality. and only those with mental or emotiona l aberrations are 
anxious :o disregard such. Now since ultimate realtty is one way of 
charactenzing God, anything which ts ontologically orion ted will 
a lso be religiously oriented . 
What are the major artistic standa.rds of the work of art? They 
are courage to face reality as it ls and lnte<}!ny b transmitting this 
1nsight to others through some artistic medium . Courage and inte9]"ity 
are the primary an!sttc critena . If the artist honestly and courageously 
expresses what is g iven to him in the creative aesthetic intuttion, 
this is essentlally what is required. Again, it is necessary for the 
artist to d1sctpllr.e himself and his medlum so that he car. create 
somethin9 adequate to his insiQht . 
Tllllch does not want rel1910n as it is ordinarily conceived 
heteronomously to provide standards for areas not directly concerned 
with 1t . In makmg- this clear Tllllch say·s that "theology cannot and 
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should not give judgments about the aesthetic value of an l!rtlstic 
creation,"'! for "the theolooian as theologian is no expert in any 
matters of preliminary concern .•• 2 There must be thls mutual protection 
both for reltQlon and for cultural creations and actlvltles. 
Nevertheless, somethJng shines through the aestheuc :arm wh!eh 
ts of ul timate significance, and works of art may thus have some 
relevance for ultimate reality. 
Pictures, poems, and music can become 
objects of theology, not from the point of view of 
their aesthetic form, but from the point of view of 
the!I pot .. •er of expressing some aspects of that 
which concerns us ultimately, in and through their 
aesthetic form . 3 
This relation between art and rel1910n ls expressed as a matter of 
Intention: 
Both phJlosophy and the arts do express something 
else intentionally . . . . But In doing so, they 
indirectly do somethfn9 else; namely, they make 
ul Umate reality shine through . • . . So from the 
point of view of intention, . , . art does not have 
thts intention, cannot have any other intention 
than baing ~ood art . But in being good an, it 
expresses . 
Earlier It was nollced that God Is ultimate reality and that this 
carries with lt the meaning that religion and philosophy ere connected 
lT!Ilfch, Systematic Theoloqv, I, 12 . 
2
rbld . 3 lbtd . ' p . 13. 
4Tllltch, "Art and Ultimate Realtty," op . ell . , pp . lt -12 . 
• 
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ln some vitel manner. It a lso means that anything which ls withm the 
context of .being (including artHacts and cultural constructs) or anything 
which ext sa is related to ultimate reality and thus to God .1 :But !f 
this is so. then a very definite consequence follows . 
If the 1dea of God includes ultimate rea11ty. every-
thtnQ that expresses ultimate rea11ty expresses God 
whether it intends to do so or not. A.."'td there is 
nothing that could be excluded from this possibility 
because everything that has being is an expression, 
however preliminary and transitorj it may be, of 
being-itself, of ult imate real!ty. 
In spite of the fact that everything expresses u!timaLe l'eality and may 
be taken as u symbol of it, it ls also true that different facets of 
ultimate reality are especially rovealed by different expressions . It 
is further true that the capacity ror richness of insight and for 
trans1>arency of insight varies from manifestation to manifestation , 
By revealin9 its speci~l facet and by beHtc;J both rich and transparent, 
art may have a unique function to perform. 
Thera Is only one thing which saves art from being legislated to 
by some external het0ronomous criterion, and that is the Protostant 
principle , which refuses to give anything an absolute authority . By 
refusing to restrict be he! to narrow religiosity, T1111ch makes possible 
the mutual enrichment of an and reliqton without the encroachment of 
1
vide suora, PP . 29·41 . 
2Tilltch, ••An and U!!imate Reahty," oo . cit . • p . 2. 
J I 
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either upon the rights of the other . Religion and art should be friendly 
whlle £u.nct1ontng autonomously; they should. not be fused into e 
thoroughgoing unity with one being distorted Md absorbed by the 
other. "'A modest harmony is better than an lmposed unity ."! 
Whatever Tlllich's fatlures, he has brought together two of the 
most widely divided fields, and has placeci them In an amiable 
relationship, whether or not he has adequately cnunctated all the 
principles by means of which they should be placed into some fully 
loglc~!!lly consistent system. His breadth of concern has shown that 
!He Is comprised of such widely disparate things and that at least a 
Gestalt of experience wUl lnclude aU these elemems '·'lhether expla -
nation can be fully adequate . If he has not prov!ded the full solution 
to some of the most pertinent questions on the relation between art 
and religion, he has at least pointed toward some of the basic questions 
as well as the kind of sensitivity which must prepare the way for 
understanding . 
S. Summary 
By looking at the relation between cul ture and rel1q1on 1 one can 
observe the 9enera1 outUne of the rr.ore specific relation between art 
(which Is a specUlc cultural creation) and religion . 1~ broader terms, 
I Garvin, lac . cit . , p . 283 . 
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the relation between God and the world is essentially the relation 
betweon art and religion . Autonomous, heteronomous, end theonomous 
cultures are cultures which are respectively cut free from re!tgious 
meaning, assume an authority of their 0'1-·n with an absolute or doqmet!c 
approach, or which are transparent to the ultimate . No culture can 
completely hide its reltgious meaning, but the primary question has to 
do with the transparency of directness of ultimate concern. 
Aesthetic experience is one of the most cu lturally significant 
modes for the reception of insi9hts into meaninys and into ultimate 
reality . The aesthetic is expllcated by an investigation of the conflicts 
within reason and their resolution in reve lat!on-... confhcts bet\'leen 
autonomy and heteronomy {the answer ls theonomy), relativlsm and 
absolutism (love) I and formalism and emotionalism (the reunion of 
cognition and emotion) . 
Tillich stands in opposition to any theory of art which emphasizes 
formal or ornamental phases of the object rather than tho meaning Jt 
conveys . Aesthetic lnsi9ht Is qained by means of empathy ond 
distance . There must be attachment (existential involve mont) and 
detachment . The .basic danger of art lies in its potential lack of 
seriousness I which stems from the detachment aspect of the experi-
ence . The aesthete ls able to sit back and enjoy without becoming 
very sertou$ly involved . He achieves little more than the appreciation 
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of aesthetic surface 1 supecftclal thrills, enjoyment without responsi-
bility, a playful attitude toward liie . Nonetheless, lf th!s experience 
is properly tempered w!th significant insights, it becomes one of the 
most profound means of qetUng inside the most varied perspectives 
that men have of reality . 
Techniques are essenttol to artistic production. Insi9'ht must 
have adequately disciplined expression in order to be communicative. 
Sheer se lf-expression is neither art nor the communication of 
significant emotion . 
The irreplaceability of symbols means that art's insights cannot 
be gained in any other way . Tilllch even compares art to theology, 
wah the we1ght of insight even into ultimate roaluy on the s ide of art . 
The unique revelation of ultImate reallty prov~ded by art is the dis-
closure of beauty--be&uty-ttseH. But this does not seem to be 
substantiated in some of the art objects which Tillich regards as among 
the most Jmportant . Authentic art must bear the tension of existing 
between tv.•o worlds: tt must not forget what the wcrld actually is 1 
and it must strive for the production of beauty in such a distorted 
wodd. It 1s the function of the a.rtlst to contend for bcauLy lr. an ugly 
world . for tho performance of his task integrity and courage are 
absolutely assential qualuies . The contemporary meaninglessness is 
reflected 1n modern art •s attempt to face such mear.tngfully, to take 
' . 
the meaninglessness mto itself and transform its nature. However, 
in view of the current meaninglessness art's form is usually that of 
the heroic expression of the tragic situation or the expression of 
questlon rather than answer . As such, art is preparing the way for 
the voice of prophecy, but art itself is not forcing the solution. And 
217 
by askino its searching questions, the answers of trad1tional rcl1o1on 
{which have become unlntelllgible to modern mon\ are being challenged . 
The work of art is composed of form, matter, and style . Form 
is essenttal to the existence of any object, and thus to the 4rt object. 
The problem of formal organ.tzauon Is to keep the form from concealing 
the meaning it is cmbodyin9 . Matter consists of cveryth1no capable 
of enter1n9 into the cons tructed work, as well as everythlng the work 
ls about . The ultimate subJect matter of every work of art Is ultimate 
reality . 
Tilhch Qives more extensive consideration to style, the unifying 
perspective and bas!c meaning of any person or age. The style reveals 
the ultim.,te concern and thus the religious possibilities of any period . 
Five baste styles are enumerated . Expressionism is dtst1ngu1shed from 
the other four styles in that it 1s the direct represonta.tlon of the 
ultimate, whereas the other four are indirect representations . 
Works of art may be ostensibly or Implicitly rohglous . Those 
which are ostensibly religious employ a subject matter which is 
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recognJ4ably w1thln a reh9ious uadttlon. Other works may be Just as 
raligiously significant even thou9h they have no tTaditionaJly rel1Q1ous 
subject matter . 
The fundamental question in relation to stand<!!rds in art ts 
whether art ls subjected to rell<)lous domination. For T1llich rGllglon 
is defined so broadly that it could scarcely serve as a domineering 
master . Tillich is not the proponent of a provincial denomlnattonal 
reltg!osHy. And, tn fact, his main point in the discussion o! styles 
is to show that religious works do not necessarily follow the line of 
those wh1ch have traditlonol subject matter. The maJor artistic 
standards are simply courage and integrity . 
!'ART II 
MARITAIN: POETIC INTUITION .!>.NO CONTEMPLATION 
CHAPTER V 
COGNITION AND CR&ATiOI\ 
Maritain' s basic consiCeration of poetic intultion and con:empla-
tion can be divided into two phases , creativity ar.d cogni;ior. . In fac:, 
co~nit ion and creation are the t·.·.·o basic facets of the intellectual life, 
and thus the major means of considering anything which is regarded as 
intellectual in ~atUie . The present chapter will attempt to examine 
Mantatn•s conception of the lnnor workinqs of an: and reHQion fror.-. the 
perspectives of cognition and creation . the next chapter will deal with 
Iv.aritain' s views of the world in which an ~md religior. array their (orcos 
and perform their distinctive, or competitive, or even combative fun-ctions . 
ln o rder :o 1nvcst1Qote artistic creation, it ·.·;ill be necessary to 
observe the manner in which an fits into human activities . Maritai!''l 
d is tinguis hes speculative activity from activity which is primorily 
creative or practical , and he further d ivides practica l effort into morality 
and art . He recognizes that a deeper d istincUor. must be made between 
art and poetry, for there are too many theonsts \vho fall to recognize the 
need for the creative spark Vlhich antecec:ies any technical operation or 
conscious and deliberate direction of tOO wor~ to be made . 
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The emphasis upon poetic insight as opposed to mere operation 
brings the question of the ktnd of knowledge involved in the ~reatlon of 
artistic objects . At th!s point Maritain distinQuishes rellQion from con-
templat!or. , and contemplation is pointed to as a mode of knowing 
differcm from speculative knowing: h is knO\·lledge t:-.rough connaturaHty . 
Poetry is also seen to be knov:ledge through conna~urallty . The qucs:1on 
is then ra ised 4S to the lcgltlmacy of regarding !>oth contemplation and 
art as modes of k:1owing, since they do not cieal wi:h the ordinary 
concepttJa! apparatus and relationships . 
f'ollow1nq Mar itain •s ana lysis , creative ?rocess ts examlned with 
special reference to the unconscious or preconscious £actors .. vhich 
underlie and sUmulate the primal creativity . 'I'he relation be:ween 
crcet!vity and beauty is introduced in order to specify further ~he rel8Uon 
between rel19!0" and art by showing how &rt, beauty, 4r.d C.¢d are 
1merre lated . 
Fina lly , the investigat ion of certain problems connected with 
artistic creation and knowledge will show the thln ed9e upor. which bo;h 
the artist end his art must tread . 
L. Human Inte llectual Activity 
Making a dist1netior: accordinQ to the end to which actlv1ty 
is ordered rather then accordir:g to the formal object of some 
act1v1ty, 1 Aristotle distinguishes between theorotic~l, practic~l, and 
productive knowledge. Z Maritaln follows this distinction thou9h he 
insists ••that the absolutely first and primordial divisio:'l to be recog-
nized with respect to the activity of the intellect ts the diviS!On 
between the speculatlve or theorettcal intellect a!"'.d the practical 
intellect . •• 3 The difference between the speculat~ve and practical 
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·Maritain makes :requent use of the citstincuon bet·.vecn material 
object and formal obJect: 
"'the material object of a faculty, science, an, 
or virtue, is simply the thing or subJect-manor--
without further qual!Ucation--wlth which that !oculty, 
science, art, or virtue, deals . For instance, tho 
materia! object of cl'bemlstry is inorganlc bodies: o! 
the faculty of sight, oblects within our range of 
vis Jon . But this does not enable us to distir.gulsh 
b~tween choMistry and physics, which is also 
concerned with inorganic bodies, or between stqht 
and touch. To obtatn an exact dofinttion of chemistry 
we must define Us object as tho intrinsic or sub-
stantial changes of inorganic bodies, anC. similarly 
the obJect of si9ht as colour. We have now defined 
the formal object (objectum for male cruod), that is 
to say, that which immediately and of i~s very 
nature, or tntrlnslca!ly and directly, or .a9&ir'l. 
necessarily and primarily (these expressions are 
equtvalent renderings of the l,..atin formula per se 
prlmo), ls apprehended or studied in things by a 
parUcular science, art, or faculty, and in reference 
to which it .,.pprehends or studies everything else . " 
Manta in, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 79 . 
/ ., , \ ) / \ 
2,. 71 2'.,..o(. bt. -.\1'0 ~ o( 1"1 7r p «.K7< t< 'Pt,. )1 71' 01 "li t K"l 
" , b 
" 9,"' f ",. ' K" . " Anstotle Metaphysics vi. I. IOZ; 2 5 . 
3Mar1tain , Creattve Intuition in Art and Poetry, ? . 45 . 
operations of the intellect is very succinctly stated as follows: 
.. Cognitivity and creativity are the two essential aspects of the 
intellectual naturo . • ,1 
Marttain proceeds to make a distinction within the practical 
bet\veen moral and MUstic activity. or bet\o.·con "human actions to be 
done (within the universe of man•s destiny) and works to be made 
(by man, but within the universe of things , outs ide the universe of 
mon's destiny) . • 2 
l . The Specu lative 
For present purposes lt ls only necessary to indicate here that 
the speculative function of thB intellect has knowledge as Us sole 
end . 3 Spoculation Is an activity which Is comp!M~ ·.~1\htn !tMlf . 
"'It is an immanent actior. remaining wholly w1thin tho mind to make It 
perfect. .. 4 The mind finds its primary activity and joy s1mply tn 
knowledge . 
In pass lnq, certa1n problems will be avoided by e mphas izinq 
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MaritaJn•s position on the essential unity of the mind; thls means that 
. 
whatever the activities of the mind-- whether speculative or practical--
I 
.ill£. ' p . 168. 2r· 1 · •1 '8 ...2.2.. · ' pp •• - •• 
3Mar1tain , Art and Scholasticism, p . 3 . 
4Jbld . 
the activities are of one ond the same mind. In reference to the 
disUncuon bet\veen the intellectual activities Maritain seys : "Th!s 
does not mean a disttnctlon between two separate powers but a dis -
tinction between two basically different ways in which the same pcr."cr 
of the soul--the intellect or reQ.SOn·-exerctses its activity , .. 1 
II. Tho Practical 
Although knowledQe is involved in the pract1cal 1 the tendency of 
the mind is toward some type of activity which goes bGyond mere 
knowledge . A comparison bet\•;een the role of the appetite !n each 
!nstance and the nature of truth will be of assistance both in under-
standing the distinction bet· .. ;een the speculative and the prachcal a:1d 
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ll\ u~derstandi~Q that area with which this study is primarily concerned, 
the practical . 
By the appetite Maritain means an intellectual act!vlty whtch may 
a lso be called "the w1ll, but not in the sense of a mere power of 
decision, rather in the larger sense of man•s enorqy o! desire or.d love I 
tntent on some existential good . " 2 Maslow, a. contemporary psycholo-
gist 1 would call this the conative-affective aspect of one•s nature . 3 
1Maritatr., Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 46 . 
2Jbld • 
3 Cf. /J •• H . Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York : 
Harper and Brothers, 19541, pp . 120-121, et passim. 
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The appetite .assists the speculative intellect only in bringing 
it to functioning~ in Qening tt started . After u has begu:t operating , 
the speculative intellect hes no need of the assistance of the appetite . 
However, " in the case of the practical intcllact, the appetite plays an 
esse:'ttlal !)art in the very work of knowledge . " 1 For s ince the lntelte:::t 
tends primarily tO'.'/atd satisfaction ._.,.ithin 1tseli (i.e . 1t Is primarily 
concerned with knowing though knowledge is always of somethin~; the 
intellect m itself is not concerned with ciolnct) the will must become 
operatlve in order for action to be brought abou;:. 2 
Truth is also differently re9ardcd in each instance . "Truth, in 
speculative kno\•Jledge, is the adequation or conforr.-.ity of the mtellect 
with Being, with what 'things are . " 3 This is a realist criterion of 
truth (though not necessarlly realist as a definition of truthl, and 
despite certain problems aChering to thls terminology Maritaln regards 
h!s epistemological P<>sitlon as crlllcal realism . 4 
On the other h~nd, practical knowledge is creative knowledge in 
wh1ch there is no previously existing thin9 to which the rr.md can be 
1 Merltab, Creative Intuition in Art and Pootry, p . 4.7 . 
4cc. J-ecques Marita!n , The Degrees of Knowledge, trans . Gerald B. 
Phelan (New York: Chnrles Scribner ' s Sons , 1959), pp . 71-135. Maritain's 
position can hardly be discussed hero, but it must at leMt be distinguished 
from that of George Santayana ~· ln Essays in Critical Realism (New 
York : The Macmillan Co. , 1920) . 
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adequated or to which it can conform: something must be brought into 
existence . The essence of truth here is that it "is the adequation or 
conformity of the intellect with the str~iqht appetite ...... lth the appetite 
as straightly tending to the ends 'Nith respect to ·.·thteh the :h!ng ~hat 
man is about to create will exist ." 1 
As has Just been indicated, the primary distinction is betv1een 
speculative and practlcal kncr.·.·ledQG or be;-v:een cognition bnd creation, 
but within the creative or practical realm there is onother dlvision 
which is c ruc ial to the understa ndin9 of art . This ls the d istb.ction 
betweer: a good to bo realized in human action (with the human good 
solely in :nlnd) anci a good obJect to be produced (with the good o! 
::ho object solely in minci) . This diStinction very clearly marks off 
mort~ lity from art at the outset with the insistence that the good a nd 
:ruth of each !s radically different . 2 But even .at this early point it 
must be suggested , so that there will be no mistaken conception 1 that 
there arc levels at which art and morality interpenetrate: thouQh n~ey 
are partially, they are not fully autonomous . 3 
lMaruatn , Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 41 . 
2cf. ..!.!:!!9.·, pp . 47 - 52 ; Ait and Scholesticlsm, pp . S-7 . 
3cr . Mar!tain I The Responsibility of the ~nist, passim. 
(1) The moral. --The moral sphere is concerned with action 
(agibile} . 1 It involves the free use of faculties in the promotion of 
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good . Good Is realiwd when the action "conforms to the law governln9 
all human acts and the true end of human life . " 2 Good Is realized both 
on a social and personal level when there js such conformity . "Action 
ts thus ordered to the common end of all human life ~nd tt has a part to 
play in the perfection peculiar to the human be lng . • 3 
Prudence 1s the moral virtue par excellence I and in harmony '.v1th 
the notion of truth for practical know ledge it 1•is the straight intellectual 
deterrroJnation of actJons to be done . .. 4 
(2) The artistic . --Whoreas morality is concerned with an action 
to be done, art Is concerned with a work to bo produced (factlblle) . And 
whereas it is the usc of the freedom which is primarily of concern in 
morality, it ts freedom in relation to the thing produced with which an 
ts primarily concerned . "Art •.. is the straight intellectual 
determination of works to be made ." S 
Ordlnorily '"virtue'" is a term used only of moral qualities, but as 
Marlta1n employs it in art, he definitely does not rr.ean moral vinue . 
1c£. Marl taln, Art and Scholasticism, pp , S-6; Creative Intuition 
In Art and Poetry, pp . 47-48 . 
2Marltain, Art and Scholasticism, p . S . 
4Marltain, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetry, p . 48 . 
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Vv"hat he means is that art must possess the same quality of 
infallibility which is possessed by other intellectual functions. For 
example, an Jt..ristotelian science (understood in its basic ctymoloqical 
sense as knowledge) entails stability, intuiUvo certainties, and 
Infallibility . Marllaln regards philosophy as proceeding from sensible 
data which aro ineoiTigtble. Experience provides ••truths so simple 
that they are universally and absolutely valid, so Immediate and 
evident that the!r certainty exceeds that of the best established 
sctcntlfic conclusions . .,l Philosophy, moreover, contaJns "'primary 
truths which ~re self -evldont to the understanding. ·• 2 To summarize 
what could easily be a lengthy t-reatise, one could point to three 
levels of genuine certainty: (1) '"data of the senses, .. 3 (2) "seli-
evtdent axioms , " 4 and (3) ••consequences 1mmed1~tely deduclble from 
these axioms . .. s 
No· •• ,.. 1f art ts to be cheractertz.ed as knowledge , h too must have 
an element of infalllblllty. Tho Intellect does not beQin chronologically 
or temporally with this, so it must bo developed. Maritain uses 
••habit" as the term for the general development of such a qu~Hty and 
the quality so developed, and he uses "virtue" as the term more 
1Marttain, An Inuoduction to Ph!losophy, p. 90 . 
2 
.llif!..' p. 95 . 3 .ill!!. . . p • 1 0 I. 
5Ibld . 
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specifically referring to the human or intellectual Ql.lality so developed . 
u 
"The Ancients applied the term habitus (t5 '-s ) to qualiues of a 
d!stmct and separate kind, essentially perm-anem conditions pcr:ccting 
in the hne of its own nature the subject they inform ... J Virtue is •a 
quality which, triumphing over the original lndeterrninauon cf ~he 
intellecuve faculty, at once sharpening and hardening the point o! 
1ts activity, raises tt in respect of a definite object to a n:axtmum of 
perfect ion, and so of operative efficiency." 2 
But If art Is thus infallible In Itself and thus perfect, Is It 
possible for the artlst to produce an imperiect ;.vork.? The answer to 
this 1s deci s iVely In 1he efftrmauve for at least two reasons . First, 
art Is primarily an inte llectual quality, and the infallibtllty Is a 
property of tho formal phase oC the production rather than of the matter 
which Is involved in it. The work is controlled and direct:eC by the 
mmd, but tho work itself must be done with instruments , v.'htch lnchtde 
the artist's body and the tools which he uses for the particular ert in 
which he ls engaged, and the materials \".'ilich must be molded Into the 
finol work. Thus tho finished product is a composite of form (which is 
undeviat inq reason) and matter (which i nvolves contingency o.nd even 
imperfection) . But the latter phase ls actually extrinsic to art. The 
1 Maritain, .?u"t and Scholastic1sm, p . 8 . 
2 lb1d ., p . 9 . 
manner in which these two elements enter into the ..,,.ork of art is 
summarized as follows: .,Although extrinsically and on the material 
side Involving contln9ency and falllblllty, ln Itself, that ls to say 
on the formal side and so !ar as requlaUon by the mind IS concerned# 
art does not fluctuate ltke opinion, but is firmly fixed tn certitude ... l 
Second, since H is not always necessary for the art1st to be 
exercising his virtue (though it is necessary for the moral man to 
continuously exerche his virtue), an art1st may produce a work o! 
an in which he has consciously refrained from us1nQ his art or has 
even misused 1t . But once aqaln th.ls is no reflection on the per .. 
fectton of the arust •s artistic quol!ty. 2 
In sum, art is a virtue of the practical funct ion of the human 
mind. As such, lt ls essentlolly undevlatlnq and tnfalllblo In the 
production of a work, the good of which is tts primary concern. 
Nevertheless, the art object may contain imperfections as a result 
of the material aspect of the form-matter composite. But this is no 
problem to art 1n itself, for art ts a perfection of the human betn9 anC: 
not of his products; as such, art is an Intellectual virtue. 
I Ibid., p . II . 2rbld . • p . 13. 
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2. Art and Poetry 
Since the full explication of poetry would carry the discussion 
of Marttaln almost to an end, the purpose or this section is not co be 
exhaustive but rather to make fundamental d!Stinctions. 
Marttain begins Creative Intuition in An and Poetry with a 
distinction whlch ls to be regarded as crucial throughout the book Md 
hiS whole thought on the subject of art. Art and pootry are to be 
distinguished . Art is .. the creative or producing, ·,,.•ork·making 
activity of the human mind . .. 1 Poetry {or poetic intuition or creative 
1ntultion) is "not the Particular 4rt which consists in writing verses, 
but a process both more general and more primary: that intercom· 
munication .between the inner being of things ~~rod the inner being of 
the human Self . •• 2 Thus poetry becomes .. the secret tife o! each ar.d 
all of the arts; another name for what Plato called mousik~ . .. 3 A fuller 
definition, which is g iven at the c lose of the book, is as follows : 
"Poetry ..• ts the free creativity of the spirit, and the intuitive 
knowledge through emotion, whtch transcend ond permaete all arts. 
' inasmuch os they tend to-..;ard beauty as an end beyond the end.""' 
1Marlta1n, Creative [ntuition in Art lmd Poetry, p . 3. 
2Ibld . 
4 Ibld ., p . 393 . 
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1. Fino Arts and Crafts 
The distinction between poetry, on the one hand 1 and art and 
science, on the other hand, Is that poetry Is entirely free . In science 
the m1nd is subject to the object, and truth is the conformity of the 
mind to the object . In art the mind is subject to the work to be formed . 
But poetry is free creaUvity . 1 Nevertheless, every power must ha'v-e 
some obJect upOn which it operates, and poetry does not operate with-
out an object . 2 The point here is that there is an illimitable freedom 
to choose from a superabundance of works i n germ, and the work which 
will !:><! produced will be self- sufficient, a world of its own . 3 
At this point Scott sugqosts: 
The dis tinctive thing about Poetry, In contrast to 
Science and Art (i .e . In the sense of productiV<:l 
action, factibile) , he argues , is that In !t the 
creativity of the spirit Is entire! y free, smce 
thoro Js nothinq towards which it must ter.d in 
order to be speclf!ed and formed . 4 
Since the poet (one whose operation rests upon and is directed 
by poetic lntultlonl tends to the production of what Is popul~rly called 
the fine arts, and since the craftsman (one whose operation is 
primarily artistic , tn Maritain's speciaJ sonse) tends to the production 
1Mar ltaln , Creative Intuition In Art and Poetrv, p . 169 . 
2 3 
.!l2.!£. . • p • 17 0 . .!l2.!£. .. p . 17 s . 
4Mathan A. Scott, Jr. , " Marltaln In His Role as Aesthetlclan, •• 
op , ell . , p, 490 . 
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of what are ordinarily regarded as functional obJects, one needs only 
to look at the fine ans and the crafts in order to procure an elementary 
intuition of the difference bet".Yeen poe tty and art . 
The creative Idea of the craftsman is different from but analogous 
to the creative mtui tion of the poet.l It is absolutely necessary to 
notice that poetic intuition transcends the virtue of art . 2 Poetic 
intuition is much more subtle and intellectual than art, which ts nearer 
the material world thouoh in essence it is stUl purely intellectual. 
Poetic intuition is neorer pure intellect, but it must utilize techr:ique 
and rules to complete its object. The poet's intuition can descend 
into the craftsman 's creative tdea by becoming too interested in 
technique, by not be1nq a very deep intuition to beQin with I or by 
supplementing the intuition In one•s own way . 3 M~nual dexterity I 
servile imitation or copying, and seeking to please or airr:1ng at 
emotion are throe sources of impurity in creation I which are mentioned 
in Art and Scholasticism. 4 Maritain' s whole concept of creative 
intuition J.s absolute ly opposed to such superCiclal approaches to 
artistic production . 
1ct. Marl!atn, Creative Intu!Uon In Att and Poetry, pp , 135-136. 
2 
.!!!!!!. . • p . 13 7 . 3 Jbld •• pp , 137- 138 . 
4MaritaJn, Art and Scholasticism , p. SO . 
Another difference between the craftsman' s creative Idea and 
poetic lntultton Ues in the fact that the craftsman's idea can be 
improved by practice, but "poetic intuition can neither be learned nor 
improved by exercise and discipline . • 1 Nevertheless, some effort 
is profitable !n relation to poetic intuttton, and one can remove 
obstacles to sensitivity to this creative intuition . There can be a 
deve lopment of attentive passivity . But as wtll be noticed in the 
discussion of contemplation, neither can poetic intuition be forced, 
nor c.an one produce it by any number of techni ques . It 1s simply 
something which happens to the expectant sensitivity of the poet. 
H . Poetic Experience 
"Foet!c cY.J)Orlence" Is a term with a more comprohanstve 
psychological siqnificonee than the terms, peeUc knowledge, poetic 
intuition, and poetic creation, which have been used . It is "a 
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certain state of the sou! in which self- communion makes the ordinary 
traffic of our thinking stop for a while, and which ls linked wlth 
particularly intense poetic intuition . " 2 This experience is not 
noeUcaily or 1ntu1Uvely d1fferem (it is not an expenence sui generis)i 
It Is only psycholOQlcally d ifferent In that it is more intense . 
1 Marltoin, Creative Intuition ln Art anC Poetry, p. 138 
2~, pp . 238-239. 
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There are two pheses of the poetic experience: (1\ the 
concentration (without tension) of powers, energies, and to: a! be!ng 
into repose, quletu.de, tranquillity-- a place of rest and peace superior 
to any feeling. It is a condition of passivu:y which ls analog-ous to 
the mysttcal .. dark night of the soul."' (2) Then there !s a bursting 
forth with renewed ener9y . '"NO'-A' the mind inviQorated and vivified 
enters a happy activity, so easy that everything seems to be .given it 
at once, and, as it were, from outside . ,,l 
But inspiration (or poetic experience), though it is infinitely 
rich m meaninq, is without form and thus cannot produce tt work of 
art wlthout operative reason . 2 There may be a certain amoum of 
passivity, but there c~"lnot be a total automatlc outpouring m the hopa 
that a good work will appear. Conscloc.s intel119Emce must operate in 
the direction of the wort. to be done but always under tho control of 
poetic intuition if the work is to be sign!ficant . "Reason and 
calculation in the poet ore there only to handle fire . .. 3 There is no 
rejection of artistic rules, but to subject the vision to them in o 
servile manner rather than making them subject to the vision ts to 
produce academic rather than vital art . The tension produced by tho 
1Jacques and Raissa Marltaln, The Situation of Poetry, Po 22 , 
2Marita1n, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, pp 0 245-246 0 
3 
.12&0. Po 2~8 0 
necessity of being madmen (inspired) and ra tional is a source of inner 
solitude (aloneness) and inseeurtty . 1 
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One may easily misunderstand Marita!n' s meaning here , He doos 
not regard "transports, rapture, delirium and frenzy" 2 as essential to 
poot lc experience. [n fac t, these ·• are only a token of tho weakness 
of nature and can proceed moreover from spurious sources. the real 
blesstng is pOetic intuition, and not any kind of thrlll. " 3 Passion 
cannot dominate to the point of the expulsion of the poet's eontrol of 
himself . "To c laim to have lnsp!rat!on expel mtell!qence and take 
chan;e of the work alone is an illusion similar to that of the illuminati 
in the order of mystics . ,. 4 
! ll . The Rules of Art 
There is a sense tn whlch poetry is free from the rules of art . 
"Though it ts committed to the prociucUve activity of an, poetry remains 
essentially superior to this productive activity, and remains always free 
to it, in the sense that it moves and directs ond masters it at its ow·n 
sweet .... ·UL .. s On the other handr poetry is not purely capricious and 
in d:escendtnQ to the actual ptoductlon of a work must employ certain 
techniques . 
1.!.2!!L. pp, 249 - 250 . 
4 l2!£. . • p , 246 . 
2Ibld . , p , 244. 3.!.2J!L 
s Ibid . , pp , 171-172 . 
Tho primary rule wh1ch the poet Is to follow '" that of obedience 
to poetry !tself. And this rule is as supenor to ell other rules as 
heaven is to earth . 1 for this reoson Marita!n says: "poetry 1$ the 
heave:1 of the worktnq reason." 2 
This primary rule is a heavenly rule, because it 
deals w1th the very conception , in the bosom of the 
splnt, of the work to be engendered ht beauty , If 
creative intuition is tacking-, a work can be perfectly 
made, and it is nothJnq; the arus; has nothin9 to say. 
If creative lntultlon 1s present, and passes, to some 
extent, into the work, the work exists and speaks 
to us, even 1f it is imperfectly made . 3 
!t is important to nollce that the work of art ••ts an end in itself, 
and an end totally singular, absolutely unique." 4 ThG "utter 
singularity'' of each new case makes it impossible to introduce 
Inflexible or mechanical ruJes for the producttor. o! someth li'!q rt>ally 
novel. Such ort1fic1al principles as the "rules of Aristotle" only serve 
10 make the poetic JnsiQht and the poet a slave ;o ndes in a manner 
237 
which is more 1Qnom1n1ous than 1f the workman should be a slave to his 
tools . 5 
I Ibid., pp . 59-61. 
21b!d . , p . 235: olso in Art and Scholastlc!sm, p. 80 . 
3 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art ar.d Poetry • p . 60. 
4 
..!.!2!£. .. p . 57 . 
5 Marlta!n, Art and Scholasticism, p . 31. 
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if an be tegarded as a habit or vlrlue, then the modern emphasis 
on methodology, the use of which Js available to everyone, will be 
transformed into a Hving mental proclivity, which is not the p.ossesston 
of every men . 
Stick the consummate theoretical knowledge of all 
the rules of art upon on Industrious 9raduate working 
fllteen hours a day but without a shoot of hobit 
sprouttng ln h1m, and you will never make him an 
enist; he will ah-1ays remain tnf!n!tely farther 
removed from art than the chlld or the savage 1,.•.-ith 
a simple natural <Jift •1 
Nevertheless, art is situated some·.o;herc between the pr!mltlve 
natural 91ft (in which art has not yet been developed) and acedem!c 
rules (in which art has ceased to exist) . "Such an lnnote disposition 
is clearly indispensable; but without a culture and a dtsc1pl1ne, which 
the Ancients considered should be long, patient and honest, !t • • ...-ill 
never turn into art properly so-called . "2 Thus, though rules are not 
everything, the arUst cannot forego the assiduous labor which the 
development of a virtue or habit requires . The 1ntttal gift may just 
h•ppen to belong to the Individual, but the full expression will not 
occur without effort . 
The actual process of cultivating tho natural gtft until the full-
blown artist 1s developed follows the same pattern as Maritain1 s 
<;eneral theory o! education . Morris follows Adler in d!stln1Julshlng 
l 
.lli.S!. . ' p . 3 3 . 2Ibid . 
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between operative and cooperative arts . 1 •The operative arts are 
those activities in which a human being operates on nature to bring 
about some desired effect which nature i tself cannot achieve . •• 2 "The 
cooperative arts, on the other hand,. are those tn which man simply 
cooperates with nature, assisting It and facUitat1n9 its customary 
procedures by watchful attention end timely prodding . ,.l This may be 
further s pecified by indicatlng tha t in tho casa of the operative arts 
"nature lies quiescent and passive wait1n9 for human intelligence to 
act uPOn !t, " 4 but that In the case of the cooperaUve ans ••nature is 
Jn motion already--striving, reaching. aspiring to a new fulflllment . "5 
Marit&in's analysts follows the approach of education as a 
cooperative art . " The ma ster merely 9lves assfstance from outside to 
the prtnetple of tmmanent activity within the pupil . " 6 Teaching, like 
medicine, merely provides "the interior principle inside the subJect 
with t ho means and assistance it requires to produce its af!ect . " 7 In 
l van Cleve Morris, Philosophy and the American School (Boston: 
Houghton Mlfllln Co . , 196ll, pp. 3- S . Cf. Mortimer J . Adler, "In 
Defense of the Philosophy of Education," Philosophies of Education, 
Forty- first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, 
Part l, ed . N. B. He~.ry (Chtca;o: The Society, 19421, p . 211. 
2 !bid . ' p . 3 . 
4rbld., p . 4 . 
6Marltaln, Art and Scholasticism, p . 35 . 
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the case of art special care must bo given not to cause the spontaneous 
gift to atrophy by means of too great emphasis on the purely technical 
phases or pure theory. •Practicing scales 1s not giving a concert . .. 1 
And it must al ways be recognized that the uue artist must 9'0 much of 
the way alone and tn sol itude : 
!he artist, where the fine point and highest expression 
of his art are concerned, forms and educates hlmself 
alone: the nearer one c;ets to the spiritual po!nt of 
an, the more the viae determinatae to bo followed will 
be appropriate and personal to the artist, and es such 
discoverable by one alone . 2 
The flexlblhty of the rules ls no less dependent upon the inflnlte 
modes possible for the expression of an experience of beauty . Beauty 
is so aU-encompassing that no molds can contain tt. 3 Moreover, 
appotlte Is also Involved in the productton of a work: beauty is that 
toward which appetite tends as well as intellect . This means that what 
the indivld~al ls wltl determlno the rules to be employed, for •,•,.hat a 
person is determ ines what is seen and desired . -< Thus :10 simple set of 
inflexible rules could ever produce e work of art . 
One could well summarize this discussion ln ),1arita1n' s words: 
1Marita1n, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry , p . 221 . 
2 Marltain, Ait and Scholast!clsm , p . 35. 
3 Marlta~n, Creative lntu1Uon in Art and Poetry, pp . 56-57 . 
4Ibld . ' pp ' 58-59. 
"The unique rule of tho perfect artist is finally: 'Cllng to your 
creative intuition, and do what you want . ,,l 
3 . Knowledge by ConnoturaUty 
Both contemplative and poetic knowledge are knowledge by 
connaturality . The developmer.t of these modes of cognition as well 
as the enu!lciation of their relation to other types of knowledge will 
occupy the examination of this soctlon . 
1. Contemplation 
Contemplation~ mys!lcism, and wfsdom are continually recurring 
terms, scattered throughout on of Maruatn's writings . That these terms 
&re lar9ely synonymous is apparent by the ease with which Mar1tatn 
moves !rom speaktnq of one to the other without any e::,planatory or 
transitional remarks . He does not actually equate these terms 
explicitly, and there ~ay be some minor variation !n meaninQ. The 
follo .... :inQ discussion should meke dear the complex unit of knowledge 
which these terms tndlcate . 
First, 1t w111 be necessary to show the location of contemplation 
within the general religious framework . Then, after indicating the 
three types of wisdom, di!ferent types of conte mplation wlll be examined 
1Ib!d.,p.60 . 
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to discover the nature and function of infused contemplation. finally, 
the chorecteristics of infused contemplaUon will be enumerated . 
(I) Religion and Contemolatlon . --Religion can ~ very readily 
defined as something which is done either tn worshiping God or in giving 
hlm due honor . As sueh, religion has to do primarily with worship and 
lltuti!Y . Thus relJQlon has "!or Its object not directly God Himself but 
sometiung to be done. eenaln acts to be accomplished with respect to 
God and to honor God . ·•1 And since moral virtues are acts to be done, 
reliqion 1$ essentially a moral virtue . 
Liturgical worshlp is an end in itse lf , but 1t is lnferior to certatn 
other ends. The theological vutues (faith, hope, and chanty! and the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit are superior . 2 On the other hand, worship Is 
related to these virtues and 9rows out of them . Moreover I there is 
someth.ing in worship which surpasses the order of human uctivlty 
altogethor . And the most spiritual man ts constramed by the divine 
mystery therein embodied to &ttend very dilt~ently to the Holy Mass . 
The center of the liturgy ts Holy M~ss 1 the sacrifice 
of the Cross perpetuoted on the altar, the unbloody 
immolation in which, t}'l.rough the ministry of the 
earthly priest , the Eternal Priest offers Hlmsell as a 
1
racques and Raissa Marita!n, Liturgy and Cor.templat!on, tra~s . 
joseph W . Evans (New York: P . J. Kenedy and Sons, 1960), p. 25 . 
2lbld . 
victim to His Father; the center of the llturgy is 
an act of an infinite and infinitely transcendent 
value, an (;!Cl proper! y divine, without common 
measure with the highest works of grace in the 
human soul: oocause 1t Is an act of God (using 
the instrumentality of the priest), not en act of 
I man . 
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Infused contemplation may 00 rather summarily (because of later 
development) but quite 1nc1s1vely descrlbod as depondlng •essontlally 
on the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and ls their 
common opcret!on ltself, through which the soul, carried to a superhuman 
mode of acting, Is joined to God and enters Into the depths of God ." 2 
(21 'Types of Wisdom . --In various writings Marita!n Indicates that 
there are three types of wisdom: infused wisdom, theological .. .,tsdorn, 
end metaphysical wisdom. 3 This list is !n a descending scale with 
regard to priority or excellence . 
Vlisdom may be understood by an examination of knowledg-e. 
Knowled9e may mean 11 knowing in a firm and stable way . .,-4 Wisdom 
is Included In this type of knowledqe. But knowledge moy also mean 
••knowing ln detail and by proximate or apparent causes. ,.S It is at this 
level that wisdom is seen in contradtstlnctlon to science, for "wisdom is 
I Ibid . , p, 26 . 2 Ibid. , p . 24 . 
3cr. Marltaln, The Degree of Knowledge, pp . 247 - 253; Jacques 
Marltaln, Science and Wisdom, trans. Bernard Woll (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1940), p . 22; and A1t and Scholostlclsm, pp , 3, US,n . l. 
4 Maritain, Science and Wisdom, p . 4 . 5 lb!d , ' p . s. 
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knowledge through the hiQhest sources ~nd in the deepest and simplest 
sense ... l Wisdom "makes us contemplate rtrst causes, wherein the 
mind embraces all thlnQs m the super lor unity of a simple qlance . .. 2 
"It is the province of wisdom to study the highest causes , .. 3 
Metaphysics and theology are primarily Interested in knowing, but 
infused wisdom o: contemplation tends toward union with God both by 
means of love and for the sake of love.~ Metaphysics is "the supreme 
science in the purely rational or natural order ... 5 It is not ooncer:1ed 
with God as he Is known by faith but w ith God as he Is reveo!ed to the 
:"'atural Ught or reason . 6 Metaphysics is concerned with being and, as 
natural theology , with God as the first cause of beJng . 7 
Broadly speaking , theology proceeds by means of both faith and 
reason; i.e . lt depends upon the special communication made by spec tal 
1Ib1d ., pp . 4-5 . 
2 . Maritain I Art and Scholastic1sm I p . 3 , 
3 
Marltaan, An Introduction to Philosophy, p . 80 . 
4Maritaln , An and Scholasticism, p . 115, n . 1. 
5 Maritain 1 'Ihe Degrees of Knowledge , p . 247 . 
6c£. Marltatn I An Introduction to Phllosoohy , p. 76 , 
7
.!l!!!!.. ' pp. 76-82 . 
divine revelation {wluch Is Inaccessible :o una!dod humM reason), 
but reason Is employed most assiduously . I 
"lnlused wisdom . .. Is also called myatlcal theoloqy and 
consists ln knowing the essentially supemotura1 object of faith and 
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thootooy·-OeJth as such--according to a modo that Is suprahuman and 
supornoturol . .. 2 Tills mode of knowing Is rather by sufferln9 (under-
going, experiencing) divine things than by mere learnlng;3 os such, It 
'"11 auperior to concepts and images ... 4 
To dovelop further ~'!antain's consideration of infused wisdo~, 
mysucal !heology, Ot •c:yst!cal conte~pla!ton, .. s as weU as his theory 
of connatural tty, one codd cite Aquinas' <itseusston of the two d:!ferent 
woya In which thJn9s pertaining to morality con be judqed. 6 On the one 
hand, It Ia poaalble for a person to havo a syatomot1c comprehension of 
tho virtues end to be able to 9ive an adequate roply to anyone who asks 
htm quastlons , o . 9 . concernin9 fortitude . "'A moral philosopher may 
possibly not be o virtuous man, ond yet know everything about virtues . "7 
1c1. Matltaln, Science and Wisdom, p. 23; 7ho Degrees of 
Knowled;c, pp. 249 - 253. 
2Marltotn, 'The ::>egrees o! Knowledge, p . 2$3. 
4 Maritoin, Science and Wisdom, p. 22. 
3!bld . 
5lbid . 
6st. Thomas Aq-.!inas Summa Theologlca ll-11. 4S . 2. 
7Jocques Marltaln, The Range of Reason (liow York: Chorles 
Scribner• s Sons, 1952), p . 23 . 
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On the other hand, a person mey not be a moral philosopheri he 
may not have the preceding conceptual grasp of virtue . However, he 
may possess the vlTIUe In QUestion by having It embodied in his will and 
de sire; 1 . e . he may have tus nature ln conformity ·,.,·tth it or be connatured 
with lt. If such a person should be asked about fortitude, he would be 
able to examine his own inclination or inner bents and propensities . 
Mar1tain gives a clear and succinct summary of the nature of 
knowledge through connaturality in The Range of Reason . 
In this knowled9e through union or inclination, 
connaturality or congonJallty, the intellect ts at play 
not alone, but together with affective inclinations and 
the disPOsitions of tho will, and is guided and directed 
by them. It Is not rallonal knowledge, knowledge 
through the conceptual, log leal and discursive exerc tse 
of Reason. Sut it is really and qcnuinely knowled9e. 
though obscure and perhaps Incapable of giving account 
of itself. or of be in<;; translated into v.rords . 1 
Maritain discusses "mystical contemplation" or "<;race- given or 
supernatural contemplat1on"2 tn the same manner as he hos speken about 
infused wisdom in The Degrees of Knowledge. Howewr 1 there seems to 
be a slight difference in the terminology, and infused wisdom is the 
spiritual 91ft from which contemplation proceeds: ''Christian contom -
platlon is the fruit of the gift of Wisdom. " 3 Wisdom is a sttlte or 
status; contamplntlon is an activity . 
1Ibld . 2 Ibid . , p . 24 . 
3Jacques and Raissa Marttatn, Prayer and Intelligence, trans . 
Algar Thorold (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), p . 22 . 
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Jn parentheses it should be noticed that "infused contem-
plat1on"1 {which is produced upon 1he reception of infused wisdom) ts 
the highest level of human attainment by vi.ator~s; only those •.vho are 
comorehensores or who have attained to the beatific v1sion are more 
exalted !n knowledge . 11An absolutely immediate I and therefore 
perfectly exper1montal 1 knowledge of God is reserved for beatitude. 
But on this side of that end, a knowledge which ts truly, though 
imperfectly. immediate clln begin even here below . ~~ 2 
(31 Types ol Contorr.platlon. --Although It would have been 
possible to entitle this section Types of Wisdom , 3 slr.ce this title has 
already been givon and since the present title is fully appropnate, tho 
present tllle Is being used. 
In one place Martta!n speaks of the competition of wisdom in 
reference to the natural contemplation of India and to the philosophic 
contemplation of Greece . 4 I n much the same manner he refers to 
Indian and Greek contemplation in a chapter in Scholasticism and 
Pollttcs . S In both articles he compares these two types of contemplation 
to 1nfuscd contemplation . 
1Marltaln, The Degrees of Knowledge, p . 247, n . I. 
3ct. Marltalr., Science and Wisdom, pp. 6-18 . 
SJacques Marltaln, Scholostlclsm and Poll tics, translatlon edited 
by Morumer J. Adler (l\ew York: The Macm111an Co., 1940), Chap . VTI . 
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India has its mystics and holy men, and one may well ·.vondor 
ho.., .. their religious experience compares with that of the mystics of the 
Catholic Church . Basically it can be said that "lndta always conceived 
of wisdom as a wisdom of deliverance and salvation . . ,1 .tmd wit?l.out 
entering Into the question of the movements o! the natural and tho super-
natural in the activity, Maritatn proceeds to specify a he essence of 
indian contemplation and asceticism: 
The essential character' of .. . the wisdom of tho 
East consists in this: that ll is fl.rst of all and above 
all an a seen sus, a movement UJ?!\fards whereby man 
endeavours to pass into superhuman conditions and 
enter into divine llbol'ly . From this point of vie..,,. we 
can sec the fuLl stgntf!cance ol the athleUclsm ol 
mortilicat ion, the strained asceticism and the plethora 
of means and recipes and methods of perfection ~md 
contemplation which can be observed so oftan in the 
Orient , 2 
On the other hand , Greek wisdom 
ls human wisdom, ral!onal wisdom . It is not the 
.. ,isdom of philosophy asplrJng: to be a wisdom of 
salvation . It Is a wisdom of phtlosophy with an 
order of its 0\vn . . . • But here ls no longer a:1.y 
question of a wisdom of salvation and holiness , a 
wisdom of eternal Hfe . It ls a wisdom of here below 1 
a wisdom of earth. 3 
Greek contemplation is the abstract speculation of the philosopher who, 
ltke AriStotle ' s God, is directed to pure thought . 4 
lMaritain, Sci<'! nee and VVisdom, p . 1 . 
2 lbld.,p.9. 3 Jbid.' p . 10. 
4cr. A:istotle Metaphysics xH. 9; Nicomachean Ethics x . 7-8 . 
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Maritain does not like either mysticism or contemplation as 
terms for the experience, which m1Qht better have the lengthy phrese 
"entrance into the very states of God, of God Incarnate ,•1 because of 
tho various connotations of the former terms 91ven partially by Indian 
and Greek emphases . Howev-er, he does use the terms quite freely 
with occasional warnings a9oinst their misunderstanding. 
The essential dlfferenci> between infused contemplation and both 
Jndtan and Greek contemplation lies in the fact that "the wisdom of 
salvation, the wisdom of holiness is not ach1eved by man but Qiven by 
God. It proceeds essentially not from an ascending movement on the 
pan of the creature but from a descent of the creative SpJrit ... 2 The law 
of this descending movoment is the law of the Incarnation, and the bas1s 
of the lnct~rnetion is love . 3 
What thJs means for Indian thought ls that natural spirituality 
needs techniques to produce the mystical experience, for the experience 
is not Qiven but "wotked up . •• Thus "the most obvious dif(orence bet<.'leen 
the Christian and the other mystics is the freedom of the former from any 
techniques, rectpes or formulas . "4 Thts does not mean that the Christian 
is to be la~y, even thouQh God will 9ivc when ha desires e.:ld will 
1 Marltoin, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 175. 
2 Maritain, Science and 'Wisdom, pp. 16- 17 . 
4Marita1n, Scholasticism and Pollucs, p. 188 . 
3 Ibid ., p. 19 . 
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withhold as he chooses . The would-be mystic should do all he hos 
the power to do to lay himself open to the lnbl\>oth!ng of the divine 
Spirit. But when the aspirant has done all , God' s comtr,q goes vastly 
beyond any human technique . 1 
The difference between Greek contemplation and ln.fused cor.tem-
plation is indicated by Maritain ' s frequent quotation of Albert the 
Great: 
The> object of the contemplation of Philosophers >S 
the perfection of him who contemplates, and therefore 
their contemplot!on stops In the intellect and so their 
end In thls is the knowledQe of the Inte llect. But 
the obJect of the contemplation of the Saints, sc. of 
Catho11cs, is love of the object contemplated, sc . 
God: therefore Jt does not stop in the Intellect as an 
ult!mate end through knowledge, but passes over to 
affection through love . 2 
Greek contemplation is absorbed in itself and does not have a super-
abundance which flows into practical activities : it is primarily 
theoretical; and It Is basica lly for the perfection of the thinker . 
Are the Indian mystic end the Greek thinker thus cv.t off from 
Chrlsttanlty because there is no divine infusion? If one wUl merely 
glance 4t the typos of wisdom and the types of contemplation as out-
lined in the preceding discussion~ it can be readily recognized that 
1ct. Jacques and Raissa Maritain, Liturgy and Contemplation, 
pp. 61-63 . 
2 Albert the Great (Jean de Castell De aohacrcndo Deo 9, citeo by 
Maritain, Art and Scholasticism 1 p . US, n. 1. Cf. also Scholasticism 
and Pollucs, p . 174, and The Degrees of J<.~owledge, p . 267 , 
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~etaphysics parallels Greek thought, theolo.gy parallels Indian thouQht, 
and infused contemplation may be compared to the Hebrew relig1ous 
genius (which was not dtseussed but .....,hich forr~s the reUg1ous. back-
~round for Roman Cathollcism with en emphas!s on the divine initiative l. 
Mar1tain has not completely dispensed with the primary intuitions of 
other cultures; he has absorbed the c;enlus of each into his Chrlstlan 
system . Of course, much of this had alrea<iy been done by .~qulnas 
with respect especially to Greek thought. 
Moreover, although Marltain insists that Catholic Christionlty 
contains t:te whole truth (though he would not inslSt that 1t knows 
everything, except in qerm) , he is free to acknovtledge the presence of 
truth and valid rel19ious experience wherever it can be found. ••Because 
the Chu.rch has received the treasure of superna:ural revelation l!\ Its 
cntlrety 1 lt allows us to honour every.vhere the various traces or marks 
or scattered fragments of that revelation . ... l Moreover 1 if such cases of 
mystical experience ~re valid, lt is not a purely human product: valid 
mystical experience (wherever found) arises from d1vine qrace a.nd 1s 
thus infused contemplation . 2 
1Marlt&ln, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 274 . 
2Ib!d . , p . 272. 
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In connection wlth this is Maritai n. ' s broader statement concermng 
the relation between the Church and those who are not externally or 
explicitly connected with it: 
Unbaptized persons , even though they are not sta:nped 
witil the seal o! unity so as to panic1pate through the 
virtue of the Church in the proper work of the Church 
(which is the redemption continued). can nevertheless 
(inasmuch as they receive without knowmg the .super-
natural li!e of the self-same divine blood which 
circulates within the Church and of the same spirit 
which re sts upon it) be long invisibly to Chris t 's Church . 
Thus they can hava sanctifying grace and, as a result, 
theologica l faith and tho Infused gifts .1 
Catholicism "'is religion, the only true rol1g1on, and it rejoices, without 
envy. h"l every qood. even though lt bo achieved outside us bou!'!.danes ..... 
for that 90od is only apparently outside the boundaries of Cathollctsm~ 
in reailly 11 belongs to It Invisibly . • 2 Morltaln also points to the 
Church•s condemnation o f the. propostuon: " Extra Ecclesiam nul!a 
conccditur gratia . ·• 3 
(4) Characteristics of Infused Contemplation . --The preceding 
discussion has alroaciy pointed to most facets of mfused comemplauon, 
but here il will be possible to summar12e brtet!y these characteristics 
ln broad outline. as well as to introduce anythlnQ previously omitted . 
1 
.!2!>!. . ' p . 2 73 . 
2J~cques Maritain, "Religion and Culture, • Essays m Order, by 
Marltain (trans . J . F . Scanlan), Peter Wust (trans . E . I. Watkin), and 
Christopher Dawson (New Yor):: The Macmlllan Co. , 1931), p . 40 . 
3Ibid . , p. 273, n . 2 . 
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Maritain suqQcsts that "contemplation is an experimental know-
ledge of love and union, •• 1 and that contemplation "unites the spirit 
to eternity . " 2 "By v1s1on, the creature becomes the true God Himsel~, 
not Jn the order of substance, but in the order or that l:nmatertal 
union .... ·h1ch const1tums the intellectual act . • 3 In more popular 
longuoge Marltaln defmes the mystlc81 life "as a oomin9 of the soul 
under the regimen in whlch the 9ifts of Grace, called ln sacred 
terminology gifts of the Holy Ghost, predominate (so that henceforth 
the soul is docile to the sp!t!t of God, who d1spropriatinQ it of itself, 
takes It Into His own charge) . • 4 By regarding contemplation simply 
as action uPOn the rectplence of a divlne Qlft .,.,·hereby ~r. Individual ls 
rendered docUe to God, Maritam makes the mystical life umverst~l, not 
just for the select rew . It is to be noted, however, that most o! those 
.... ·ho speak of such a life are the ones who have permitted the divine 
life such control ~nd h~ve thus developed to such ~n cx:em 1hat lt 
appears th.at contemplatlon is for the spiritually ehte. However, even 
9enume charJsms or spocial gUts are not of the essence of contempleuon. S 
1Ibid . , p . 338. 
2 Jacques Me.r1te.1n I The Th1ngs That Are not Caesar's r trans . J. F . 
Scanlan (New York: Chories Scribner ' s Sons, 1931), p . 1!0 . 
3 Merttaln, The Degrees of Know ledge I p . 2 55 . 
4Maritain, Soholastlclsm ana Politics, p . 185 . 
sibld . , p. 188. 
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There are three charactorlstics of contemplation which are 
Indicated in the precedln<,; paragraph: (ll contemplation Is a result of 
receiving from God, and thus It Involves obedience to God; (2) contem-
plation is a cognitive union with God; ~nd {3) contemplation is related 
to love . The last two will be Qiven further consideration. 
Althou9h it has Just been indleatod that cognitive union and love 
are two aspects of contemplation, it should no· ... · be shown that these 
come together in knowledge by connaturahty. Knowledge always ir:volves 
a degree of union with the object; but in concept\lal kno· ... ·ted<3'e !here !s 
always a qreat amount of detachment from the object ,l Nevertheless, 
there Is a l<lnd of !<now ledge which brln<;s the knower immediately into 
contact with the object; this is a knowledge which arises as a result of 
a person's becomlnQ like the object. This is quite Simply to say that 
one can a lways understand someone or somcthmg which is 11ke oneself 
much more readily than someone or something which is radically 
different . The lll<eness Is produced by two fac1ors (in contemplation): 
the divine gift (only Jf God bestcr.'ls himself in some special manner 
could man come to knO\v htrr: so intimately) ond the divin-e love (whlch ts 
also divine gUt) . Thus by the dlvlne 1nfu$1on of love the soul is made to 
know God, for it becomes like God, because God is love, and It loves 
htm . It is with this background that one can understand what M&t1tain 
1ct. Marltaln, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 241-244 , 247, 259. 
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means when he says: "Contemplation is ~lways ordained towards love, 
for love is more unifying than knowledge, at least than any knowledge 
outside the Seatiflc V1Slon . ., l "No pure knovdedge is able to unite us 
to God. imt:1ediately and without ,an intervening distance. But love, on 
the contrary can. ,.l It is now possible to understand Maritain's 
suqQestlon that it is better to love God than to know him, and yet it 
ts better to know temporal thlnQs than to love them. 3 
But what about the ob}ect of contemplative knowledge? Does the 
contemplator have access to truths which the Church in general does not 
comprehend? Marttain's answer Js expUelt: •There Js no supernaturally 
accessible object that can be anained by contemplation that dogmatic 
formulas do not proclaim, and do not proclaim infallibly 1 and wlth 
perfect exactitude and with absolute truth . .. 4 The difference then lies 
in what follows ; it is in the manner of knowing that mysticism differs 
from theology. "'In the way of attaining the very thing that dogmatic 
formulas teach,. in 1ts manner of knowing .. mysUcal theology ts hlghe:-
than speculative theology . ":;, 
1Marltaln, Prayer and Intelligence, p , 24. 
2Marltain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p . 323. 
3Jacques Maritaln, Three Reformers; Luther 1 Descartes. 
Rousseau {New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p . 40. 
4Maritain, The Dcgroos of Knowledge, p. 239 . 
5lbid . 
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If this is true~ then there ls no essential difference bet-.veen 
Aquinas' theology and St . John of the Cross ' s mysticism . Thus 
Christianity's dual respect for speculation and practice is perfectly 
Jeqltlmate . 1 St . Thomas is called the Doctor of Light because he deals 
with the highest communicable wisdom, and St . John of the Cross !s 
called the Doctor of Night because he deals with incommunicable 
wisdom; but their theories are not opposed, and they do not deal with 
different obJects basically, for both are led by and related to faith and 
the Church . 2 &ven Aquinas' emphasis upor. contemplation as the highest 
activity and St . John of the Cross's emphasis upon contemplation as 
the cesset ton of activity or non- activity can be reconciled if one will 
only observe that from one standpoint contemplat!on is the highest 
human activity but from another standpoint it is so for above frenzied 
hum~m action as almost to require some other term . Moreover, as the 
soul rises in rcletion to God it becomes more end mere pass ive; i . e . 
it i s not concerned ·.>~1th 1ts own activity, !t yields Itself in qreater 
measure to the divine activity. 3 
Finally, !t must be observed that contemplation "raises man to a 
i<.ncr.·:ledge and love of God whJch are all spirituat, in solr!tu et 
ventate, stripped of the sensible and the human, transcending the order 
I Ibid. 1 pp . 334-335. 
2Ibld . , pp. 310- 311. 
3Maritain, Prayer and Intelligence, pp . 25-26 . 
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of images and ideas and therefore incomprehensible and lneffable, 
and Introducing the soul Into the luminous cloud of divine things . .. 1 
Contemplotion draws one aw~y from the sensible wo:-ld so far that 
analOQies break dov1n and the experience becomes ineffable: it is 
because of this that mystics speak of the void, the dark night of the 
soul , the cloud of unknow1ng, and the via negattonts . 
To summarize, contemplation Is an activity o! the soul which ts 
produced by an Influx o! divine grace and love . The love both tncllnes 
the soul to be like God and inclines the soul to love God . The know-
led9e thus produced Is knowledge by connaturallty . And yet It Is a 
knowledge which goes so far beyond ordinary experience and knowledge 
that it is usually referred to as darkness and unknowing and is Jarqely 
incommun!cable . 
u. Poetic Intuition 
There are many who have questioned the possibility of the poet's 
having knowledge of anyth1ng . Maritain meets this query directly ·sith 
the insistence that the poet does have knowledge, though it ts know-
ledge of a specil!!l kind . The efforts of certain contemporary ph~loso-
phers (e .Q. A. J. Ayerl which have proceeded along the lines of denying 
that the poet has scientific or even philosoph1c k.no-....•ledQe is only an 
attempt "to escape the problem by considering poetry a set oi 
1 
Ibid . , p . 21. 
pseucio-statements-·with no meaning--or a substitute for science 
Intended lor feeble-minded people . • 1 It ls ttue that the poet has "an 
obscure knowledge," 2 but this does not present an a ortor1 basts for 
the reJection of such . 
(1) Historical Evolution of Self-Awareness . --Poetic knowledge 
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ls essentially a comlnQ toqother of the self and the world !n slgn!!leant 
encounter . After examinln9 the differences between C!'t!nc se and 
Indian art, Marltaln says: 'The typical difference !><!tween Indian art 
and Chinese art does not proceed from the Things that man contemplates. 
It proceeds from men who eontemplete Thinqs. "3 This means that an 
is dependent up.on a self, and the nature of thts self is revealed in the 
insight which H has through the si9nificant encounter with the •.'lorld. 
"The poet knows h1mself only on the condition that things resound 
in h!m. " 4 And "the more the poetic perception which animates art 
catches and manifests the inner side of 'Things, t:'le more it involves 
at the same tlme a disclosure and manifestation of the human Self ... s 
An examination of Greek art reveals its preoccupatfo:'l with the 
human figure: "' Greek art bent 1n adoration before the human figure ... 6 
1Marita1n , The Range of Reason, p . 25. 
2Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 115. 
3 4 Ibid., p , 18 . Ibid., p . 114 . 
5Ibld . ,p.l9 . 6lblci.' p , 20 . 
But careful scrutiny reveals that even in Greek art, though it is Jess 
self- forgetful than Chinese art, there is little awareness of "the inner 
mystery of personality"! due to its re9ard for man simply as an obJect 
among other things (though 1t may be the most perfect among theml. 
The self In Its interiority has appeared only as a result of the 
confrontation of Christ and Christianity. !he incarnauon brought a 
new apprehension of personal!ty, and 
ot the same time tho human mind was confronted with 
a new Idea of man--the Gospels and St. Paul disclosed 
to it the prevalence of the internal man over the external 
rr.an, of the tnner life of the soul over legal or exterior 
forms--and tt could contemplate in !he Son of Man 
crowned with thorns the ab~smal depth of the most 
11ving and mysterious Self. 
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F'rom this original explicit disclosure self- awareness took various 
turns with four main phases in its evolution: Byzantine art, Gothic 
architecture, the art of the Renaissance (a1ong with baroque art and 
classical art), and the art of modem times. The major theme of 
Byzantine art was "1ts glorious and royal, not suffer ins; Christs, " 3 
which served to conceal the immense human real ity which •. .,as vin:ually 
present. 11Christ in His humanity114 is at the center of the art at the 
time of Gothic architecture . 
Renaissance, baroque, and "our classtca1 art .. s represents the 
"process of internalizatlon"'G in which there is a passage "'from the 
1Ibld . ' p. 21. 
4Jbld . 
2lbid . 
5 
.!2!2.·' p. 23. 
3 Ibid . ,p . 22. 
6Ibid . 
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object depleted to the mode with which the artist performs hls work. •1 
Upon this self- awareness there burst forth an individualism which 
tended tow (ltd tho glorification of the artist and his calling. But even 
more significantly, "the unconscious pressute of the artist's individu-
ality upon the very object ho was concerned with in Nature came to 
oxorctso and manifest itself freely in his vo•ork • .. z Nature is no longer 
reoarded as an ideal sensory object; It ls "the Inspirer of an Imaginary 
world which he draws from Thinos •,vJth her assistance and collaborauon . • 3 
The f.inal phase of th!s development ••began, 1n rough outline, 
after the Romantic preparanons, with the second half of the last century, 
anc!. it seems to be entenng a serious cnsis in our day. "4 This phase 
has proceeded into the heart of subjectivity,. to "'the creative act itself, .. s 
while also indicating "the intuitive 1 and entirely individualized, way 
through which subjectivity communes with :he world in the creative 
act . n6 Poetry's prise de conscience (self- awareness or becoming- aware 
of onesel f) 7 occurs at the point ·.,.,•here "'the inner meanings of Things are 
enigmatically grasped ;hrough the artist's Self, and both are manifested 
in the work together . .. 8 
1ibid . 
4lbld . • p . 27 . 
7 Maritain 1 The Range of Reason, p . 58 . 
3told . , p. z;. 
Sible . 
8Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 27-28 . 
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So Imperative is self- awaronoss in art and other forms of develop-
ment that Maritain says: 
for all tho greet forms of proqress of the modern age, 
be it o question of art, of science, of philosophy, 
of poetry, of the spiritual life Itself, seem largely 
to exhibit this growth of self-consciousness, this 
awareness .1 
And Mer1tain insists that "creative subjectivuy cannot awaken to itseU 
except In communino with ThlnQs . .,2 In addition, he says: 
By nature the human creative idea depends in a 
humUiaUng manner upon the extenor world and upon 
all that mfinlte mass of forms and beauties already 
made; and !urthermore upon all the store o! what the 
9enerations have learned; end upOn the code of signs 
in use tn the tribe; and upon the very rules for the 
fabrication of the object (insofar as th~y are yet 
distinct from the creative idea itselO . 
Even in normal thought the stgns which man uses to 
signify things (direct signs) si9nify man himself 
(reverse s1gns) . Every work of art ts a confession, 
but it is by discovennq the secrets of be1n9 (guessed 
a t by dint of suffering the things of this world) that 
!t makes confession of the poet's secret. 4 
I 
Jaccr..1es Marita in, True Humani sm, trans. Marqot R. Adamson 
(London: Geoffrey Ble s, 1938), p . 225 . 
2 
Maritatn , Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 29 . 
3Maritain, Art and Poetry , pp. 85- 87 . 
4Jacques Marltain, "Language and the Theory of Sign, .. Language: 
An Enquiry into lts Meaning and Function , ed . Ruth Nanda Anshen 
(
14Science of Culture Series, " Vol . VIII; New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishin9 Co . , 1957), p . 99. 
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Concerning tile role which !!auc!elair9 played In this evolvement, 
Mart:"tr. says :hat lt is to !li!!!. th~t ·~od~m art ewes Its having becor.:e 
~wa.ro o! :ho theologtc~t.l ~ality and tyra!".:t1col sp1tlt~.usllty o! beeury . ,. l 
And he further points ou:: 
I need r:ot insist on the historic 1::1portoncc o: 
the process of self-~wareness which poetry hos 
oxperlonced In modern times . Thla procoao had !>egur. 
before Baudel aire, with the German Romantics 1 NovaUs , 
Tlock , Holderl!n , on whom Albert s6guln's book brir.gs 
us slgm.hcant data . Edgar Allan Poe and Ncrval played 
their part in it. But It is after Baudelaire !hat It l ook 
on tts full dimensions. 2 
In :PAIJ1nQ, one might poin; to the s1Qn1!1con: £oct that Maritain's 
apprecla!lon foe 3<1u<ielaite is paraUeled L~ T . S . Eliot's thou9ht. 
!!audelalre Is at least superficially In an opposlntj camp, but both 
:..:arttaln and Eliot clair:: him . 3 
ln ;>aintin9 it is C~zanne who ts "tho llboerat.lr.9 flqure tn contempo-
r~ry ort . " 4 He so mastered noture thai M~rltaln 1s "wlllln9 to Insist 
' -that ony of Cezanne ' s paintings •• ••. but an tde09ram of himself . "> 
(2) The Objoct of Poetic Intuition . --A peuon does not <now 
conceptually his own subjectivity or hiS own substance (wha: hi) Is In 
h15 1nnermost esser.ee or beir.c;l, for n ts not cor.eeptuallzable . 
!Ibid. ,;> . 166 . 2Jtta .. p . 1n . 
3Cf . tho tnterestin9 bnef study of ~~~ri:olr. L"'">d Eliot lr. ).'!'tchael P. 
Molon••y, "Clio: ar.d Marlta!n," America, LXXV (Jur.e 29, 19~6), 277 - 279 . 
4)bld 0 ' p , 30 s!Jilll . , p . JI . 
Subjectivity as subjectivity is inconceptualis4.ble; 
Is an unknowable abyss . It Is unknowaole by the 
mode of notton, concept, or representation, o:- by 
any mode of any science whatsoever-- intros;>oction. 
psychology, or philosophy . How could It be other-
wise, seeing that every reality kno-.·:n throuqh a 
concept, a r.ot-ion, or a representation is kn01.un as 
o!>;ect and not as subject? 1 
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But there is a knowledge which comes !rom seeinQ oneself reflected i.:l 
the universe . There is an affective union with the world which is 
distinctly different from conceptual knowledge . 
There is a .. particular intellectual process , without parallel in 
log leal reason, through whjch Thinos and the Self are grasped together 
by means of a kind o: experience or knowled9e whkh has no conceptual 
ex-;>resslon anci is expressed only in the artist'S wor:< ." 2 Seth poetic 
!ntu!!lon and mysllclsm are knowledQe by connatur~tll:y, but they are 
definitely ciiiferent, for poetic Jntuition is essentially related to the 
creativity of the spil'it and tends to express itseli in a work of art, 
whereas mysticism is primarily satisUed to remain in its vision . !hus 
it can be said that in poetlc knowledge " it is :he object created, the 
pc-cm, the paintinq, tne symphony , in its o-..·:n existence as o world of 
its own, which plays the part p layed in ordinary knowledge by the 
1Marita1n, Existence and the Existent, p . 77. 
2Mar1ta!n, Creative Intuition in Art ai'l.ci Poetrv, pp . 33-34 . 
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concepts z.nd judgments produced within the mind ... l The mind can 9ive 
expression to its poetic knowledge only in a •.vork of art. 
The thln9 grasped by pOetic intuition is not M essence, for 
essencos are conceptuaHy disengaged from things. What !s known is 
(ll the thing Jn its tnf!mty, 1ts relations: "the sint;ular ex!stont wiltch 
resounds jn the subjectivity of the poet, toyether wuh all the other 
realities wh1ch echo in this existent , and which tt conveys in 1he manner 
of a sign . .. z One should notice here tho symbolic character of the 
thing known. as ·well as the symbolic nature of poetry . There is also 
tho apprehension of (2) the subjectivity of the self--connatured with the 
thln9 known . And :tnally one kno· ... ·s (3) the work made . This work ls 
valuable m itscl: as an object. but It also is the dltect Sign of the 
secrets of things and the reversed sign of the subjective universe of 
the poet. 3 These three phases of creative intuition are excellently set 
forth in a rather lQngthy passa.Qe: 
Man does not know himself tlu-ough his own csscnco . 
H1s substance is hidden from h1m1 he perceives himself 
only as refracted by the world o: h!s act s which itself 
refracts the world of things: if he does not fill himsel! 
w1th the universe he remains empty to himsolf; thus 1t 
is not in the h9ht antecedently possessed of an 
lntuttion of the se t! by the self that he has his crea tive 
lntu1t1ons, as have the pure spirits 1 he cannot oxprcss 
himsol! In a work except on condition that th.Jngs 
resound in hlmf and that in him 1 at the mutual WDkeninq 1 
they and he come forth together out of sleep . Hence the 
perplexities of the poet's condition . U he hears the 
I 
..lliS!. . • p . 118 . 2rbid., p . 126. 31bld . • pp. 125-129. 
passwords and the secrets that are stammering in 
thinQs ~ lJ he perceives realtties, correspondences, 
figures of horror Ol' of beal..lty of a very certaln 
objectivity, if he captures like a spring-finder, the 
springs of the tra!'l.scendcntals, it is not by dls-
anQaQing this objectivity for Itself, i>ut by recclvln9 
all this into the recesses of his sentiment and of 
his passion- - not as something other than he, 
according to the law of speculative kno· ... ·ledQe, but 
on tho contrary as inseparable from himself, and In 
truth as part of hlmsel!; and It Is thus to seize 
obscurely his own bejng with a knowledge wh1ch will 
J'!.Ot coree to anything save in being creattva, and 
which will not be conceptualized save in a work made 
by his hands . I 
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Sillern gets at the heart of Marttain's position in a (ev; well-chosen 
sentences . 
Poetic knowledge Is a knowledge that ts esser.tla lly 
creative tending to produce something hnherto 
unknown to the world. tn this form of kno .... l edqe 
"It Is tha objoct created, the peem, tho palntmg, 
the symphony. in its own existence as a world of 
its o·,.,.n, which plays the part played in ordmary 
knowledge by the concepts and JUdgements produced 
within the mind . " Artistic knowledge is not conceptual 
know lodge formed by abstraction from thir:gs because it 
1s a knowledge creative of something entirely new. 
from which it is 1mposs1ble to abstract anything before 
it oxlsts . 2 
And Clancy says the same thing in a very pointed manner: 
Pcetry ls essentially a kind of knowledge . Having 
its roots ln tho preconscious life of intellect , moved 
to expression by the poet's intuition of roality, Qiven 
1Marltaln, Art and Poettv, p . 89 . 
2£ . A. S!llem, •Jacques Marltaln and the Philosophy o! Art," 
Dublin Review, CCXXIX (Summer, 1955), 183 . 
life in a work of art, poetry makes known something 
which was not known before and cennot be know'fl. in 
any other way: the spiritual world of an lndlvldu&l 
subjective experience . 1 
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A brief co~;>arison of the intellect's operatlor. in the disengage -
ment of concepts from sense experience and its operauon tn the 
oxporiencing of an object of art may be helpful at this point . 
"The intellect , , . is spiritual and, thus, d1snnct, in essence 
from the senses . u 2 Yet there is nothing 1n the 1ntel1ect which was not 
fl!st tr. the senses . The agent or Hluminattnq 1ntellect is posited in 
order to explam the manner in which tho potentially but not actually 
intelligible in the presentations to sense 1S transformed into an 
actually ir.teltigible form . The Hlumlnattng intellect does not know , 
nor Is It ava!lable to consciousness; It Is ;hat which ts posited In 
order to explain consciousness . The fundamental pomt is that 
··Ne possess in ourselves tho Illuminating intellect, 
a spiritu~l sun ceaselessly radiating, which activates 
everything in intelliQence, and whose Hght causes all 
our ideas to arise 1n us, and whose energy permeates 
every operation of our mind . And this primal source 
of light cannot be seen by usi it remains concea led .in 
the unconscious of the spirit . 3 
lwtllla:n P . Clancy, "The Intuition o! Jacques Marltaln, •• 
The Commonweal, LIX (December 25, 1953), 3 10 . 
2Mar1taln., Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 96. 
3lbld . ' pp . 98-99 . 
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i\ow one of the fundamental differences between the abstr4ctive 
process whlch ls lnvol ved ln the formetion of a concept and the 
experience of sensible beauty is the labor of ~bsuactton and the 
immediacy and restfulness of art . 1 l'he basis for this dtsunctton lies 
in tho fact that abstraction tends to obvJate the d1fference betw·een 
intellect and sense; aesthetic experience reduces the difference .. o..nd 
sinco man !s essentially a unity, that which assists in unihcation is 
more easily and peacefully accomplished; that which disrupts the unity 
does so wlth difficulty . 
The notion of beauty will be discussed later, but it i s necessary 
to Introduce at least the term here to conclude this analysis . Marltain 
suggests 
that in the beauty which has been termed connatural 
to man and is peculiar to human art this brilliance 
of form, ho· ... ·ever purely lntelHg!blc it may be ln 
itself, Is apprehended in the sensible anci by the 
sensible, and not separately from h . The intuition 
of artistic beauty so stands at the opposite pole 
from the abstraction of scientific truth .... 
Tho rr.lnd then, spored the least effort of 
obstraction, rejoices without !about and wHhout 
discussion . It is excused its customary task, it 
has not to extricate something intelligible from the 
matter ln which it is buried and then step by step 
go through its venous attributes; like tho st~g ot the 
spring of runnlng water, tt has nothing to do but 
dunk, anC it dnnks the clarity of bein9. Firmly 
1Marltaln, Art and Scholasticism, pp . 20-21, 125-126, n . 55 . 
fixed in the intUltion of sense, it is irradiated by 
an tntell!g!ble light granted to lt of a sudden In the 
very sensible In whtch it glitters . 1 
He further indieatos ir. one of his very Uluminctlng notes: 
It lS mmd and sense combined, or, to uso such an 
expression, the tntellectualised sense which qives 
rise to aesthetic jOy In the heart . lt ts thereby clear 
that the mmd has no thought--unless secondarily and 
reflexivel y--of abstracting from the sensible particular, 
in the contemplation of which it ls fb:ed, thG 
Intelligible reason for Its joy: It Is olso clear how 
the beautiful can be such a marvellous tonic for the 
mind without deve loping in the lo~st its power of 
a~straction or reasoning, and that the perception o: 
the beautiful is accompanied by that curious feeling 
of intellectual fullness through which we seem to be 
swollen with a super lor knowledge of tho object 
co:ttomplatcd though it leaves us powerless to exp:-ess 
and possess it by our Ideas or make it the object of 
scientific analysis. 2 
i11. Emotion end Love 
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Poetic intuHton can come about only by means of emotion, for as 
an integral or whole experience no facet of human nature can be exc luded . 
But this is not mere emotionalism or sentimentalism, for poetic intuition 
is a kind of know ledge, and emotion per se does not know . A contrast 
must bo made :OOtvYcen brute feeling which i s purely psychological or 
emotional (unstructured animal feeling) and an aesthetic experience which 
is char9ed with an emotion which is formal ami intentional . By form 
Maritatn means that emot~on serves as one phase of the structunng of 
1 ibid . ' !) . 21. 2 J!ili!.., p. 125, n. 55. 
the poem (created object}: the emotion involved in creative mtuition 
does not tend to dissipation and destruction as in an orgy or frenzy . 
The emotion 1s also intentional; 1 .e . it 1S a spiritual or immaterial 
tendency toward somethin9 else I the object and reality--it carr-ies 
lnflnltoly more within ltsolf than Just Itself . 1 
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Although there Is o sonso In which contemplation Is the product of 
love in a manner transcending art (the transc.endence of the supernatural 
over the natural order), it Js also true that art has a relations hlp to love; 
or it mey be sa!d that art has a relaUonship by love to the beautiful. 
In art as in contemplation, intellectual!ty at its 
peak goes beyond concepts and discursive reason, 
and is achieved through a congeniality or connaturality 
with the object, which love alone can bring obout . To 
produce in beauty tho artist must be In love with beauty . 2 
In !ove something special happens, a unique rel&Uonship !s 
established between the lover and the beloved. In reply to the 
Pascalian dictum that men love the qualities rather than the person, 
Marttain insists: 
This is a false statement, and exhibits in Pascal a 
trace of the very rationalism against which he sttove 
to protect himself. Love is not concerned with 
qualities . They are not the object of our love. We 
love the deepest, most substantial anci hidden, the 
most existing reality of the beloved being . This is 
a metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities 
1ct . Marltain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry , pp . S-9, 
119-120 . 
2 Marita.in, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 58 . 
3nd essences ·.o;hich we can find and enumerate in 
the beloved . The expressions of lovers are unending 
because their object is Ineffable .I 
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When the principles Involved ln human relationships are applied to 
art , one can say that love goes to the heart of the obJect and discovers 
secrets unknown by others . Love may not yiold its secrets to knowledge 
which is purely conceptual, but one who has been in love would not 
exchange this experience and this knowledge for all of tho beautiful 
detached observations about it. 
The basic difference between the love involved in art and the 
love involved Jn contemplation is in the fact that artistic love is not 
infused charity . Artistic love ts a natura! love of the natural world . 
iv . The Superiority of Knowledge by Connaturality 
One reason for the superiorlty of knowledge through connaturahty 
over knowledge by concepts and judgments is that knowledge by 
experience is a seeing .es opposed to connectmg anci mferring, which 
are more dist~nt from the objects themselves . Moreover, the experience 
of seeing by the reason is possessed by the intuitive :-e~son as opposed 
to log1cal or discursive roason; and intuitive reason is prior to lo9ical 
reason in. the sense that logical reason begins with basic mtuitions . 
1Jacques Maritain 1 The Person and the Common Gooci, trans . John J. 
Fltz9erald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19471, pp . 28-29. 
Reason does not only articulate, connect, and infer, 
H also sees; and reason's intuitive grasping, 
lntuitus rattonis, is the primary act ond function 
of that one and single po-.ver which 1s called intellect 
or reason . In other w'ords. there is not only logical 
reason, but also, and prior to it, intuitive reason . 1 
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If there are posslbillties of removing obstacles to the Intuition, and 
if there can be D deepening o! sensitivity, ono ts forced to consider the 
Issue as to whether "beyond a certain levol, this pr()9ress In spirituality 
can eonunue without, under one form or e.nother, a reltgtous experience 
properly so-called that would aid the soul of the poet to qu!t the surface 
levels . .. 2 
The answer to this must be that 
if in the natural order anyone has entered into a 
sort of agreement and, if one may dare to say so, 
a kind of metaphysical conspiracy with God as cause 
of beings, it is not the philosopher but the poet . 
He is the one who, after the manner of a man. also 
creates; his art is the grandson of God, according !O 
Dante •s expression . , . . The poet is, therefore, 
rr.uch better prepared than anyone else to understand 
things that are from on high, to know the various 
kmds of metaphys1cal experience we have been 
d1SCU$Sin9 , 3 
That is. •wtthtn the natural order of things !he me1aphysicia~ is ordmarily 
regardeci as having the primary understanding of things, whereas 
actually the poet is able to get closer to such understancitng precisely 
1Morita1n, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. p. 75. 
2Maritain, Art and Poetry, p . 90. 
3Marltaln, The Degrees of Knowledge, p . 282. 
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because of his mode of knowing. The objects of such knowledge 
would be the same for the metaphysician and for the poet in a sense, 
and yet the mode of knowing would transform the obJects on the one 
hand .into essences and on tho other hand into creative ideas which are 
lnconceptualizable . Now In neither metaphysics nor In poetry does 
ono got into the supernatural realm, which is knowa!>lo only by divine 
revelation and faith . But both metaphysics and poetry are at the l!mlt 
of knowledge 1n the natW'lll order, and no other ~nO'.~ ledge even 
approximates thorn. Concerning the poet Marltoin says: 
He perceives in things and brings forth a sign, 
weak though It may be, of the spirituality within them; 
he !s connaturalized, not with God Himself, but 
with the mystery that ts scattered !n things and 
;:~:~sh:: ;,:~ew~~~~ :~~mu~~~~~$~~1 inv1slb!e 
"Poetry, we might say, is the natural spiritual !He of m~n. "2 
It appears that art ranks higher than metaphysics in knowledge 
because art is called ,.the flower and perfection of this world. ,.l .:!r.Jso 
POetic knowledge is knowledge through connaturality, and, at these 
peak level s at least, such knowledge is mere significant tha:1 know-
ledge by concepts. 4 
1Ibld. 2 Clancy, loc.clt . , p. 3 10 
3Marltaln, Art and Poetry, p . 66 . 
4vlde supra., pp . 254-257 . 
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Infused contemplation closes the distance between itself and its 
Object and as such is in a better place to know God than other modes 
of knowing him . 
By being !Ike the object there Is 9reater familiarity · "'th what 11 
Is . Only by such intimacy can you really know . The whole being Is 
Involved and tends toward the object . 
4. The Preconscious or Unconscious 
A deeper understandJn9 o{ the process of creation wU! emergo in 
an examination of Marita.in's theory of two types of unconsciousness: 
(ll There is what m!Qht be called the Freud1an unconscious (vo'ithout 
making it peculiarly or solely Freudian~ or the automatic or even the 
deaf unconscious; it Is deaf to the Intellect . It is the unconscious of 
flesh and blood, instincts, tendencies, complexes, repressed images 
a~d desires, traumatic memories (as constituting a closed or autonomous 
dynamic whole) . (2) There is also a spiritual unconscious which might 
better be called the spiritual preconscious in that it is the preconscious-
ness of the spirit in its living springs . These Mo types of unconscious 
are essentially distinct and thoroughly different in nature, but they are 
intimately connected and ceaselessly communicate . 1 
The rapture of the lyrical or reh9ious soul is 
in 1tself specifically spiritual, and, therefore, 
specifically distinct from the animal instinct. Does 
1ct. Marltaln, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetr)', pp . 91-92 . 
this mean that this rapture is separated from instinct? 
It is absurd to absorb the su~rior in the infenor, but 
It Is Inhuman to disjoin them .1 
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The study of the unconscious is extremely significant smce it is out 
of the "hiciden wori:.ings of c'!!ln immense ond primal preconscious 11fe .. 2 
thot Gil the world of consciousness emerges . MGrlt~ln Insists th~t 
Dcscartos ' emphosis on consciousness has produced some of tho 
current problems in the contemporary world . 3 
Now Maritein is not only interested in poin1ing to the unconscious 
depths (and helqhts) which produce consciousness, he also wants to 
correct the freudian imbalanc.e, which would make entmals of men . 
Mar1ta1n is certain tha~ Freud's psychoanelytlc mc!hodology as well as 
his psychological ins19hts have been tremendous, but he reJects the 
Freudian philosophy . 4 
A threefold division is necessary: 
Psychoanalytical method 
Freudian psychology 
Freudian phllosophy 
And I would begin by saying, that in the !!rst case 
(psychoanalytical method) Freud appears to me as 
a genius of investigation and discovery . l:"i -:he 
third case (Freudian philosophy), he seems in some 
1Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 163-164 . 
2Mar1lain, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetry, p . 94 . 
3Jbid .• p . 95 . 
4cf . Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 144-145 . 
way an obsessed mind . In the second case (Freudian 
psycholoqy) I regard him as a very valua!>le psycholoqlst, 
whose ideas~ activated by an extraordinary instinct of 
discovery, are obscured by a radical empiricism and an 
aberrant metaphysics , unconscious of themselves .1 
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One can see very clearly Marttain ' s basts for rejecting a psychology 
which 91ves only the animal as poet of man 's being a rtght to existence . 
His distinction bet~.veen personality and individuality is 4;nalogous to 
the dfsttnctton between a spiritual unconscious and an an1mal unconscious . 
Two further passages w111 summor!ze his attitude toward Freud and the 
phase of the unconscious which he uncovered. 
The notion of the spec!fica!lon of tendencies by 
their formal obJect is entirely absent from Freud's 
thought; constderinQ tendencies and instincts exclusively 
on the side of the subject , he cannot pos slbl y discover 
in them a distinction in essence . How, then, could he 
help making them all flow baek to the samo fundamental 
instinct. of which they would be but transformatio:ts, 
or rather, different masks? On the other hand, hts 
negation or the autonomy of the spiritual and his de sue 
to hum111ate the human person, could only lead him in 
the same direction . As a result, the so-called "supenor" 
states, --the inspiration of the poet, tho Jove of the 
mystic, £or tnstance, - -are , in Freud ' s opinion, only 
trans1ormations and masks of animal instinct, the 
diverted path by which a sensuality, inhibited in Its 
normal exerclse, satisfies itself 10 an insidious and 
veiled manner: aU human exhllara.tlon is specifically 
sensual . 2 
With qreat sagacity I Freud saw that even the most normal 
human nature implies a certain pluralism of more or less 
ar.tagor.!sttc forces . l"his pluralism becomes absolute 1 
ond the human person decomPOses and decays under the 
very eyes of the psycholoQist. Freud invc:'tted a po· ... ·erful 
I 
..!!<!£.. ' p . 145. 2 ~ . • p . l63 . 
instrument for exploring the unconscious, and beheld 
with deepest ins1ght this fearful world, the interior 
inferno, full of all the monsters repressed tn the 
unconscious . But he mixed up the unconscious itself 
with this inferno, which ls only a part of it . He 
separated lt from the life of reason and of the spirit: 
he therefore considered as a pure bestiality hidden: 
in man the whole of lnstinctlvity, and not only that 
part which has effective ly separated itself through 
repress1on or through vice or wickedness . He thus 
iqn.ored the central law, which I have mentioned, the 
law of the essentially human character of norm.al 
lnstinctivlty tn mon . Repressed, active, bestial, 
tnfanttle, al091caJ, sexual,-.. these are the six terms, 
which Jones uses to characterize the unconscious 
according to freud .1 
Vllth the preceding under consideration it is not difficult to understand 
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that there must be a spiritual preconscious, which provides for the arhst 
a source of insight and creativity . To place the artist on tho level of 
the automalic unconscious would be to deprive hlm of the dis!inctly 
1ntellectual role whtch he is to play as well as to conrroven the very 
principle of his existence as an artist. The artist's art as well as his 
poetic intujtion is intellectual in character and must feed on tho 
spiritual within his being rather than upon that which !s specifically 
animal . rho spiritual preconscious is an absolute necessity from 
~arltaln's perspective . 
'The vuious powers of the soul proceed from the essence or the 
soul in a descending order; i.e . from the soul essence proceeds the 
inte llect , from the intellect proceeds the imagination, and from the 
I lbld . , pp . 165-166. 
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tmagination proceed the external senses . Thus there is a hierarchy 
which Is set up In \•hlch the principle of order is the priority of 
procession; consequently , there is the following descendinQ order: soul 
essence, intellect, imagination, and external senses .1 
It is at the common root of all the powers of the soul thot the 
spiritual unconscious lies . 2 And this 1S the point at which poetry 
finds Its source. 
Because poetry is born in this root life whore the 
powers of the soul ore active in common, POetry 
implies en essential requirement of totality or 
integrity , Poetry is the fruit neither of the intellect 
alone, nor of the imagination alone . Nay more, it 
proceeds from the totality of man, sense, imagination, 
intellect, love, desire, instinct, blood and spint to-
gether . And the first obligation imposed on the poet is 
to consent to he brouqht back to the hidden place 1 
near the center of the soul, where this totahty e~!sts 
in the state of a creative source , 3 
In the preconscious there may be activity which tends toward conceptual 
actualizatiOn 1 but, as tn the case of an, tho tendency of the activity 
may be toward knowledge in act or the CQ9nit1on involved in the cre~Uon 
of some object. Such preconsciousness may be compared to the ''dark 
night of the soul, .. spoken &bout by mystics. 4 
The main concern of S!llem's article on Marlta!n is to show how 
a work of art~ which is supposed to be (accordin9 to Maruatn) a seamless 
1cr. Marltaln, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetry, pp . 106-109 . 
2 3 4 J.!lli!. ., p. llO . Ibid . , p . Ill. Ibid . , pp . 98-100 . 
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unity, can be produced by a being which is such a complex ccmposite . 
SUlem .also argues, as this sectton has shown , that it is because it 
is at the single root of the soul•s powers (or where the whole being 
convergesl that the work of art is produced that it is m reality such a 
seamless unity . 1 
At thls point the rr..ean.tn.g of Marita1n 1s statement, "there is no 
Muse outside the soul; there is poetic experience anci poetic mtuition 
within lhe sou!, coming to the poet from above conceptual reason , "2 
should be quite clear. 
~ . Creation and Beauty 
Maritain introduces the notion of beauty as closely connected to 
the crcauon of art objects . He initially defines ooauly (per effeelum, 
by its effect\ as intuitive knowledge and delight: beauty Is ld guod 
visum placet. 3 Intelligence is the proper perceiving power of the 
beautiful, but there is a much closer relationship bet·.veen the senses 
and the intellect in aesthetic experience than there 1s jn ordinary sense 
experience or speculative intellectual activity . By the fact that 
creativity is an integral or totalistic exporicnce , which is jnclusivc of 
I Cf. Slllem, loc . clt., pp . 176-187 . 
2 MarUa1n, Creative Intuitlon ln Art and Poetry, p. 242. 
3cr . Marltaln, Creative Intuition tn Art and Poetry, pp. 160- 161; 
Art and Scholasticism , pp. 19-22. 
the hlghes: levels of tntellect~a! lr.stght aa woll aa flesh an<i blood, 
it ts :o be uroed that tf be:.t.:.:y ts to be broc:7ht lnto conslc!er.auon as 
or.e OSPf!CI of creauve a."'\d appreciative experten::;o ~ U Is brocg~: L"\to 
a totollauc or hohsuc hui:":.s.r.e xpertence; thus It ls tntt~a.tely rela:cd 
to Lhe senses. 
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Tho ossontial characteristics of boo,uty o.ro (l) integrity or 
perfection 1 (2) proportion or consonance, and (3) radiance 1 brightness, 
or elartty .1 The basis upon whteh these quoUuos are accepted is in 
t!'\o essential req-J.irements of the intellect: ~ullnoss o! bc2ng, 
tntellt9er.t arran;;emen! o:- orC.er, and ontol09ical C'lartty. 2 Thet is to 
soy, slr.c:e be.s:..r.ty ls !..."\tellectually opprohonslb!e, be4~ty must have 
these (u."''damental properties which satts!y the lntc.llect. 
By perfccuon Marita!n means that tho ob,oct :-:1ust have 4 sense 
o~ completeness: 1t must appear as flntsh~d. But here, as ln the other 
qualities of beauty, completonoss must not be understood ln any rlg!d 
or obsolute sense, which would exclude something like Ravalsson's 
Venos of Melos. "If It pleases • futurist to potn: a lady with only o"e 
eye, or a quattor of an eye, r..obody dentes htm such a r1Qht: ~ll or.e !s 
1cf. Marttaln, Art and Scholast!el3m, pp. 19-20, 23, and 123 
n. ~9. 
2c1. Marltoln, Creat:ve lntutllon In Art ond PO<><ry, p. 161. 
entitled to require--and here is the whole problem--is thet the quarter 
eye is all the lady needs in the given coso . .. 1 
Proportion, as ~ quality of beauty, is concerned with unny, 
balance, harmony, and oppropriateness. 2 ProPOrtlon dJfiers 
with the object and tho ond aimed at. Proportions 
cood in a man aro not good in a chUd . fiQure s 
cons tructed according to the Greek or the Cgyptian 
canon am perfectly proPOrtioned in tholr kind: but 
Rouault's yok3ls arc also as perfectly proportioned 
In their kind . 
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Marito!n regards clarity or splendor as the most ImPOrtant quality 
of beauty; it is "tho essence of beauty . " 4 By clarity he means the 
Aristotelian notion of form, .• .,.hich is "the inner ontological princ1ple 
which determines things in their essences and qualities, and through 
which they are, and exist, and act" 5 rather then some external shape. 
He &lso means what the scholastics called "solendor formae • the 
splendor of the form I say the splendor of the secrets o: being raC.tattng 
into intelligence . ,.G Maritain elaborates upon the problem involved in 
this characteristic: 
1Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p . 22 . 
2Ibid . ; cf , also Maritain 1 Creative lntuitioi"' 1n Art and Poetrv 1 
p , 161 , 
3Marltain, Art and Scholost!cism, p , 22. (Ibid .,p. 23. 
SMarltoin, Creative Intuition in Art ond Poetry, p . 161. 
0Ibid. 
By brilliance of form must be understood an 
ontological splendour which happens :o be revealed 
to our minds, not a conceptual clar-ity . There nust 
[SiiJ bo no misunderstanding hero: the words clarity, 
lntelllqlbil!ty and light, used to cheractcrise the part 
played by form In the hean of things, do not ".ecessarily 
Indicate somethin9 cleat and intelligible to us, but 
rather something which, although clear and luminous 
in itself, intelligible in itself, often remains obscure 
to our eyes either because of the matter in which the 
form in question is buried or because of the trans-
cendence of the form Itself in the thin9s of the spim. 
The more substantial and profound this secret 
sign1flcance, the more concealed from us it is; so 
much so, in truth, that to say with the Schoolmen that 
form In things Is the peculiar principle of intelligibility 
is to say at the some time that it is the peculiar principle 
of mystery . (There can in fact be no mystery where 
there is nothing to know: mystery exists where there is 
more to be known than is offered to our apprehension.) 
To defino beauty by brilliance of form is at the same 
time to define It by brll!lonce of mystery . 
It is a Cartesian error to reduce absolute brillia:'lce 
to brtlllance for ua . Such an error produces academicism 
in art and condemns us to such a poor kind of beauty as 
can qive only the meanest of pleasures to the soul. 
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All beautlful thinqs are so analoQously; 1. e . the term "beautiful'• 
is predicable of many different types of things, and as a result 1t must 
be so predicated for many different reosons: "eoch kind of being Is in 
its O'o ... n way, is good in us 0\\1'n way~ is beautL.Lu.l Jn its 0\oJn way • .. z 
Maritain says also in explanation of the notion of onai<>Qy: 
Obviously, the thre~ characteristics in quest ton [the three 
properties of beauty/ must be understood In their !ar9est 
slgniffcance, and not fn any narTowly delimited speciUcation . 
£at,;h one of them is realized in an lnf!ntty of various manners , 
!Marltam, Art and Scholasticism, p . 23, n . I. 2Ib!d ., p . 24 . 
as well as beauty itself . In other words, these 
notions are not univocal, but analoc;;ous notions .1 
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Examples of beautiful things a.l'e Clowers, mt~thematical demonstrations, 
acts of generosity, and human beings . 
The reason that "beauty01 must be applied analogously to different 
objecls lies In lhe fact that beauly Is o tronscendenlal. 2 But what Is 
a transcendental? Transcendental s are "'concepts which surpass aH 
1Jm1ts of kind of category and will not suffer themselves to be confined 
in any class, because they absorb everythlnq and are to be found every-
where. ,.3 ln polnUng out certain erroneous concepts of being, Maritain 
very sharply underlines the need for the concept of the transcendental. 
If being 15 not a transcendental, then it 11becomes a genus, a class, the 
widest of ell . It is termed a genus, the supreme genus . "4 But notice 
what happens as a result of such an approach: 
How shall ·.-.·e proceed to reach this supreme genus? 
You may not introduce into the definition of the Qenus 
animal the characteristic notes o: one of !ts spec tcs, 
man for example . to conceive animal you must 
:nake absttact1on of whatever belongs to man alone. 
That is to say to arrive at the gen~s you el!mtnate 
whatever Is distlncUve of the species. What, then, 
if bemg ls simply a genus? To reach th!s supreme 
genus you will be obltged to eliminate all the 
varlet.!&$ of being, all the determinations which 
1Maritam, Creative Intuition in Art ~nd Poetrv, p . 162 . 
3 tbld . ' p , 163 . 
4
racques Maritaln, A Preface to Metaphysics (New York : Sheed 
and Ward, 1939\, p , 36. 
part1cularise it. In short to arrive at the genus 
beinq you will be compelled to elimmate everything 
which is and you w111 thus reach a being mdis-
tinguishable from nothing. This was Hegel's 
procedure. Secause he had forgotten that being is 
a transcendental, he was loqically compelled to 
Identify being with nononUty .I 
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Maritaln thus holds that there are transcendentals and that their 
function Is to "permeate or Imbue everythlng•2 so that things may both 
be and hove various general qual!tles . 
"The classic table of transcendentals (ens, .!!! , J!.!l!!!!l, al!quid, 
verum, and bonum) does not exhaust all transcendental values . ,3 
Though pulchrum or beauty does not appear in either the statement of 
Aristotle or o! Aquinas (but notice that Plato dld Include Ill,~ this does 
not mean thet their treatment excludes such a possibility . :'¥1aritain's 
pos1Uon, which he regards as an explicit statement of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, is that the impltctt character of h1s predecessors• treatment 
of beauty is due to a twofold reason: (ll beauty u reducU>le to the 
90od; and (2) beauty is "the splendour oi all the transcendentals 
I 
..!l!!§_. ' p. 37. 
2Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 163 . 
3Marltain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 132, n . 63b . 
4 Cf. Plato Theaetetus 185-185; also Symposium 211 . 
together . .. l Or one may say: "Beauty ts the radlance of aU trans-
cendentals united. "2 
In regarding beauty as the unifyinQ transcendental of the trans-
cendentals or the rt~:diance or splendor of their combination, Maritaln 
is putttnq beauty in a preferred place even among the transcendontals 
in a fashion approach.ing Plato's famous paean to beauty in the 
Symposium. 3 Does Marltain order his entire u:1ivcrse upon the 
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principle of beauty? One might qrant that the ordering of the physical 
universe is primarily upon the bas1s of beeuty; but it must bG constantly 
kept in mind that all of the transcendentals are metaphysically one in 
the Supreme Being or God. Thus it may be that, in the natural world 
and ln comparison with other philosophic concepts, beauty is the great 
architect which brlnQS all other things into order; however, when the 
whole picture is examined I beauty is only one of the <!!vine attributes . 4 
There appears to be some tension fn Maritafn's understandin9 of 
beauty in relation to the other transcendental& . He suggests that St. 
Thomas constantly afffrms that the beautiful and the good, 
1Marltaln, Art and Scholasticism, p . 132, n. 63b . 
2Mar1taJn, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 162 . 
3 Plato §ymposium 20ID- 212C. 
4cr. Maritaln, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 163. 
metaphysically, are the same thing in reality and differ only 
conceptually . 1 It ts so with all the transccndentals, which are 
1dcnUcal In objects but wtuch differ in one's concepts o! objects . 
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But there are times when Maritaln almost rec;:ards beauty as purely 
intellectual and a matter of truth (veruml and others where the primary 
emphasis is on beauty as a kind of good (bonum\ in wh1ch the appetite 
Is basically concerned. Still further, Marttaln exalts beauty beyond 
both the purely Intellectual and the purely appetitive . 2 Creative 
Intuition in Art and Poetry does not seem to reject anything arrived at 
in the earlier An and Scholast1c1sm, and a careful analysis and 
synthesis seems to requrre that for Marltain beauty be regarCed as the 
ultimate unification of the transcendentals !ncludlng the very important 
verum and bonum • As a result, Marltain must emphasize both verum 
and bonum as essential phases in or factors of the apprehension of the 
beautiful . In no discussion does he tota1ly omit the one or the other, 
but for various purposes he may see f it to emphasize the one or the 
other . 
G<>d is beautiful simpliciter (absolutely!; he Is the fountain of 
all beauty , even as he ls the fountain of all being. Nevertheless, the 
1cr. Maritoin, Art and Scholasticism, p . 128- 130, n . 56 . 
2 Cf. .!l!Ji! . , pp . 19- 26, 123- 134, nn . 54-65. 
' 
' • 
title of boauty Is especially ~ppropriate to the Wo rd (or Son) In the 
Godhead . 
In the Trinity •. . the title Beauty Is specially 
epproprtated to the Son. As for tntcgrlty or perfecuon, 
He has truly and perfectly ln Himself, without the 
least dfmiflUtlOn 1 the nature 0( the rather • As for due 
proponion or consonance, He is the express lma(Je of 
the Father , a perfect likeness; and it fs proportion 
which befits the picture as such . As for brilliance, 
He is the Word, the light and splendour of the mind, 
"perfect Word, lacking nothinQ and, so to speak, 
art of the Almighty God . • I 
Everylhin• which Is is boautlful by participation in the divine 
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beauty , God's vision dlscerns transcendental beauty; t.e . throu9h his 
o·wn transcendent~! nature in the sense that there is nothing in God 
comparable to human sensory experience . For God, everything is 
beautiful because the transcendentals overflow into every existing 
thing . However , evil Is ugly ln the <>yes of God, but this Is precisely 
because evil is not beinq: evil is nothing or non- being . 2 
It ls at this point that th<> Idea of an aesthetic beauty arises, for 
man cannot see as God sees: man has .e sensory nature as well as an 
intellectual n~turo . Things In the Intellect- se nse world are divided 
Into the beautiful and the ug ly . It Is the funct10n of art to struggle to 
lift the aesthetically ugly up to transcendental beauty; In fact, art 
1ibld . , p . z; , 'l'h<> quotation enclosed ls fro:n St. Augustine 
De Doctr!na Christiana L 5 . 
2cf. MarUain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, pp .. 163 -164 . 
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oncieavors to transcend tho distinction between aesthetic and tra:'ts-
cendontol beauty . But it is 1mportant to notice that there is also a 
very real sense in which the beauty of objects in tho natural world 
kaeps ltS transcendental character; i .e . in the sense that sense is 
permea1ed by 1ntelligence. The intellect becomes more and more aware 
of the transcendental and analogous character of beauty as it learns 
more tnsightfully o1 Mt end poetry . Consequently , art is seen as one 
means by wh1ch man is drawn to the source of his boing and all other 
being . Art evokes a longing by revealing a lack an<! poinl!ng to the 
tra.nscenCenta1 beauty of the beautiful simpliciter.1 
!n ear lier discussion poetry was rcQerdcd .e:s supremely free with 
respect to any obJect; now one may raise the query as to the possibil ity 
of reqarding beauty as the object of poetic knowledge and creation . 
Must one still mainte!n that in contrast to science and art ln which the 
spirit 1s bound to certain concepts or rules creative intultlon 1s free 
creativity, i .e . it is not subordinate to an object wh1ch controls its 
actlvity? tt must still be rnotntatned that poetry has no object . Even 
beauty is not the object of poetry, though it may be looked upon as the 
transcendental eo-rrelaUve of poe tTy . Beauty is transcendental, and 
thus not containable in a genus and species as arc other "objects." 
Poetry has no immediate goal , but an end beyond the end . 2 This is 
I l!ili!..· . pp . 165- 167 . 2Jb1d . • pp . 167- 171 . 
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simply to say that beauty does not consist ln "conformity to a cert~in 
ideal and unchanging type." 1 Poetry docs not have a vision of beauty 
and copy or ptoduce it, but there is an inspiration at t he source of 
beln9 out of which beautiful objects proceed. And since no power can 
operate without an object I creative intuition must create its own for 
itself . The poet's "proper task is to create an object that brings joy 
to the spirit in which the brilliance of a form shines forth . " 2 
Merl!aln chooses to use a phrase coined by Plato for the precise 
statement of the relation betwee-n creative intuition and beauty· 
(••engendering in beauty"), 3 though it Is a moot point as to whether 
Maritain is using the phrase in the same manner in which Plato meant 
!t . "Poetry is on terms of coequality or connaturality with beauty ." 4 
~either is subordinate to the other . Beauty evades the grasp of the 
poet m a sense, but poeUc intuition tends tO\vard beauty because of a 
netural affinity ond likeness . A work is cre{'!ted, and th1s ar1ift'!ct# as 
we ll as e very other existing object, participates in beauty . Poetry 
produces in or engenders in beauty, but it docs not produce beauty, To 
make beauty an object is to recede from beauty and to tend toward 
lMnrltaln, Art and Scholastlc!sm, p , 23 . 
2Mar!ta!n, The Degrees of Knowledge , p . 282 . 
3cr. Mal'ltaln, Creative lntu!tlon !n Art and Poetry, p, SS . Cf . 
also Plato Symposium 206 . 
41b>d . ' p , 172. 
-academicism. To make a conscious a.tt~mpt to create beautiful things 
is to fall short of h1ghest attolnment . 
We may say, of course, that the fine arts (the self-
s ufficient arts) aim to produce beautiful things, bet 
we should never say, in o rigorous terminology , that 
they a im to produce beautyi for the expression is 
equivocal, and risks leading the one who uses it to 
believe more or less obscurely that beauty ln the 
work is produced as an object of making (a direct 
terminus of the process of product ion), that ls, !. 
thJng contained in a genus--whereas, in reality, 
beauty in the work ls produced as a pa.rt.icipotlon 
in a transcendental qual tty , or in something which 
cannot be made . In other words the work is a product; 
but its beauty is not a product that 1mprog:natos it as 
with a perfume or invests it as with a garb or an 
armor; the beauty of tho work , which inherently results 
:rom its ver y production , is in its very being & 
particular mirroring of a transcendental or an tn(!nite. 
and a gift from the spiritual source--poetry--in which 
the production of tho work o riginates . Lot us say, 
then, that art engenders in beauty, or produecs l~ 
beauty, not that it produces beouty .l 
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The preced!nQ discussion makes 1t possible to distinguish between 
the crafts and the fine a.ns . Since beauty permeates the crafts as well 
as the fino orts , one ought not to speak of the f!ne arts as being deftr.ed 
essentially in their relation to beauty (as Maritatn had been accused 
after the wrlt!nQ of Art and Scholasticism l . 2 "The fine arts , to be 
sure, have essentially to do with beauty . But no transcendental 1 even 
aesthetic beauty, can be used to define e genus~ since transcendent4ls 
1Ib!d . , p. 181 , n . 33. 
2c£ . Montgomery Be lgion , "Art and Mr. Mar !lain ," Dubl!n Rev!ew, 
CLXXXVll (October, 1930), 201-215, passim. 
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permeate aU qenera . • 1 Maritain proceeds tO distinguish the fine arts 
from tho crafts upon the basis of thot which pertains to the qood o( 
the work, and the primary question is concerned ·.·nth whether the work 
is basically good for something else or whether the work 
succeeds more in beinQ a good in itseH and for itself, 
a world of its own--whatever' the relations 1t can a.nd 
must continue to have with the concerns of human Hfe 
:nay be . When the 9ood of the work reaches such self-
interiority, the art involved is nat subservient, but 
free, as is the caso with archttectwe and stlll more 
with painting and sculpture •.. , and sttll more In 
music and poetry. 2 
As a resul t of the principle by which this distinction is made, Maritam 
prefers to speak of subservient arts (those which serve or are b&stcally 
qood for something else) and free or self- sufficient Mts (those which 
are intrinsleally gO¢<!) . 3 
6 . Preble ms of Art 
The various problems which art faces are partially discussed in 
other places with!~ this study, and they could have been fully discussed 
there with only brief digressions . The mDin purpose of bringing to-
gether some of the major problems of art is to sketch in broad outline 
certain basic problemauc areas . One phase of these problems ts called 
impurities in anist!c creation; another has to do with gtatuitous!less or 
I Mar1t&1n, Creative Intuition Jn Art and Poetry, p . l7S . 
3Jbid . 
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the unwarranted srrolnlng for an impossible purity either of creativity 
like God or of "art for art's sake . " The f!nal phase is concerned with 
the coQ'nH!ve aspect: art may lose interest in creation or be absorbed 
in a quest for absolute knov1ledge . 
1. Impurities in Artistic Creation 
(I) Manual Dexterity , --!hcre are many whose basic emphasis 
Js upon technique and skill in the reproduction of natural objects . 
Imitation, which is closely rclatod to the nature of skill and manual 
de>."terity, will be examined shortly; but at this ;>oint Jt ts necessary 
to point to manual dexterity which is a requisite condition to the 
production o! the work of art as being extrins ic to art 1tsolf . As a 
result, overdue emphasis upon finesse of technique can only !':'~iss the 
point . An is concerned with insight, cognition, and the creation of a 
new world: technique may assist hut it can only be an instrument in 
the hands of poetry .1 'h'ealth of technique moy conceal poverty of 
Insight . 
(2) Imitation .--Imitation may be conceived of as the "exact 
reproduction or copy of reality . ... 2 If this were the purpose of art, then 
Illusion would be the standard by which all an would be evaluated . 3 
That is, the more djfficult it is to toll the \o,'ork of art from the natural 
I Marita1n, Art and Scholasticism, pp . 11, 50. 
2 Jllli!.. . ' p . 48 . 3rbid . ' pp . 40-~9 . 
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object which It Is copying, the better the art object Is 0 It has already 
beon observed that the kind of knowledge involved here (sensory 
experience and Its duplication In an ortlflctal obJect\ Is not what is 
sought after in the production of a work of art . And if it were, such 
knowledge would be vastly Inferior to other kinds of knowledge; e o9 0 
.. H art were a moans of knowledge, it would be wildly inferior to 
geometry 0 • 1 
Though the artist ls a creator a long with God, it is not his 
purpose to £22l God's creation, but to continue lt . However, the 
artist can derive benefit from becoming a pupil of the divino creator, 
t .e . by studying nature, God's creation. 
If the artist studies and cherishes nature as much 
as and mueh mom than the works of the masters, It ls 
not to copy nature, but to base himself upon nature, and 
because It Is not enough for him to bo a pupil of tho 
masters: he must be God's pupil, for God knows the 
rules qoveming the mak.ing of works of beauty. Nature 
concerns the artist essentially, simply because it is 
a derivation from the divine art in things, ratio art is 
dlvinae indlta rebus . The artist, whether ho knows it 
or not, Is consulting God when he looks at things 0 2 
Nature serves a r .... o-!old purpose: it is .. a stimulus and a check to 
artists, not a mode l to be slavishly cop1ed ... 3 
V. B. Evans summarizes Maritaln's position by reference to the 
rejection and acceptance of imitation by certain artists: "\\'hen a 
painter Like Gauguln or Maurice Denis says the work o! art is not a copy, 
I 
.!!?.!£. 0 ' p 0 4 3 0 2 Ibid 0 ' PP o 49 - 50 . 3Jbid 0 ' p 0 so 0 
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he is thinking of the creative aspect of art; when a painter hke Ingres 
or a sculptor like Rodin affirms that art is necessarily lmltatlve, he Is 
thinking of its foundet1on in nature . ,. l 
Mari tain sugQests that art's modern self-consciousness and 
awareness of its freedom has lod, a.mong other things 1 to an endeavor 
.. to froe itself from nature and the forms of nature . .. 2 But this 1s not 
done in defiance of nature . By means of such freedom the wtist has 
really succeeded in "disclosino a deeper reality" by steeling ''from 
nature its own secrets of poetry . "3 
(3) Emotionalism or Sontlmentallsm. --The delight wiUch an 
provides must never be equated w1th me·re pleasure. Furthermore, 1t 
is the hei9ht of adulteration or contamination in art iO try to provoke 
emotion . Tho stralnlng after effect by the artlst only ln<iuces revol t 
and disgust on the part of the appreciator . "I refuse to suffer the 
domination of on art which deliberately contrives moans of suggesuon 
to seduce my subconsciousness, I resist an emotion which the wHl 
of a man claims to impose upon me .• 4 However, 1f the artist produces 
an object whlch subjects me to itselC there ts no harm done . What 
Maritatn here rejects i& the deliberate attempt on the part of the artist 
~almai Burwood Evans, "A Scholastic Theory of Art, •• Philosophv 1 
Vlll (October, 1933), 403. 
2Maritain, Creative Intuition In .o.rt and Poetry, p . 73. 
3rbid . 4 
..!.2!£. .. p . 51. 
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to "work up" emotion and feeling without actuelly productn9 an object 
which merits such an experience . The artist ought to be sufficiently 
disinterested tn his creation that he ls non - self-conscious: he must 
not be continually stciving for effect. 1 
Maritaln is hopeful (at the time of writing "The Frontiers o f 
Poetry") that the curront romantic and sentjmental exodus from reality 
.. ,ill give ·.vay to an intense concern for reality . He says: "'After such 
an orgy o: sentime:naltsm, it L';odern ar.ii wants rude contact w!th 
reality, stripped and naked . •• 2 
.u . Gr atuitousness 
(1) Idealism or Pure Creatlon.--In the cra.ftsman creativ!ty Is 
tied to a particular aim, i.e . the satisfaction of a paftlcular naed . In 
the poet there is free creativity which tends to engender in beauty, and 
this opens up a proliferation of possibilities, sJnce beauty is a trans-
ccndontal. In this sense the poet is like God in free creation, and 
God is the First Poet . God created out of his own boln9 , for there was 
nothing else beside himself out o! which he could have lnlt!ally 
created . In theological terminology thls Is called creatlo ex nlh!lo . 
Moreover , since God is pure form and has no senses, he can know the 
world only !none way, i.e . tlu'ouqh his cr . .,.n being-. 
l • d 51 lf!L . . pp . - 52 . 2Ibld .• p. 93 . 
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However, the poet, though his c reativity 1s not formed by things 
in the sense of reproduction or copying, must know by cont~ct with 
the external world through his senses ; for he could know nothing apan 
from hlS senses . The poet must even knovv the external world in order 
to kn-cr.v himself . But thon whatever he knows, he can utU1ze to his 
own purpose and thus manifest hts own substance !n creation in a 
modo analogous to the Dlvine Poet .1 
Thus the artist ts a creator, and it is not strange that in .an 
extreme moment he should think of himself as a creator ex nihilo 
in the same manner in wh1ch God croates . Ma.ritain refers to the 
Parnass1ans, the Symbolists, Mallarm~, Max Jacob, and trlk Satle 
as artists who hold that "the content of the work of art, the material 
to be shaped, the artistic thing , the lyrical and intellectual stuff, aro 
all an irksome burdcn 1 an impurity to be got rid of . .. 2 This is e. quest 
for pure art in which the subject iS "completely whittled away. ! c all 
that a sin of icieoltsm 1n relation to the metter of art: pushed to the 
e"-treme, a perfect building, with nothing to bulld."3 
Xevertheless, though the perfection of 4rt lies in the intellectual 
virtue, the object of art is a composite; and thou9h mon may continue 
1Maritain, Creative Intuition In Art and Pootry, pp. 112-113. 
2Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p . 99 . 
3Ib•d., p . 100. 
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tho divine creation~ one must always be cautious lest analO<;ies be 
reduced to the ridiculous by betng carried too far. Though highly 
imaginative developments may occur, "pure creaUo:t Is not possible to 
man. Sor.1e inner content, received from elsewhere, is necessarily 
present. .. 1 
(2) Art for Art 's Sake .--The discussion of art for art's sake wlll 
also be brief, for there wUJ be other material devoted to just this 
problem. Let it be suHlclent to point out here that the emphasis may 
shift from an eliminat!on of the matter of art, as ln attempts at pure 
creat,ion, to "the elimlnauon of every human end pursued."2 According 
to this view, everything must be sacrificed to art, and no experience 
whether morally pure or utterly vUe should be avoided lf It lends itself 
to artistic expression. 
It Is true that art Is an end In itself, and the artist cannot be 
continually bothered, as artist, by considerations which are necessary 
to him as a man. But here is just where the exaggeration being 
considered QOOS liStray: it does not recognize the difference between 
the art and the artist . "The theorists of gratuitousness . . . omit to 
distinguish tho~~ which, as such, has no other end than the good 
I Ibid . ' p . 79. 
2:v~arltaJn, Art and Scholasticism, p. 101. 
r 
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of the thing to be made 1 from the artist, ""ho , as working man, can 
have as many ends as he pleases . "l ''The virtue of ort, with all 1ts 
perfection and peculiar ext9encies, is an Instrument in relation 10 the 
artist, the principal agent . .. 2 
Ill. Ma9ical Knowled9e: Absolute Knowledge 
Maritain rccoqnizes that it ls possible to have poetic intuition 
without actually producing a worki neverthe less, there is an implicit 
creativity in s uch an intuition . "No doubt one can be a poet without 
producin9 any work; but lf one is a poet, one is vinually turned ta...,ard 
operation . .. 3 When poetry becomes soU- conscious, lt may enter into 
conflict v.-1th art : "Whereas art demends to shape an obJect, pOetry 
demands to be passive , to llsten , to descond to tho roots of being, to 
the unknown which no idea can circumscribe . " 4 Thus a tension ts set 
u p in the poet' s life ; however, this in 1tself is of no pressing concern, 
for it is onl y "one of the natural tensions and crises in the life of the 
spirit . " 5 
But whore there is tension, there is the posslbthty thai one 
aspect of the tension wil l become predominant, and if this happens to 
poetry , it wtll proceed in the direction of a yearning to know . Poetic 
1Ibid . , p . 102 . 2 Ibid . , p . 103 . 
3Marita!n, Creative Intuition .in Art and Poetrv, p . 185. 
4Ibid . , p . 186. 
~---------------------~-- -
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knowledge w!l l then be transformed into absolute knowledge, which is 
a distortion of its actual nature . 
Poetry thus out of joint will develop a monstrous 
appetue for kno· ... ·ledQe, a vampire ' s appetne which 
will drain man body ond soul . It will claim for 
itself all the l!ving springs, and the gift of heroic 
life, It w!ll wish to bo all things and to provide 
all things--act, holiness, ttanssubstant1at1on, 
and miracle; it will assume the burden of humanity .1 
Marltain regards the Surrealists as exempltiy!nq this approach to 
poetry and knowledge in its completely exaggerated manner . 
One result of this frenzied yearning after absolute knowledge is 
that the work of art is no longer considered. as a.:l: end in itself, "the 
work becomes only a means of communicating knowledge, a kind of 
miraculous preaching . "2 
The second result is that beauty is dismissed . The end beyond 
the end of tho work is now transformed 1nto absolute knowledge as the 
end in itself . 
The result of all this is that p.oettc knO'.<~Iadge, which is still 
regarded as d1fferent !rom conceptual or rational knowledge, becomes 
an unnatmal science which is funher "1dent1!1ed ·...-ith power . .. 3 Such 
knowledge may be called magical, for in magical knowledge the im-
agination is cut loose from its moorings in intellect, and knowledge ts 
"ruled by the law of JmGQes for which there is no prJnctplc of 
2 Ibid . , p . 187 . 3 Ibld . 
noncom:radlctlon . .. 1 Moreover. there is a blurrir.g of tha dtstmction 
between knowledge of relationships and the relat!onahtpa themselves 
(be tween formal-obJect!ve causal!ty and eff!ctent causaHtyl . 2 Thus 
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!)Urrcalism proceeds to ooorch for power in a :nanncr not too far distant 
fror primitlve mentaluy. •Nothing ls more na!wal for prlmlttve 
montal!ty tha~ :o m4k• tM nome 1nto a real oqu!' 4l4nt o! tho thi:'tg 
namod, and to have a pouont as confi<ient in swallow1no the pre -
scnption as in swallowtno the medicine itself . .. 3 
Tho ultimate 9oal of tho unnatural thirst for absolute knowledge 
Is described as 
that s~intual exportenc:e of the blind gUtter of 
nothL~g;,ess, In whteh all d:f!erences are abel! shed 
anC ~11 cont:adlcUons made one, by vlrtue of the 
void. and 1n ·.<hlch the soul believes t! ts transferred 
above everything and enjoys Infinite llbeny. ThiS 
Is the black mysticism tn which poet!c knowledge 
transformed Into absolute knowledge finally winds 
up . ~ 
7 . Summary 
Thts chapter has co~red a broa.C exp~nsc of thou<wht . :t begins 
·.·nth a spectL:::a:.tor. of the lr.tellecrual :un-:::on which ls an, artd ar: 
I Ibtd .• J) . 188, 
2 M&ritatn, "Lanouaoe and the Theory of Sjgn/' op . cit., p , 96 . 
3 Ibid . , p . 98. 
4Maritain, Creative Intuition in A."t ar:.d Poetry, p. 189. 
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is distinguished from speculauon and morality. Probing more deeply, 
art is found to have an underlying source or energy, which ts called 
poetr y . Poetry is not the art of v.·rittng verses, ~ut a basic intuition of 
the self and the v.•orld. with a deepening of the understanding of i:>oth 
in the apprehension of the conQenialily of both . The only manner in 
which this profound apprehension could be brouQht to fulfillr.:ent and 
set before the experlenco of others is in a work of art. 
Poetic oxporlence Is the broader psycholoQ>cal ramifications of 
the original creative tntuttfon; it does not imply frenzy or any other 
comparable connotations . The work of art is produced !n a creative 
fire. but this creative fire can emerge into a sat!sfactory product only 
if cer[afn rules of deliberative reason are applied by a creative gen!us, 
who 1s not subJect to them but master of them . 
The argument then tw-ns to the characteristics of knowledge by 
connaturality . Here contemplation is introduced; it is :hen compared and 
contrasted with religion in general and with wisdom . Infused contem-
plation, which .is the goal of the religious life on earth~ Js carefully 
distinguished from conte mplation in general. Contempla:ivc knowledge 
by connatur&lity is essentially a knowledge which is infused by God, 
which operates by love, which closes the gap betv.,recn tha soul and God 
which is alwoys present in conceptual knO"'JV'ledge, and which is thus the 
supreme religiou.s experience and knowled9e . 
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Creotlve Jnt"itlon is also knowledge by connatllfallty . The 
historical perspective in which self-av;areness has risen to the level 
of creative intuition is bas1cally theological (Christian), thow;Jh one 
can lind profound insights in Chinese, Indian, and Greek art. The 
essential point is that none of these other cultures -. . ·ere sufficiently 
aware of the interionty or the potenUallties of reflectton of the human 
personality . 
The objoct of POOtic tntuttton is not o concept; it could not be 
bound tn this manner; it is free creativity , The ob!ect of poetic 
intujt!on ts obscurely recogniz-ed in the interiorny of the self 1n its 
encounter with the inner secrets of things; it is brilliantly displayed 
in the production of a work ln which the bri!Uance of a form is embodied 
!n matter . Emotion and love are involved in poetic knowledge. but this 
love must 00 contrasted with jnfused love. 
The superiority of knowledge by connaturality 1s due to its 
directness, its unification of the powers of the bemg ·.vho has such 
knowledge , and the congeniality of the person and the objec! . This 
is true of art and contemplation . 
The creative process needs the further elaboration wluch Mari:ain 
gives in his analysis of the splritual preconscious. It is by seeing 
that poetic intuition occurs at the single root of the soul's powers that 
one can understand how such a complex entity as man could produce 
a work with such hormony, bola nee, proPOrtion, and unity. 
The notion of beeuty must be introduced in order to understand 
the relation of the intellect to the obJect of art . Beautiful obJects 
satisfy the intellect; as such, they hove the characteristics of 
perfection , proportion, and radiance. But beautiful thin9s are 
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beautiful in many different ways, and their beauty must be approached 
from many d ifferent an9les . This is due to the transcendental character 
of beauty . But beauty is not meroly another transcendental lor 
Maritain; it Is the radiance of all the transcendentals united . Beau:y, 
thus, occupies an ultSmate position . But one must be cautious here: 
the relig1ous perspective transforms all of this. Beauty may be ultimate 
in its Une (the natural world\ but beauty is an attribute of God. 
Transcendental beauty is not aesthetic beauty , I! is the function 
of art to conquer the spHt bet\veen the multiple beauties of eanh and 
the unity of the transcendental beauty . The artist does not observe 
beauty and copy it . He is connat-ureci with beauty by means of his 
creative intuition. Beauty is the end beyond any end, for it can no! 
be contained in a genus and species as individual objects . It is in 
this connection that Maritain defines the self-sufficient arts and the 
subservient arts. The self- sufficient arts are those m . .,hich the basic 
concern 1s for the good of the work; i .e . creative intuition and beauty 
alone are involved, there ts no operation in slavery to an object or 
purpose . 
The various problems posed .at the end of the chapter point to 
the primary facets of the investigation--cognitfvtty ond creativity. 
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In c reativity there may be too great e mphasis on technique or manual 
dexterity, or the artist may slavishly im1tate nature. Though delight 
is one of the effects of beauty, it may be worked after or v.•orked up 
rather than let como by the beauty of the work . lt is also possible !or 
the artist to rec01Jnlze his a!!inity with God in creaaon and attempt to 
create pure art . On tho other hand the artiSt may become proud of his 
free c reativity and exalt an as an end in 1tsel! without a consideration 
of othe r possible ends . 
F!nal!y, the artist may setze upon the excellence of his knowl-
edge and thirst for absolute knowledge; he may M tl.lrneci from his 
creative function . His end can only be that of a Vllld mysticism which 
has completely los t !ts hold on reeHty and which rejoices in the void 
and nothingness . 
CHAPTER VI 
POETRY AND COI'TEM?LATIO;>; 11'\ THE WORLD 
The place and function of pOetry and con:cm;:ht!on '"· :he ·.·:orld 
mus: be examiMd sapora:ely. They ho''" beer. ex1mlr.od os :hey a:e 
basically considered In themselves . The first question ls tho: of :he 
relation of expression and communication . What is there about :he sell 
that eon and should be exproasod and commun;ca,9d? 11 art and con:empla-
tion are not primarily com::·Jr.1ca!tve ~ ho·.•; 1s it thot th¢y so frequen:!~, are 
re;arded es com:-:l.UlicaUve? \\'h.at 15 !he :ela;io:-. bo!wten pee;.ic in:t:~:!on 
or.d the acrJal proriuctton of the work of ¥1'? l\~ari~aJr. ~U~m!~ates all of 
these questions . 
This br ings one to Moritam's discussion of th& work of art. Tile 
three epiphanies of pooUc intuition are the :hreo levels of the e~cn;er:ce 
of poe:tc ~n~"Uition i."'.to the body of the ;.·:ork . T!:.fo r< ~lc se:"tse is basic 
as :he most l;;:.;nedlate expression of the poetic expe:-tence . :'he crea:.:. ... -e 
purity of the work 1s see :"I as essentially reJoteC. :o the i)Oe!ic se::se; 
the motal aspects of thJI must be noticed . 3y cxamSnino the levels of 
the emergence of poetic lnlultlon, lt Is possible to catoQorlze the arts . 
Art must bo roQardad from Its standpoin: os an end In Itself and 
also as br.ctionir.~J in the human commu:tity . Su: eve:t art ~s an end i:l 
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itself performs through its superabundance the function of releasing man 
from his rr.ultiple stresses . Art must perform sor:.e servjce to morality, 
but morality needs redefinition for many people . Moreover, some of the 
charges by moralists against art can be challen9ed by seeing dlfforcnt 
Implications In the facts . 
Marltaln sharply delineates the distinct worlds of the natural and 
the supernatural: then their Interrelations arc Indicated . Art Is the pride 
ond joy of the natural v:orlci; contempl ation ~s the Qool of reliQious man 
in vie . The world of an must be experienced and apprec!atecl: before it can 
be Judged, for it is closely connected to the contemplative's world, and 
!ts occupational stream does tend toward a type of sainthood . Moreover, 
art has a function in tho provision of salva'!ior. f.or men . Its s~lva:ior. is 
not that of religion 1 but it fits man for the life of the spirit. Fir.a!ly , 
religious art is a distinct merging of art and religior. . Xo1 all art ~us1 
serve this purpose. and tflere are specific categories for JUdqing an 
which has a religious purpose . 
1 , Expression and Communicat:on 
i . Personality and 1ndiv1duality 
If the insight of the poet leads him deeper ar:d deeper into the 
recesses of his being 1 does this t':".ean that the POet is becomin9 
increasingly egoistic or self - centered? ln a:ts·.ver tc this it is necessary 
to examine Maritain ' s distinction between personality and ir.dividuality . 
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On the ontological level matter is the principle of individuation 
m all things which 9re below pure spirits . The ungels ate differentiated 
by form rather than matter, and each is a distinct species within Jtself .1 
Though "materlallnd•vidual!ty Is not something bad In ltse1f•2 (since 
matter is a phase of the existence of some beings, to be w1thout matter 
1s not to be), materia prima or pure potent1aUty is "~!>le netth.er to!?;! 
nor to be thought by Itself, • 3 and It tends to disint<>gration or decomposi-
tion and multiplicity . 4 
Moreover, as the ·.'/hole has a kind of priority to its pans, the 
natural species is prior to the various lndividuols which compris~ 1! . 
Again, the state is prior to the jndividuals compestnq it~ for the state 
imposes restraints upon the individual, and he must surrender his rights 
and even hts life at times for the welfare of the state . 5 
From the standpoint of personality there is a totally different 
Perspective . 
\Vhat do we mean precisely, when v.•e speak of the 
hur.11an person? \¥hen we say ihat a man ts a person, 
we do not mean merely that he is an individual, in the 
sense that an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, or an 
e lephont ts an individual . Man is an individual who holds 
1cf . Maritaln, Scholasticism and Politics, p . 61 . 
2Ib~d ' ' p . 65 . 31bld .• p , 60 . 4 Ibid., pp , 61-62 . 
5cf, especially Me:rttatn , The Person and the Common Good, 
pp . 27-28; also Jacques Maritaln, Freedom In the Modern World, trans. 
Richard O 'Sullivan (New '{ork: Charles Scrl.bner's Sons, 1936), p . SO . 
himself In hand by his intelligence ond his will; he exists 
not merely in a physical fashion . He has spiritual super-
existence through knowledge and love, so that he is, in a 
\•.-ay, a universe in himself, a microcosmos, in .. ,htch 
tho great universe in its entirety can 00 encompassed 
through knowledge . By love he can give himself 
completely to Ooings who are to him, as it were , other 
solvos . For this relation no equivalent can be found in 
the physical world . rho human person possesses these 
characteristics because in the last analysis man, this 
flesh and these perishable bones which are animated and 
activated by a dJvine f.i.re, exists ••from tho womb to the 
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grave" by virtue of the existence itself of his soul, which 
dominates tlmo and death . Spirit Is the root of personality . 
Tho notion of personality thus Involves that of totol!ty and 
independence; no matter how poor and crushed a. person may 
be, he is a whole, and as a person, subsistent in an !ndeJ>Qn .. 
dent manner . To say that a man is a person ts to say that 
In the depth of his being he Is more a whole than a pan 
and more independent than servile . 1t is to say that he ls 
a minute fragment of matter that is at the same time a 
umverse, a beggar who participates Jn the absolute being, 
mortal fl esh whose value is eternal, and a bh of straw 
Into wh1ch heaven enters . It Is this metaphysical mystery 
that religious thought designates when it says that 
the person Is the Image of God. The value of the 
person, his dignity and rights, belong to the order 
of things naturally sacred which bear the imprint 
of the Father of Being, and which have In him the 
end of their movement . 1 
Fechner outlines the four .. fold consequences which flovt~ from the 
preceding quotation . 2 (ll "Personality" is applicable onl y to man 
(of all the beings who are composed of matter) . (2) Personality derives 
from an Immaterial and substantial soul. (3) A corollary of 
l facques Maritain, "The Conquest of Fre12dom," Freedom, Its 
Meaning, od . Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. , 
Inc . , 1940), pp . 635-636, cited by Fechner ,q> . c it . , pp . 158-159 . 
2 Fochr.or, op . c it., pp . 158- 162 . 
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the preceding is that personality involves intelligence and v..tll . 
(4) Finally , each person Is an end ln himself; he possesses dignity 
and stature and is not to be used as a means only. Fechner may include 
this In hls development of the four main facets of personallty, but 
self·awareness must be emphasized os ono of the major factors atony 
with the necessity of communication by knowledge and love . 1 
Evans suggests that "the notion of person Is analogical. "2 
It is le~st applicable to man. for man ts the lowest of tho spirits or 
intelll9ences . I! personal!ty Is derived from spirituality (or being a 
sp!r!tl, then the higher the spirituality, the hl9her the personality . 
And God i s the Supreme Person . 
In t he 9rowth of personahty there arc two major directions which 
mby be taken: "tcr,•/ard individuahty or self-centeredness or toward 
spiritual personality. "Man will be truly a person only in so :ar as 
the life of the spirit and of Ubeny reigns over 1hat of the senses and 
passions ... 3 Jn Maritain's book on educaUon, he points up thJs distinction 
and urges educators not to think oi education as animal traminc;J. By this 
he means that too great emphasis upon conditioned reflexes and rote 
1ct. Marltaln, The Person and tho Common Good, pp. 31-32 . 
2Joseph \f!/. Evans, "Jacques Madtasn•s Personalism," Tha Review 
of Politlcs, Xrv (Apr !I, 19 o2) , I 72. 
3Mar1taln, The Person and tho Common Good, pp . 34-35 . 
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memorization will hinder the prime goal of education which "is the 
conquest of internal and spJritual freedom to be ach1eved by the indi-
vidual person ... 1 Such development Is In the direction of splntuallty and 
creativity . That spiritual Hght which ts already ln man is simply tutored 
and now!shed, and eventually creative personality is achteved. 
No·.v M aritain 's emphasis on poetic 1ns1Qht and communication, 
s ince poetry is primarHy an intellectual operation, would naturally be 
upon pcrsoMitty os opposed to >ndlvlduality . And :V.arltain comes 
through with the expectation . The artist Js not just concerned with 
expressing brut.e emotion or in commurucating this emotion to others; he 
is vitally concerned w!th the production of a work 1n which ir.tclliqence 
glows so much that an Intelligible obJect (though not conceptual) is 
p laced before the mind of the appreciator so that he too may enjoy this 
exquisite object. In enjoying this the apprecietor is not drac;ged through 
the individual subjectivity of the poet; he is creatively lntroduced to 
spiritual bemg, which inversely tells something about the poei and h1s 
world but without the contamination of two individuals minghng their 
existences . 
Personality is richness of being .and involves a commanication o: 
knowledge and love. "The creative Self of the artist is hls person as 
person , in the act of spiritual communication, not his person as material 
1Jacques Maritafn, Education at the Crossroads (New Hoven: Yale 
Universtty Press , 1943) , p. 11. 
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indiv1dual or as a self- centered ego . .. 1 The best artist is submerged in 
subJectivity, for it is only by such submergence that he reaches the 
level of the preconscious 9rasp of the affective union of things and tho 
self, but ho doos his work adequately only Jn a sort of self-forgetfulness . 
11 . Superabundance 
By comparing contemplation and poatJc Intuition on the pol"t of 
superabundance , an important facet of MarJtaln's thought will l>e 
explored: the re lation between contemplalton and work and the roaltlon 
betv.•een poetic intuition and communication . 
"Contemplation, " Maritain says, 
itself is in fact not work, not a thing of utllity . !1 is 
a fruit. It is not ordinary leisure; it is a leisure 
cotncidJng with the very hl9hest activity of the human 
substance •••• 
But in virtue of that generosity which is inherent in 
immanent activity at its highest degrees, loving contempla:ion 
overflows as a protection and a benediction to society. A.l"l.d 
though not itself a useful service or a work, even tn the 
widest meaning of the word, that which is beyond usefulness 
super abounds thus in a usefulness, 1:'\ which the notion of 
v.•ork ts ~11 realized at the extreme limit of refinement. 2 
At another place Maritain says: "The 'mixed lite, ' which St. Thomas 
declares to be superior to the merely contemplative life, ts not the life 
tn which action diverts from contemplaUon, but the life in ·...-hich 
lMaritatn, Creative IntuttJon in Art and Poetry, p . 142 . 
2MarltaJn , Scholasticism and Po HUes, p . 177. 
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contempla\ion itself superabounds in act!on . ul 
The contemplative moves away from the ordinary traffic of life 
os a result of the divine descent to h1m; then as a result of the abu:'ldanc.e 
of h1s ow·n love, the contemplative once aqe1n appears among men, but 
with a dynamism which Is r.ot of thts world . "By love ond lr. love, 1t 
proclaims that God is love. •• 2 
In an analogous manner the essence of poetic lntu1t1on is not 
communication; )"'.cvcrtheless, out of the superabundance of hJs insights 
and the depth of his creatlvity he produces a work which canr:.ot Out 
communicate a vision oi beauty . The artist strives for the creation of 
a work; however, he tends tOYJard expression in a manner departing from 
:he basic stgnlftcance of the contemplottve life . 
!ti . ?OE:'lttc Intuition and the Work of Art 
Marnatn is very careful to index the fact that in producing the work 
of art the artist actually does somethinq which could not be done without 
such a ptoduct1on. There are some things present in the work of a.'l"! 
which were only vlrtuolly present in the creative idea . In fact I the ide~!~ 
itself receives certain developments in the process of creation . It is 1 
thus I not proper to reoard the basic intu ition es 
1Maritain I The Things That Are not Caesar's I p. 114 . 
2Ib>d • 
a model which the artist carries in his head and sees 
there ready- made, and of which the work ts to be the 
~ or portrait. This ts to make of art a cemetery by 
definition, a cemetery of imitations . 1 
Maritain compares the production of a work of art •. ,.1th the 
rel!glous Ideal of Imitating the solnts . Such Imitation IS not just the 
copying of a religious !deal; It Is permitting sainthood to permeate the 
being In such o manner that there Is a profound end vito! splrltuol 
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transformation 1n one ' s 1nner being. From such a profound transformation 
flows a life of "imitation." "'To imitate the Saints ts to become, 
precisely , an original , not o copy . • 2 
The work of an is a lso an origh'!.al, not a copy; it ls "'the body o! 
the anist 's 1deas . ,3 Thus "it is only when the symphony is made and 
finished that, in the mind of the composer, ns creative 1dea Is itself 
achieved ." 4 
rho production of the work of an may be regarde-d as an~logous to 
the expression of the philosopher in a concept or mental v.•otd . Even as 
the philosopher is not philosophizing until he ])roduces concep1s and words, 
the poet is not fully wor}ang until he produces "the work of art . 5 
Maritain introduces the notion of the "music of intuitive pulsions," 
1Marltatn, Art and Poetry, p. 78 . 
2 
.lli!!.· ' p . 79 . 
4!bld . 
3rold . , p. 80 . 
Srbld., pp. 80- 81. 
or the •beginning of a \•;ordless musical stir , •• 1 whic:t aro nature! 
movements and signs and whlch precede any social signs or external 
.. ~t·ork.2 He explains it as follows : 
A kind of mus lc&l stir , of unformulateci song, 
with no words, no sounds , absolutely inaudible 
to the e ar, audible only to the heart, here is 
the first sign through which the presence of poetic 
experience withln the soul Js recoontzed .... 
On the one hand we have an actual flash of knowing--
poetic experience, poetic intuition--born, throuQh 
spiritualized emotion, in the preconscJous, non-
conceptual life of the lntellect. On tho other 
hand, we have a spiritual miller--a kind of fluid 
and moving world, activated by tho d1f!use l19ht of 
the lllumlnoting Intellect, and seemlnqly asleep 
but secretly tense and vigilant - -which is this 
preconscious life of the intellect, and of the 
lm!!.qination and of emotion , empty of any actual 
concept or idea , but full of images and !uli of 
emotional movements , and in which all the past 
experiences and treasures of memory acquired by the 
soul are present in a state of virtuality . It is 
wlthln this fluid and moving milieu that poetic 
experience and poetic intuition exist, not virtually, 
but as an act or actuation definitely !crmed . 
How would it be poss ible that they would not 
awaken and stir th1s vital milieu, and produce, as 
it were, waves in it? 3 
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:he waves stlrred up Jn this fashion are imaginal and emotional dynamic 
charges or intuitive puls1ons . "Each of the partial units .. . is a 
complex of virtual !mages end emotlon , stirred in the fluid and movin9 
world of : he creativity of the spirit, and cssentl&lly tender.tia l , dynamic, 
i Maritatn, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetry, pp, 300 , 302 . 
2Ib ' . ~· · p , 304 . 3 Ibid . , p . 301. 
anci transient.••1 These untts may be spoken of as '"b meaning set free 
in ~ :notion" 2 or a kina ol melody . Each dynamic charqe !s dependant 
upon the indivisible unity of the original POetiC !ntuition. 
These wordless mus1cal charqes move out in the direction of 
material creaUon, and they are terminated only in the artistic •.'/ork . 
2 . The Work o: Art 
l . The Poetic Sense 
The poetic sense is that in the work of (lrt which corresponds 
with the poetic experience tn the poet . 3 As such r "the poetic sense 
!s to the poem what the soul is to mtm"4 in givin<J "to the poem 1ts 
inner conslstoncy , its necessary configuration , and first of all its very 
be lng and cx1stence ... s It Is the poettc sense whi ch i s mtuit!vely 
perceived by the reader either tmmediatGly or upon careful rereading , 
as a result of the reader' s openness to tho poem ' s stQntftcant emotion . 
The po~nic sense w111 be considered first tn relation to poetry in 
the ordinary sense . The relauonship between poetic sense Md !ntelligi.ble 
or logical sense must be examined . So different arc these type of r::~eaning 
that art frequently "endeavors to get lree from the !ntell!g!b!e or loqlcal 
sense itself . " 6 But this is to con! usa the whole issue, for the l091Cal 
11btd . ' p . 302 . 
4Jb!d . ' p . 258 . 
2Jbid . 
SJbid . 
3 J!lli!... ' p . 257 . 
6Jb!d . ' p . 74 . 
3!5 
sense is of!.e of tho components of the poeuc sense; its function in the 
poem , however, ls determined by the poetic sen so, which predominates . 
The poetic sense is an 1mrnanem meaning m~de up of 
meanin9S: the intelligible meanings of the •.vords 
(carried either by concepts or by images) .... and the 
imaginal meanings of the words .. -and the more mysterious 
meanings of the musical relations behveen the words, 
and betw·een the meonlngful contents with which the 
words are !aden. Thus the intelligible sense, through 
whlch the poem utters ideas, is entirely subordinate 
to the poetic sense, through which the poem exiSts .l 
C larity and obscurity in the poem ore dependent upoe the 
mtel liglble sense of the p.oem. These arc relative propenies ~cause 
complete clarity would be poss1ble only if the poem rece1ved Its 
existence from the inteJhgtble sense alone {and w1thout the poetic 
sense there would be no poem); complete obscudty v.·ould Involve tho 
total absence of inte lligibility , 2 
Obscure poems may be diff!cult (or hermetic). Such cif:iculty is 
<iue to heavily concentrated intelligibility or the attempt to reduce the 
whole poem to one single intelligible word. 3 Other obscure poems are 
noctwnel or obscure in fechng . When s1gnlftca:ion becomes too riqid 1 
it actually thwarts its o·.vn purpose . Words hllve come to exercise a 
tyranny over man~ but they do not h~ve the. legitimate right to undue 
respect . In fact 1 words are 
1Joid . ' p , 259 . 
3 !bid . ' p . 262 . 
2Io!C: . , pp . 259 - 251. 
the most ungrateful and treacherous material--
sounds which are poor in color and variety, si9ns 
which arc worn out by social usc, haunted by swatr:'!S 
of adventitious associations, and stubbornly fixed 
in the least connotations of their meaning .I 
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By means of tearing ordmary s1gns from their uadltional usages and b)o· 
:no King them flexible or fluid, there can come an expansion of compre-
hension . 1he result ls a fresh transparency , but one which operates in 
a <ieqree of darkness (because of its relative freedom from intelligible 
sense) . 2 
So concerned is Maritaln over the continual effort for precision that 
he ls wU!lng to 9tant a degree of fluidity even in phllosoph1c d iscourse . 
Inasmuch as in philosophy more than in any other science 
words can never roliovo us of thinking, it is fitting that 
>n phUosophy suppleness of vocabuiart should take 
procodcnce over fixity, and that a certain mar9ln of 
Imperfection In languaQo obligos the mind constantly to 
revitalize and to 90 boyond signs . If l were not afraid 
of scandalizing the reader. I should say that in philosophy 
as in poetry verbal cqujvocatlons occasionally guarantee 
the most fertile and the truest intuitions . 3 
In obscure poems the intelligible sense Is Implicit and may be 
either determined or undetermined . A determinod intoUtglble sense is 
one in ·.vhich an object is denoted or POinted toward; o.nd on undetermined 
1Maritam, Creative Intuition ln Art and Poetry, p . 306 . 
2ibid .• p . 252 . 
3Mortlmer J. Adler, Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species 
(Kew Yor~: Sheed and Ward, 1940), lntro . by Marltaln, p . lx . 
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mtelligible sense is one in •.-;hich there is no such point ing: "We sec 
nothing, yet we feel there 1s something to be looked at ... 1 
Cle~r poems have an explicit tnte llig1ble sense , which is 
either expressed by conceptual utterances clearly 
circumscribing it--or carried by images , without 
the Intermediary of any expressed concept (though 
a great many virtual concepts arc involved), in which 
case the lntelll9ible sense, althouQh still explicit, 
ls, as it were, not circumscnbod, r would say, open . 2 
Since the reader can be made aware of the true s;.gmhcation of the 
poem only by being brought back to tho orlgtnal 1ntuU1on, and since the 
poetic seose Is the poetic experience In the poem and thus the !Jfe of the 
poem, it 1$ the function of poetic sense to brinQ the reader back to this 
orh;tnal lr.tuftion . 3 There are two fun.damenta! ways tn which this 
~pprehenslon of the original lntui1ion can occur, as classical and 
modern poetry e>:emplify . Classical poeay operated upon the basis of 
a double signification: reference was made to dehnite things and also 
to the trans- rea!ity cauc;ht by poetic intuition . Doub!e s1gniflcatlon 
arises ·.vhen the structure of the work of words ts dominated by logical 
orga:~tzauon, in which specific thlnqs are denoted. The basts of this 
type of organization Hes In the manner in which the creative Intuition 
functions m giving rise to the work; I .e. the imagination iS filled with 
I Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 265 . 
2lbld.' p , 264. 3lbid . ' pp, 311-312 . 
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full- blown images, and conceptual reason fully develops its concepts .1 
In modem poetry the movement from the oriQ!ne:l creative intuition 
or the m-..z.sic of the intuitive pulsions does not perm!! development ln the 
imagination beyond •preconc;eptua l images~ •• and in conceptual reasor. 
beyond •tmagtnation-dominated concepts . " The result o: this is that 
.. tho form o! the poem is free";2 it does not dispense Wlth concepts, 
but ratlont~l orQanization is broken up so that there is no attempt to 
denote objects in the world, which . ln turn, signify cieeper real Hies . 
It is In this sense that ••modern poetry has freed itself from the sover-
eignty or the logical organization of concepts . "3 Of course, concepts 
"rom.a!n tndtspcnsable instruments of meaning , but they are no longer 
the masters o( the work and in this sense they have all been dethroned. ••4 
The result of the emancipation of modem poetry from the domination oi 
concepts and their objects is a single siqnificotion: modern poetry 
brings the reader directly to the trans-reality cauqht !>y the initlal 
poetic tntvttton . 5 
A great poet may be morally corrupt, but his poetic 1ntult1on and 
thus :he poetlc sense of the work cannot be. •A great poet can be cor-
rupt, .. -.•hile h1s creative intuition never !s . .. o Thore is an innocence about 
creative intuition which transmutes and dehuman1zes moral corruption 
1 Ibid., pp . 313-320 . 
~!b!d . , pp . 313 - 324 . 
3Ibld . • p. 323 . 
6rbid . • p . 375 . 
may emer the work~ but their impact is lessened by tho passage of 
time and the greater energy of the original poetic purity .1 
In connection with the poetic sense Maritatn makes this pointed 
comment: 
Many elements ~n the work itself can convey the 
resentment or the maUciousness of its author . 
A rhythm, a musical motif, a brush stroke, a color 
can be malicious . But the melody in a work, sonata, 
picture or poem cannot be malicious . The melody, 
as Arthur Lourie put lt, is always good, !a m'lodJc 
est touJours bonne, because the melociv is the most 
immediate vehicle o! the poetic sense . "2 
It 1s an easy step from the immoral artist using impurity but with basic 
purity in the creative innocence to the morally good artist an-d his use 
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of impurities . ..The art of a purified soul uses any;::h.ing, even mud, for 
the glory of the work , vnth pure hands and with no connivance . .. 3 
li . The Three Eplpharues of Creative Intuition 
I< IS reasonable that If the work of art Is to be a product of 
creauvc intuition's connaturality with beauty and an engendcnng in 
beauty, the work Itself should display the basic properties of beauty . 
This is the approach which Mantain makes when he analyzes the work 
1Ibid . , pp . 375-376 . 
2Marltain, Th<> Responsibility of rhe Artist, p . 53. 
3Ibid . ' p . 62 . 
of an . 
Radiance or c larity, which is the absolutely prime 
property of beauty, and matters first of all, appears 
principally (I do not say uniquel y) in the poetic 
sense or inner melody of the work; Integrity, in the 
action and the theme; and consonance, in the number 
or harmonic structure . 1 
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If there 1s any 9ood basis for considering poetic sense !n 4 section 
apart from the other two ep1phanles of creative i ntu!t1o!"., it is because 
it is of first importance and may be regarded as the actus primus 
(first act, fullness or completlon of bein9, the act by which anything is 
brought into existence); action and theme and consona!"'.cc arc each 
"an actus socundus, an emerQent terminative act, or a superabundance 
of exJstence, through which betn9 asserts itself beyond substantial 
existence . Z 
The work itself docs not bear such differences within itself . Its 
existence , action, and number are together in the work. Thus it is not 
in the work itself that the distmcUon can be made betv;een an actus 
prirnus and an actus sec:undus . The basis of th1s distmction is withtn 
the framework of their relation to the creative source and "their intcr\tional 
value (that ts, of their value as conveying the creative source, m virtue 
of the immaterial and purely tendenti&l existence proper to the meaning) ... 3 
1Maritam, Creot!vc Intuition in An and Poetry, pp . 369- 370 . 
2Ibid . , p . 358 . 31bid . ' p . 359 . 
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The poetlc sense is on the level of the creative intuition itsel~ and is 
buried in the nocturnaL regions. Action and theme are a motion ourward 
tO\vard the world but remaining in the intellect jn the stage of "the work 
as mentally conceived, the work. as thought.••• • Finally poetic intuition 
penetrates Into the sphere of the daylight viSiOn of the lntellecL or of 
the formed logos, I mean to soy, or the virtue of an." 2 Thl$ ts the 
leve l o( "the .. .-ork in the mak1ng . "3 
Action pertains to the will of the poem , but this must be considered 
metaphorically. What Mantain means is that action is that in things 
w·htch corresponds to will in voluntary a9ents. 
The dr~ma:ic action 1s the splrttuol elan or mouon whlch, 
emanating from a constellation of human agents gathered 
tOQOthcr ln a certain situaUon, carries them along, and 
which, as a result, command6 a cert<:ln development of 
events in time, permeating it with a dehnite significance 0 4 
Now throuQh the action something is offered tn the work which is the 
11 U1timate fruit of intelligibility: the significance of the action, in othor 
•oo;ords, the theme 0 .. s However, the theme is r.ot simply reducible ro 
lo9ical statement, though it is that ln the work which comes nearest 
the poss!!>!l!ty of such statement . "Thus It Is that the theme Is ln 
the poem the e lomont which ts t he nearest to rational intellectua lity ... 6 
!Ibid., ;:>. 366 . 
4lbld.' pp. 356-357. 
2 ~- ' p , 367. 
5Ibld . , p . 360. 
3Ibid . 
6lbld . ' p . 361. 
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The theme of the work of art may run in contrast to the poottc 
sense; if th!s is so, the work de9enerates or d issipates . Thus there 
must be a proportion bot'Noen these to.vo levels of the work . In fact, 
it is upon this proportion (to be regarded as the primordial proportlonl 
that the proportion involved in number or harmonic expansion rests . l 
As the action complements the poetic sense, so action end 
poetic sense are complemented by number, or harmonic expanstor., 
which f11ls out the work in a manner analOQous to the cxtenslor. of the 
substance of natural things In quanttty . •Thore is . . . a p.oettc space 
in which the unity of the work as spiritually conceived unfolds tn the 
mutual extraposition of parts, extended e1ther tn time or in physical 
space . .. 2 The harmonic expansion of the poem is the "vltal concurrence 
of the multiple, or vital order bringing to complex orchestral unlty parts 
struggling to assert their own individual claims . , 3 
It is the expansion or harmonic s· ... ·elling of the .. ,ork which is 
most obvious to the observer; 1t is this which is most intimately related 
to the material of art . Furthermore# 1l Is the laws of the arran<;ernent of 
the pans which 1s that with which "the worki:'lg or d!scursivc attontlon 
of the artist or the crlt!c ls most occupied . ·• 4 
The novel may bo pointed to as exemplifying espactally we ll the 
I Ibid . , p . 368 . 
3Ibid . 
2Ibld . • p . 3 64 . 
4Tbid . 
' 
principle of harmonic expansion . 
In the novel, the parts of the work are characters 
in mutual conflict, on whose inner depths :he interest 
is concentrated . Then the poetic space becomes a 
world , and the number or harmonic expansion becomes 
the v~tal order--mai<fng diversity at its peak conspire 
in the unity of an enigmatic purpOse--through whlch a 
creative providence (J:overns a universe of free agents . 1 
ill. Three Types of Poetry 
Maritai r.'s discussion of the cate9ories of art and poetic 
senslbUlty is extre mely brief. Although every work of art exempllfles 
the three levels of the development of the object, each work of art 
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is a special embodiment of one level. Upon this basis of classlficatlon 
works of art may be divided into three types, whjch Mar!tatn calls the 
POem, the drama, and the novel. Bach of these types cona!ns that 
art which lts name popularly s1Qn1fies as well as some of the other 
arts, so that a ll of the arts are included in this classifjcation. The 
plastic arts are Jncluded with the novel . Drama inclu<ies the dance . 
Music is in the same category as the poem. 2 
Correspond In() to the three types of poetry are three kinds of 
poetic sensibility--lyrical senslblllty, histrionic sensibility , and 
introspective sensibility , 3 
1Ibid ., p , 365 . 
31bid . ' p . 399 . 
2lbld., pp , 388, 393-399 . 
The excellence of the c&tegorles of an Ia dependent ~por. lts 
proximity to the source or Jr. tuition . Thus the priority o! excellence 
of these e&tegorles may be Hsted In the follow;no delcor.dl:>g seneso 
the poem, tho drama, and tho novel. Poetry and mustc are Qi•-en 
prcomtnonce in Maritatn•s thou9ht. 
Groat as the pootry of the Theater end tho poetry 
o f the Now I may be 0 the poetry of t he Poe m or t he 
Sono Js by nature and wlll always ramo in the prime 
and most spiritual type of poetry o &nd the deares t to 
thea human soul, because it is the closest to crcauve 
lntuttlon.l 
And music occupies the pn:!'.ary place tn Marit atn•s thot:.~ht ~ca-..ase 
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It "hat t!>o pec.War prtv!!ege 0 0 0 of express:no--beyond any possible 
meantnQ of .,..ords--the mos: deeply subject!vo, sir:.qylar and aJ!eCt1\o"e 
stirs of creative sub;ecllvity, too <!eep- aea:ed to be posst~ly expressed 
by any oth"r art . .. z "Music is perhaps the moat a1Qnificant of al l. "3 
3 0 The Human Function ol Art 
Art, as a human virtue, has 1ts own ond& v.'h1c::h are not human; 
the end of on Is tho 9ood of the work o Sovtmhelesa 0 art Is a human 
\•tr.uo and cust operate w1thln a ~an . Tho goal o! art must be: made to 
serve ln.strumentally the whole man . Mo~eover, If the utls: 1s des-:royed 
tn the production of the an obJect. the obJect uaotr rem61ns inco:r:p!eto, 
1
rbtd 0 2 ~ .. P o 40 4o 3roid 0 0 p 0 ~ 0 
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and further productions do not occur . The artist may also destroy his 
sensitivities by certain practices and habits. 
1. Art an End in Itself 
It has already been Indicated with sufflc!ent emphasis that 
essentially the an object Is an end ln itself . Martta!n prefers to call 
the fine arts self-sufficient arts . Now is there anything about such 
art which is significant for man? 
It must be reiterated that the work of art is not a means primarily, 
not even a means of communication . Nor does ar. primarily convey 
!ntelllg!ble meaning . Yet the poem does convey something to the 
appreciator by a super-abundance with regard to the creator, but which is 
absolutely essential from the point of view of the 
reader, or the listener . . . . 'What the ...... ork tends 
ftnelly to convey to the soul of others is the same 
poetic intuition which was in the soul of the poet: 
not precisely as creative, but as cognitive, both of 
the subjectivity of the poet and o! a flash of reality 
echoing the world . I 
The appreciator may participate in the creator's emotion, but not as In 
the subjectlvh.y or subJective feelings of the poet . Marttain rejects 
theories of EinfUhlung because of their subjectivity . "Maritam1 s theory 
of beauty, developed from St. Thomas• !d quod visum placet, is 
thoroughly intellectual!st and metaphysical, and therefore not 
1Ib .. 
---1.£.. . , p . 307. 
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subjecuonist and emouonaL"' 1 0:1 the other hanci, Marttairr.'s position 
ls primarily mtellectual and concerned .... ·1th insight and cognition. The 
emotion involved in the rec ip1ent ' s experience is "emotion as causing to 
..!!!. · ,.z It must be suggested, however, that Mar itain does not urge pure 
det~chmcnt, and he delineates the !mpossiblllty of truly understanding by 
"a mere external contemplation of a work . .. 3 
·what the artist intends and what th& appreciator receives may be 
many d1!ferent thin9s . "The significance of the work Js larger in o':'le 
sense, a:1d more diversified , In the ndnds of mer. than ln the mind of its 
author . ••4 But lf even some small phase of his intuition is received, the 
artist, who has human desites and expectations beyond hls artistic 
functlon, will be at least partially gratified. 
It is necessary to point out that the appreciator receives benefit 
from tho unhuman facet of art (I.e . the fact that art ' s end Is the 9ood of 
the work pnmarily) in deriving a sense of freedom from Ufe•s practical 
expcnences , from its urges ond drives . No one can stand lt!e•s 
pressures without some relief; there 1s no better narural rellcf than 
Uu-ough the distancing •.'w'hlch ls involved in aesthetic appre1cation . 5 
1Rufus W!U!am Rauch, ••The Esthetic of Maritain, .. Thought, VI 
(September , 1931), 231. 
2Marltain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry , p. 309. 
3tbld . ' p. 308 . 4Ibld . slbid ., pp . 309-310. 
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11 . Art and Morality 
The fundament~! posttton on the relation beMeen art and morality 
has already been pointed toward. The elaborahon of this view could 
occupy a book, as i:tdeed it has in Maritain ' s The Responsibility of the 
Artist . Since morality r for Maritain, involves man's final good !n the 
sonse of ultimate ciesUny, and since rellgion is usually thought of in 
broad enough terms to include this (frequently this !s the essence of 
rel!Qionl, it is necessary to make a brief outl!ne of his position . Evans 
provides a summary of the basic distinction . 
The scholastics gave to the artist all the freedom he 
can possibly desire as an artist; this is the settle-
ment of the dispute bet<.veen anlst and rr.oralist. The 
artist has the right to consider nothin9 in his work 
but tho beouty of the work, irrespective of its practical 
consequences . The moralist, however, necess~r!ly 
cl&,ims an interest in all human activity, including 
that ol the artist, in so far as that !s the acUvtty of 
a man reallzlnQ Itself in the physical world, which is 
the social world . His approve! or condemnation of 
the work does not touch it as art; it is relevant only 
to the work of a ~, among men. As a man~ the 
artist has mor~l responsib1Ut1es like tho rest of us, 
and sometimes there may be at least the appearance 
of conflict ben•.•eon his virtue as an artist and his 
virtue as a man . If we hold that the world is a 
rational world, 1t 1s ~ however, impossible chat 
beauty and morality should not be In harmony, lor 
morality is only real 4$ an aspect of the Good of 
which beauty is also an aspect. And in spite of the 
moralist, it is beauty which wo can thin.'< to be :nora 
really a character of the ultimately real , for it ls 
free from the taint of the merelv human which affects 
all moral acts ,1 
1v. B. Evans , loc . ell . , pp . 378-379 . 
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Though an and moraJlty are relatively autonomous in thct each h&s 
o good which is spectHcally different, morality has the advantage over 
art in that it is concerned with the g-ood of man, whose good art m;..xst 
ultimately serve. 
A."ld because an artist Is a man before betnq an artist, 
the autonomous world of morality is simply superior 
to (and more inclusive than) the autonomous •.vorld of 
art . There is no la .. •; 49ainst the law on which the 
destiny of man depends . In other words Art ts 
indirectly and extrinsicolly subordinate to morality .1 
Thus the plight of the artist depends somewhat on tho concept of 
morality which is mairnaincd, Maritain confesses !hat "if the perfection 
of human 11!e consisted in some stole athletlcism o: moral vinue. and 
In a man-made righteousness achteved to the point of !mpeccablllty, all 
of u$, en<! especially ihe Artist and the Poet , would be in a rather sad 
predicament . "2 However, "if the perfection of human life consists in a 
ceaselessly increasing love , despite our mistakes and ..... eaknessos, 
between the Uncreated Self and the created self, there is some hope 
and some mercy for aU of us, and especially for the Artist and the Poet . .. 3 
"What is demanded of us men is not to have reached, but ceaseless ly 
to tend ... 4 
1Maritain , The Rasponsibtlity of tha Artist, p . 41. 
2Jbid . ' p . 42 . 
4Ibld . , p , lll. 
3Jb!d . ' pp , 42- 43 . 
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There are three problems which peculiarly plas;ue the artist, or at 
least some would pla9ue the artist with these Issues . (ll The artist 
lives what might be called a sensory cxistonce . 'A'orldly emotion and 
sensitivity are essential to him 0 The tensions of Inspiration (ecstasy) 
and technical excellence produce instability, which is inimical to 
perfection In moral lifo 0 (2) Artists, especially writers, need to know 
tho practical phases of evil as well as good: abstract and theoretical 
knowledge are not sufficient. "Are they not obltged, then, In order to 
be Qood wr.Jters, to make the devH their assistant, at least on a pan-
Ume basis~ and to seek after that experiential science of evU which is 
the privilege o! sin? ,. l (3) This problem 1s the question of the know-
ledge of the artist's characters by connaturahty and the possibility o! 
comphcity or connivance with evil . It is thJs issue ·.vhtch Maritain 
regards as the most serious . 
The novelist or the playwright knows his characters 
by means of that kind of knowledge which Is called 
knowledge through inclination or congeniality--throt:.;h 
the very pass ions , inclinations or instincts that he 
shares with his characters, even ·.vhen he hates them 
with that lucid hate which makes a man know his 
enemy as himself . In other wotds his characters 
are virtual aspects or possible developments of himself . 
. . . That 's why the novelist is capable of foreseeinQ 
what his characters will do . Nov: is it possible to 
use such knowledge , especially in tho total intimacy 
meant by creation--without entering into a kind of 
complicity or connivance w1 th the imaginary being in 
llbld o, Po lOS o 
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question, and without suffering in oneself a reperCt;SSion 
of their own diseases or inferno? 1 
Maritain freely grants that these are the facts as stated; what he 
reJects is certain inferences drawn from these facts . (ll "Ne1ther the 
senses ... nor the delights of the intcl11Qonco-pormootad scnso are 
Impure in themselves . " 2 rhe temptations pecul1ar to the artist may 
bewitch him or they may become stepping- stones to higher thtngs . 
(2) Granted that it is necessary for the artist to know evU, "'introspection, 
more than any poor and always limited experience of sin, is the best 
teacher in the geography of evil . .. 3 
{3l The third problem requires more extensive analysis. Basically 
it can be sa1d that knowledge by connaturality does not involve any 
confusion of the being of one Individual with any other beinQ .. .\s such, 
there is no necessary complicity \•lith or pleasure tn the evil chatactets 
one ts deptct!ng. 4 
The novelist may be considered as the God of his characters . As 
such, he knows his characters in himself, and yet he is in himsct: 
perfectly separate from them . But man is too frequently a poor creator 
in that he often fails to maintain the proper immanence or transcendence; 
i.e . he e ither mingles too intimately or becomes too detached from his 
!Ibid . 
3lbid . ' p . 112. 
2rbld . , p . Ill. 
4rbtd . 
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characters ,1 It certainly is possible for an auth-or to be col"'.taminated 
by his work, but this is only 4n accident and may be regarded as one of 
the inevitable temptations arising rrom any sort oi work. Marltain thinks 
it to be probable that people who Insist that the connection of the 
novelist with an evil character in his work enta1ls sm are "victims of 
tho old Lutheran illusion, which cons1dcrcd any disordereci. movement or 
storm of the sensibility--very strong perhaps but 1:woluntary a:'ld not 
consenteC to--to be a sin . • 2 
K.nowledqe by connaturahty, even ln the poet, operates by love . 
Oostotevsky "loves his characters , more tenderly perhaps than does a::ty 
other an:ist, he puts himself into them more then docs ar.y other; at the 
same t ime, he scrutini~es them and judges them tnflex1bly ... 3 
tf the novelist ls the God of his characters, why 
could he not Love them wHh a redeeming lovo? We 
are told (it is Irrational, but it is a fact), that 
Bern~nos could not hel p praying for his characters . 
When a novellst has this kind of love even for h!s 
most hateful ch~racters, then he knov;s them, throu9h 
inclination, in the truest possible way, and the 
risk of being contaminated by them still ex!Sts for 
him., I think, ~ut to a lesser degree than ever . 4 
1Marltaln, Art and Poetry, pp . 59 - 61. 
2Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p . 113 . 
3Maritain, A:!t l!lnd Poetry, p. 59 . 
4Maritaln , The Responsibil!ty of the Artist, pp . 113-ll4 . 
What has been sa1d in the preceding discussion concern!nq the 
creator could be adapted to the appreciator 1 who receives the basic 
intuit ion o f the creator . 
4. The Worlds of Art and Religion 
l. Religion: The Supernatural Order 
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Maritain makes a clear distinction bct'Neen the natura) and the 
supernatural spheres . There is a natural man, a natural mysticism, 
the natural Ught of reason. The supernatural sphere ts the realm of 
fatth and revelation . Infused contemplation ts a result of the divine 
infuston, of gifts of tile Holy Spirit . Theolo<;y uses reason , but It Is 
always the use of a reason that is tempered by 1 corrected by 1 and 
ul timate ly amenable to faltn . Tile noly dogma is not a human product; 
it is the result of the pronouncement of God's vicar on earth . The 
Church may have members who do not measure up !O us lns1Qhts; but 
the Church is lnfalllblo In Its pronouncements; l! Is God •s holy a9ency 
for the salvat1on o! men . 
11. Art: The Natural Order 
Art is essentially tho 910:-y of the natural world; 1ts excellcnco 
Is such that lt pracucally establishes Itself as a world within the natural 
world. The worlds of tho contomplattve and the artist are different, yet 
they tend to be remarkably aliko In numerous respects, as in the type of 
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enemtes they choose . The occupational stream of the art1st runs 
definitely in a direction opposite that of the monk; nevertheless, each 
one tends toward his own kind of sainthood . Finally, there is the need 
for insi.c;;~ht and pleasure. and, in !act . art provides a type of salvation 
through ins1ght, pleasure, and the purgation of passion . 
(1) A \¥orld of Its Own .--ln considering reality ••from the point of 
view of the order of nature. of the universe as a work of art made by God, 
as a ... ,.ork of creative art, .. 1 the moral and spiritual p.otnt of view ts n.ot 
considered . The universe may be re9arded, from this perspective , as 
"God's work of art . •2 Mar!ta!n speaks or the work of art as a " self -
subs1sttno cosmos, " 3 "a man-made cosmos • .,4 The object of art " is a 
world- -the poem itself will by itself be a self-sufficient universe, with-
out the need oC signifyin9 anything but itself, and to ·.vh1ch tho soul must 
allow Itself to be enclosed blindfolded . .. s A genuine work of art Is such 
an organic unity that the artist c~mnot chan9e his an wHhout changing 
himself so that a new or9anic unity emerges , "The arnstlc conscience 
of the poet forbids hJm to chango anything in the work whlch ts required 
1Jacques MaritaJn, St . Thomas and the Problem of Evil, tran$ . 
Mrs . Gordon And! son. The Aquinas Lecture, 1942 (Milwaukee, Wise . : 
Marquette Un!versny Pross, 1942), p . 10 . 
2Ibld., p , !2 . 3Jbid •• p. 49 . 
4Mar!tain, Creative Intuition In Art and Poetry, p. 369 . 
~Jacques and Ra issa Mar1ta1n, The Situation of Poetry, p. 45 . 
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by the good of the work, as he sees it, and by his tnner sin9ular truth 
as a poe:t. .. 1 
Tho questton of "the artist's own singular tn:th .. 2 has been raised 
and partJally answered. The artist ts not concerned with conformity to 
obJectS as such, whether these are natural or dtv1ne or hurr.an. 
Baudelaire's .. vision of human love v;as the most profound--! do not say 
truo--that the corrupt eye of a Jost epoch was cepab!c of ... 3 In this 
passage Martta!n has a notion of truth whlch is different from the 
singularity of the artist's truth spoken about eorl!er . Ultimately 
there may be some truth (as presently exists in germ in the Catholic 
Church) to whlch everything must conform . But Maritain does not 
ordmari!y ::nake the a.1"1lst omen able to this kind o! tn.:.th, for man, 
includjng the artist, qropcs after light and constructs hls own world, 
which may or may not approximate the ultimately true world. Mo.rit~ln, 
thus, for the most part osks the apprcctator to be willing to suspend 
his behef-dlsbellef framework and get inside the presupposuions and 
framework of the artist . There must be "a kind of previous consent to 
the intentions of the artist and to the creative perspectivas in which 
ho ts placed . • ,4 To be really open to the poetic vision or ony work of 
1Moritoln, Tho Responsibility o! the Artist, p . 62 . 
2 lbld . • p . 90 . 
3Mar1ta1n, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 390. 
4Maritaln, The Responsibility of the Artist, p . 90 . 
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art .. requires a sort of previous, tentative consent --to :he ..... ork a~d :o 
the tnter.uo:,. of tne poet --wuhout which we cannot be taken lr:.to :he 
conlldonco olthe poem • • I 
Marltotn cnco!lr~ges !lexiblltty tn exomlnln~ o work ot an for 
the purpose of adjudtcatir.g 11. He regards tho paradl9::' offered by 
the work of O&nte as highly acceptable, but ho suooosts : •we may be 
unfair to modern poots if we use this patl!ldigm as o too simple and 
untvoeol measure of comparison ... 2 In fact, '"Baudclalre, 1:'1 the place 
where h• wos, and fro.:l whlch he looked at thtn~s, was precisely 
requlrod by poetry not to percetve the adJustment, but to feel the spll: 
ond dera.."'.~ement . • 3 
(2) The Con:emolat!ve and the Artis:. --TWo passages from lhe 
Besponstbtltty of the Art1st serve to summarize the major point of 
contact between the contemplatJve and the artist as well as the l:>aslc 
d!Voroenco : 
The Contemplative and the Artist, the one bound to 
wisdom, the other to beauty , are naturally close . 
They also hove the some brand of enemle s. 7he 
Contemplative, who looks at the htoheat cause o~ 
wl\lch every bel no; and activity depend, knows the 
place a.:td :he value of an, ond understands the 
Artist . Tho Artist in his turn dlvlnea the 9ra.ndeur 
o! tM Contem;>!at!ve, and feels con;erual wnh 
1Mc:Hita1n, Creati\,-e Jr. tuition In Ar. .snd Poe:rv, p. 308 . 
2Jbtd .• p . 388 . 3 .ill.!!. . • p . 3 91. 
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him. When his path crosses the Contemplative's, 
he w!U r<>cognlze love and beauty .I 
Poetry has 1ts own spiritual mystery, by virtue of which 
1t resembles and foreshadows a 9reater mystery, and 
symbollzes with grace-given gifts without penetroting 
into their domain. And poetry's spiritual mystery is 
available to Heaven and to Hell as well. Poetic 
o:<perience Is a brooding repose which takes place 
at the center of the soul and tn which the \•;orld and 
tho subjectivity are obscurely known together In a 
non-conceptual manner. This experience Js not mystlcal 
experience . It is busy with the created world and the 
enigmatic relations of things with each other, not wi th 
the principle of things In Its own supra-mundane unity . 
The obscure knowledge that It Implies comes about 
through emotion . not through love of charity . Poeuc 
experience is from the very start oriented toward 
expression, and terminates in a ..... ord uttered or a \•tork 
produced, whl1e mystical experience tends tO"A'ard 
s1lence, and terminates in an immanent fruition of tho 
absolute. 2 
MacGregor Is very unhappy wlth Marltaln's posl!lng of sueh an 
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1ntimate relat!on between art and contemplation . Concerning MarHa.tn, 
he says: 
All forms of netural knowledge by intuition, sympathy, 
or connatural!ty he readily admits to be more or less 
distant analogies of mystical experience . The poei or 
artist is more prepared than any other man to know the 
divine, because I althou9h not conna1ur.eHzed to God 1 
he is at least in the way of being connaturalized to 
"the mystery that comes from God and is scattered 
through everything". Here we think Maritain may be 
1Maritain, The Responsibility of the .~.rUst, p. 43 . 
2 Ibid ., p. 101. 
allowin9 a facile analogy between mystic and 
artist from which one would have expected hts 
awareness of Jts inherent danger to have saved 
h!m . l 
But Marita.in has already given reply to such evaluations; he does 
recognize the dangers inherent, but this does not cause hlm to reject 
the intimacy of the relationship. 
llctwoen the world of poetry and that of sainthood 
thoro exists an ana1ootca1 relation--! use this word 
with all the force metaphysicians give It, with all 
that It Implies for them of kinship and of distance . 
All errors come from the fact that people misread 
this analogy: some swell the similarity, m!Xlng 
poetry and mysticism; others weaken it, maklnQ 
p-oetry out to be a craft 1 a mechanical art , 2 
(3) The Occupational Strcam ... -Maritain introduces the concept 
of occupational stream which means "the typical cond1Uons, both 
external and psychological, involved !n a certaln s1ate of life or a 
certain vocation, in relation to moral progress and the perfection of 
human life . .. 3 The external and psychological conditions of the arttst 
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are 9fOUncied in the world; the artist is "dedicated to the world and the 
beauty and mystery a.nci glory of the world. "4 As such, the artist's 
1
Geddes MocGregor ~Aesthetic Experience in Religion (London: 
Macnullan and Co . , Ltd., 1947), p . 143 . 
2 Marltoln and Cocteau, Art and Faith, p . 88 . 
3Marltaln , The Responsibility of the Artist, pp . 108-109 . 
4 
.!J2!l!.., p. 109 . 
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occupational stream "is at the opposite extreme of that of the monk . •• 1 
But is it possible for the artist to have aspirations lor sainthood, 
to labor for abandonment to God? In order to answer this question, 
Marita1n disUnoutshes between canontzable sainthood and sa1nthood. 
which is not canonbable . There are many who ara saints, who are 
never canonized . Canonizablo saints are "only those endov .. ed ..... ith 
such poise and heroism that they can oo offered as beacons to man-
kind . " 2 For Maritain, artists can oo saints. but they are of the type 
which are not canonizable . "The kind of sainthood to which they can 
asprre is not, I think, of the canonizable type--but rather of the 
type pointed to by Kierkegaard when he imagined sainthood in the 
shape of the most ordinary, unrecognizable man . .. 3 
Thus even thouqh the occupational stream of the poet runs 
counter to that of the monk, the life of the .artist may tend toward 
sainthood . Moreover . the virtues of the poet are evangelic in natur~ I 
comprising voluntary poverty, sobriety, chastity. respect, fortitude I 
renunciation, obedience, order, and humility. Of course, each of 
these must be applied to the artist's activity and experience in an 
analogous manner. 4 
1Ibid . 21bio .• p. 1o7 . 
3lblo . • p . 1oa . 
~Ibid . , p . 100. Cf. also Marltain, Creative Intuition in Art 
and Poetrv, p. 257 . 
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(41 !lrt and Salvatlon.--Whatcver the judgments the artist may 
heap upon himself, "'he serves the community better than the engineer 
or the tradesman . ,.! Even 1i he lneures damnation to his soul, he may 
still provide a means of salvation for those who come into contact with 
his work . 2 
Man is so constituted that he cannot live without some type o! 
pleasure or delectation; when spiritual pleasures are Jacking, he 
passes to carnal pleasures (fleshly or physical pleasures) . The 
surrealists dismissed beauty with its exalted joy ••for the sake of 
maolcal knowledge, whereas the modem •,'/orld, with infinitely greater 
success. dtsmlsses beauty for the sake of nothinQ except hard labor • .,3 
Th() modern 1ndu.strial world is extremely ascetic in re lation to beauty, 
it has developed .. ,. kind of asceticism at the service of the useful, a 
kind of unholy mortification for the sake of no supenor hie . .. 4 As o 
resu lt, the only source of qralification is "those arts and pleasures 
which satisfy 'the brute curiosity of an animal's stare . "' 5 The modom 
world is "sick '"''ith a repressed, brutally frustrated longing !or unity, 
beauty, and POetry •• ,6 
1Marlta!n, T~.c Rcsponstb1Uty of the Artist, p. 86 . 
2lbid . , p . 87 . 
3Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetrv, p . 190 . 
41bid . stbld . s t bid. , P . 228 . 
The problems of the modern world can flnd a large share of their 
solutions by a return to art. Art "ts the most natural power of healin9 
and agent of spiritualbation needed by the human community . •• 1 The 
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basis for tha effectlveness of art lies In the Immediacy of the experience 
(there Is no need for the labor of phllosophlzlng}2 as well as In Its 
profound penetration of the depths of lila and being . 
Every work of art reaches man in his inner pQ'.vers. 
It reaches him more profoundly and Insidiously than any 
rational proposition, either cogent demonstration or 
sophistry . For it strikes h.im with two terrible weapons, 
Intuition and Beauty, and at the stn9le root in him of 
all his energies, Intellect and VV!ll, Imagination, Emotlon, 
Passions, Instincts and obscure Tendencies . 3 
Art is much more than a pretty little frosting on a cake; it !s vital to 
enjoy It as genuine spiritual food . 
Poets do not come on the stage after dinner, to afford 
ladies and 9entlemen previously satiated with 
terrestrial food the !ntoxtcatfon of pleasures which 
are of no consequence . But neither are they waiters 
who provide them with the breaci of existentialist 
nausea, Marxist dialectics or traditional morality, 
the beef of political realism or tdealtsm and the ice-
cream of philanthropy . They provide mankind with 
a spiritual food, which is intuitive expenence, 
revelation and beauty: for man, as I sotd in my 
youth, ts an animal who lives on transcendentals. 4 
1
lbld . ' p . 191. 2vide supra, pp . 267- 268 . 
3Morllaln , The Responsibility of the Artist, pp . 58- 59. 
4 Ibid.,p . 73. 
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Even the disinterestedness or "uselessness" or on tokes on one 
of the most practical of functions; 
it 1s precisely to the extent to which poetry is useless 
and disengaged that poetry is necessary, ~cause it 
brings to men o: vision of reality- beyond reality, an 
experience of the secret meanings of thinqs , an 
obscure insight into the universe of beauty, .... ·tthout 
which men could neither live nor live morally . 1 
Both music and drama have the effect of purging the passions a!".d 
or allovlat1ng the emotions . The emotion produced by the v:ork of art 
ts thus not ar: end ln itself. ••The 'purgation of the passions ' is a 
privilege of tho drama , especially the tragedy, where we contemplate 
our passions movtnQ on a superior plane , both detached from ourselves 
and obeying their own fateful lew." 2 The manner in -.• .. hich the passions 
are purged !s !nd!cated ln an excellent passage in Art and Scholasticism; 
Music no doubt h8s this peculiarity that, symbolising 
by rhythm Md sound tho very movements of the sou.l--
cantare amantls est--whon it produces emotion, it 
produces precisely what it symbolises . But such 
production is not hs object, any more than a 
representation or description of the emotions . The 
emotions which 1t evokes in tho soul by sound and 
rhythm are the mouer by which it ought to give us 
the experienced joy of a spiritual form, of a tran-
scendent order, of the brilliance of be1n9. So mus1c, 
like tragedy, purifies the passions by developing 
them within the hmtts and In the order of boauty, 
llbld., p . 85 . 
2Marltatn, Croat!ve Intuition 1n Art and Poetry, p . 39 7. 
J 
har:nontsing them w!th the intelligence, in a 
harmony which fallen natw-e experiences nowhere 
else .1 
But art does not fully satisfy; lt only predisposes one for the 
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ultimate delights of a supernatural order: this is its supreme function. 
"Poetry is spiritual nourishment , But it does not satiate, it only makes 
man more hungry, and that is its QranCcur. "2 Thus it ls said that 
.. Beauty limps . "3 There is nothing "more precious than a certain sacred 
weakness, and that kind of imperfection through • ...-hlch inffrlty v.-ounds 
the finlto . "4 Contemplation also compares to art tn this regard, for 
tt too manifosts a ltmptng lmperfectlon: "The contomplotive limps in 
one foot, for havlng known God's sweetness he remai:-ts weak on the 
side that leans on the world . " 5 
1u't, thus, occupies the highest regions of natural apprehension, 
but its autonomy is not complete . "As [do with metaphysics 1 abase 
poetry only before God.." 6 But subordinatio:'l to God 1s no handicap. 
It h clear that~ once the fact of revelation 1s 
admitted, philosophy can suffer no harm from any 
such indirect subordination to faith. Uke an and 
every other human discipline, it is free and mistress 
in its own sphere~ but that spl".ere ts limited and 
1Marltain, Art and Scholasticism, pp . 50- 51. 
2 Maritatn, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p . 235, 
3Ibld . ' p . 167 . 4Ibid . 5Jbid . 
6Marltain and Cocteau, .>.rt and Falth, p. 93 . 
subordinate; it does not therefore enjoy a:t absolute 
freedom, but 1s there anybody absolutely free but 
God Himse If? 1 
3~3 
(51 Rel!glous !\rt . --Marltoln distinguishes between art which may 
be c&llod religious in a general monner ond art which is truly religious 
(or sacred) in the sense that 1t Is helpful In worship. 2 It 1s truly 
rel!glous art which Is of concern here. 
S~cred art must be fully dependent upon thoological wisdo:n and 
the roQulaUons of liturgical usage . The determinlnQ factor in religious 
art (that which makes It religious) Is the use to which It Is to be put. 
Thus if the art foUs to succeed in the use to which it is to be put, it is 
of no value os that kind of art . But if art is to succeed as religious, 
!t must be orthodox and liturgically sound, or 1t will lead the worshipers 
astray. 3 lncldontolly. Marltaln Is quite happy to grant that much art 
1s not for the purpose of worship; such art should not be d!scrad!tod 
because it does not serve a function for which it ...... as in fact :-tot 
intended. 4 
1Jacques Marltatn, St. Thomas Aquinas, trans . J. f' . Scanlan 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1946), p . 86 . 
2Jacques Ma:r!taln, .. ReUections on Sacreci Art," LlturQ1cal Arts, 
IV (Third Quarter, 1935), 131. 
3Ibid . Cf. Marltoln, Art and Scholasticism, pp . 111-113 . 
4Mar!taln . "Reflections on Sacred Art ," oe . c!t., p . 131. 
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Religtous art docs not require a spectal style . "There ts no 
style pecuh ar to rel191ous ort, there is no religio'Js technique . .• 1 
11 It is the style of each epoch, the living style of the time in which 
·.ve Hve, that should be used for a work of sacred art ." Z It must aJso 
be added, however, that whatever style is used it should be lntelHgible 
(1! it is to give explicit instruction), a nd it must be finished ("work 
which .ts well done , cccompHshed, clean , permanent and honest") . 3 
The final observation is that "re l1gious art ought to be rel1Qlous . ,. 4 
This means that the artist must depend upon religious inspirehon, not 
just upon his ability to produce religious emotions (he must not strive 
for th!sl, not upon the religious subJects which he considers, and not 
upon some rol1q1ous s tyle . The artist shoulC be a Christlan and 
•part icipate existentially in the love tau9ht In the Gospels . Then his 
work •. .,ill be, itself, existentially Christian ." 5 Genuine religious 
emotion can be produced not by following certain tnilextbla rules, but 
"'by the artist shb.ring, in one way or another, in the spiritual life o( 
1Marualn, Art and Scholasticism, p . 110. 
2 Mar!tain, "Reflections on Sacred A:rt, " op . c!t . , p . 132 . 
3Maritain, Art and Scholas ticism, p . 111. 
41bid . • p . 113 . 
5Maritain, "Rcfloctfons on Sacred Art , " oo . c u . , p . 133 . 
the Saints . .. l Thus Maruatn says: "The religious quality o: a work 
docs not depend upon 1ts subject but its spint ... z 
HS 
For some men a radical trltnsformation · .... ould be necessary for 
the production of religious art , but Marttain warns that "religious 
conversion docs not always have a favorable repercussion on the v.•ork 
of artists , especially minor artists 0 " 3 
5 . Summary 
The ar9ument of this chapter has analyzed the development of 
an object in the world . No longer has the trnu1t1on to be re9arded in 
itself and according to its essential developrr.ent ~nd function. The 
objoet must no·,... be considered as producing a world of its own which 
competes with other obJects and experiences 0 This chapter has shown 
how art enters Into compe tition with other phases of life and prov1des 
one of the most adequate developments of human insiqht and under-
standing . 
Expression 1$ to be regarded as essential to the artist; the 
contemplator has no such need . HO'oYever expression produces su<:h 
a superabundance of insight and rapport that it makes possible a 
<:ommunication from the poet to the appreciator. And what ts communicated 
1Maritain, Art and Scholasticism , P o 114 0 
2Maritain, Art and Poetry, p . 28. 
3Maritain , The Responsibility of the A.""tist, p . 97 . 
is the poet's ori9mal insight; the appreciator comes to apprehend a 
fra9ment of the poet•s world as expressed in a particular poettc 
production . The contemplative does not necessarlly emerge into the 
activity of the world; yet through his superabundance of spintual 
insight ~nd love for God, he does proclaim in love that God 1s love. 
The important thing to notice is that the J)Oet and the contem-
plative are not conhned to an express1on which ..... 111 give some li~tlc 
bit of news or help to others . The insight, tho love. the spiritual 
contact. the expression,. all of these arc sufficient unto themselves . 
If anythin9 further occurs. lt ts a result of the superebund&nce of the 
experience . \;\'hat this bastcaUy means is that both ort a.r.d contcm-
platton ere ends in themselves . 
When this has been said, It mey appear that the work of art Is 
extrins1c to the poetic intuition . This may further seem to moan that 
the work is really unnecessary to the intuition . Hov1ever, Jt has been 
shown that the work is the actual embodiment of the C!'eativo tntuition 
1n such a manner that h clarifies and <ievelops th9 in.tuit!on nself. 
7hc work 1s not a copy of tho creative idea; lt is the embodiment o£ 
the idea. 
The work o! art must be seen liS the embodiment of the poetic 
sense 1 which is that !n the work which correspo:tds to poetlc 
experience in the poet . Now since the poetic sense emerges from the 
creative fires of poetic experience (which themselves involve 
innocence tn purging immoral and corrupt practices and ideasl, the 
poetic sense is itself innocent as the basic melod;• of the work . The 
harmonies which correspond to the melody may be corrupt, but they 
are overcome in the creative and formative poetic sense. 
The poetic sense, thus , directs the work of art. But there must 
be l)n intelligible sense, or the work would be wholly obscure or 
unintelliQible: !t would be nonsense . Th.ls does not mean that the 
poetic sense ts nonsensical; it only means that the poetic sense is 
not cut o(f [rom intelli9lblllty. 
The poetic sense is the first eptph~ny of pOetic tntuiUon . The 
second emergent phase is action or theme (the meaning of the action) . 
The third phase is number or harmonious expansion . All three of 
these phases aro essential to the production of any artistic •.vork., but 
each work or art is a unique embod iment of one of these phases. 
Art I considered as a.n end in itself, does gJve the ~ppreciator 
significant emotion; the ap-preciator is caused to see as the anist 
originally saw. But if art ls an end in itself, the creator cannot 
strive for emotional effect . Moreover I Maritain rejects theorJes of 
empathy, because of their over emphasis on subjectivity. Freedom 
from life's practical urges and necessity, purgation of the pass1ons, 
and slgn!flcant emotion are offered by art . 
But art cannot be divorced from the man who produces or 
appreciates h . Art has a final goal, but its final goal must stand in 
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innocence in pu.r9in9 immoral and corrupt practices and ideas), the 
poetic sense is itself Innocent as the basic melody of the work . The 
harmonies which correspond to the melody may be corrupt, b·Jt they 
a.ro overcome In the creative and formative poetic sense . 
The poetic sense~ th!JS, directs the work of art. But there must 
be an lntelli9ible sense~ or the work would be wholly obscure or 
un1ntc1Ugiblc: 1t would .be non sen so . This does not mean that the 
poetic sense is nonsensical; it only means that the poetic sense is 
not cut off from intelligibility . 
The poetic sense Is tho first epiphany of poetic intuition. The 
second emergent phase 1s action or theme (the meaning of the action) . 
The third phase is number or harmonious e;<pansion. AH :hree of 
these phases are essential to the producuon of any artistic work I but 
each work or art is a ur.ique embodiment of one of these phases . 
Art, considered as an end in itself, does glve the apprecJatot 
significant emotion; the appreciator Is caused to see as tho 4rHst 
originally saw. But if art is an end in Itself 1 ~ho creator cannot 
strive for emotional effect . Moreover I M&r1!&1n rejects 1haorics of 
empathy, because of their overemphasis on subjectivity. Freedom 
from life's practical urges and necessity, pur9at1on of the pass tons I 
and significant emotion arc offered by art. 
But art cannot be divorced from the man who produces or 
appreciates it. Art has a final goal, but Its final goo! must stand In 
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spiritual pleasures . At least, art 1s a thrust upward in the direction 
of the transcendentals, which are facets of the divine be in; . It is 
but a step from beauty to God. 
Art may be either generally religious (in the precedinQ and m 
a somev1hat more speciaHzed sense) or specifically relig:ous or 
socre<i; the latter is for employment tn divme worship . When lt ls 
so used, it comes under special criteria , such as orthodo>."Y and 
Hturq1ca.J practice . But art, in general, rloes not have such restricted 
developrr.ent or appreciation . 
PART Ill 
COMPARISON, EVALUATIOX, SUMMARY 
CHAPTER VII 
COMPARISONS 
Both T!llich and Marltain have been pQrmitted to speak for them-
selves and in their o·.vn manner as much as possible. The thtn9s ·.vhtch 
each one emphasizes have been emphasized without an ~uempt to pour 
both men Into some preconceived or a priori mold . As a result there ls 
no slmple set of questions, which they were t~sked and to wh1ch they 
proceeded to respond: in the development of their systems . Consequently, 
the attempt to compare and contrast these views cannot be in full 
detail . The main purpose of this procedure has been the aspiration for 
maximal obJectlvl:y . 
It is possible, however, to specify major areas of agreement and 
d isaqrccment which prevail between these two me:"' . This chapter will 
be directed to an enumeration and examination of these. 
It must .be emphasized that the cntique of each m~n is begtnnin9 
in thts chapter 1 for ?Omts of aoreement wil l tend to be strong points 
(though it is recognized that the !act that they agree does not make 
them nght}; points of disagreement ...... til bring out problematic areas. 
The stature of these men and the critiques they would make of each other 
provide a key discussion in the evaluation of this dissertation . 
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1. SlmUariHes 
1. Pos1tive Attitude tov;ard Art 
Many religious thinkers have been extremely negative toward art 
and other cull!:ural manlfestations. They have tended to reject art as a 
temptation of the flesh, as an incitement toward evil, or as a serious 
waste of time. Augustine complains about the lust of ea1in9 and 
drink.mg, the charms of perfumes, pleasures of the ear, allwements of 
tho eyes. Even hymns sung In church tn the .. ..-orsh.ip o! God may reduce 
spuitual insiqhts and enjoyments. "\\"hen it happens to me to be more 
moved by the singing than by what is sunq, I confess myself to have 
sinned criminally, and then I would rather not have hea:-d the s1ngln9 . .. 1 
The most pm'lcrful temptations of the senses, (or Augustine, are those 
of vision and beautiful forms . 
What numberless things, made by various atts and 
monufactures, both in our apparel, shoes , vessels, and 
every kind of work, in pictures, too, and sundry images, 
and these gomg far beyond necessary and modcra:e use 
and holy s1gnificatJon, have men added for the er.thtal -
ment of the eyes; followin9 outwardly whet they make, 
forsaking inwardly Hlm by whom they were made, and 
destroying that which they themselves were made 12 
The attitude and influence of Calvin and Calvinism are indicated 
in a br!ef statement made by Mayer: "The Calvinists were qreatly 
1St. Augustine The Confessions x . 33 . Th!s and the following 
quotauon are from the J. G . PiUonqton translation . 
2 Ib!d . ' x . 34 . 
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responsible for dimln!shlng the esthetic Influence of the Renaissance . • 1 
.o\lthough many others could be cJted, the preceding: su9gesuons are 
indicahve of the attitude of many rellQlous thinkers . 
One of the most obvious and most striking impress ions received 
from both )Aaritaln ond TUlich is that they embrace art as providing some 
of the most sign!Hcont Insights into reality, as affording a depth 
dimension which is rel19ious (in preparation or implication). and as 
being especially beneficial rather than deleterious, s imply gratifying 
to the lower part of the be!ng, or wasteful Oust worthless fineryl in 
effect . 2 
Primitive dances, mud, corruption, the most morally degenerate 
elements are Incor-porated in art, but this does not destroy the arustk: 
lrmocence of the work . 3 Moreover, human functions which are normll.lly 
regarded by religious thinkers as taboo or as performed only with a 
sense of outlt are accepted as perfectly legitimate and normal human 
funcuor.s . For example, Tillich accepts sex as a legitimate phase of 
human extstence, and he feels that one of the reasons for its coming to 
such overwhelm in~ power in contemporary socie ty is that 1t has lost 
1
rrederick Mayer, A History of Modern Philosophy (New York: 
American Book Co., 19Sil, pp , 43-44 . 
2
vide supra, pp. 155- 156, 164-167 , 178-188, 339 · 343. 
3
v1de supra, pp . 179, 318 - 319 . 
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its religious connections and overtones . "Protestantism, in rejecting 
sexual symbolism, is in danger not only of losing much symbolic 
wealth !:>ut also of cutting off the sexual realm from the 9round of being 
and meaning in which tt is rooted and from .. ..-hi ch u. gets tts conse-
cration . "! T!lllch does not exploin what he means by "the rich use of 
sexual symbols in classical Christiamty, .. 2 but he may have 1:'\ mind a 
variety of symbols clustering a!'ound the vlr91n and the ha.by . At any 
rate, it is probable that Marltaln would reject the T!lllchlan approach 
to religious sexual symbols . His ov.•n l!ltUtude toward sex may be some -
what more sublimated . However, both Maritain and T11lich are w1111ng 
to accept elements wh!Ch are frequently regarded as evil both !n art 
and ln common human activity as perfectly leglumate in art. 
Muitain does not so unhesitatingly embrace all human functtons 
as legitimate, but he tends to think of llle9itlmate elemems as freely 
entering into the work though overcome in the _pun!ying fires of 
creativtty and in the corresponding pe>ettc sense , Here Maritam proceeds 
in a fashion slmllar to Croce as he develops the concept that the 
images or the poetic vision arc not merely concatenated; they are held 
together in a total impression . And Jt is this total impression which 
really determines the sign1!1canee of the work . 'Nhat is applicable in 
1
-rillich, Systematic Theology , I. 119, n. 4 . 
2!oid . 
terms of meaning (epistemologically\ is appllcoble to the moral (and 
immoral) elements entering into the work of art . 1 
Thus !vlaritain and Tillich may differ upon certain phases of the 
basis for their positive ottitude to ... ,.ard art, but there are some more 
basic reasons for such an attitude. which bind them toqether . The 
positive attitude grows out of these underlyin9 factors: art is based 
on beauty 1 which is an attribute of God: the u ltimate CtJteqories of 
the universe emerge as essentially aesthetic; human creativity is 
rooted in God or Is an lmltotlon of divine creativity; and for Tilllch 
art has its depth dimension, for Marttatn art is the :tower and per-
fection of the world and contemplation is the culmination of earthly 
religious experience and existence . 
ll . Tension between Art and Religion 
While tho attitude of both Maritoin and Tillich Is positive, both 
recognize the danger that art may achieve a $lt~~tus in wh!ch the tl'\le 
God is dethroned for this false God . Beauty may have pnests and all 
of the cult of divine worship . 2 The worshiper may succumb to the 
beauty of Bach' s music and miss the slgnl£1cance of the music . 3 In 
lvide supra, pp . 314- 319. 
2Vide supra, pp . 297-299 . 
3Vide supra, pp . 165-166. 
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sum, that whleh ts hJqher may be sacnficed to that .. ,.·hich is lower. 
In Maritain there is tension between :he senses and reason, the 
flesh and the spirit , There is a desire to think of man as a whole. who 
has senses and reason or flesh and spirit, but there is a direction ir. 
which thls unified being moves, which ts away from one facet of the 
being. That is, though the senses may be accc~ned es leg1ttrnatc, they 
are ie91tlmate only as lon9 as they occupy a subordinate position . The 
ideal , for Marltain , is God , who does not have these senses. 
In TUUch's thought there is conflict between the ultimate an-d the 
preHminary, and Tillich recOQntzes the problems of malntafntn9 a proper 
atatude tov~··ard things which surround men. But since the ultimate can be 
revealed only ln things, it is impossible to completely dispense wtth 
them . The necessity of retaining the natural world but ln a propor manner 
provides a source of d lfticulty which ls completely Inescapable . One 
must perennially struggle agamst the tendency toward idolatrous attach-
ment to some specific object or set of obJects . 
111. Beauty and God 
for T!lltch there is beauty-ttself. For Ma.ritain beauty ts a 
trattsccndental . Thus for both there is o recoynition that beauty is 
resident in the ultimate being. Beauty ts not 'ust some subjectively 
manufactured characteristic; nor is it objective quality simply: beeuty 
is one of the primary character istics of ultimate reality .1 
This mvolves two things: if beauty !s one of the primary 
character istics of ultimate reality, religion and art are inseparable; 
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and if beauty is pred1c4b!o of God, this means thot the ultimate 
categones of the universe are partially aesthetic . The Inseparability 
of religion ~nd art and the 4Scr1ption of aesthetic cateQor!es to ultimate 
reallty are both firmly held by Marltaln and Tlllleh. For example, 
Tillich regards the enhre universe as under the sway of beauty even 
more than under goodness (from the perspective of morality) , The 
fact that Tlllich is more concerned with beauty than with morality stems 
as much from whot he has not said as from what he has sald: Tlll lch 
has sald very little about the relation between art and morality, a.nd 
he introduces s uch a naturalistic approach to art that one wonders 1f 
he ts particularly interested in the relation . 
Maritain also thinks of the universe as subsumed under aestheUc 
cateqories, but he tencis to regard the c;ood of man {for h1m a moral 
cateQory, for some the essence of rell<;tonl as more irr.portant than art . 
Ultimately an ts instrumental. Nevertheless, the world can be 
regarded as God ' s work of art, and to God all things in his cosmos are 
lvlde supra, pp , 180-182, 281-290 . 
beautiful except sln 1 and sin is u9ly prectsely because 1t is tainted 
with nothingness.! 
It 1s impOrtant to not lee that neither reduces morality to the 
keeping of tules . For both it is a matter of continued effort ln the 
proper direction . 
tv. Divine and Human Creat1vity 
3S8 
Maritain has much to say about the relationsh1p between human 
and divine creativity. There aro references to this !hrou9hout 1he 
discussion of Maritain. 2 The human and the divine creativity are 
aUke 1:"1 many respects I but this should not cause Ol"'.e to regard them 
as stnular m all respects . 
T!lllch ~lso relates the human end the divine creativity. but he 
ts much less inclined to speak of divine creation; no doubt this is due 
to the extremely anti-anthropomorphic alGment in his ihOUQht. TO 
regard human and divine creativity as analogous would draw the d!vine 
down too much into human ways . There are numerous dtsttncttons between 
the divine and the human order whtch can be reconciled only with 
difftct!lty; e .9 . between time and eternity~ divine and natural causal 
power, and divine and human knowledge (especially foreknowledge) . 
The next section will elaborate the relation between divine and 
human creatlvJty further. 
1v1de supra, pp . 286-287 . 2vtde supra , pp . 291 - 296, 330-335 . 
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v . Creatlvity and the Unconscious 
Both Marttaln and Tllllch make much of the rolationslup between 
creation and the unconscious, but this 9eneral agreement does not 
mean specific agreement in theories of the unconscious . Tilllch's 
theory is related to his concept of the abyss in ultimate reality . The 
abyss In ultimate reality Is the dark side of ultlmate reality . It Is 
cre(ltive ~ seething, primitive, chaotic . 1t destroys forms in the 
construction of nev<' forms . Creativity in man rests upon the primitive, 
chaotic, yearning, str.iv!ng, destructive ... creattve aspect of his nature, 
and this is not fully revealad to his consciousness . Jn 16tcr writings 
TiJllch tends to consider human unconsctousnoss as opc!t to the 
dtvlne consciousness . Even the dtvtne abyss is not as dark and as 
much in obscurity to the ultimate as it appears to be in his earllest 
cons1derations .1 
Mar1toin also regards the unconscious (v.·hich ~aritatn prefers 
to call preconscious) as an indispensable factor in arusuc creation, 
and though the unconscious is as creative for Marite1n as for Tillich 
it has a destructive or undisciplined factor only as an indicatlon of 
weakness . That ls, Maritain is much more cautious in prescrvinq 
the ratlonality of the unconscious . He freely rejects much of the 
Freudian analysts as characteristic of animals but not of hu:nan beings 
1vtde supra, pp , ~ S - 49. 
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in toto: i .e . man has not only an animal nature (which Freud analyzed), 
he has a splfituaJ and rational nature as well . Moreover, it is from the 
spiritual aspect of human nature that creation in the arts proceeds . 1 
TiJlich 1s also cautious to maintain that he does not desire to 
make of human O!' divino creation an irrational acUvity and manliestation . 
On the other hand, there is much which he says to give an irratior.al 
slant to his discussion . Morltain does have to include two types of 
preconscious, whereas Tilltch has on ly one type; T1lUch's position lS 
closer to most contemporary analyses . Though it has been suggested 
that T1Jltch's view leaves room for 1rrahonaJ.ity, it must be quickly 
included that his emphasis on reason is such that even 1f the move-
ments of the unconscious are nonrattonal~ the operation of reason in 
man can impress sufficient form upon these destt'.J.Ctive-creatlve urges 
to preclude it from becoming irrational. And certainly there ts enough 
absurdity or 1rrat1onallty in God's universe (at least to empirical 
observation) to cause one to think that God is not fuUy able to overcome 
every problem and dUflculty within his 011o·n nature . Or at loast for 
some reason or other God is perm1tttn9 evil, pain, and destruction to 
to be quite prevalent. And possibly Tillich's view leaves more basts 
for real nove lty and creativity. 2 
lvlde suora, pp . 273 - 278. 
2vlde supra, pp. 39-SO. 
Another significant difference between Mnr1tol.n and Tillich 
Ues In T!ll!ch's insistence upon the d istlnctlon between an individual 
and a collective unconscious . Tillich makes much of the need ior 
creation's spnnging from the collective unconscious so that communi-
cation wlll be possible . Maritain does not include communication as 
one or the essential factors ln creation. and he does not give explic it 
considerat ion to this distinction within the unconscious ,1 
vi. The Autonomy of ATt and R&llglon 
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Both Matltain and T!ll!ch look upon art and religion as independent 
yet interrelated spheres . The influence of one sphere upon the other 
is lnd1rcct . This means that for the most port an is free from the 
domination of religion and that art! sUe truth does not have to submit 
to religious truth. 
For Tillich this relationship seems even mere open-ended than 
for Marita1n, and one of the major rea. sons for this Hes in their attitudes 
tow·ard reH9ton . Tilllch's concept of rel1qlon is very plastic w!th 
regard co everything except one basic doqma--the Protestant principle . 
By means of thts bt~sic dogma every idolatrous c laim to ultimacy is 
disowned, &nd no theory or person (except for the special instance and 
In the special manner of Christ) holds an untouchable (inviolate) 
1Vide supra, pp. 50-66. 273-278 . 
status. Thus there are no pondersome and all-inclusive rules and 
regulations to impose upon art and the artist. 1 
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Maritain does have a religious conviction which re9ulates large 
areas of his thinking. Even after he offers his best insights he reqards 
hlmself as subject to the larger and better vision of his Ch.urch . But 
in spite of this he maintains that even as contemplation ts the goal of 
man in via 1 even so 1s art the olory of natural man . Art has a dignity 
~nd s rreedom which is about as complete as anything else In the 
world . It stands only under divine judgment~ and only God Is abso-
lutely free. Thus art for Marltain is not cramped by reiiQious traditions 
and stereotypes; lt IS gloriously free to operate , .. ;ithtn its own 
perspective$ and to construct its own world, ar.d its creative freedom 
has the quality of innocence . 2 
vii. Primary Emphasis on Insight 
If some theorists have been preoccupied ··~lth techmques # methods, 
and rules, such cert~lnly cannot be said or Marlt~in or Tllllch . Both 
have emphasized the need for an an which has something to say 
rather than for ~n art which says little or nothlnq very well. In fact, 
Tilllch Is so Involved In the insight phase of art that he would almost 
lv,de supra, pp. 211-214. 
2VIde suora, pp, 333-335 . 
be guilty of completol y omitting technique were it not for his very 
latest statement on the topic .1 
Marttain suggests that the artist comes to the point ln his 
experience at which there is a secret communion between the self and 
the world; this communion discloses secrets about both the self and 
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the world because of the emotional, volitional , es •.voll as intellectual 
uni!!catlon of the self at the deepest level of the being in an experience 
by which the self is seen as connatured with the world. Tho only 
monner in which this experience and the knowledge involved can be 
both elaborated and communicated is in an artistic work . Tho 
appreciator ls caused iO see what the artist sees (in part, at leastl by 
means of his own significant emotion induced by the work, 2 
THUch also speaks of a discovery of the inner secrets of th1ngs 
by an empathic projection which ls properly distanced . He does not 
d istinQuish as carefully between the creator and the appreciator, for 
he seems to re9ard their experiences as basically the same. The baste 
significance of art is to indicate a phase of ultimate meantnq, to 
reveal a facet of ultimate reality (beauty) . 3 
1Vide s upra, pp . 176- 178 . 
2vide supra, pp . 314- 319. 
3Vlde supra, pp . 180-182 . 
The insight gained , for Marttatn , is not of the na ture of 
revelation , but it does prepare one for the life of the spirit or the 
presence of God: it moves in the direction of God . l TUUch's view 
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of revelatlon differs from Maritain's: Tilllch's view is not propo-
sitional and dogmatic. It ts not •• ..,ithout human reciplence end inter-
pretation . It !S not infallible . Thus for Tilllch there is no content or 
subst~nce uniquely revealed in the sense that it provides a core of 
doctrine which could be attained only by some mysterious thing called 
revelation. There is no earthly book or Church which has Hnal ·.vo:r<i, 
and to ·"'•hich obedience is necessary. No eva:u Is incapable of 
providing an encounter with ultimate reality. There is no sacred and 
profane; there ls no natural and supernatural in any traditiona l 
Christian .sense . There are only events in which the awareness of man 
is sensitive to the divine presence and there are events in whtch the 
mind is callous and 1mperceptive. To restrict divine revelation to a 
book, person, or institution ls to destroy tho very possibility of 
revelation . Nevertheless, art is one of the supreme ly transparent 
areas for an encounter with the depth or being, with ultimate reality . 2 
Marltatn also believes that people outside of Reman Catholicism 
have experiences of roal faith and vital participation in God, but his 
1Vide supra, pp . 339-343 . 
2Vide suora, pp . 178-180 . 
commitment to the visible Church is so profound that he cannot accept 
a posit ion such as Tllllch's which not only brings the Church Itself 
under divine judgment but also regards many people or the latent 
Church as closer to the Kln9dom than people or the visible Church . 
MarUaln may brinq tooether as closely as possible the realms of 
nature and grace, but he does not dissolve the distinction .1 
Consequently, Maritatn•s and Tillich•s concepts of art, though 
concurrlng in the fact that insight ls essential end- primary, differ 
with respect to what it is that is revealed , For Mar!tatn an can only 
lead one into a place where one Is open to the d1vL11e encounter . For 
TUilch It Is art itseU which has a depth dimension; art ltsel! ts 
essentially religious . For Marltaln the Insights afforded by art are, 
as lon9 os they are merely art, pure ly natural. For Tillich ttue 
arttsuc insights have a reliQious facet . 
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Marltain's position appeals to the confirmed religious soul, to 
one who must be related to some spec! He religious institution or 
organization; Tillich's position appeals to the uncommitted (externally), 
the skeptic, the one , .. ·ho longs for God but who is too nonconform1st 
to accept the rlqidlty and smugness o f specific religious or9anizat1ons. 
1vide supra, pp . 332- 335. 
2 . Contrasts 
The contrasts have been mentioned for the most part in the 
preceding discussion of similarities . It was necessary to show not 
only that there were slmllorlt!es but where these similarities broke 
down. This wHl serve as an emphasis and summary. 
i . Communication and Expression 
On this point there seems to be more difference of opinion than 
at most other basic level s . Mo.r1ta1n doos not reqard the function of 
the artist as communication . It is necessary !or the artist to express 
himseH; this is fundamental to the creative aspect of his art . 
CommuntcaUon is a superabundance; tt is vital :or i:he appreciator of 
the work, but It Is not an essential part of ltte work itself. 1 
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Tllllch clearly Indicates that one of the major functions of art is 
to communicate . But Tillich insists that this is not the communication 
of information as an encyclopedia or textbook conveys :acts . Art Is 
essential to the communication of a level of understanding of reality, 
which cannot be qrasped in any other fashion . Art seems to bring the 
appreciator closer to an understanding of ultimate reality than theo .. 
logical discourse . With this Maritain would lorgcly agree J and the 
difference seems to be primarily terminological. What Maritain tends 
to fear 1s that art will become primarily instrumental and simply serve 
lvide supra, pp . 310-311 . 
the purpose of information. What Tilllch tends to fear is that art will 
be mere finery or ornamentation and wtll lose its s1gniUcance as 
providing essential 1ns1Qhts into the secrets of the universe. Both 
regard art as cunilf\g in the appreciator to siqnificant insights . 
II. Concept of Religion and Religious Art 
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Stemming from thetr different concepts of rellglon is a correlated 
difference in the concept of religious art . Maritain recognizes that 
art mt~y be religious in a c;~eneral sense, but art which is used for tho 
purpose of worship should be orthodox anc liturgicelly sound . 1 
Tilltch does not seem to regard the notion of onhodoxy as important . 
In fact, 1t may be that the an Is so orthodox tha! it precludes some 
M><!ous soul from worshjping ~causa of his skepticism ab¢ut tha 
adequacy of orthodoxy . T!lltch ts not nearly so concerned about 
orthodoxy as he is about worship in which one is confronted with 
ultimate concern . One may be rl9ht and dead (Intellectually ao.d 
spir!tu~lly) or one may not conform to the churcn•s notion of rightness 
and be mcreasingly alive to contempOrary problems and issues in their 
relation to the ultimate . 2 
1VIde supra, pp . 343-345 . 
2vlde supra, pp . 182-188 . 
This may bo one of the clearest d!stinctlons between Tillich and 
Mar ita in, and lt is based upon their respective Protestantism and 
Roman Catholicism. This is too general e statement to be rig1dly 
maintained, but it appears that there is some t;ood basis for making 
such a gener~! assertion. 
1!1 . Open or Closed System 
368 
It may be said that the ultimate dlfference between Maritain anci 
Tilltch is in the relatively closed or open character of their respective 
systems . Neither has a completely closed or a completely open 
system, but Matitain tends more to a closed system (on the basts of 
his rehgious commitments) and THUch tends more to an open system 
(on the basis of Ills religious eommllmentsl . Nel!her Is completely 
c losed to new concepts, both are eommiteci to a dogmatic principle . 
Art is still, for both, an area of creative freedom , anC u may employ 
e lements which if put in their relig1ous or moral context would be 
highly unoccoptoble . T!ll!ch would probably go further 1n his 
admission o! aU kinds of disturbinq elements (to relig:ious and moral 
sensiuvuyl into the work., but both 9rant an amaz ing {from the 
religious standpoint) amount of freedom to the artist and h1s work. 
Another way of puttinq the difference between Maritain and 
Tllhch is by saying that Marttatn•s system re:n1nds one of an e!e<;ant 
mathematical proof or loglcol system . It Is tightly knit by logical 
consistency and careful definition. The work of TilHch ts an 
aesthetic whole with parts cohorinQ not by logical lmpllcatlon (though 
not inconsJstently) but by beauty and harmony . Marita!n's work is 
scientific and methodical. Tillich 's work is artistic, poetic, and 
literary. In short, one could broadly say that Tillich ' s thouoht is 
Platonic; Maritain ' s system is Aristotelian . This must !'lOt be 
considered as an overs1mpl1ficatlon but rather as an attempt to focus 
the 9eneral results into one pithy assertion , 
3. Summary 
Simllaritles and conb'asts between Tlllich and Maritaln have 
been pointed out. There are more points of conver9ence than of 
dlveroence, but tile reasons for the eonvarqenee vary. And eve!\ at 
the points of agreement there are frequently divisive factors which 
seem to loom larger than the agreement. 
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(ll Maritaln and Tllllch both have • pes!Uve attitude toward art, 
thouqh they are basically religious thinkers . The basis of this is not 
the same, 4nC THltch's acceptance of human action appears to be 
more lenlent, whereas Maritain accepts in art what he would condemn 
in general human conduct. (2) Both realize the tension between art 
and relioion. (3) Beauty Is the primary quality of an, and beauty is 
a qualtty or attribute of God or ultimate rea lity . But Marltoin is more 
concerned with morality than TUltch. Aesthetic categones are somewhat 
more pronounced in Tilllch than in Marltaln. (4) Human and divine 
creativity are closely related either es an imitation or continuation 
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of divine creativity or as springing from the al>ys:nal character of God. 
(5) Creativtty and tho unconscious ere also closely related . Maritai.n's 
analysis of human croation is more detailed . He distingu1shes between 
the preconscious and the unconscious; TUlich's basic distinction is 
between the individual and the collective unconscious. He puts the 
source of human creativity in the process aspect (abyss} of ultimate 
reality. Maritain gives no basis lor the possibility of process In God . 
TUlich tends toward the suggestion that thero is an irrational element 
in art; Marltaln Insists always that there !s nothing irrational (though 
the artist's wcakr.ess may admit such entranco into the work) &bout 
art or artistic creation . (6) Both Tilllch and Maritaln Insist on the 
autonomy of art and re!lgton . for both this is a limited autonomy so 
far as art is concerned . (7) Both Tlll!ch and Marltain Insist on insight 
as havinQ the primacy over technique or pleasure, but what ts experi-
enced In relation b the religious differs for each . For Maritain the 
highest potnt of ertistic 1nstght is natural and cut off from the super-
natural (thou9h art provides insight into an attribute of Godl . For 
Tlll!ch art provides Insights Into ultimate reality Itself. 
(8) Tilllch and Maritaln differ on whether art ts expression or 
communication, thouqh Maritain, arter insisting that art is basically 
express i ve to the cre.otor 1 proceeds to include communication as a 
superabundance and as essential to the appreciator . (91 TUI!ch and 
Maritain differ on the nature of religion and on the signifleance of 
religious art . ReU91ous art must depend upon on:hodox doctrine and 
llturgical usage, for Marltain . Since he does not have a body of 
doctrine in the same manner as Marita.in, and since he is not nearly 
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so concerned about the •• salvation of the lost,,. Tilhch is less concerned 
·.vith the sattsfact!on of a religious crlterion other than the Protestant 
principle . (10) Tilllch and Marttatn tend toward a relatively open and 
a relatively closed system respectively , TiUich' s approach is artistic, 
provocative, creative, coherent. Maritam's approach ls methodical, 
logically consistent, tightly knit, and systematic . 
CHAPTER VIii 
EVALUATION 
The conclud1n<;J chapter will be rather brief Since summary and 
evaluation have already been begun in the preceding chapter. This 
chapter v:Ul comprise the c;eneral evalueuve approach whtch ts bein9 
made to ... oarci Marttaln and Tlllich, the spec1fication of the basic 
problem or both mon, a separate evaluation of each man, er.d a 
conc luding statement . 
1. Gener~l Evaluative Approach 
There are numerous reosons for !tot producing a qreatly ~xpanded 
cntiquc of Marita1n end T1111ch, but the most pertinent are that the 
emphasis of the disscnatlon is upon e rela:ively ob~ecuve statement 
of the problems encountered by these men and the1r solutions to them, 
and [hat the structure of their thouQht 1s such that only a very extensive 
critique could make any claim to adequacy . 
In examininq a philosophic troatise or position H is nccossary to 
determine whether tho single ueatise can stand alone or whether it !s 
such an inte9ral aspect of a broader position that its message cc:t be 
apprehended only by an examination whtch extends to the full scope of 
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the posit! on. If the work is independent of other considerations, one 
can analyze it without external ram1f1eations. One cor. proceed to 
attack proposutons and refute them. HO\~;·ever, if what ts presented is 
only one phase of~ thinker' s posltton, any adequate refutation would 
have to take the whole system into account . 
Thus for two basic reasons this l!nol chapter w!ll adopt the policy 
of pointing toward tondcncies in the th0u9ht of TilUch and Maritaln 
rather than to try to refute certain aspects of these positions . This 
dissertation Is baslcolly an attempt at setting forth clearly the positions 
of Tllllch and Manta!n, and both men could be adequately mfuted only 
if there were time to assess their basic assumptions and to shcr. ... · the 
9eneral inadequacies of their positions as a wholg . Consequ-ently, the 
plan for thts chapter is to point to\•lard basic problematlc tendencies 
without any attempt at a full formal refutat1on. 
2. One Basic ?roblem 
If there Is any qeneral criticism of both T1ll!ch and Maritain, It 
is the question as to the empirical relevance and adequacy of these 
positions. Do these positions at key points veer off from the facts and 
hypostauz.e abstruse systems and entities? Can there be such total 
dismissal of scientific method and procedure? Here lt must be granted 
that Marlta!n has a thorough back<Jround m science, but Madtaln is no 
more interested than Tillich in permttttn9 science to provide a basts for 
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the transtormauon of a dogma or philosophic concept . Phllosophy 
(metaphysics} and theology are supreme and use science; ho·.vever, 
they are in turn not vitally affected by science . Possi bly both attempt 
to "save the appearances, .. but a more extended effort in this c!.irecUon 
might have resolved various difficulties . 
T\vo critics point to weak spots m Maritaln's theory of the 
unconscious : 
Mar1ta1n's conception of the preconscious tnteUect 
is not backed by the sort of empjrical evidence 
appealed to by depth psychologists whc do Insist 
on the meaning-fulness of the concept of the 
unconscious; hence, Maritain docs not c laim the 
support of the only evidence for the unconscious 
which mi9ht be regarded as scientifica11y acceptable . 1 
"Thore are phases o! hls psychology--particularly those that bear upon 
his doetrt:'l.e o: the spiritual preconsclous--that will suroly strike us as 
exceedingly cumbersome and perhaps even obscurantist. .. z Maritaln ' s 
problem here seems to be his lack of interest in empirical data . 
A critique by Vincent Turner fs most sl<;;ntficant in thls respect . 
The author confesses (tonQue In cheek\ that he may stmply be dis -
p laytnq a British prejudice, but that he has one basic cr!!1c1sm concerning 
1ca.rl R. Hausman, *Maritaln's hucrpretatlon of Creativity in 
Art, • The Journal of Aesthetics and Art CriUc!sm, XIX (Winter, 1960), 
217 . 
2Nathan A. Scott, jr . , "The Collaboration of Vls>on In the 
Poetic Act, " The Christian Scholar , XL (December, 1957\, 286 . 
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an element which vitiates Mar.ltain's entire Creative Intuition in Art and 
Poetry. Marltain does not proceed by "a patient , modest, omptr£c~.l 
inductive method'•:1 rather he Ls "a Himalayan climber in a realm of 
essences ."'2 He points out that Maritain fails to discuss particular 
poems and pictures to any !llumlnating extent and one is hard put to 
determine the manner of the testebllity of Maritain's assertions . 3 
Turner even qocs so far as to say that books liko Maritain's are tedious 
ar.d unilluminallno : "it has to do wuh the high altitude from which the 
subject is surveyed, w1th the fact that there is little or no concern to 
melntaln communication with actual works of art, and w.lth the conse-
quential evacuation of the meaning of the assertions that arc made . u4 
Vv'ith all of thts I in praise of Maritain Turner says that 1f one accepts 
Marna~n·s way of doing thin9s1 he ts one of the most important in his 
particular tradition . 
While Turner's rejection of Mar ita in is too complete, the main 
point o£ his problem 1s well taken; Maritaln is just not su(fie1ently 
concerned •,o;Jth re latln9 his position to the omplrical. 
Criticism of Tllllch might proceed olong the some lines. TiUich 
docs mention several paintlnos tn his writinos I and he seems to have 
a highly sens1tive aesthetic taste; however, he no more than mentions 
1vtncent turner, " Poets and Painters : M. Maritain on Creative 
Intuition," The Month, CXCVIII (November, 1954), 27L 
3Ibid ' ' pp , 273, 276 , 4rDid . , P . zso . 
-
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some1hin9 concrete than he veers off into the expanse of ultimate 
reality and the profound tns19hts whtch are to be found by an apprehension 
which goes to the depth of the work . 
A more general statement concerning his lack of empirical 
considerations Js found in Randall's assertion: "The one strand of the 
philosophical tradition which he does not take very seriously. and 
consequently fails to illuminate , is the empincism s temming from 
Loc:ke ."l 
3 . Evaluation of TiUich 
1. Ambiguity in the Distinction between Art and Religion 
The central issue fn the case of TUHch's ciiscu.sslon oi art and 
rell91on seems to be that he is not su!rtctently clear or. the charac-
terlstlcs by which these are to be d lstln9ulshed . The crucial problem 
1s simply to state THUch's view on the relation between art and 
re ligto:1 . 
On one hand, Tillleh suggests th!lt -.·.·hen the obJect ls presented 
in tts Immediacy, it is to be considered from its perspective os art . 
But when the same object is considered from the perspective of depth, 
1John Herman Randall. ]r., "The Ontology of Paul THlich," 
The Theology of Paul Tilllch, ed . Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. 
Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co . , 1952), p . 133 . 
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it is no lonQor art but religion . 1 Now If this is the case, can there be 
aesthetic experience which is intrinsically signiiicant or must it perform 
the instrumental function of communicating some rel1Q1ous message? 
This 1s a problem which Is largely avoided by YJaritatn•s analysts . 
If or.e attempts to defend Tllllch's approach by saying that his 
language is imprecise but his intentions are proper, one may probe 
further to say that there Is a depth cilmenslon in art, In which there is 
e disc losure o£ ultimate reality but not in the some manner or from the 
seme perspect!vo as religious revelation . 2 However, it is by no means 
certain that this is what Tilltch really means . 
The tnslQhts g iven by art appear not to be immed1ately religious, 
but they are indirectly religious . Nevertheless, art, as a cultural 
manifestation, Is primarily question rather than answer . But very 
curious ly Tl!llch insists that the u ltimate subject matter of art Is 
ultimata reality and styles are religiously siqniftc:ont . 3 Moreover, 
Tillich even compares art with theological discourse (as the arguments 
for the existence of God would ordlnar!ly be considered), and the 
• reve~HnQ pO\.,·er of art comes out vory high in tho comparison . .. 
Tllllch docs not want to dlsttnouish bet\vcen the sacred and the 
secular; he includes the organized church under JudQment just as much as 
1vide supra, pp . 163-170. 
3vlde suer•, pp . 190-194. 
2vlcie supra, pp . 166-167 . 
4VIdc supra, p . 178 . 
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culture. Then he proceods to say that overything has tts depth 
dimension, so cel!glon ts everywhere; it does not need to be limited. to 
o particular area or orqani~ation . But then v.·hat is the relation ber ... ,.een 
religious insiqhts m art and those inslt;;hts which arc purely a~ I sUe or 
aesthetic? If one says that the deepest insights are religious, then does 
this mean that ort must cease to be art in order to be aesthetically 
adequate? I 
It may be that the basic distinction is between art and religion in 
the area of insiqht and motivation . Art provides insights into the wholo 
spiritual situation 1n contrast to science and religion, which are 
effective in the transformation of situations. 2 But if this 1s taken as 
the primary dlstlnCtl<>n, then does this mean that an could not produce 
some changes in tho thinking and living of men vdthout becoming 
re1ig1on, or does tt mean that reltQion could l'l.ot <;;rant insights as well 
as transfor~ations? 
Is Tillich's theory of the resolution of conflicts in reason by 
revelation adequate? Especially In respect to art Tllllch almost 
requires that art cease to be art in order to be artistically adequate . 
The depth dimension, the cessation of lovtty, the profound insiqht 
into the depth of reason itself--these ate necessary for adequacy of 
the aesthetic. Aesthetic experience ts insight mto beauty, but !t is 
1v1de suora, pp . 166-167. 2v1de supra, pp . 155-156 . 
also insight into the judgment of ultimate reality upon existentlel 
distortions . Now if this does not have some rel!gtous significance 
in Ti1llch ' s system, what Js there in his system which does have 
religious signtftcancc? 
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It is true that an asks questions, which are answered by religion . 
But port of the analysis o! art Itself Is tn terms of rel19lon . Tllllch 
doos not :ully develop Ms theory of styles, but he doos say that tho 
five whtch he considers are present to some extent in every work of 
art . Thus every work of art has relig1ously s1gniiicant stylistic keys . 
Evory work of art is an answer as well as a question . What, then , does 
Tllllch mean by saying that the answers do not rise out of the questions? 
Problems involved in styles may not be es conclusive as they 
mit1ally appear, for Tillich's insistence upon the comin9 tOQether of 
question and answer 1 culture and religion is here concre te ly exemplified . 
Tho only proble m, once again, is that of disUngu1shing the t'.·:o facets 
which are concretely tO<}ether . But If one will carefully analyze Tlllich ' s 
stylistic keys, one -. .. ·Ul discover that there is scarcely anything which 
they express , which necessarily 900s beyond tho purely cultural . That 
is, what is uniquely rollgious about the uniting of 4 particular with its 
cosmic significance? What is reliQlous about the emphasis upon unity? 
What !s rel19ious about descnptive or critical realism? \Yhat is 
religious about facing the existential facts? And even expressionism ' s 
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novelty and creativity are not necessarily religious . 1 In shon. styles 
may be considered either as religious or as aesthetici but the question 
is, how is the religious to be distinguished from the aesthe;ic? And 
Illlich seems to 9ive no explicit criterion for such dlstlnction. or the 
distinctions which he does make at'e too vague or imprecise . 
Tillich' s problem is not in his refusal to isolate art and religion, 
but m hls !allure to produce distinguishing character!sllcs so that art 
and rel:glon can be seen as separate . The differences which he makes 
between art and religion would have to be intelligible to be sig:nficant, 
and they do not seem to be . 
On one hand. it would appear that what tillich is doing amounts 
practically to the denial of leQ!tlmate existence to everything except 
the reUgious . Yet he is most concerned that phllosophy, art, science I 
and other cultural manifestations will have duo place . 2 T11Uch' s 
difhculty in discussing art and religJon arises out of the obscurJty of 
his view on the relation between God and the world . If one Is 
comparable to the other, 3 and tf he has difficulty with one, he 1s bound 
to have difficulty with the other . The baste problem ts a general 
obscurity bet\•;eon God on<i the world I religion and culture, theology 
and philosophy, reliq!on and art . 
1vtde supra, pp . 197- 204 . 
3vtde supra, pp . 154-IS S. 
Zviae supra, pp . 150-151. 
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ReliQlOn thcs doe a seem to abaorb art !n:o !tself, net 1n the sense 
o! a nMTO'N rellqiosity, but in the sense of on all-er.compassmg some -
thin;, whose wtlu.ato intelHglbUlty Is extre~r.ely dlfllcult (Ji not 
tmposatblcl to detcrmme . His attack on rellQlon 1s always upon ~ts 
trod1Uona1 and institutional forms, nover on roUQion per se . He 
rejects lr~dlttonal relig ion's stereotypes and all-encompassing 
abeorptton of culture, and yet he seems to roqulre absorption by his 
own type of rollglon . 
As tho !ndlvtdual (any Individual form) Is Insecure and always 
stands ln dar.Qer o: ~mq swaucr .... ed 1.:p !n tho abyss, and 41S tt:.e world 
Is ~.ardly dtsttr.gUJshable fro"' God, so an Is In dan;er of topphng Into 
the obyss and of losing its disUnettor.. Thtte 11 a eonf:.a1on o! 
lndtvtduallty, personality, and the ur.tfylng order of the ~nlverse . 
This Involves a loss of privacy and ultlmotoly of Individual d lgr.lty . 
Roberta • perplexity Is apropos of the problem at hand . 
l have always been mystified as to how he cowd be 
so flexible, concrete, vital, and '"close to home" 
on the one hand, and so schematic I abstract, 
abstruse 1 and remote on the other. tho stru(Jgle 
between these hvo tendencies runs th:ouohout his 
~-rltl:tgs, and the schematic as.,ect 11, so far os 
I em concerned. both an aaaet 4.."\d a Uat:llt~. It 
IS an asset wherever 1t 11 usod analyt!cally ar.d 
OrQ'a.nlz.atlonally, that Is, where 1: 1s u.Md to clarify 
concepts and to show thetr lnterrelatedneaa. But 1t 
becomes a llability at the polnt where ox1stenttal 
problems, after being htoh-U;hted, are awauo-... ·ed 
Into an abyss . Somehow Tllhch, like God, manages 
to engulf d!stineUons without blurrinq thorr.. He 
fully realizes (again, no doubt, Hkc Godl that such 
problems are met, in so fer as they· ever are, by 
Uvinq t'&ther than by constructing systems . But it 
is a weird experience, which I have undorgone many 
tlmes, to have problems answered with great 
sensitivity and patience, by beln9 brought Into 
connection with some relevant segment of the system, 
only to discover later that I do not happen to be the 
man who carr!es this system around in his head .1 
11. The DiVIne Abyss anc! Artistic Creativity 
Two further problems w!U be only brlofly noted . T!l!lch would 
find many antaoonists because of his treatment of the abyss in God . 
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The religious problem of reposing evU in God cannot be d1scussed, but 
the correlated problem o: elements entering into artistic creation must 
bo mentioned . Since the creativity of the individual anist rests upon 
the dlviM abyH as a form ereator- dastroyer. ar1 itself tends to .. ard 
an irr~tior.a.lism or an anti- formalism . 
Tillich ' s appreciation ior primitive art \'o'lth its apparent 
aberrations ..... ould tend to be either o product of his rcli9ious emphasis 
on the abyss, the source of his concept of the abyss, or produced by 
some factor in his experience which also produced the doctrine of the 
abyss . At any rate, :nuch of the art which Is appreciated by Tllllch 
might appear very bizarre to numerous appreciators because or lts 
extreme emphasis upon the nonobJective, the realistically distorted, 
1 David E. Robens, •ruuch's Doctrine of Man," op . cit., 
p . 130 . 
the de monte and grotesque, the somber . 1 C~rtainly to say that such 
art provides insight into ultimate reality is to conceive of ultimate 
reality (God) In an e~-rraordinary (though Interesting) fashion . 
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This Is not to deny a place to the type of ort appreciated by 
TUltch; nevertheless, one may well wonder if his emphasis on these 
phases of art is not a revelation or a pessimistic view of reallty, which 
needs to be attenuated by a greeter incH nation toward optimism. lt is 
also to be acknowledged that Tilltch offers some cautions In this very 
area . 2 
111 . UlUmatc Aesthetic Categories 
Tillich ' s view of the universe [Cnds to be the deve lopment of a 
monism which must be aosthotlcally experienced tn order to be appreciated, 
and hls loc:::ation of beauty in ultimate being serves to reinforce this 
suggestion. One might further question whether or not Tilllch gives 
sufficient attention to morality and moral categories? This Is said in 
full awarEmess of his incisivo social and political awareness . Doesn't 
Tillich's system tend to be an ultimate aesthetic whole which requires 
and makes possible ccsthetlc appreciation with suspension of the moral 
behef-dlsbellef framework? 
Could it be that Tillich's acceptance of the dark side of the 
divine ls reflected both in morality and mart with the result beinq 
1VIde suora, pp . 181-188, 199-201. 2Vide supra, pp. i99- 201. 
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that Tll!tch can look upOn both grotescp.:e art and a 9"0tU<;'JO and 
d!storted wocld wit.it aesthetic dehght or opprecta~lon o~C without t:te 
norma available for red!rectlng the natural course of th1n9s tO" ... • arC 
~reotor production and conservatlor. ot tho good? 
It Is d!Hlcul t to evaluate Tllllch at this point because he does 
not have onou9h to say in thJ.s area . But once a;aJn, 1t seems that 
horo ts a trend In his thinking which could produce so:r.c undesirable 
results . 
4 . tvaluataon o! V.61!t41.n 
1. ~1a.rltat:t's ::>tchotomi~s 
Maritam's position is much mote pree&So thar: TUUch's, so :t 
docs not err In tha dJiection o! amblq-Jity, or lr, ol>sctamQ the line 
between art and reliq1on . In. fact, lt seems that where M<ttttaln's 
problom lles 1s In tho dichotomy which he Introduces between the 
lower and higher, the physical and the sptrltual, tho natural and tho 
supernatural, art and reli9ion .1 !hat la, Marltatn is 1n cianqer of 
lntrodueinQ a bifurcation of realtty into tv.·o dtst !'lcl spheres wlthout 
the poulblllty of reintroduclr.g a ::-.eons ot putting the::J ::.ac< :09etl:er 
agatn . And here Ma!'.:.ta.:...."\ vacillates, wtth a deftnlte e:.ph.asis upo~ 
tho superJortty of the spt.ntual but wnh a concern tha:: the materlol be 
permeated by the sp!.rit>Jal . One th!ng ht'" never doos is to confuse the 
!VIde supra, pp . 332-335 . 
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religious (whether contemplatfon or worship} with art. 
Contemplation is distinguished from art in that it receives special 
supernatural assistance; it proceeds by means of infused love, for the 
sake of love, and in relation to the divine object, which 1$ love . 
Poetry is the peak of natural human effort, and it has many things in 
commor. wlth infused contomplationi however, Maritain never has 
difficulty In distinguishing the one from the othor . 
The dichotomy between art and Infused contemplation ls to be seen 
especially in Maritain's distinction between canontzablo and uncanon-
izable s ainthood . 1 One wonders whether such a distinction would have 
been necessary lf Maru:a.tn did not have in his system such a real 
distance between the natural and the supernatural that it could never be 
really spanned . it is true that Maritain may be qrdntinq some special 
re1191ous dispensation ~o the .nrtist in order to grant him any sainthood 
at all, but he stU! fails to bridge the 94P created by his basic dichotomy . 
II . External Standards of Art 
Maritain •s utter devotion to a temporal relig!OUS orqanizatfon 
makes POSSible the subjection of art to some absolutely inflexible 
external criticism. Granted that Maritain does not have this intention 
in mmd, he does subject everything he thinks to the arbitration of the 
hierarchy of the Church . He even suggests that there are some things 
1vidG supra, pp . 337-338 . 
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which he might not consider as seriously improper for assistance in 
worship, but if the Church rejects such, with oll the CanQer of error 
and heresy~ who is he to pit hjs small wisdom up against the larqor 
wisdom of the Church of God, which has withstood the pressures and 
attacks of the ages?l 
No.,.,. whUe no individual has 4-ll wisdom, and while an organi-
zation with the trad1t10n and ins !ght of the Cathollc Church should 
have a vision far surpassing anything ·...-htch any ;:>erson could achieve, 
one is still concerned lest this is finolly a submission of art to an 
exter nal authority , rel1g1on. Tillich's Protestant principle ::'lakes 
possible the avoidance of the final authority o: any religious organi-
zation . 
Not only does Maritaln subject art to religion and religious 
crlterto, he also regards art ns indirectly subordinate to morality. 2 
Art ultimately becomes an instrument of men, but morallty is concerned 
with tho basic good of man . Thus art ls subordinated to the basic 
good of man . Granted that Maritain takes an extremely tolerant view 
toward art and various corrupt factors (from hts moral viewpoint) whtch 
may be present in it, does not this lay art open to the possibility of 
external crit1ctsm? And if the standards of art do no1 rise fro:-r. the 
works of art themselves and from therr own significance, then must 
lv1de supra 1 p . 343 . 2V!de supra, pp . 324- 332 . 
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not ert lose to so~e extent the very sel!-eufftciency and dlstn:erested-
neas whtch Maritain reqwres of satisfactory art? Art then becomes 
at least wually practical and subserv1on: to proetleal ends, namely 
tM pror.)otton or the yood of man . 
Thus, although Marltain Initially Introduces a dichotomy between 
ut end roUQlon, morality, and contomplatlon, ho in some sense 
evaluates art on the basts of the latter ond does not contlnue to permit 
art the solf- sufllclency which 11 previously aPPO<lted to have •1 
Ill. Innocence and Salvation 
Thts d1Seussio~ !':'!ay !::le lntle core th.an an elaborahon of the 
prec tdlng problematic a:ea, and yet sometlunq new must be added . 
If the artist's work 1s begun In a erea!lw fire whleh renders the moral 
qu4IUles of the work neutral, may not Marlteln be putltng some kind 
of moral or religious sanction upon the work oC the artist? I s thoro 
really such a hushed awe and rovcrenco about his creative activity? 
If or.e ~etually ex~mines the creative !napiratlon of many artists, does 
tt roally seem to t;row out of such a parU'sod e:-:perJenco? It would 
appear that Marnain may be confusinq the crcauve innocence of t!':.e 
dlv1no creator wtth :he creativity of the poet, which rnay 1n reality no: 
Oe so lnnocent in 1ts creative sources. Could 1t ba that MarttlJltl !S 
carrytnq the analoqy between God as creator of the world and ::>an as 
1VIdc supra, pp . 324- 332 . 
388 
creator of ~ work of art too fer? Maritain has insisted that analogies 
must be watched, but has he watched this one with sufficJent care?1 
May it not even be that Maritatn has exchanged the Muse for God and 
his inspiration? Hausman concludes his discussion of creativity in 
Maritain's thought by saying: "Although Maritain rejects Plato's Muse 
ln order to explain creat1v1ty in terms of the human mind~ ultimate ly, he 
replaces the Muse with God . " 2 
Moreover, certain works of art may be effective ln preparing one 
for rs Ug1ous experience, but is it not 9ratuitous to insist that art, as 
such, actually does this? This ts not to deny the religious significance 
of much art, but it is to question the necessity of every work's leading 
to religion . 
S . Conclusion 
The fact that certain problematic areas have boon indicated is 
no diScredit to the basic valuG of their systems . Greater concern for 
the empirical may be necessary, and followers of Tllllch may need to 
enunciate the relation between art and religion more clearly . Thoy v.•Hl 
need to investigate the (!byss in God and its rclauon to artishc creation . 
They will need to specify the relation between aesthetic and moral 
categories . On the other hand, those who endeavor to m~ke Marit(lin's 
POSition somewhat more adequate will need to investigate the relation 
1vtde supra, pp . 336-337. 2 Hausman, loc. cit . , p . 219 . 
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between the natural and the supernaturaL His notion of artistic 
innocence needs clarification or modification . And the perspectival 
notion of trut:'l in art needs amplification. 
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However. the work of Maritain anci TUUch on an and rel!gion is 
a rea1 contrjbutlon to the solution of a recurnng problem. Both Maritain 
and THUch have admirable aesthetic sensitivity . Both have re ligious 
experience which is vital and ciynamic . T.11e result of tho thought of 
men who have both aesthetic and religious appreciation ls .... ·orthy of 
one's deepest consideration. The assistance of these men to others •.vho 
are qroplnQ for answers i s profound as a cursory 9lance at the current 
literature In art and re ligion will Indicate . Both Marltaln and Tlllich 
must be commended for the excellent job which they have done in 
br!nQing an and tel!gion togethet into some ciegroe of system .... ·nhout 
simply setting them together or rlqidly imposing a clrcumscrtptive unity 
upon them . 
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ABSTRACT 
Tho purpose of th!s dissertation ts to tnvest!Qate the rclattonshtp 
botween on and religion as found In the thouoht of Jacques Mari taln and 
Paul T!lllch In order to throw light upon tho problems of the emergence 
o( tensions and conflic\s when art and reH91on confront each other . 
Ttlltch and Maritain are cons1dered sopa.ratoly tn the first n .. ·o 
pans; tn the last pan they are brought t¢9ether fe< comparison and 
evAluation. TUllch•s pos~tlon 1s eonsiderod in relation to his notion of 
the aymbol s1nce it is this notion which per:oatos the whole of his 
tllouohl Md provides th<! key to h1s e11tlro syatom. Roll<;lon provides the 
most 81Qnt!icGnt meaning of, and typos of, aymboltsm; art ls one o: the 
most lllumlnatlng of ell cultural creations In providing Insights Into 
ultimate reality . Marltain's concept of art Is related especially to his 
consideration of mfusod contemplation although other facets of mllgton 
Me meluded. Infused contemplation and art arc alike tn their mode of 
knQINiodfle (cOn."latural1ty) ~ superlor1ty, self-.su!flclcr.ey. ar:C. operatton 
by love. 
It Is discovered that -:tlllch reqards all c ultural mantfesta,lo~s as 
having a depth dlrr.enslon, i .e .• they are religiously stgntflcant . 
Roltglon does not Inhabit some world whl<:h Is separate !rom the 
Jf" ..1. 
ordinary secular world, ~!though men frequently distinguish between the 
sacred ond the secular because of human inability to apprehend the 
presence of ultimate reality . Art and religion are not separate in terms 
of the concrete object, but they dUrer m the point of view taken toward 
the obJect and In that vJhlch Is revealed by 11 . This means that art 
objects have a religious dimension and that any attempt to deny this 
dimension can only lead to an ultimate in&bility to apprehend the full 
meanln9 of the obJect . 
Marlta>n Is very careful to distinguish between art and rellglon . 
In fact. there is a dichotomy runnfnq throughout MarttaJn's world 
between the natural and tho supernatural. Art is regarded as the flower 
and perfection of tho accomplishments of tho natural world; infused 
contemplation is the highest attainable supernatural experience and 
knowledQe by man in via (still on the way toward u!Umate beatitude) . 
A summary of tho simUarities and contrasts betv-;een Maritain and 
Tillich will show the main areas 1n which each one moves . (1) In 
contrast to the attitudes of many re ligious thinkers 1 MarJtain and Tillich 
both have a very positive attitude toward art . Whereas Maritain accepts 
in art what ha would clearly condemn ln 9eneral human conduct. 
TilUch' s acceptance of human action appears to be mora lenient . 
(Z) Both realize the tension between art and rel!Qion . Art may tond to 
usurp the place of reliqion in its movement toward ultimacy I and certaln 
religious attitudes and emphases may ctrcumscrl.be artistic creativity . 
I 
I 
(3) Beauty is the primary quallty of art, and beauty Is a qual!ty or 
attribute of God or ulUmate reality . But Maritain is more concerned 
with morolity than Tillich . Aesthetic categories are somewhat mere 
pronounced in TU!ich than In Maritain . (4) Human creativity is closely 
related to divine creativity either as an imitation or continuation of 
divine creativity or as springing from the abysmal character of God . 
(S.} Creativity end the unconscious are inextricably united . Maritain's 
analysis of human creation ts more detailed . He disUngufshes bet~~locn 
the preconscious and the unconscious . Tillich ' s basic distinctlon is 
between the htdiv1dual and the collective unconscious . He puts the 
source of human crcauvtty in the dynomic aspect (abyss) of ultimate 
reality . Maritain 91ves no basis for the possibility of process in God . 
TilUch tends toward the suggestion that thero is an Irrational e lement 
in art; Maritain insists always that there is nothmg irrational (thouqh 
the artist's weakness may admit such entrance into the work} about art 
or artistic creation . (6) Both Tllllch and Ma.ritain insist on the autonomy 
of art and religion . For both this is a llmited autonomy as {ar as art is 
concerned . (7) Both T!lllch and Maritain insist on Insight as having 
the primacy over tt:~chnique or pleasure , but what is experienced in 
relation to the religious dHfers for each . For Maritaln the highest 
point of art1st1c insight is natural and cut off from the supernatural 
(though art provides Insight Into an attribute of God) . For Tlll!ch ort 
provides ins1ghts into ultimate reality Itself. 
(8) T!lllch and Marltain differ on whether art is expression or 
communication, thouQh M&ritainJ after insisting that art is basically 
expressive to the creator, proceeds to include communication as a 
superabundance and as essential to the appreciator . (91 Tllllch and 
Maritain differ on the nature of rellgion and on the SIQniftcance of 
rellqious an. Reliqtous crt must depend upon onhodox doctrine and 
llturglcai usage, for Maritain . Since he does not have a body of 
doctrine in the same m&nnor as Maritain, and since he is not nearly so 
concerned about the "salvaUon of the lost," rtllich is not interested in 
any rellglous criterion other than the Protestant principle . (101 Tllilch 
tends toward a relatively open and Marltatn toward a relatively closed 
system . Tillich's approach is artistic and provocative . Mar1tain's 
approach is methodical and systematic . 
Evaluation of Maritaln and Tllllch proceeds in the duectlon of 
pointing toward trends in their thinking rather than in an attempt at full 
formal refutation . 
One broad criticism may be made of both men: neither Marltaln 
nor T!!Hch ts as concerned with empirical d~to as the modern mtnd 
generally expects . One cannot question their real and intense sensitivity 
to sensuous and oasthotic experiences, but oft-en their analyses do not 
explicitly util!zo those in the construction of tho1r systems . 
The major criticism of Tllllch is that his pas!tlon tends toward 
an absorption of all thinos Into ultimate reality# 4nd ort is not spared 
1n this . 'i'he baslc problorn ls the reconcihaUon o! hi& concern for the 
concrete and the tendency toward its absorption tn a vacuous ab-
slraction . He tends lO obliterate the distinction between art anci rellqlon. 
ln addition, tho rolationshlp ber,.een the dtvlne abyss and 
croauvSty Is problomattc 1n that the e~phasts 1n art ts upon the 
oretesque, aberrant, distorted, ond somber. The aapect of the dlvlr.c 
which Is encountered In such art Is subject to considerable c!lsp.:ta:ton . 
Finally, Tllllch tends to place such emphasis upon tho aosthetic as an 
ultlmoto category of reality that mony may well wondor If morality Is 
not bein9 given duo consideration. Possibly T11Uch 1R view may en-
courage aesthetic delight not only In the presence of art obJects but also 
In relot!on to the world tn such manner as to make moral valuation 
unnecessary . 'l'hu could cenatnly have ra:oniftcauons for rellg1on . 
Marltain's thoory avoids this problem Initially by the ma.1nng of 
ample distinctions and dichotomies, but one wondors 1f there is 
sufficient consideration given to the fus1ng of tho various pans . This 
dichoto:ny is clearly present in his theory of canonical and unca:1o!lical 
sainthood . Tha artist mioht be a samt of L"te u.ncanonlz.able variety. 
Moreover, Maritain tende to provide an with the e:..."'t@cmal standards of 
morallty and the Church (or rell910nl . Finally, Marltaln appeats to put 
some degree of rol1Q1oue sanction upon tho work o{ an in insisting that 
tho creative flres of arUetle creation purify thl" work of art . His 
onaloqy between artlalle <>nd cllvlnc creation moy h&\'9 been carried too 
far a:. litis po!nt. for tl".:ro Is much reason to quesUon the innocence of 
the poet, whereas wore he actuAlly God or like God tus work would be 
germtnally and necessarily pure . 
Both Marttaln and Til Itch must be highly commended lor their 
b<aadth of understanding and the penetration of tholr tnslvhts . l'hey are 
both aesthetically senutlve and rellg:ously olive. 
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